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STATE ECONOMIC PLANNING IN A CAPITALIST SOCIETY: 
The Political Sociology of Economic Policy in Britain, 1940-72 
- Frank Hoover Longstreth 
This thesis investigates the relationship between businesG and the 
state in modern Britain by focussing in particular on the develop-
ment and attempted institution of forms of economic planning and 
more generally on the formulation and implementation of economic 
policies. In this effort it looks at changes in forms of representa-
tion, modes of procedure and patterns of state intervention in the 
economy. It then attempts to characterise various shifts along all 
three axes in terms of an oscillation between pluralism/liberalism 
and corporatism/interventionism. A central theme is that the latter 
programme has been relatively weak and poorly instituted in post-war 
Bri tain, and most of the empirical detail is constructed around an 
explanation of this phenomenon. The core of the argument here is that, 
while relations between dominant and subordinate interests can be seen 
as primary in the explanation of the politics of economic policy, rela-
tions between business sectors are also an important and necessary part 
of that explanation. More specifically, the thesis attempps to document 
the argument that relations between the industrial and financial sec-
tors have been marked by various lines of conflict, both actual and 
potential, and that the latter have been structured by a particular 
pattern of national economic developnent which has placed financial 
interests in a position of economic and political dominance. As such 
the introductory chapters trace out the historic roots of that dom-
inance and instances of intra-business conflict in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. The main bulk of the thesis attempts to sub-
stantiate a case for'their continued relevance in the period since 
World War Two, focussing in greatest detail on the attempts at economic 
planning and other forms of state intervention under Labour and Con-
servative governments in the 1960s and 1970s. The weakness of the 
corporatist/interventionist programme is then attributed to various 
insti tutional, structural and political-economic features of the 
re lations between the state, finance, industry and organized labour. 
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CHAPI'ER ONE 
Introduction - Theoretical Framework 
This dissertation addresses two principal issues. Firstly, 
it offers a political-sociological account for specifically the rise 
and subsequent career of interest in and attempts at some form of 
national economic planning and more generally the formation and imple-
mentation of economic and industrial policy in postwar Britain. Sec-
ondly, much of this account concerns the relationship between dominant 
socio-economic interests and the modern state in a capitalist society. 
Neither of these problems could be adequately treated without also 
considering the role of subordinate interests, most obviously organized 
labour. However, in_part in order to focus the limited attention and 
resources of the author and in part because recent work has already 
dealt with the role of labour in considerable depth (see among others 
Panitch, 1976, and Crouch, 1977), the latter will constitute only a 
secondary theme in the present work. 
Originally the project of this dissertation was inspired by a 
reading of what is now commonly accepted as a minor modern classic, 
Andrew Shonfield's Modern Capitalism (1969). Shonfield's work, first 
p.lblished in 1965 at the height of the long postwar boom, was in essence 
an explanation of what had gone right for the main capitalist political 
economies, especially the European powers, in the years since the Sec-
ond World War. His account of this success and future pros~cts was 
fundamentally optimistic, depicting the underlying conditions as "more 
favourable than at any time in the history of ca pi talism (p. 6))" and 
conceiving no necessary reason why the boom-slump "patterns of the past" 
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should reassert themselves. As an explanation he stressed three main 
economic factors: steadier growth, rapid gains in productivity and a 
more equal distribution of income. However, it was particularly 
the acceleration in technological innovation and the commitment to 
full employment that struck him as distinctive features of the new 
order. Moreover, his appreciation of the development of means of 
conscious regulation and innovation of new kinds of political insti-
tutions and practices more than anything was responsible for his 
Whiggish prognosis. Among these he included the increase of govern-
ment influence and expenditure, the growth of public welfare, the 
taming of the "violence" of the market through government-business 
collaboration, the expectation of and poll tical commi bent to steady 
growth in real incomes and finally the "pursuit of intellectual co-
herence" most obviously manifested in the emergence of long-scale 
national planning of the economy (esp. Ch. 4). In fact it was really 
the political institution of the latter as a means of "controlling 
the boom" that as a British author constituted his primary concern. 
My own research began a year after the postwar system finally 
came tumbling down, that is if one dates the oil crisis of 1973-74 
a.s the final blow to an already teetering edifice. As suCh the pres-
ent work is l1lUoh more an explanation of what has gone wrong , although 
unlike Shonfield I will be exclusively concerned with one of the 
weaker of the major capitalist nations. It is no less than a terrible 
irony that all of the political institutions and practices identified 
b.Y Shonfield above as the basis for his favourable view of the pros-
pects for democratic capitalism have been brought into question if 
not disrepute in the last decade or so. Although I too am primarily 
interested in political institutions and practices, the following 
account will again unlike Shonfield be essentially pessimistic in 
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tone both as regards the past and, although I will refrain from 
~lredictions, the future. It is not my intention in this introductory 
.::haf.tE'r to rehearse the recent debates on the nature and role of the 
state in modern capitalism, the representation and influence of the 
major sccio-economic interests and similar issues usually associated 
with the topic of corporatism. This has been done well and often 
enough elsewhere, although I will return to these issues in the con-
elusion at least as regards the implications of the analysis presented 
here. For the moment I will simply introduce some of the concepts 
that will be employed in later chapters as well as the analytic 
framework that has served as a heuristic guide to selecting and organ-
izing the rather large bulk of material contained in subsequent chapters. 
The concept of organized ca~ism, although first employed 
by Hilferding as early as 1915, has hardly been developed since that 
time. This is in part because of its association with Hilferding's 
evolutionary and deterministic model of capitalist development but 
more particularly because of his polemical use of the concept as a 
justification for social democratic practice in Germany during the 
period of the Weimar Republic. Wha.t is immediately notable is the 
similarity between the analyses of Hilferding and Shonfield, despite 
the gap of half a century between the publication of the two works, 
Finanzkapital and Modern Capitalism. Both authors depicted a stabil-
ization of capitalist production, i.e. the taming of financial and 
economic crises, and linked this to specific organizational features 
of a "modern .. political economy. However, the sense in which I will 
attempt to develop a model of organized capitalism (or its absence) 
follows the usage of the term in a recent collection of articles 
edited by H.A. Winkler (1974).in that it eschews any claim that the 
tendencies towards crisis have been finally eliminated. Here it refers 
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to a number of processes appearing most explicitly in Germany but 
also with considerable variation in other major capitalist nations 
in the period 1870-1914, which mark out a break from the liberal or 
competitive capitalism of the 19th century. Following Kocka (in ibid.) 
I will designate the main aspects of this period as follows: 1. on 
the basis of rapid but unbalanced economic growth and the development 
of new productive forces, the emergence of the modern corporation, 
syndicates, trusts, cartels and other forms of suppressing "free 
competition" and the interlacing of industrial and banking capital 
in a form which Hilferding te lJIled "finance capital;" 2. the emerging 
separation of ownership and control functions, including here the 
development of "scientific management," new forms of specialization 
and increased bureaucratization; 3. related changes in social structure, 
including the growth of new managerial and white collar strata, especi-
ally in the sectors of commerce, finance and services; 4. the devel-
opment of organized class conflict through both extensive unionization 
and the largely responsive growth of employers' associations; 5. the 
elaboration of new and more active forms of state intervention in 
the economy; 6. imperialistic expansion and the intensification of 
international rivalries; 7. developments in the political sphere, 
including new styles of administration and the growth of the mass 
party and 8. an associated ideological shift with a new emphasis on 
science, organization, efficiency and planning. 
The utility of this approach lies in a particular and in some 
senses negative or counter-factual application to different national 
and historical contexts. For, as I will explain more fully in the 
next chapter, it is precisely the absence of the characteristics 
of organized capitalism outlined above (at least as regards this in-
itial period and in some cases for much longer) that helps to explain 
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the particular pattern of British economic and political development. 
When this model of organized capitalism is married to notions of the 
features of early and late development, derived mainly from the brief 
but influential work of Gerschenkron (1962), one has the beginnings 
of a he~ristic for the comparative historical study of the political 
economy of modern capitalism. However, it should be re-emphasized 
that this is not an evolutionary or deterministic account of political 
events and processes. The relationships, institutions and structures 
established in the late Victorian and Edwardian periods did not fix the 
contours of the British political landscape for all time. It is only 
in so far as one can establish the conditions for their reproduction 
that a case can be made for their persistent influence,an~ conversely, 
any transformation in those conditions should point to significant 
changes in political relations and the opportunity for pursuing diffe~ 
ent political-economic strategies. 
The above considerations relate primarily to the background and 
point of departure for the present study. As such these issues will 
enter into the argument specifically in the next chapter where I will 
consider the relations between industry and finance, the institutional 
development of both and their relation to the state and the pattern of 
economic policy. More explicitly the apprQach adopted here has been 
informed by a critical appreciation of recent debates in political 
sociology in reference to democratic capitalist societies on the form 
and significance of interest representation (especially concerning the 
rise of neo-corporatism), Marxist explanations of the nature of bourgeois 
dominance, the pattern of state-economy relations and more specifically 
the characteristics of state intervention and finally on various features 
of the modern state itself, in partiCUlar its institutional structure, 
modes of access and influence including but not limited to patterns of 
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interest representation and the various rules or modes 01 procedure 
that guide decision-making with specilic reference to economic and 
industrial policy. Wnile this dissertation is primarily descriptive, 
one issue that is pertinent to these debates will feature throughout 
the follow1ng pages, namely the relation between the industrial and 
financial sectors in Britain. The view that the "separation" of industry 
and finance retains a last1ng significance, as well as that tne pattern 
of relations between the two within the "dominant bloc" has remained 
one in which financial capital is the pre-eminent partner, obviously 
deriv~s from Poulantzas's arguments concerning the two aspects of 
capitalist hegemony, i.e. first,the constitution of a dominant power 
block and, second, the presentation of ~Ie interests of that bloc as 
those of the nation as a whole (Poulantzas, 1973, esp. pp. 77-98). 
However, these dual tasks should not be taken in any sense as auto-
matically or spontaneously fulfilled. Both the constitution of a 
dominant bloc and the presentation of its policies as the national 
interest occur on the contested terrain of the state, and as such both 
are problematic. Even a fair degree of success in this area, the 
construction of a "hegemonic project',' by no means guarantees that the 
policies pursued are the "right" ones in terms of the reproduction of 
a capitalist social and economic order, a point to which I will return 
below. Thus, the use of this terminology does not mean that I have 
taken on the entire baggage of Poulantzas's epistemological and theoret-
ical position. If I use the term "fractions" ra thf?r than the more con-
ventional elites, it is because this evokes the sectoral conflicts 
and alliances which I see as essential to understanding tne political 
practices of the dominant class and the formation of econoreic and in-
dustrial policy. 
The issues delineated above, namely the cleavages and alliances 
within the dominant class and tneir relationship to both the demands 
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and pressures from subordinate groups and the economic and industrial 
policies actually implemented through the political process, will con-
stitute the main substantive tnemes of subsequent chapters. Although 
this dissertation is an overwhelmingly empirical worK, I will draw here 
certain other distinctions whiCh, while remaining mainly in the background 
of the discussion, have guided the presentation of much of the material 
and which will be referred to explicitly in later chapters as regards 
the development 0:1' particular policy areas. On this basis I will briefly 
distinguish three dimensions of the analysis WhiCh, while generally 
treated as JRrt 01' the same historical process, can be sesn as analytically 
distinct, namely representational inputs, modes of procedure for policy-
formation and types of state intervention or economic policy outputs, and 
. 
through this presentation introduce some of the subsidiary themes 01' this 
thesis._ 
As regards the first dimension of this framework, namely the 
political representation of socio-economic interests, this issue is 
inevitably tied up with the revival of corporatist or more exactly 
neo-corporatist approaches of the 1970s. Since the publication of 
articles by Schmitter (1974) and Pahl and Winkler (1974) the literature 
on this subject has mushroomed, and the concept of corporatism has 
become increasingly diffuse. Although Schmitter offered a relatively 
contained operational definition of corporatism as a system of function-
al interst representation and regulation, Pahl and Winkler and later 
.... _ ... _._-_.- .. ---
Winkler (1976) introduced a different meaning into a politically 
receptive British audience, namely corporatism as a system of state 
control over the private sector. Subsequently, the term has also 
::ee:: :!.;.plied to pa·t.ron-dient relationships l::w:!t.ween state agencies 
and the recipients of their services, especially in the fields of 
social policy and public welfare (Cawson, 1978, and Offe, 1981). 
In the following chapters I will use the term corporatism and 
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related concepts in the narrower sense discussed above, that is, 
referring to functional forms of interest representation and regu-
lation of major socio-economic groups. In the British case I would 
~ree with Jessop (1979) that corporatist forms of representation 
have a,lways been subordinated to the parliamentary system, that the 
typical articulation has been one of "tripartism" where the latter 
has had a rather narrow issue focus, mainly within the realm of 
what is known in German as ~ungspolitik and Konjunkturpolitik, 
that is policies of economic stabilization. Thus, the impetus for 
the institution of functional forms of interest representation has 
typically been such concerns as economic restructuring, planning, 
labour training and industrial conciliation and incomes policy. Even 
in the 19305 radical advocates of corporatist representation saw it 
as subordinate to parliamentary rule. In terms of this thesis I 
will be concerned primarily with sub-species of corporatism as they 
apply to relations between business and government. In a descriptive 
sense I will attempt to substantiate a specific periodization of func-
tional interest representation for the British case in which the main 
differentiating factors inclUde the degree and mode of formalization 
or institutionalization, the use and extent of sanctions, whether the 
latter have a statutory basis or rely on some form of "moral suasion," 
and the degree of compulsory as against voluntary memberShip. 
The second axis of differentiation in this work is the mode and 
pxtent of state intervention. Of course, even the use of the term 
state intervention presumes an initial separation between the state 
and the economy. The logical derivation of this separation has been 
a focus of the German Staatsableitung approach (see Holloway and Picc-
lotto, 1978). For my own purposes I will simply assume that the 
state in advanced capitalism is fundamentally divorced from the 
accumulation process. Alternatively, in the terms employed by Lind-
blom (1977), there exists an area of market controls separate from 
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1.nd impinging upon polyarchal controls. Thus, while recognizing that 
even laissez-faire implies a specific relationship between the state 
and the economy of an initially active sort (Polanyi, 1957), I will 
use the term state intervention to apply to any attempt to modify or 
su bvert the "free play" of market fo rces. Qui te obviously many such 
efforts, as in the area of Ordungspolitik mentioned above, are asso-
ciated with the development of forms of functional interest represen-
tation, especially since such interests are typically obliged to admin-
ister those policies at least in part. The role of incomes policy is 
usually seen as central in this relationship, and, although this will 
constitute one theme of the present work, much of my concern will be 
with economic and industrial policy in the sense of industrial restruc-
turing and other forms of limiting or modifying competitive market 
relations. The different factors included in the periodization of 
state intervention are whether it is ad hoc and responsive to specific 
crises or generalized and initiatory, the extent of compulsion and 
the use of sanctions/statutory controls as against fiscal incentives, 
subsidies or other informal instruments and the degree to which such 
policies are co-ordinated by a central political authority or concerted 
through corporative agencies, autonomous associations, non-public 
institutions or private firms. However, my focus will be somewhat 
wider in that I will treat these specific policy areas in the context 
of and in terms of their articulation with the macro-economic frame-
work that various governments have employed. The relation and 
tension between such Ordungspolitische issues and macro-economic 
policies as well as the implications and effects of both of the above 
on the forms of interest articulation and the converse consequences of 
the latter thus constitute other significant aspects of this dimension. 
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As this dissertation is primarily about attempts (however restricted) 
at economic planning, I will refer to the shift away from liberal con-
ceptions of.the role of the state in the economy, or in Winkler's terms 
the move from facilitative to supportive or directive activity. 
However, contra Winkler (~976) a central theme will be the limits, 
both political and economic, on tne state as a directive or planning 
agency. 
The final dimension informing the present analysis is based on 
Offe's (1975) distinction between different sets of decision-making 
roles or modes of procedure within the state administJ:ation itself as 
applied to its economic activities and related polici~s. He proposes 
three "logics" of policy-making: bureaucracy, p.lrposive action and 
consensus, which correspond to different modes of action. The bur-
eaucratic mode of operation follows from Weber's ideal type and cor-
responds to the formal activities of facilitation and support outlined 
above in the sense that these involve the application of the typical 
resources of the state, law, money and administration, within a 
formal and universal framework. Bureaucracy in this sense is pri-
marily oriented towards inputs, legal and political directives from 
above, that is the application of general rules and specific political 
commands, which is both its main advantage and greatest limitation. 
The institution of a purposive-rational or technocratic mode of 
procedure involves a shift towards output, that is, "an activity 
is 'adequate' not if it conforms to certain established rules and pro-
cedures, but mainly if it leads to certain results (Offe, 1975, p. 14)." 
In effect this amounts to the state administration adopting the practices 
of modern corporate planning but with a major drawback. For a bus-
iness firm the central goals, e.g. the price or quantity of a certain 
commodity. can in a formal sense be derived from the market relations 
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in which the firm is imbedded. No such automatic mechanism exists 
to inform the economic operations of the state. Purposive ration-
ality must presum~ its ends in order to be effective; it is a purely 
instrumental strategy. In a political system those ends are inevit-
ably determined politicalll whatever recourse is made to technocratic 
problem-definition. Having said that the adoption of supportive and 
di~ctive activities would seem to at least encourage the attempt at 
d~veloping technocratic modes of procedure, since relying on input-
oriented bureaucratic administration is bound to have negative con-
sequences or inconsistent results from the point of view of actively 
sustaining conditions of accumulation. 
The third mode of operating is to establish forums for consen-
sus-building or the concertation of immediately affected interests. 
In the context of the present discussion this involves the use of 
corporatist or similar agencies as a mode of procedure as well as a 
form of interest representation. The problem here is similar to that 
mentioned above; there is no necessary relationship between decisions 
made by reference to consensus and the wider rationality of the econ-
omic activities undertaken by the state. As with technocratic forms 
of procedure consensus-based decision-making would apparently corres-
pond with the development of supportive and directive roles, especi-
ally in so far as substantive activities affect particular socio-
economic interests. However. none of these different approaches should 
be seen as in any sense functional to a particular stage of develop-
ment of capitalism or a particular type of state activity. Neither 
is the adoption of a specific procedure or mix of several likely to 
be adequate. Indeed, a point to whi'ch I will return is the degree to 
which the institutionalization of different procedures in separate 
departments contributes to the fractionalizing of the state adminis-
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tration itself, i.e. the way in which the adoption of different terms 
of reference as well as the representation of divergent socio-econ-
0Mic interests introduces strain and conflict within the state. 
AS a final point to this section one should note that these 
three dimensions, while analytically distinct, tend to overlap con-
siderably in any concrete historical conjuncture. As such this typol-
)gy (as with much of the previous discussicn) should be seen as 
a set of considerations which have informed what is by and large 
a historical analysis and not as a set of propositions to be tested 
or an analytical shema which will be rigidly adhered to throughout 
this dissertation. The reason for elaborating it at this point is 
to introduce some concepts that will be employed in subsequent chapters 
and to indicate the points where a primarily discursive account inter-
sects with theoretical issues of current debates. In a broader if 
looser sense another theme of the present work is related to these 
considerations, namely the occilation in modern British political 
economy between forms of liberalism and forms of corporatism/inter-
ventionism in the relations between the state and the economy/economic 
interests. By the former term I mean the attempted restriction of 
state activity to facilitative modes, the 
reliance on parliamentary forms of representation and the pre-eminence 
of bureaucratic decsion-making, especially where the latter takes as 
its reference point the subordination of the state to commodity rela-
tions, i.e. doctrines of "fiscal prudence," financial responsibility," 
and "monetary control." By the latter term I am referring to the 
development of supportive and/or directive modes of state intervention, 
corporaUst or tripartite systems of interest representation and their 
articulation with technocratic and/or consensual modes of procedure, 
where the latter is typically allied with a "productivist" orientation, 
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i.e. a concern with productivity, growth and unemployment as 
specific aims of economic and industrial policy. As I will clarify 
in later chapters the relative weights of different economic interests 
and social and political forces will constitute a central focus 
in the explanation of the P91itical condidticns of existence for 
these shifts between corporatist and neo-liberal programmes. 
The various themes outlined above are raised within an argument 
that is essentially historical and tnus presented chronologically. As 
such Chapters Two and Three introduce the case for the significance 
of the particular path of British economic and political development 
and the long-term importance of the sectoral conflicts and alliances 
referred to above. Chapter Two outlines the relationships that defined 
the classic liberal system of the late Victorian period and the challenge 
to that system posed by economic and political developments of the early 
twentieth century. As described by the term "free trade imperialism" 
this system invovled the institution of an "arm' s length" re la tionship 
between the industrial and financial sectors, the persistence of the 
family firm, the de facto alliance between staple exporters and a financial 
sector oriented towards international trade and the political predominance 
of the latter through the explicit commitment to free trade and the 
operaticns of an international monetary system based on the gold standard 
and centred in London. The Tariff Reform cam18ign within the Conservative 
Barty is then described as the first hint of the breakdown of this system, 
and the ensuing conflict is analysed in terms of both its sectoral compo-
si tion and its poli tieal Hmi tations. Chapter Three picks up the same 
themes in a discussion of the inter-war period. After charting the 
attmpted revival 01' the pre-war monetary system, I look at its implications 
in terms of secotal conflict and the emergence of alternative programmes 
within industry and the 4bour movement. In contrast to other inter-
pretations, especially Middlemas (1979), I emphasise the limited 
nature of the coporatist challenge and the restructuring of economic 
and political relationships that occurred in the 19)Os. 
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Chapter Four investigates the rise and fall of the system of 
war-time planning or "supervised seL.-government" of industry. Labour's 
attempts to synthesise this experience in a programme of "democratic 
planning" are then examined along with the reasons for the failure of 
the latter. Chapter Five charts the revival of neo-liberalism in 
the 19)Os in terms of the resurgence of the City as a major political 
force, the renewal of Bank and Treasury control, the restrictions 
placed on demand-management Keynesianism and the decline of direct 
links oetween industry and the state. Having outlined the emergining 
conflicts and problems that acompanied "Conservative liberalism" I 
look in Chapter Six at the origins of the shift towards -indicative 
planning" and "neo-coporatism" in the 1960s, focussing on the key role 
of major industrialists. Chapter Seven discusses Labour's attempt 
to institutionalise this alternative programme of tripartism, growth, 
sectoral intervention and incomes policies. The failure of this pro-
gramme is attributed to the dominant position of the financial sector 
and the increasingly unstable basis for policies of industrial consensus 
gi ven the exposed position ot' the British economy and the grow ing importance 
of a distributional conflict between industry and labour. In Chapter 
Eight I return to some of the structural and institutional themes raised 
at the beginning and look at the predominant post-war trends in the in-
dustrial and financial sectors as well as their inter-relations, highlight-
ing the economic basis for increasing severity of the political conflicts 
of the 1970s. Chapter Nine reviews the attempts on the lBort of the Heath 
government to break out 01 the post-war stalemate in the direction ot" 
liberalism. In Chapter Ten I investigate the revival of the neo-corporatist 
programme under Labour and the rapid undermining of the same through 
the combination of the monetarist conversion of financial markets and 
the inability of the government to overcome the distributional conflict 
that now dominates industrial relations. This analysis sets the stage 
for the final break with the post-war system represented by the 'Ihatcher 
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government by emphasising the extent to which Labour had already retreated 
in a similar direction. In the conclusion I attempt to bring togther the 
main themes of the narrative in explaining the nature of the present 
impasse in British politics. 
To summarize briefly these are the main themes that will 
be pursued in the course of this dissertation: 1. the relations 
within the dominant socio-economic class, in particular between what 
I will designate as the two main "fractions," banking and industrial 
capital; 2. related to the above, the structural and institutional 
features of these two main interest groups, especially as regards 
their relationship with and mode of access to the state and as prem-
ised upon economic relations carried over from early British devel-
opment; 3. changes in the patterns of interest representation and 
modes of procedure within the state system and 4. the relationship 
bft~ee~ state economic intervention and the prccess of capita: accu-
r:rulat i ~, where tr.e latter concerns not merely profitability but the 
brca:!E'r issues of ;>roducti vi ty, competi ti veness a"id economic growth 
as ~fll as features specific to the position of financial markets 
a~d ins~itutions, in particular the roles of sterling, financial 
crises and government borrowing. These various, if not too disparate, 
thfmes will, I hope, be woven together in a reasonably coherent account 
of the rise of and limitations on state economic planning in partic-
ular and more broadly the pattern of governmfnt economic and industrial 
policies in relation to the role and influence of dominant and subordinate 
classes in the modern British context. 
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;h~ Vecadence of British Capitalism, 1870-1914 
what is remarkable in this vast movement [the British railway 
boom of the l840~ is that the great leaders of the financial 
world took no part in it. The mighty loan mongers, on whose 
fiat the fate of kings and empires sometimes depended, seemed 
like men who, witnessing some eccentricity of nature, watch it 
with mixed feelings of animosity and alarm. 
Disraeli, ~dymion, Ch. 58. 
3ritain was cf course the first industrial nation, and by the mid-
1 :;th century British industrial development was admired, feared and 
·-.'lla ted by all countries aspiring to maintain their posi Hon in a 
r: .. ?id ly changing wor 1d • However, Britain' s position as the first 
country to undergo capitalist industrialization imposed a distinct and 
la~gely unique path of development; one which was not so widely imitated 
and which had lasting and in many respects detrimental consequences. 
Thf' chief "peculiarity of the English" was that noted by Disraeli in 
the above passage: industrialization was a piecemeal, unplanned process 
Q~sed largely on the reinvestment of accumulated family fortunes into 
small and highly competitive private businesses. The capital require-
ments of the early period of industrialization were small, the technical 
innovations faitly simple and the process itself spread over a relative-
ly long time-span (Landes, 1970, ch.2). In consequence there was no 
need for the development of centralized credit institutions for the 
funding of industrial investment, and the financial and industrial 
sectors prospered on the basis of a distinct, somewhat distant re la-
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tionship which continued well into the 20th century. As expounded in 
one influential article: 
The industrialization of England had proceeded without any sub-
stantial utilization of banking for long-term investment pur-
poses. The more gradual character of the industrialization 
process and the more considerable accumulation of capital, first 
from the earnings of trade and modernized agriculture and later 
from industry itself, obviated the pressure for developing any 
special institutional devices for the provision of long-term 
capital to industry (Gerschenkron, p.14). 
This is not to say that the financial sector of Britain was in 
any sense backward or underdeveloped. In fact the "financial revolution" 
of the 19th century took hold first and most completely in the British 
Isles. The rise of the great discount houses and joint-stock com-
mercial banks established a firm base for the provision of credit by 
concentrating the various savings of the growing middle class. But. 
the banks avoided the "unorthodox" policy of borrowing short and lending 
long at least in the domestic market; as their deposits were short-
term so were their loans, and industry in this period was quite content 
to rely on retained earnings as the chief source of investment funds with 
the stock market playing a secondary role. The merchant banks and dis-
count houses were in the business of looser -term finance. but, as they 
had grown and prospered initially on the finance of foreign trade, their 
sights remained firmly fixed on the possibilities abroad, avoiding 
entanglement with domestic industry, which was in any case unnecessary 
and undesired. Thus arose the particular pattern of British development 
which proved so crueial in later decades, the country banks available 
for the finance of short-term commercial credit but avoiding any long-
term investment and the fiDanc1&l houses of the City with an almost 
exclusive overseas orientation (Landes, 1970, pp.74-5 & 205-6). 
On the Continent by way of contrast the very backwardness of the 
credit structure, the late entry into the development process, the lack 
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of gradually-accumulated family capital and the need to play catch up 
ball in a period when the initial investment demands of industry were 
steadily rising, all conspired to create the need for a more highly 
organized and adventurous financial sector. The particular institu-
tion devE'lop.;'d to cope with the pressing need for industrial credit was 
the joint-stock investment bank. While the first successful example of 
this type of financial institution was the Societe G~nerale founded in 
Belgium in 1822, it was only in Second Empire France that investment 
banking found its most fertile soil. The prototype of the new generation 
of banks was the C~dit Mobilier founded by the freres Pereire in 1852. 
Eroile and Isaac Pereire had been active adherents of the Saint-5imonian 
brotherhood, although more interested in its economic as opposed to 
political or religious doctrines. In particular they were influenced 
by the Saint~iaonhan critique of French finance and attempted to put 
into practice the society's notions concerning the "mobilization of 
credit" and the "marriage of industry and finance." Louis Bonaparte 
chartered the Cr~it MObilier as part of his "industrial coup d"tat" 
against the conservative financiers of the hautes maisons, the most 
notable of which was the house of Rothschild. The latter institutions 
had been the banking elite of France, the bulwark of petit-bourgeois 
capitalism, tied politically to the July Monarchy and unfavourably dia. 
posed towards industrial investment. James de Rothschild had previously 
acted as the chief supporter of the Pereire brothers, but whether for 
political or personal differences the latter had fallen out with him 
during the republican interlude and with their new-found patronage 
began one of the great rivalries of the epoch of capitalist industrial-
ization, one which virtually transformed the. economic landscape of 
Europe (Cameron; Landes, 1956 and 1970, pp. 205-210). 
The C~dit Mobilier and other new corporate banks which merged 
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commercial and investment activities engaged in the finance of large-
scale industrial projects of the Second Empire, railroads, canals, 
factories, ports, etc., filling the gap in the credit network which 
remained unnoticen and unchallenged across the Channel for the next 
three-quarters of a century. However, they also, perhaps more signif-
icantly, engaged in similar projects in other Continental countries, 
fostering numerous offspring in their own image. The Cr~it Mobilier 
participated in the founding of the Darlnstiidter Bank in 1853 which in 
turn played a key role in German industrial developement. Following 
this success the Pereires moved into Austria to help finance the state 
railway system but were quickly followed by the Rothschilds, who set up 
the Kreditanstalt largely it seems to exclude the rival firm. The 
princes of haute finance thus adopted the form of the new instituions 
in order to maintain their privileged position in French banking, and 
thereafter the two groups competed in setting up rival companies or 
projects in Spain, Switzerland, Italy, Russia and Turkey. As a result 
the total export of French capital in the period. of 1850 to 1870 con-
stituted something between-\- and t of net realized savings. a proportion 
unequaled even by Britain during the heyday of the Empire. Whether or 
not this was detrimental to French economic development. it created a 
pattern of industrial finance distinctly different from the British 
model (~.). 
After the failure of the Cr~dit Mobilier in 1870 and the fall of 
the Second Empire investment finance gave way to the more conservative 
joint-stock deposit banks in the British mold, as exemplified in the 
Credit Lyonnais. A legal distinction was now drawn between bangues de 
depOts and bangues d'affaires with the former involved in the collection 
of personal savings and the latter in cooercial finance. The Bank of 
France now played the crucial role of organizing the credit system, 
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mainly by offering generous rediscounting facilities to the private 
banks. French industry developed increasingly along British lines 
with a preponderance of small, family-owned and self-financing firms 
and a similarly slow rate of industrial growth. The financial secto~ 
turned increasingly towards foreign finance,although by then it was geared 
primarily towards government loans rather than private industrial pro-
jects and with t of the total going to Russia by 1914 (Clapham, ?}88 
and Feis, ch.2). 
Meanwhile, the seeds sown by the Cr6dit Mobilier across the Rhine 
brought forth fruit thirty-fold. The universal banks whm emerged in 
Germany especially after 1870 combined the functions of an investment 
bank with the more traditional activities of the commercial banks. 
They thus rested on a more secure basis than the Cr~di t Mobilier ttwi th 
its enorMously swollen industrial portfolio, which greatly exceeded its 
capital, and its dependence on favourable developments on the stock 
exchange for continuation of its activities (Gerschenkron, p.l)." 
They developed close relations with industry , financing heavy capital, 
promoting joint-stock enterprises and buying up shares during a crisis 
to maintain their price and prevent bankruptcy. Pre-financing became 
the normal mode of offering credit, i.e., the banks provided investment 
funds through initially short-term loans which were renewed indefinately 
until accumulation allowed for a new capital issue. These securities 
were then placed in the banks' branches consolidating or replacing the 
debt. The banks collected savings and organized finance thus "mobili-
zing credit" in a country chronically short of this resource. The 
concentration and centralization of banking capital in the last decades 
of the 19th century facillitated a parallel process in German industry 
resulting in the intimate relations between the two sectors noted ~ 
Rudolf Hilferding in his classic work, Das FinanzlCapi tal (1968). Often 
even new firms were constructed as joint-stock corporations at the 
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i.;-.iU .. :ttivp and with the heavy participation of the major banks. The 
Grossbanken were thus not merely the agents of finance but often 
con~rolling owners, and,while they competed actively for deposits, 
combination and market carve-up were the rule in their field of opera-
tions, hence the term "organized capitalism." Given the subordination 
to ~ompstic industry, the lack of a rentier class, the protectionist 
attitudes of the politically dominant Junkers and the chronic lack of 
capital, foreign investment in the period up to 1914 was minimal. 
What carital export that did take place was closely vetted by the state 
which, increasingly nervous about the lack of a German empire to match 
that of the French or English, ensured that all foreign investments had 
a direct political pay-off and did not finance the possessions or allies 
of its national rivals (Gerschenkron, pp.l) and 4), HU', ch.2., Feis, 
chs. ) & 6, & Winkler, H., PP.9-57). 
The British pattern of financial development was thus quite 
distinct from that of the Continent (with the partial exception of 
France after 1870). In particular, the dominant institutions of the 
City had emerged out of the web of international trade and were oriented 
primarily towards that market. The joint-stock banks, while not directly 
involved in overseas finance, none the less never developed an Uwestment 
functi on wi th regard to domestic producers (not that the latter wanted 
such serv~ces) and were moreover indirectly subordinated to the financial 
houses through the complex network of the flow of money between insti-
tutions. The new issue market, in the words of one historian of the 
period, 
was strongly oriented towards foreign lending, largely because 
of the evolution of the issuing houses fro. merchant banks con-
nected with foreign trade. The British lenders, living in tbat 
age of secure value of money (after nearly a century of predom-
inantly falling price levels)and lacking the floods of British 
governaent bonds which decended upon them subsequently in two 
world wars, seem to have had an apetite mainly for bonds, and 
to have de_nded a rentier's ra~ of return rather than that of 
an entrepreneur (A.J.Brown, p.j6). 
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The international direction of British finance was illustrated in 
the fact that by 191) "nearly half of the international investments of 
the world were British owned (ibid., p.47). Of the British total 
of overseas' investment in that year the Empire absorbed around 47%, 
a proportion which was still increasing up to the eve of the First 
World War (Pollard, 1970, p.21). In consequence, one may say that 
City institutions were priMarily interested in the promotion of world 
trade and long-term foreign investment. This was primarily portfolio 
investment, although much of it was tied up in industrial construction 
associ~ted with the cheaper movement of primary goods, especially rail-
road construction which accounted for as much as 40% of the total even 
as late as 1914 (Kemp, 1969, p. 193 and Strange, p.l40). 
The growth of foreign holdings in the period from 1875 to 1914 
did not, however, necessitate an increase in the actual transfer of 
resources through cap1tal export as the latter was more or less 
balanced by the inflow of income from those investments. In net terms 
there was no overall growth of capital export, so in effect foreign 
investment could be viewed as a self-expanding block of capital. 
Nevertheless, as Barratt Brown points out there was no necessity in 
reinvesting foreign income back overseas. This seems more surprising 
given that the rate of return on home investment was apparently higher 
than on that for overseas ventures (Barratt Brown, 1974, ch.B). Two 
explanations have been offered for this paradox. Strange argues that 
on the basis of the high proportion of industrial investment in the 
overseas total one should see the City as playing an essentially 
managerial role at least on an internat~onal level. A managerial 
ideology would presumably explain the remarkably patient attitude as 
refjlLrds the return on capital export, i.e., financiers had a preference 
for capital growth over current yield. Strange associates this 
ideology with the "top currency" positiJon that sterling exercised in 
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this period over world trade, as the holders of that currency had a 
basic interest in consolidating their world-wide position, regardless 
of the cost of certain lost opportunities in the home market. Thus, 
the City in this view acted as an investment banker with regard to 
its formal and informal empire overseas, while it avoided precisely 
those same sorts of commitments in the domestic industrial sector 
(Strange, p.14l and Feis ch.l.). 
Barratt Brown argues on the other hand that this investment 
should be viewed as that of a rentier fraction of the capitalist class. 
He emphasizes that "about half of the capital investment consisted of 
loans to governments or to mixed public and private enterprises." He 
catagorizes railroad investment along with p.blic utilities as social 
overhead capital, which together constituted some 70% of the total and 
often was backed by state guarantees, whether or not these were broken 
in practice. British foreign investment was somewhat different from 
that of Germany or France, as the latter was typically in the form of 
loans from one government authority to another, but all had a similar 
object, namely security of income (Barratt Brown, 1974, p.17). His 
argument is more convincing in that state-backed portfolio investments 
can hard 1y be compared to the sort of risk-taking entrepreneurial 
activities that characterized the German Gross~ken, for example. 
British capital was, rather, dominated by a rentier fraction of the 
dominant class, and the economy consequently began to develop in a 
direction that suited the ideology of that prevailing fraction. 
Strange does make a convincing case for the importance of the 
world role of sterling during this period as a farce influencing the 
structure of British developnent. She uses a model of currencies 
which elllphasizes political and financial interrelations, in particualr 
the political preconditions for the world use of a currency and the 
consequent restrictions on the issuing state. She distinguishes four 
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types of currency, first,a master currency. which applies to the 
situation when an imperial state imposes its monetary system on a sub-
ordinate country severely limiting the latter's monetary autonomy. 
Second, a diplomatic or negotiated currency. existing when the issuing 
state has lost its position of outright political dominance and must 
bargain over the terms of its use. Such declining currencies, like sterling 
or the dollar in the recent past, must offer inducements to prevent 
reductions in the holdings of former colonial or semi-colonial poss-
essions. The issuing country, moreover, has a limited array of 
coercive weaponry, mainly devaluation or the sequestering of funds, 
which can in any case only be used in moments of crisis and even then 
only at the cost of further decline in currency's use. A top currency 
is simply one favoured for international monetary transactions, but 
its main consequence is that "it induces a peculiarly developed sense 
of responsibility towards the international economy (Strange. p.5)~ 
A top currency thus circulates outside the area of the issuing country's 
imaediate political control, a role performed by sterling in the 19th 
century and by the dollar in the twenty or twenty-five years of mon-
etary stability that followed World War Two. lastly, a neutral 
currency originates in the strong economic as opposed to political 
conditions of the issuing country. It none the less does have specific 
political effects in that its use forces the home country to submit to 
monetary movements outside its own control thus giving it a strong 
interest in international monetary stability. 'Ibe Deutschmark, 
Swiss franc and the Eurodollar exemplify this type of currency in the 
modern period, especially the latter as it is outside the control of 
any one state and subject to quite violent international movements 
(Strange, ch. 1). 
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As Strange constructs the model, these various functions 
are not mutually exclusive; the same currency could have different 
roles concurrently. Thus, sterling was the top currency during 
virtually the whole of the 19th century and the 20th in the period 
up to the First World War, its use being virtually coterminous with 
the extension of commodity relations around the world. At th& same 
time the pound had a master currency function in the countries of the 
Empire, that is, its use was imposed on the subordinate colonies and 
semi-independent Dominions. Significantly, this process of establishing 
sterling as the master currency took a surprisingly long time. In 
British West Africa and India a British-managed currency was not 
installed until the 1890s, in Hong Kong not until World War I and in 
Sast Africa not until 1920. The period of the extension of both the 
master-and-top-currency status was thus coincident, indicating the 
interrelatedness of the two processes. As Strange sUJllJlla..rlzes, 
the political process of acquiring an empire and the financial 
process of acquiring an international currency were highly inter-
active. So large an empire could not have been so quickly and 
cheaply acquired without the incomparable asset of a strong, 
internationally-used top currency. But, at the saae time the inter-
national use of sterling as top currency was greatly extended, 
and invisibly and unobstrusively supported, by the political 
power and influence exercised by Britain over so large a part of 
the globe (ibid., p.47). 
The key interconnection between the international financial 
system and the British domestic economy was the gold standard which 
governed a superficially stable but essentially contradictory and 
contingent sys tem • In the first place, the system managed to function 
on the basis of gold reserves in London not much higher than l.~ of 
GNP. After the Beer War the supply of gold allowed only a aarginal 
increase in the size of the reserves, from £30 - J.5m to £4Oa by 1914, 
as against an annual illport bill of £6J.5m. Secondly, the Bank of Eng-
land's position in the financial structure was highly ambiguous, if not 
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schizophrenic. It was both a private banker and the central bank 
of the home economy, called upon as lender of last resort, although 
it refused to publically recognize that role. At the same time, 
as a consequence of the position of London in the world economy, 
the Bank regarded the maintenance of the gold standard as its primary 
duty, with the result that the Bank rate, the central means of defending 
the reserves, was highly sensitive to international flows of gold and 
the state of the reserves. Since the main source of strain on the 
reserves was internal, the Bank rate was typically raised during 
booms and lowered during slumps, but ~ directly in relation to 
internal demand but only indirectly through the position of the Bank's 
gold and currency reserves. At the same time higher rates successfully 
attracted short-term capital, effectively controlling gold flows in 
am out of the country. However, the rate was only lowered when the 
market rates dropped sufficiently and the gold reserves were not endangered, 
so them was no autom tic impulse to push rates down even when reserves 
were sufficient (Sayers, Vol.I. ch.J). 
The internal instability was due to the growth of the joint-stock 
banks, which were not only outside the "political" apparatus of control, 
the so-called "inner circle" of established accepting houses and 
merchant banks, but were under no form of monetary discipline, having 
no obligation to hold their deposits in the Bank of England. In periods 
of crisis when overextension led to a rush for liquidity and panic, 
the Bank simply lost control of the money market, as demonstrated in 
the Baring crisis of 1890. While the Bank and the "inner circle" man-
aged to preserve their authority despite this rather severe crisis, 
the anarchic structure of the credit system and the contradictory posi-
tion of the Bank of England remained hidden but ever-present sources 
of instability right up to the eve of World War I. The underlying 
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conflicts then burst into the open even before the declaration of war, 
as stock brokers, who had lent short-term abroad were caught by the 
closures of the foreign exchanges. The joint-stock banks, at this 
time net creditors to the "inner circle" institutions, had no confidence 
in the capacity of the Bank of England to act as lender of last resort 
and began to call in their loans. The suspicions of the bankers at 
this point were so great that they even considered setting up their 
own alternative gold standard and formed a Gold Committee for that 
purpose. While nothing came of these efforts and the crisis was re-
solved through the frantic efforts of Lloyd George, Keynes and others, 
the instability and tenuousness of the gold standard system even in its 
moment of greatest glory foreshadowed events of later decades when the 
contingent factors that allowed it to operate virtually evaporated 
(De Cecco, chs. 5 & 7). 
'Ibe gold standard worked during this period because the massive 
increase in capital export and foreign lending was matched by increases 
in British exports. Similarly, the Bank rate was equal to its appointed 
task of drawing in gold or foreign currency in moments of strain on the 
reserves, although this led to sOllle discontent 8.Ilong industrialists at 
the frequent rises in interest rates by comparison to the steady cheap 
money available on the Continent (Sayers, ch.). Increases in Bank 
rate did not implant the fear of devaluation in the minds of foreign 
holders of sterling, as in later years, so, despite the periodic ex-
pressions of underlying structural contradictions, the Bank's ability 
to cope with crisis inculcated in all sectors of British capital an 
identification of prosperity and industrial and financial supremacy 
wi th the existence of a London-based gold standard. As long as the 
preconditions for its effective operation remained present, this 
ideology corresponded with the real position of sterling as the world's 
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top currency as well as with Britain's role as the pre-eminent trading 
power. Of course after World War I the global situation changed rather 
dramatically, however, 
the ideas about ~ritain's role in world affairs and British 
foreign and economic policies which this heyday of sterling 
propogated so effectively ••• long outlasted the peculiar and 
largely fortuitous circumstances that gave them birth (strange, p.47). 
While the export position apparently allowed for the increase in 
foreign investment, this superficially healthy balance concealed a 
gradual erosion of British industrial strength especially in the mar-
kets of the advanced capitalist world. The British share of world 
manufacturing production dropped from )l.~ in 1870 to 14.0% in 191), 
while the share of world manufactured exports over the same period 
declined at a slightly lower rate from 4~ to 2~. The industrial 
position was steadily deteriorating in the face of German and American 
competition, but, 
Britain could go on investing abroad mainly because she had 
found a 'preserve' for her exports in the EIIpire. The Empire 
exported to the rest of the world and iJllPorted from Britain 
(De Cecco, p.ix). 
India was the linchpin in this system, as the earnings from her high 
trade surplus were deposited in London and held as part of the official 
reserves defending the gold standard (De Cecco, ch.4, A.J.Brown. p.47. 
and Gilpin, ch.). 
The extent of foreign investment was truely massive. Increasing 
roughly 250% between 18'70 and 191) it totalled £4 billion by the latter 
date, absorbing fully one-half of national savings. About half of 
British assets were abroad on the eve of World War I, and the income 
from these investments constituted l~ of national inco.e. This in-
vestment went increasingly to the countries of the Empire, 4).~ in 
1890-1914 as opposed to 35.~ in 18'70-89. and grew in step with and 
in response to domestic industrial decline. In the simplest teras 
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the City was responding to the lack of a guaDanteed income in the 
domestic market by funnelling its resources abroad, and the consequence 
for Britain was the progressive decadence of the industrial sector, 
the emergence of a truely rentier economy (Gilpin, ch.) and De Cecco. 
ch.2) • 
It is important to recognize that British industrial decline was 
by no means inevitable, although some loss of markets to the emerging 
industrial powers was, of course, on the cards. It was the result, 
rather, of a political-economic strategy under the hegemony of the City 
to which British industry acquiesced rather than face the more difficult 
task of meeting foreign competition in the advanced sectors head on. 
The growth of portfolio investment overseas not only resulted from 
industrial deterioration but contributed directly to that very process, 
the first of the "vicious cycles" that plagued the British economy in 
later years. From 1870 when foreign investment first exceeded domestic 
fixed ca pi tal formation, the former rose just as consistently as the 
latter fell, from 39;C of GNP in 1865-75 to 7% in 1895-1905, indicating 
the extent to which the two were practical alternatives. In comparative 
terms the percentage of national product devoted to domestic capital 
formation was about one third the American figure and 60% of that 
common in the major European countries (A.J.Brown, p.55 and Gilpin, p.93). 
Indeed, the amount of real investment in this period may not have been 
enough to maintain the existing stock of capital (Hobsbawm, p.192). 
The extent of industrial decadence is indicated not only by such 
quantitative measures enumerated above but by the equally significant 
qualitative aspects, the failure to develop new products and processes 
and the structure of the industrial sector. With respect to these 
aspects as well the existence of the Empire had serious deleterious 
consequences. While of course the official policy of the British 
government and ruling class was & doctrinaire cOlftlli tment to free trade, 
-35-
various informal relationships ensured that British exports received 
favourable treatment in the dependent countries of the Empire. Only 
British-owned enterprises were allowed to operate in India, and in 
other countries an unofficial policy of "buying British" was the 
rule (De Cecco, p.29). The fear of foreign penetration of these markets 
led to an increasing clamour on the part of British industrialists for 
a more formalized system of protection, a point to which I shall return 
shortly. However, as a result of the "informal" captive market and 
the low rate of investment, industrial capital chose to exploit its 
favoured position by selling more of the old products rather than move 
into the advanced sectors where foreign advantages could not be avoided. 
The core of British industry continued to be the traditional sectors of 
the "first industrial revolution," coal,textiles, iron and shipbuilding, 
while in the newer areas of chemicals, electronics and automobiles 
Bri tain lagged considerably behind the new leaders. Likewise, British 
industry was slow to adopt the new techniques of production, failing to 
mechanize or electrify existing processes, even in the traditionally 
strong sectors. Technical and scientific education was, as often noted, 
much neglected by comparison to Germany or the U.S., although this was 
not the case in the provision of specialized technical training for 
workers, which was probably the best in Europe if not the world. The 
hostile reception given to the proponants of scientific management in 
the period also exemplifies the extent to which conservative and com-
placent industrialists were prepared to rely on the greater exploitation 
of existing methods and markets rather than adapt to the harsher envir-
onment of advanced capitalist production (Levine, ebs. 2 cl 4, Turner, 
ch.l, Gilpin, ch.3, Hbbsbawm, ch.9, Phelps Brown & HandfieId-Jones, and coppock) 
Industrial backwardness was finally manifested in the small size 
of British firas and the prevalence of family control in the manufactur-
ing sector. From the 18508 the necessary l~l changes had taken place 
-)6-
to allow for the development of joint-stock corporations, and by the 
1880s this fo~ wa~ beginning to be widely adopted. Between 1885 and 
1907 the nu~ber of domestic firms publicly quoted rose from 60 to 600. 
During economic booms financial syndicates promoted merger issues, 
counting on the inflated values of the stock of the combined enterprises 
over the aggregate value of the individual firms as a source of spec-
ulative profit (Hannah, p.22). Yet, at the same time the stock market 
did not contribute app~ciably to industrial capitalization, since, 
"in the years before the (first World) War only 10% of real investment 
in this country was made by issues of industrial firms through the Lon-
don Stock Exchange, and only J' by new industrial firms (Pollard, 1969, 
p.18)." Moreover, while the merger movement in Britain at the turn of 
the century was more intense than at any earlier period in the 19th 
century, it was dwarfed by comparable events in the U.S. and Germany. 
Hannah, for example, estimates that in 1899 255 firms disappeared by 
amalgamation in the U.K. with a total value of £22m, while in the U.S. 
in the same year 979 firms were absorbed through mergers with a com-
bined value of over £4OOm. The concentration of productive capital 
in the rapidly advancing countries was in other words of a completely 
different order of magnitude (Hannah, ch.2). Likewise, the industrial 
partnership and family enterprise remained the typical unit of British 
manufacturing. Even in 1914 four fifths of joint-stock corporations 
were private, and those nominally public often retained the previous 
entrepreneurial families in key managerial positions (Pollard, 1969, 
pp.10-14 and Hannah, OPe cit.). In other words such mergers as occured 
took the form of "decentralized trusts," aggregates of distinct firms 
which did not fuse into a new organizational structure and as a result 
simply reproduced the backwardness of the original companies, each 
division still run by the former owning families which placed the 
interest of their particular firm above that of the collective trust. 
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These combinations were based on a horizontal princi¥le, rather 
than the vArtical monopolies that predominated in Germany and the 
U.3. They w~re in essence purely defensive combines, occuring for the 
most part in the consumer goods and textile industries rather than in 
the growth sectors of the "second industrial revolution (Merlick, pp.6l-
62)." The trustification movement, so important to Hilferding's anal-
ysis of "organized capitalism," had simply not taken place in Britain 
by this pOint, although centralization had occured to a significant 
extent in the financial sector by 1914, especially through the growth 
of the joint-stock banks (Pollard, 1969, p.l4). British industry 
appeared to have ossified, retaining the structure of the first industrial 
revolution, a structure whose institutions ran throughout the British 
economy and which was supported by a vast imperial network that effective-
ly prevented any urgent sense of the need for a rapid transformation 
with its consequent dislocation and social strife. 
The solp significant exception to this state of backwardness was 
in the strongly interconnected defense and shipbuilding industries. 
This sector alone was characterized by the large size of the component 
combines, the two doainant trusts being highly centralized and vertically 
structure in the German or American mould. Significantly, this exception-
al state was the result of specific state intervention and tariff 
protection, the only sector in which the necessities of imperial defense 
undermined the prevailing laissez-faire ideology. The unique status 
of the armaments industry gives an indication of the extent to which 
the liberal political economy had to be overthrown in order to effect 
the progressive transformation of British industry (Medick, p.62). The 
fact that this was the only area where the Tariff Reform campaign 
achieved eYen limited success in the decade before Wor1d War I seems 
hardly coincidental, a matter I shall take up more fully in the next 
section. 
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The Folitical Relationship of Finance and Industry: 
'Free Trade ImperialisJ and Tariff Reform 
Thp dominance of the City and the emergence of a rentier economy 
were reflected as well in the operations of the political system. Just 
as economic activity increasingly flowed along a course chartered by 
finance. ~o the priorities expressed in state policies corresponded to 
their primary concerns, namely defense of the international monetary 
system and preservation of a political economy favourable to the free 
export of capital. While industrialists largely accepted the rule of 
finance in matters considered as their sphere of expertise, i.e., the 
operation of the gold standard and money markets, from the turn of the 
century they began to voice increasing concern over the indications of 
industrial decline and to demand some sort of counter-active measures. 
However, the course of treatment prescribed by industrial leaders was 
designed to treat the symptoms rather than the disease, for in many 
respects industrial capital was far too wedded to the existing system 
to contemplate the truely radical measures necessary to secure regenera-
tion of the productive sector. In particular they never faced up to the 
debilitating consequences of massive capital export (nor have they in 
subsequent years)~ indeed, most of the proposals for formalization of 
the imperial network included the aim of continuing extensive overseas 
investment but simply wanted it tied more closely to political objectives. 
The political regime dominant at the turn of the century was in 
all essentials that which had triumphed in the middle years of the 19th 
century with the repeal of the Corn Laws, the passing of Peel's Bank 
Acts and the extension of electoral suffrage to the emerging middle 
classes. The social basis of this regime rested on an implicit alliance 
between the major industries of the industrial revolution, in particular 
the textile firms of Manchester and Lancashire, and the City, what one 
- JG-
author has ':iti?rorri..ateLy ter:ned a "marriage of cloth and gold (Kurth)." 
As accumulation in textiles and other early industries could take place 
without active promotion on the part of either investment banks or 
the state, these industrial entrepreneurs made common cau.se with the 
financial sector for a programme with essentially negative aims, i.e., 
oriented towards eliminating the barriers to the free movement of goods, 
capital and labour. The political institution which arose to serve 
this coalition crystalized in the form of the liberal state, systematically 
and self-consciously removing the political controls on both internal 
and external markets. As British industries in this period could 
rely on their initial economic supremacy to capture foreign trade, 
they had no need for specific political instruments to guarentee their 
success abroad or protect them from foreign competition at home, 
apart from the need for a strong navy to secure the "rule of law" on 
the high seas. "Manchester liberalism" and "Parliamentary sovereignty" 
were thus the political hallmarks of the British bourgeois revolution 
(Kurth,and Polanyi, chs. 12-15). 
Yet, even at the height of the triumph of liberal doctrines a 
strong imperial logic lay beneath these espousals of non-interference 
and free trade. A dual conception of empire was prominent in the 
thought of the early liberal reformers base~ first, on the informal 
dominion of Britain through her unequalled position as "workshop of 
the world," and, second, on the imposition of a formal empire through 
direct appropriation and colonization of those areas of the world not 
yet penetrated by capitalist relations of production. While differences 
existed over the extent to which the exercise of direct political con-
trol was necessary in overseas territories, even the Radicals supported 
imperial aims in the informal sense. '!bey simply believed that the 
natural superiority of British enterprise obviated the need for direct 
political domination, hence the appropriateness of the tenn "free trade 
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imperb.lism" to characterize that combination of gunboat diplomacy 
and commercial domination that typified the international political 
economy of the liberal regime (Semmel, 1970, Barratt Brown, 1974 chs. 
2, 5 & 6, Platt, Gallagher and Robinson, and Cain and Hopkins). 
The consolidation Jf this informal empire in the first half of 
the 19th centure paved the way for the policies of capital export in 
the face of domestic decline in the decades following 1870. In contrast 
with the more o~rtly imperial logic in the overseas operations of the 
emerging German Reich, relations between the state and the financial 
institutions in Britain were always at arms length, based on shared 
understandings rather than official commands. The main channel for 
communication between financial leaders and government officials, then 
as later. was the Bank of England with its useful position as both 
banker to the state and central organization for the City. Consensus 
on economic policies was also established through the social means 
of communication, the London clubs as well as the old boy networks 
and even the country weekends or hunting parties, and through the 
medium of the Houses of Parliament where financial as well as industrial 
interests had their quota of seats. This sometimes almost casual mode 
of communication was none the less highly successful in ensuring that 
the priorities of the City and the strategic aims of the British state 
were well co-ordinated, almost fused in a symbiotic relationship. The 
process by which this hegemonic bloc operated has been well described 
in the famous work by Herbert Feis: 
In a variety of ways suggestions passed back and forth between 
the financial world and the government, subtle indications of 
each others judgement. For the absence of any formal official 
requirement that the government be consulted before the emission 
of foreign loans did not mean that there was no interchange 
between the government and those engaged in the loan business. 
The course of foreign investment was pointed in unofficial dis-
course between those who shaped the country's political and 
financial behavior (Feis, pp. 85-6). 
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::-: i:~, :h':n, Wd.~, the ;;vsi tion fa.cing industrialists at the turr: 
of the century, an economic system premissed upvn their continuing 
decline and a political regime entwining financial interests in the 
heart of the state totally committed to the free-trade doctrines of 
Victorian Britain. Industrial capital, however, drew benefits as 
well from the imperial system, even given its informal, complacent 
political directorship, most notably through the provision of more or 
less captive markets for British goods. While it would have been 
against the short-term logic of their economic position to make a 
dramatic break with a system which offered such convenient outlets for 
obsolescent goods, even if at the cost of their long-term viability in 
the advanced capitalist environment, they increasingly did question 
the parameters of orthodox political economy as foreign competitors 
began to demonstrate the superiority of new methods and organizational 
structures of capitalist enterprise. Paradoxically, their response 
was to advocate the consolidation of the informal and haphazard sys-
tem of concealed imperial partiality into an explicit and official 
regime of Empire protection, a policy which, while promising short-
term benefits, could and ultimately did reinforce those same attitudes 
of complacency, underinvestment and lack of specialization leading in 
the long run to a return of the "vicious spiral" of industrial decline. 
The strategies advocated by industrialists in the period from 
1900 to World War Two to combat their relative decline in the world 
market and the recurrent experience of depression at home largely 
followed one of two paths: on the one hand the move towards imperial 
autarky, the creation of tariff walls around the Empire and the con-
solidation of more or less captive markets for British exports; on the 
other the concentration of industrial capital into large corporations 
capable of competing with German and American firms, particularly but 
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not exclusively in the "science-based" industries of the second 
industrial revolution, chemicals, petroleum, automobiles and elec-
tronics. These two strategies were by no means exclusive of one 
another; indeed, they could be and often were seen as complementary 
and mutually reinforcing. The crucial difference between them was 
that the former required political direction in turn implying the 
need for overturning the main orientation of economic policy and the 
organiza tional capacity to effect that change. As I shall describe 
later, the failure of the first strategic aim, that of tariff reform 
(at least until the 1930s), turned industrialists in general toward 
the alternative of consolidation and merger, especially in the 1920s. 
In turn the failure of the "planning" and "rationalization" movements 
of that decade to secure the needed stability of both international 
and home markets led to a renewed effort in the direction of imperial 
protection, cartelization and autarky, and, ultimately to the posing of 
perhaps more fundamental questions regarding the whole system of finance. 
In the period under consideration, however, the conflict within ·the ranks 
of capital largely crystallized. around, on the one hand, industrial 
interests, particularly in the iron, steel and engineering trades 
tased in the Midlands, and, on the other, financial interests, particular-
ly those sectors engaged in the international capital market, the so-
called inner circle of merchant banks, discount houses, the stock 
exchange and the associated insurance companies under the titular 
leadership of the Bank of England. 
The first expression of industrialists discontent with a political 
regime based as ever on the "marriage of cloth and gold" and pUrSuing 
the overseas policies of "free trade imperialism" dominant since the 
mid-19th century emerged with the founding of JOBeph Chamberlain's 
Tariff Reform campaign in the first decade of the 20th century. 
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Chamberlain, a screw manufacturer and former mayor of Birmingham and 
without doubt the most significant. political figure of his time, 
was responding to the rising concern of Midlands manufacturers, 
in particular their worry over their declining position with regard 
to the emergent industrial giants abroad. Chamberlain was no narrow-
minded pork-barrel politician, however, and his achievement, though 
by no means his alone, was to paint the interests of his political 
base onto a wider canvass, an imperial triptych of Zollverein, Kriegs-
verein and Staatsverein'Blake. p.l??). 
Chamberlain had begun his career as a Radical Liberal in Birming-
ham, as part of the "liberal caucus" that gave the label its modern 
meaning, involved first in the local "civic" policies of "municipal 
socialism," which were later extended to the national political stage. 
The Chamberlains were one of a key group of provincial, Non-conformist 
bourgeois faailies, including the Cadburys. the Lloyds (whose family 
firm later formed the base for GKN) and the Calthorpes, whose business 
interests were centered on the light engineering and consumer good 
industries which dominated the region. Entering national politics 
with his reform mantel fully established, he broke with Gladstone over 
the Irish Home Rule Bill of 1886, a major factor in the splitting of 
the Liberal Party at that time and an event which plagued the rest of 
his political career. Much of the latter was spent in the pursuit of 
a programme which Ilight unite both aspects of his political inspiration, 
social reform a.rxl the nationalism of a "Greater Britain." By 1895 he 
had bP.come Colonial Secretary when the Liberal Unionists joined Lord 
Salisbury's Conservative government, and it was really at this point 
that his new vision of the progressive path for British development 
was consolidated. He played a prominent part in the Colonial Confer-
ences of 1897 and 1902, atteapting to secure support for a system of 
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imperial preferential tariffs, accepting even at an early date the 
Canadian suggestion that cereals, wool, meat and sugar be included in 
such a scheme. Little came of these conferences apart from the further 
confirmation of Chamberlain's vision that greater unity within the 
Empire was possible and would be supported by strong elements abroad, 
at least in the White Dominions. Chamberlain, it seems, was 'bbsessed 
by the feeling that the United Kingdom, in the modern era, was in no 
position to compete with the monolithic strengths of nation-states 
like Germany, Russia, Japan or the United States," and a reinforced 
Empire, even imperial autarky, offered to his mind a means of breaking 
with Victorian complacency and retaining the political and economic 
power of Britain in the face of the rising continental nations (Gollin, p.). 
The Boer War finally offered the opportunity to raise preferential 
tariffs as a concrete and practical political issue. Not only did the 
War expose military weakness and the need for social reform if the work-
ing class was to be either fit or willing to defend British capital fro. 
foreign encroachment or the uprisings of native populations, it had 
placed an increased burden on the Treasury which as a consequence had 
to find additional sources of revenue to meet existing payments, let 
alone cover the cost of any programme of extending social welfare 
provisions. In his Budget of April, 1902, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, proposed to revive the duties on corn, 
meal and. flour in order to raise tue needed revenue. Liberal misgivings 
turned to alann when Chamberlain used the opportunity to call for 
lmperhl unity and to attack the "economic pedantry" and "old shib-
oleths" of free-trade orthodoxy at a speech to the Birmingham Liberal 
Unionist Association on 16 May.(Gollin, p.2S). While it is not my in-
tention to investLgate the political crisis precipitated by those events, 
a few comments are in order to indicate certain features of the exer-
cise of political power which recurred regularly in later crises. 
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In the first place the centre of free-trade resistance to the tar-
iff proposals within the state was the Treasury itself. When Charles 
Thomson Ritchie succeeded Hicks-Beech as Chancellor, he was determined 
not only to resist future tariffs but to repeal those already on the 
statute books. In this struggle he was supported by Sir Francis Mowatt, 
the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, in pressing the issue in the 
Cabinet as one of principle (Gollan, p.48). Even the Prime Minister, 
Arthur Balfour, had to rely on outside economists, especially Peter 
Ash1ey, for assistance in preparing his submissions to the debate, as 
the Treasury was blind 1y cow t ted to free trade (i bid., p. 88) • nu s 
resistance was successful in that it prevented Tariff Reform from becom-
ing the policy of the Balfour government, although only through the 
sacrifice of the free trade ministers in the Cabinet in the poll tica1 
crisis of September, 1903. By then Chamberlain was convinced that he 
would have to undertake a massive propaganda .campaign to win support 
for his imperial programme, and he consequently resigned at the 
same moment to devote himself totally to this end. Balfour was nat-
urally relieved since he thus had a free hand to manoeuvre the Cabinet 
in accordance with his desires for the rest of his term of office, 
having only to contend with the much more pliable son of his great 
adversary, Austen Chamberlain. He was in this way able to hold on to 
power and complete his programme of imperial defensel the reorganization 
of the War Office, the development of new weaponry, the initiation of 
a "naval revolution" entailing the construction of a new top class of 
battleships (the Dreadnought) and the conclusion of the entente with 
France and the defensive alliance with Japan. As pointed out earlier, 
these aeasur8S of state support for rearmament were the only area of 
success for the tariff reformers, creating the basis for the only truely 
modernized sector of British industry and consequently winning for Bal-
four the support of the armaIlents and steel industry. At the same time 
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they helped to ensure ultimate defeat at the polls in 1906 as the 
governing party became bitterly divided over the wider issues raised 
by the Chamberlain campaign (Gollan, ch.15). 
In the autumn of 190) Chamberlain embarked on his crusade "to 
replace the easy drifting of the age of Free Trade with a system 
based upon ordered, rational and scientific thinking (Gollan, p.l9Q)." 
The social imperialists organizing the Tariff Reform League's campaign 
"for the defense and development of the industrial interests of the 
Bri tish Empire," included prominent industrialists apart frOll those 
wedded to and not yet suffering from the traditional alliance of "cloth 
and gold," namely the woolen and textile trades who sided with their 
City partners (Semmel, 1960, pp. 101-). Yet, the principle diffi-
cul ty of the Tariff Reformers was not the winning of support from 
troubled industrialists but, rather. securing a base in the enfran-
chised sections of the working class. 'Ibe latter had, of course, 
largely fallen under the tutelage of the Liberal Party and t even 
as they were beginning to break away with the formation of the Labour 
Party, remained committed for years to come to the Liberal principles 
of free trade and the "cheap loaf." 'Ibe intent of the social or 
preference imperialists was to win the working class, or at least some 
part of the labour aristocracy in the declining trades, to support a 
"producers' alliance," a BisMrckian programme of imperial tariff and 
social reform, utilizing the increased revenues to finance state-
supported welfare measures, "homes for heroes" as put in the later 
imperialist slogan. Chamberlain no doubt erred in this campaign 
by insisting from his first speeches that a tax on food would be neces-
sary, an approach which could only alienate potential working class 
support. He was no doubt Ilotivated in this by the contradictory need 
of making concessions to the primary producers in the Colonies and 
White Dominions, those who had much to gain from a system of imperial 
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autarky. not to ~ention the traditional landed interests of the Tory 
Party who were still highly influential and had been badly affected 
by the fall of grain prices in the Great De;)ression. None the less, 
Chamberlain's overt insistence on this point gave his opponants an 
easy target and contributed signifia.ntly to the defeat of the ~~paign. 
The opposition was equally committed to an imperialist strategy 
but one based on the orthodox principles of free trade. Liberal or 
"cosmopoli tan" i:nperialists, in Semmel's terms, including noted poli-
ticians like H.H. Asquith, Sir Henry Fowler, Sir Edward Grey.and R.B. 
Haldane, founded the Liberal League supporting Roseberry's contention 
for leadership and confronting head on the campaign for tariff reform. 
They too favoured social improvements in education and housing, as 
well as temperance, in the interest of national efficiency and as 
"a condition of national fitness equal to the demands of our Empire -
administrative, parliamentary, colllllercial, educational, moral, naval 
and military fitness (Semmel, 1960. p.6J)." However, free trade imper-
ialists opposed the protectionist policies of the preference imperialists, 
proposing instead direct taxes, particularly a land tax, as the means 
of financing the necessary reforms. Not surprisingly they had close 
links with the City, in effect constituting the political wing of high 
finance. The City of course looked on protection as an anathema, seeing 
the system of free trade based on the gold standard as the basis of their 
world position and hence British prosperity. As Sir Halford Mackinder, 
a leading theorist of liberal imperialism who later converted to the 
neo-mercantilist or protectionist position, expressed the nature of 
the controversy. 
This gives the real key to the struggle between our free trade 
policy and the protection of othercountries - we are essentially 
the people with capital, and those who have the capital always 
share in the proceeds of the activity of brains and muscles 
of other countries (cited in Semmel. ibid., p.l68). 
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The d f> [xl. te between neo-mercantilis t and free trade imperialists 
explicitly recognized a conflict of interest between the two major 
fractions of British capital. Free traders like the early Mackinder 
even publicized the view (in the Journal of ~ Institute 2! Bankers) 
that, "the financial importance of the City of London may continue to 
increase, while the industry, at any rate, of Britain, becomes rel-
atively lnss," believing that the returns on overseas investment and 
the finance of world trade would more than compensate for industrial 
decline (Mackinder, p. 271). Neo-mercantilists like Austen Chamberlain 
deplored these tendencies, insisting that only the growth of the "pro-
ductive sector" would bring an end to rising unemployment and offer a 
secure basis for national power. In terms of bourgeois support the 
free traders banked on the City together with those sectors of industrial 
capital which depended on international trade yet had not felt the 
threat of severe foreign competition, namely wool and cotton, and that 
which received state support without a general preference policy (thanks 
to Balfour) because of military needs, i.e. shipbuilding and armaments. 
Preference imperialists had their base of support in the Midlands 
manufacturing sector but received aid and succour from outside the 
country, mainly from the primary producers of the White Dominions, 
though of course nascent industries in the latter countries had serious 
objections to a system which would flood their markets with cheaper 
British imports. 
In the end Chamberlain's campaign went down in defeat, in the final 
analysis because the leaders of the labour aristocracy remained un-
convinced for good reasona that eliminating free trade would not raise 
the cost of food am thua reduce 11 ving standards. However. the efforts 
of the aocial imperialists did not end with the Liberal victory of 1906. 
as indeed they appear to have consolidated their hold on the Conser-
vative Party in the next few years thereafter. Tariff reform was 
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a major factor behind the Tories rejection of the Liberal Budget of 
1909 in the Lords, but it effectively breathed its last gasp in the 
pre-war period in Cctobey', 1910, when Lloyd George approached F.S. 
Smith, leader of the Unionists, with a proposal for an national 
coalition, a precurser to the "Government of Business Men" under his 
leadership on a platform of military training, naval armament, imperial 
preference, national insurance and Irish home rule. However, this 
attempt at political realignment of a bourgeois bloc fell apart over 
the other devisive issue of British politics, the Irish question, and 
by November, 1911, even the Unionists, once the bedrock of the Tariff 
Reform League, had dropped the preferential clauses of their tariff 
proposals. As I shall argue in the next chapter, the :tmt.:. house con-
ditions of the war economy allowed for the growth of protectionist pol-
icies from their initial seed bed in the armaments industries, a pro-
cess which continued in a piece-seal, empirical fashion over the first 
post-war decade. However, free trade remained the dominant principle 
of economic policy until the complete devastation of the world trade 
system in the crisis of 1931-32 cleared the ground for a green revolu-
tion in foreign econoaic relations. None the less, the periodic efforts 
of important sections of industrial capital and its political spokesmen 
to hack away at some of the overgrown precepts of orthodxy indicate 
the extent of their committment to the reform programme despite political 
failure. The vastly improved economic position of British industry dur-
ing the war obviated the need for any radical change in overseas policy, 
but once the post-war depression set in they again renewed the drive for 
imperial protection, although by then the other current of industrial 
defense, namely reorganization and concentration of capital, took greater 
prominence. 
Chamberlain's efforts were certainly a mixed blessing from the 
point of view of industrial capital. He was at least the catalyst in the 
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fissure of tftO major bourgeois parties during his lifetime, the Lib-
erals and the Unionists, and his final campaign failed virtually 
totally in political ter!'ls. His activities as Colonial Secret.::.ry 
from 1895 to 1903, when he first promoted imperial development, and 
as back-bench propogandist from 1903, when he stumped the country for 
imperial unity, dD, however, lay the basis for the protectionist structure 
finally erected in the 1930s and only dismantled in the end with British 
entry into the EEC. Yet, this very system, while no doubt unavoidable 
and obviously attractive in an era of sometimes concealed and sometimes 
overt trade war, at the same tiae allowed British industry the space 
to delay radical restructuring until finally forced by the penetration 
of even protected markets to adopt (in part) the methods and organiza-
tions of other advanced capitalist powers. '!he po 11 tical economy of 
imperial preference also, paradoxically, laid the basis for the resurgence 
of the City in the 1950s, albeit in an altered form as I shall argue later. 
In short the effects of imperialism were never simply beneficial to the 
domestic economy of the home country, as some theorists would have it, 
particularly when one looks at the long-term structural effects. 
Rather, imperialism has often offered a soft option to that of radical 
restructuring or the adoption of costly methods of more advanced firms 
with attendant social dislocation and disruption, and the easier road 
has necessarily had negative long-term effects, so long as the host 
country remained integrated into a capitalist world system (see also 
Gilpin) • 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Conflict and Compromise, 1914-39 
The First World War was of course a watershed in British his-
tory. The changes introduced during that short period covered such 
an extensive area that it is impossible here to do anything more than 
underscore sOlle of the more salient features with regard to the re la-
tialS between capital, labour and the state. The determining aspect 
of the war condition was the gradual extension of state control over 
the economy and the consequent suspension of market forces in key 
areas of the productive process. Although the government's rallying 
cry at the start of hostilities was for "business al!l usual," wi th the 
recruitment of a "government of businessmen" under Lloyd George the 
state began to assuae in a piece-meal fashion, 
direct control of productive capacity, either by taking over 
the management of fins, as in the case of the railways, the 
National Shell factories, the collieries, the flour mills and 
the Irish Distilleries, or control by requisitioning of output 
or licensing; there was state purchase of raw materials, especi-
ally abroad; there were restrictions of dealings, especially 
imports and exports, by licensing and other means, and similar 
restrictions of capital expenditure (Pollard, 1969, p.47). 
The state managed the major transport systems, purchased 9($ of imports 
and marketed 8a,C of hOlle food suplies. It similarly either controlled 
prices of many goods or sanctioned price-fixing agreements among affected 
producers and assuaed direction of the labour supply, suspending the 
long and painfully established rights of workers and trade unions. 
While most of these features evaporated quickly with the end of 
the war. they did leave a permanent imprint on such areas as labour 
relations, methods of production, the use of tariff protection and 
most i~portantly the organization and structure of industry. In all of 
these spheres the reversal of laissez-faire policy entailed nothing 
short of a transition to the political economy of "organized capitalism," 
albeit on only a transitory basis. Reconstruction saw the revival of 
orthodoxy and the attempt to revert back to liberal principles (much 
as following World War Two), but the experience of the regime of "war 
socialism" made a definite impact both practically and Deologically. 
Not only were certain of the organizational changes irreversible in 
any absolute sense, but for many industrial leaders and their polit-
ical representatives the model of state regulation and discipline was 
firmly implanted as an alternative to the anarchic structure of liberal 
capitalism (Wendt). In later years of economic and social crisis they 
revived this .odel of a corporatist regime as the programmatic frame-
work for the complete overhaul of British society; the common war 
backgrOund of virtually all of the corporatist polemicists of the 19)os 
testifies to the long-term ideological significance of the war system 
despite the liberal roll-back instituted during reconstruction. 
On the labour front,following the truce between the government 
and trade union leaders embodied in the Treasury Agreement of March, 
1915, and later in the Munitions of War Act, the "dilution" of the 
skilled trades through the employment of women and other unskilled 
labourers at tasks formerly reserved for craftsmen not only undermined 
the privileged position of the labour aristocracy ( and caused some of 
worst social conflict in 20th century British history), but it cleared 
the resistance from below to the installation of labour-saving auto-
matic processes. such as the conveyor belt, accompanied by the detailed 
division of labour and the use of payment-by-resul ts systems. The 
successful integration of trade union leaders as junior partners in 
the war-time state system also raised at least the prospect of a new 
mode of social control through co-optation, although this strategy 
appeared far too risky for most industrialists except under the ex-
ceptional conditions of war. The bid to placate trade union expecta-
tions that government supervision and/or control would continue into 
the post-war period reached a high-water mark with the proposals of 
the Whitley Committee in 1917 for Joint Industrial Councils on national, 
district and plant levels as a means for the peaceful arbitration of 
industrial disputes. Yet, while these Councils (or Trade Boards as 
referred to in the second Report) were extended over a number of minor 
trades, they never received significant government backing and rapidly 
faded in importance except in the case of the Civil service. In labour 
relations the post-war reversal was fairly complete, although the use 
of industry-wide bargaining among all grades of workers in place of 
local agreements primarily with craft workers did spread rapidly after-
wards on the basis of the war experience. Laissez-faire policies pre-
vailed in the immediate aftermath of reconstruction, but the example of 
state supervision remained as a model for future reference when the need 
again arose for trade union co-operation (Pollard, ibid., pp.76-88, 
Wendt. pp.1JO-l)), and Hinton). 
The war likewise stimulated interest in and the introduction of 
new methods of production. The government supported such interest di-
rectly through the founding of the Department of Scientific and Indust-
rial Research in 1916 and encouraged industrial groups to set up their 
own collective research organizations. While the effects of these efforts 
were felt most accutely in engineering, as mentioned above, state 
inducement and war-tiae expansion also led to rapid technological change 
in such industries as chemicals (especially dye-stuffs), optics, 
electronics, automobiles, precision glass and machine tools as well 
as the extension of the use of basic open-hearth technique in steel-
making. The imposition of price and profits controls on a cost-plus 
basis facilitated the introduction of modern forms of book keeping 
_ r.,.'+_ 
associated with the schools of "scientific ~anagement." In the 
chemical industry state financial support was of key importance :n 
the founding of the British Dyestuffs Corporation in 1918, later one 
of the firms involved in the formation of ICI and one of the industrial 
bases of support for tariff protection in the interwar era. In gen-
eral the interest in industrial research went hand in glove with the 
expansion of productive capacity and industrial reorganization induced 
by the war. Industrial capital awoke to the potential benefits of 
amalgamation and association when coupled with collective research 
and price agreements among competitors (Wendt, pp.l33-l)6 and Pollard, 
ibid., pp.53-62). 
The McKenna Tariff of 1915 finally achieved what the Tariff Re-
form campaign had been unable to accomplish, namely the first breech 
in the hitherto impregnable fortress of free trade orthodoxy. The 
conditions of total war quite simply forced the government to seriously 
consider the capacities of the Empire to provide the basic raw mater-
ials and foodstuffs necessary for British survival, particularly given 
th&;Geraan strategy of economic war through the unrestricted use of U-
boats. The Imperial Conference of 1917 gave official sanction to the 
call for greater unity to secure Imperial independence in basic mater-
ials and industries through some measure of Imperial Preference. While 
protecti ve measures had been introduced by the government in any case, 
particularly in chemicals, the Report of the Committee on Commercial 
and Industrial Policy after the War under Balfour, including representa-
tives of the textile, shipbuilding, iron and steel, electricity, and 
engineering industries along with the prominent Tariff Reformer, W.A.S. 
Hewins, renewed the deaand for the new, science-based "key industries" 
even after reconstruction. This policy faltered as well during the 
period of liberalization, but it did achieve some success with the 
trade associations the basis for a new set of industry-state relations 
for thp process of reconstruction. The direct result of these efforts 
" ..as thp crprltion of t.hp !'ir!5t !;UCCPss1ul ;:>eak organization of industrial 
capital on a national basis. Dudley Docker was one of the leading 
figures of the time, a manufacturer whose vision of Britain's 
future encompassed, 
a completely integrated society and economy, in which each industry 
would have its own organization of workers and managers, the 
two sets of organizations united by peak federations, and all 
finally capped by a great national forum of workers and manag-
ers and employers, embraced by the protection of an Imperial 
Tariff (Blank, 1973, p.14). 
In early 1916 Docker initiated a gathering of indutrialists representing 
some 100 firms primarily based, like his own, in the Midlands engin-
eering sector which led to the formation of the Federation of British 
Industries. These efforts were hampered from the start, however, by 
the existence of two other nascent peak associations, the British 
Manufacturers' Association, likewise based in Birmingham but oriented 
essentially towards tariff reform, and the Employers' Parliamentary 
Association, centered by contrast on the cotton and textile industries 
of Manchester and, reflecting the continued division of industrial 
capi ta 1, coui tted to f%"ee trade. While nel ther of the two al terna-
tive associations were able to overcome their local and sectional 
framework, the absorption of the Manchester group into the FBI in 
1916 required the abandonment of protection as the precondition for 
a national industrial organization. The Federation quickly spread its 
cover to the bulk of the industrial sectors of the economy, but the 
continued divisions within productive capital meant that FBI policy 
was vi tia ted by the cOllpromises necessary for unity. The FBI con-
sequently began with the lowest-common-denominator approach that 
characterized it for much of its subsequent history, effectively 
preventing bold initiatives even during periods of severe economic 
Safeguarding of Industries Act of 1921 and the Dyestuffs (Import Regu-
lation) Act of 1920. The former was in particular the result of the 
efforts of the remaining Chamberlain supporters, organized in Parlia-
ment in the British Commonwealth Union and the Unionist Business Commit-
tee, and while limited to "key industries" was extended to cover some 
other sectors during the 19205. Thus, if the war did not result in 
thw whole-hearted adoption of a preference policy, it did lay the 
groundwork for the ultimate victory of the neo-imperialists like L.S. 
Amery and Meville ChaIIlberlain in 1932 both through securing the partial 
acceptabdlity of protective measures on a case-by-case basis and through 
its indirect revival of imperialist ideology and organizations (Wendt, 
pp.lJ6-l)9 and Pollard, ibid., pp. 19)-195). 
The system of war controls had its greatest effect, however, on 
the organization and structure of industry, in particular through the 
direct encouragement given to trade associations and peak organizations. 
The system of direct controls could only be made effective if it secured 
the active co-operation of the manufacturers. Any ideological objections 
were diffused through the simple and practical expedient of "administering 
production controls through agencies headed and directed by businessmen," 
setting in this area as well a precedent for state control in future 
times of national emergency (Hurwitz, p.lSO). The above-mentioned 
innovations in industrial research, the protection of key industries 
and labour relations were closely inter-related with the state-supported 
development of industrial organizations for commercial and political ends. 
Industrialists had their first taste of "functional" economic organization, 
and the lessons of war-time co-operation were not forgotten when the 
contradictions of competitive capitalism erupted with a vengence in 
the inter-war yean (Pollard, ibid., pp.53-62 and Harris, pp.)6-)8). 
Some of the "new breed" of industrialists saw in the emerging 
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crisis (Blank, ibid., pp.13- l 5). 
Indeed, the political weakness of industrial capital was further 
, 
indicated by the FBI's early depeaence on state support. In particu-
lar the Foreign office appears t~have played a major role in stim-
ulating its creation and early growth. Two of its key staff members 
in the inter-war years, Roland Nugent, the first Director-General, 
and Guy Locock, the Secretary and second Director-General, were both 
introduced into the FBI on secondment from the recently created Com-
mercia1 Section of the Foreign Office. This was not the last time that 
the state would act as instigator in the attempt to forge a single 
peak organization of business interests, e.g. under Labour in 1965 (ibid.). 
Whi le the FBI quickly established itself as the central organiza-
tion of British industry, its internal divisions over the question of 
tariff reform were further exacerbated by initiatives on the pressing 
issue of industrial relations. Docker's organic vision of a co-opera-
tive empire necessarily linked both aspects of imperial unity and the 
reform of industrial relations. He and others of a similar mind were 
favourably disposed towards the proposals of the Whitley Committee for 
joint industrial councils of workers' and employers' representatives 
as a locus for resolving disputes without recourse to industrial action. 
In December, 1917, the Fed~ration's Labour Committee issued its only 
report urging discussions between trade unionists and trade associations 
to bring a stop to restrictive practices and extend provisions for 
sickness benefit, superannuation, disability allowances, unemployment 
and technological displacement benefits and even minimum wages for 
periods of short-time work, all on the basis of shared contributions 
and in addition to any government measures. This report, however, 
created another major fissure within the FBI, and the threat of resig-
nation from the employers' Associations forced its withdrawel (ibid., pp. 
16-18) . 
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The Federation was compelled by these same groups, led by the 
Engineering FJuployers' ?'ederation, to pass a "self-denying ordinance" 
prohibiting any dealings with labour affairs. Yet, the FBI's interest 
in progresr.ive labour relations did not end at that point. It sup-
ported a National Industrial Conference in February, 1919, which re-
commended legislation on a minimum wage and limits on working hours 
as well as the formation of a permanent National Industrial Council. 
While these proposals were never implemented by the government, in the 
wake of the conference the employers' federations seceeded from the 
Federa tion and set up the National Confedera. tion of Employers' Organ-
izations, later renamed the British Employers' Confederation, which 
henceforth dealt exclusively with industrial relations leaving the 
FBI to concern itself with other matters of interest to industry (ibid.). 
The British Manufacturers' Association likewise continUed into 
the inter-war years on an independent basis, although incorporated 
briefly as a constituent organization of the FBI in 1917. It was 
more overtly political in stance, committed to protection and largely 
based on small .anufacturing firms in the Midlands, although larger 
companies like Austin were initially active. Docker, disillusioned 
with the compromised policies of the FBI, resigned from the latter 
to take up a leading role in the National Union of Manufacturers, 
as the BMA was rechristened, which did not exclude discussions of in-
dustrial relations' matters. However, in later years the NUM became 
largely the voice of small capital, opposing the close relations be-
tween big business and the state, especially under Labour governments. 
and forcing concessions on the flank of the FBI, whatever the con-
victions of the latter's leadership (ibid., pp.l9-2l). 
As a result of these splits on key policy issues the stewardship 
of the FBI passed to more conservative industrialists, and the Feder-
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ation backed off from its founders' conception of the organization 
as a creative and initiating force in industry-Labour-state relations. 
It began to focus more on industrial services and such general pol-
icies as could command universal business support, e.g., lower 
taxation and government spending. Progressive industrialists in 
consequence often had to take initiatives outside the auspices of the 
key peak organizations or at least without their official backing, 
as in the case of the Mond-Turner conferences, the movement for the 
rationalization of British industry or the agitation for imperial 
preference. However. on at least one significant issue the FBI was 
able to formulate a distinct political position, albeit one which 
was rather weak owing to continuing divisions and its general lack 
of authority, namely the question of the return to the gold standard 
in 1925. 
The conflict between industry and finance continued through the 
inter-war period, although the issues in question varied considerably 
froM the simple opposition between free trade and protection. The 
period was marked by the personality of Montagu (later Lord) Norman, 
who reigned over the Bank of England for the entire era and was at the 
focus of many of the controversies. An understanding of the role of the 
City in the formation of government policy is impossible without a 
fairly close consideration of his aims and activities. In general 
one may say that the hegemony of the dominant financial bloc was per-
petuated , first, through the return to the gold standard in the attempt 
to re-establish the pre-war linkage between international capital flows 
and the domestic economy and, second, through the specific articulation 
between the state and the financial system, i.e., the set of rules 
governing public borrowing and expenditure. In both cases practices 
appropriate to an earlier stage of capitalist development were continued 
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into a period when conditions had vastly altered. 
The return to the gold standard in 1925 is rightly seen in the 
literature on this era as the focal point of the conflict between 
industry and finance. There is little doubt as to the aims of the 
City and the Bank of England during the first decade following World 
;jar One: 
The men of 1919 believed that the best monetary system was that 
of 1913: a world gold standard centered on London, with the Bank 
of England controlling the system by manipulation of Bank Rate, 
and acting as the watchdog of financial practice (Sayers, Vol.l, 
p.lll). . 
The Cunl1ffe COllUlli ttee on Currency and Foreign Exchanges after the War 
had recommended as early as August, 1918, a return to gold at the pre-
war parity rate as soon as practicable. The Committee, in fact does not 
seem to have considered any alternative (Clay, p.l55). None of the 
various witnesses called before it challenged its basic assumption 
of the desirability of restoring "the conditions necessary to the 
maintenance of an effective gold standard ••• without delay (cited in Mogg-
ridge,l}6G,p.12)." Consequently, its recommendations focussed simply 
on the prerequisites to that end, namely, 1. the elimination of gov-
ernment borrowing, 2. the re-establishment and raising of the Bank 
of England discount rate tying domestic credit to the flows of inter-
national finance and 3. limiting the issue of fiduciary notes. 
Wi th regard to internal policy the Bank wanted to reduce the 
price level as quickly as possible from the inflated war levels. 
Likewise, the vast growth of Treasury bills during the war meant that 
th~ Bank rate had little effect on the short rates in the money mar-
keto This debacle was itself a result of the way the war had been 
financed, i.e., on the terms set by financial capital through the 
intermed iAr)' of the Bank of England. As a consequence the vastly 
increased governaent budget had been financed by borrowing, resulting 
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in an ~normous increase in the size of the floating debt. The reduc-
tion of th~ latter was a main aim of the Bank during this period, but 
of th~ thrpe yossible means to this end, i.e., running a budget sur-
plus, funding (converting to long-term debt) or a capital levy (for 
example,on war profiteers), the Bank favoured the first. Its fear of 
inflation because of its lack of control over the money supply also 
led it to support a high Bank rate, although the government held back 
for a time on this measure for fear of unemployment and the likelihood 
of labour unrest (see Howson, p.ll). 
The government's policies were constrained by the fact that the 
Bank acted as the sort of institution it was, a private bank with public 
responsibilities following the "sound financial practices" articulated 
by the financial sector (Tomlinson, 1977). From 15 December, 1919 the 
government affirmed the policy of returning to the gold standard at 
pre-war parity at the earliest favourable moment. Even before that 
date the Bank rate had been raised to ~, falling somewhat thereafter 
and then rising again in preparation for the return to gold. Deflation-
ary policies fitted in with the national and international goals as 
well as the ideological axioms of the dominant agents in the policy-
making process. The Bank advocated them as a necessary step on the 
road to the restoration of the pre-war international financial system 
and the Treasury out of an equal commitment to the reduction of the 
war debt through budget surpluses. 
Norman's position in the City's campaign for the resumption of the 
gold standard was crucial. As Strange argues, his perspective demon-
strated the inherent schizophrenia of a "top currency" state, namely the 
conflict of interest between internationally-minded finance and dom-
estic industry (Strange, p·5l). There is no question that Norman put 
the preservation of the international role of the City at the top of his 
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list of priorities, supporting the City's attempts to re-establish 
its cpntral financial role. As Clay points out in his apologia for 
the "Norman yoke," he viewed devaluation (returning to gold at a low-
er exchange rate) only in negative terms. He felt that its positive 
effects would have been eliminated by the rise in prices of necessary 
imports and by the reduction in income from overseas' investment, 
shipping, etc., all of which were denominated in sterling. 
To these obvious advantages in working for the pre-war rate, 
Norman would add the less definable but not less real advan-
tages of restoring and maintaining the country's internatiooal 
position - the advantages of possessing a world currency, which 
made IBytlents to other countries easy becaused they were always 
willing to hold balances in it, and facilitated the entrep8t 
trade and international services which contributed a large part 
of the country's overseas earnings (Clay, p.l6o). 
Furthermore, 
the Bank and the City would naturally attach great importance 
to the loss of prestige which devaluation would have involved, 
and the Treasury officials do not seem to have differed (ibid. 
p.155)· 
As a result of these considerations Norman led the move back to gold 
as soon as the two most disturbing features of the financial system, 
the war debt and German reparations payments, were resolved to his 
satisfaction, even if the latter proved more intractable as the years 
passed by. 
The global strategy of Norman was perhaps best expressed by one 
of his main adversaries in the world of high finance, Emile Moreau, 
the Governor of the Bank of France at the timel 
Now that the financial position of Britain has been restored, 
they are striving to make London the great international finan-
cial centre. But those close to Norman state that this is not 
his lI&in objective. Apart from all ideas of centralization, 
he wants Iftore than anything else to witness the setting up of 
links between the various banks of issue, even without his 
initiative. His big idea would be the following. The economic 
and financial organization of the world appears to the Governor 
of the Bank of Eng1Lnd to be the major task of the twentieth 
century. In his view, politicians and political institutions 
are in no fit state to direct with the necessary competence and 
continuity this task of organization which he would like to see 
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undertaken ~Y central banks, independent at once of governments 
and private finance. Hence, his campaign in favour of complete-
ly autonomous central banks, dominating their own financial mar-
kets and deriving their power from agreement among themselves 
(citee in Boyle, 1~7, p. 205)· 
Norman's project for the centralization of world credit through 
the co-operation of central banks was a few decades premature. In 
the 19205, one might say, the British bourgeoisie had lost and the 
American bourgeoisie had not yet gained the capacity for governing 
world finance. Britain's status as the "top currency" nation was 
alreadY dependent on financial support of the dollar, hence Norman's 
close relationship with Benjamin Strong of the New York Federal Reserve 
Bank. At this time the national ruling classes of the West were far 
too divided politically for this sort of scheme, especially as part 
of a thinly disguised effort to re-establish British hegemony. The 
French in particular resisted and ultimately helped to torpedo Norman's 
plans for the restoration of the gilded age of pre-1914 capitalism 
(Strange, p. 52) • 
None the les8, the trappings of that era, i.e., the gold standard 
at the pre-war parity rate, were dusted off on the occaision of Churchill's 
budget speech of April, 1925. 'Ibe position of the City, the Bank and 
the Treasury was, as indicated above, fairly straightforward. The 
financial world and its agents and allies viewed the move as an 
expression of support for London's rightful place in the centre of the 
world financial system and as a necessary step for the revival of 
Bri tish capi talisa and the imposition of world monetary order. In 
this aim they were tacitly supported by all of the governments con-
cerned, including the I..&bour government and its Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Phillip Snowden, who proved one of the most unbending ad-
herents of financial orthodoxy of the entire inter-war era. The return 
to gold and the preliminary efforts of the early 1920s had restored 
-64-
the Bank to its dominant position in the policy-making process. 
Its autonomy from any sort of political influence was secured by 
the complete acceptance of its view on financial matters by the 
relp.vant ministers, the belief that these were best left to the "auto-
matic" regulation of the gold standard and the international flows of 
finance. 
Yet, opposition to at least some aspects of this global strategy 
oid emerge in the 1920s, at first fitfully and then with greater 
intellectual precision and the concentration of political resources. 
Industrial capital constituted the core of this opposition, although 
it was bolstered by the arguments of some prominent intellectuals, 
in particular Keynes, and the support of some leaders of organized 
la bour but not the dominant politicians of the Labour Party. This 
opposition proved ineffective, however, in the first place because it 
lacked the coherence of the dominant bloc in that it attacked mainly 
the effects of financial policies and not their presuppositions and, 
secondly, because it came after the fact, as a response to adverse 
circumstances rather than as an elaborated set of alternative policies. 
Gradually, however, the various strands of criticism were woven into a 
fairly coherent challenge to virtually every aspect of orthodox polit-
ical economy, and leading industrialists attempted, again with only 
limited success, to weld a political coalition which would prove 
capable of putting the alternative programme into political practice. 
In the initial stages industrial capital was certainly reluctant 
to Challenge financial orthodoxy in matters outside their own realm of 
expertise. They believed in the competence of the City and the Bank 
and Treasury on matters of monetary and fiscal policy, and only 
gradually came to realize the full effects of the latter on industry's 
economic prospects. At the same time the central organization of 
-----
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industrial capital. the FBI. was still only in its formative stages 
and manifested the divergent views of its members. According to 
w.A.Brown. "The general tone of industrial opinion was agnostic 
towards the question of the return to gold." The same a.uthor described 
the main expressions of industry's dissatisfaction as. first. "a 
rather vague feeling that the interests of the City. particularly 
the speculative part of the City community. were best served by a 
fluctuating exchange. while the best interests of industry were served 
by a stable exchange." and. second. an "attitude of nervousness and 
apprehension on the part of industry over a possible hardening of 
money rates and credit contraction in connection with a return to 
gold (W.A.Brown, pp.50-5l)." 
None the less, lndustrial leaders did baulk publicly at the 
course of events even if their criticisms lacked coherence and were 
politically ineffective. As early as September. 1921. W. Peter Rylands. 
the President of the FBI, sponsored a memorandum to the government which 
emphasized that, 
So far as trade ls concemed, 1 t is important to remember that 
stability is of far greater importance than the re-establishment 
of any pre-war ratio with gold or and other standard of value. 
From this point of view, deflation can be as potent a source of 
instability as inflation (cited in Hume. p.l4l). 
At the Annual General Meeting of the FBI he argued that a stable ex-
change rate at the then current value of four dollars to the pound 
would best serve the interests of the manufacturers. 
O. C. Armstrong, Rylands successor as President. initiated a 
similar memorandum to the govemment in July, 1923. The meeting which 
approved that proposal was also the occaision of a more general attack 
on "Treasury theories of IlOnetary policy" by Sir Alfred Mond, a leading 
manufacturer and founder of lCI whose subsequent activities will be 
investigated in greater detail. Yet, despite the more critical views 
, ,. 
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of somp. industrialists FBI policy remained equivocal at least in the 
period leading up to the return to gold. The Federation sent further 
memoranda to the government in October, 1923, February and July, 1924, 
and March, 1925, but from July, 1924, the objections to the pre-war 
rate had bP.en dropped (ibid.). However, one should not conclude from 
this that industrialists had enthusiastically embraced the gold standard; 
rather, they accepted the determination of the government to pursue 
that ;"'rticular course but repeated their reservations about the 
possible effects of deflation on industrial prospects. 
The most complete expression of Federation policy appeared in their 
submission of July, 1924, to the Chamberlain-Bradbury Committee on 
"Currency and Bank of England Note Issues." That memorandum accepted 
that "a general return to the gold basis by the principal trading 
countries would ••• be greatly to our benefit," but noted that such a 
general return was "impracticable" at that moment in time. Assuming 
that devaluation was ruled out itdesignated the choices as either 
waiting for U.S. prices to rise or forcing down British prices to the 
American level. The result of the second approach, it warned, would be 
detrimental to industry, involving "a serious temporary dislocation of 
trade and a probable increase in unemployment," "a severe fall in 
British prices," "a serious industrial dislocation due to the necessity 
of reducing money wages by l~, which would in present circumstances 
seriously increase the difficulty of maintaining industrial peace," 
"a strong probability that a severe check would be administered to the 
export trade." and "an increase in the real burden of the National Debt ... 
As a consequence the Federation warned that "a British initiative in 
restoring the gold standard at an early date ••• ~ould be premature and in-
advisable," and urged instead a policy of postponement or at least a 
bilateral agreement with the U.S. for regulating the value of gold 
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until an international settlement could be arranged. The memorandum 
concluded by emphasizing industry's need for stability and offered 
the view that the lattpr "cannot .•. be achieved by one country act-
ing alone. but only by a general agreement on the part of the principal 
trading countries of the world to re-establish a common monetary stan-
dard (reprinted in MacMillan Committee Evidence. Vol.l. pp.190-19l)." 
It is instructive to look at some of the other views offered to 
the same committee. Keynes and Reginald McKenna were the only other 
individuals who were opposed outright to the return to gold (Moggridge. 1969, 
pp.28-JO). Governor Norman on the other hand thought some sacrifice 
might be necessary but that this was outweighed by the benefits of 
a stable exchange rate. Another Director of the Bank of England put 
the position somewhat more explicitly. 
admitting a sacrifice even though we may differ as to the amount, 
I think it would not be too high a price to pay for the substan-
tial benefit to the trade of this country and its working classes, 
and, also, although I put it last, for the recovery by the City 
of London of its former position as the world's financial centre 
(ibid., p.28). 
Industry's reception of the final announcement of the return to 
the gold standard in April, 1925. was not exactly exuberant either. 
The President of the FBI. Colonel Willey. stated in terms reflecting 
their aMbivalent position, 
Fro- the long point of view the decision is to be welcomed, but 
the imaediate effect may create difficulties. At the present 
moment the pound is overvalued in relation to the dollar, i.e., 
in relation to gold ••• lt is to be assumed that the announcement 
made today, together with the powers given to the Bank of England, 
will rapidly bring the pound to parity with the dollar and will, 
for a time at least, increase the present difficulties of our 
export trade, which is already suffering from a greater rise in 
the value of the pound than is justified by the relative level 
of sterling and gold prices (cited in Hume, p.l44). 
Similarly. Sir Alfred Mond gave a somewhat prescient last-minute plea 
in Parliament against an overly hasty return to the gold standard. 
Now, apparently. we are to be harnessed to the money rate in 
New York. our trade to be further depressed whenever there is 
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a flurry on Wall Street, because some people seem to think we 
must be hanged on a cross of gold. I hope that doctrine will 
be repudiated. I can imagine nothing more dangerous to the 
harassed and already depressed state of trade in this country 
than that we should hitch ourselves on to the American money 
market, and take it as the guide and loadstone of British 
finance (cited in W.A.Brown, p.55). 
However, the first consideration, the desire for exchange stab-
ility in any form, was probably uppermost in the minds of less far-
sighted industrialists. W.A • Brown 's contention that "the majority of 
manufacturers were not particularly interested in the question of gold 
and monetary policy" and that "they did not clearly relate it to their 
own practical problems" is perfectly believable (i bid., p • .56). Their 
lack of concern or understanding in conjunction with the prestige that 
the City and the Bank still exercised within the dominant class no doubt 
convinced most of them to follow the lead of finance in the hope that 
the restoration of the symbols of the old order would put things right 
in reality. There was certainly no direct questioning at this point of 
the structure of the already decomposing world financial system, nor 
of the City's role in that system and in the domestic economy, nor 
of the right of the Bank of England to formulate monetary policy. 
Large industrial concerns were probably more concerned with the 
"real" problems affecting them at this time, namely the complete re-
organization of the structure of ownership that occured in British 
manufacturing in this decade. An alternative ideology for industrialists 
was articulated mainly in the movement for "rationalization" or "planning" 
which coincided with the return to the gold standard. As expressed 
by its most able advocate. Lyndall Urwick, rationalization included 
two main elements, "financial combination of business" and the applica-
tion of "scientific methods of management to existing units of control." 
Rationalization provided an alternative approach to both the free-
market competition of laissez-faire capitalism and the socialism of 
the labour movement. It seemed to be the answer to the problems of 
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over-capacity and flagging demand in the traditional export industries 
as well as th~ ~eans to provide a more stable relationship with 
labour aftpr the unprecedented levels of confrontation immediately 
following thp war and during the General Strike. One could hardly 
believe it to be coincidental that one of the main opponents to the 
return to the gold standard from within the ranks of industry. Sir 
Alfred Mond, was also very active in the merger and rationalization 
movpment. He participated in the Amalgamated Anthracite and Inter-
national Nickel combinations as well as the founding of reI. not to 
mention bis key role in the Mond-Turner talks between industry and 
organized labour. in which rationalization was offered as the pre-
condition for improving the social welfare of the working class 
(Urwick,and Hannah, pp.28-44). 
IndeP.d, the Mond-TUrner conferences must be seen as a crucial 
moment in the political as well as the industrial struggles of the 
time and a harbinger of future developments. For they not only 
amounted to an attempt at accomodation between managers and union 
leaders allowing rationalization and implicitly higher unemployment 
in the short run in return for the maintenance of the wages of those 
still at work. They were also the first attempt since the demise of 
the Tariff Reforn campaign to weld together a "producers' alliance" 
against financial capital's control of the state. The interim joint 
report adopted by the full industrial conference in July, 1928, for 
example, went considerably further than official FBI policy on the ques-
tion of the gold standard and general credit policy. Noting the fears 
about the adequacy of the gold supply and the conviction that "elas-
ticity of currency and credit" were essential to industrial recovery, 
the report resolved. 
That under the special conditions in which 
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the gold standard operates at the present time we are not con-
vinced that it is either practicable or desirable that the credit 
policy of the country should be determined more or less auto-
matically by gold movements as in pre-war days (TUC, 1928, p.2)O). 
The same report also called for the creation of a National In-
dustrial Council composed of representatives of employers' organizations 
and trarle unions, for full recognition of the role of the unions in 
industrial relations and for the establishment of machinery to review 
victemization and provide arbitration for industrial disputes. It 
further recognized the trend towards rationalization and merger but 
significantly stated that "this tendency should be welcomed and encour-
aged in so far as it leads to improvements in the efficiency of indus-
trial production, services and distribution, and to the raising of 
the standard of living of the people (ibid., p.229)." 
The final report dealt more specifically with the problem of un-
employment, and again monetary policy was accorded the greatest share 
of blame for the deteriorating situation. Consequently, it called for 
"the currency and banking policy of the Treasury and the Bank of Eng-
land [to] be framed as to take into more complete account the require-
ments of industry (TUC, 1929, p.191)." Unemployment due to rational-
iza tion was deemed to be "temporary" or not "a serious factor." In-
deed. it argued on the contrary that it was 
unfortunate for the country that industry generally, and par-
ticularly some portions of industry, have been unable, partly 
on account of the time factor, partly for more fundamental rea-
sons outside their control, such as the level of credit facili-
ties, partly on account of factors within their control, to 
apply rationalization with sufficient rapidity for the progress 
aM prosperity of the nation (ibid., p.l92). 
As Pollard has argued, the Mond-Turner conferences represented an 
attempt "by the main victims to combine forces against the Treasury 
and the City which had done them such grievous harm (Pollard, 1969. 
p.l5l ).M The effort failed of COurse but not interestingly because of 
trade union hostility. The main concern expressed at the TUC confer-
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ences was with regard to the position of unions in the drive for 
rationalization and scientific management. One opponent, George 
Hicks of the Building Trade Workers, expressed the fears of skilled 
labour regarding industrial restructuring: 
Rationalization under capitalism is a totally different thing to 
how you would approach it if it was rationalization under a 
system controlled by the people and run in the interests of the 
community. Rationalization today ••• will undermine the position 
of the craftsmen. Yes, there are some craftsmen here who will 
realize that every attempt at rationalization means a ~eneral 
cheapening of the cost of production (TUC, 1928, p.428). 
However, such objections were easily deflected by resolutions sup-
porting greater efforts at unionization as the best means of securing 
an equitable outcome from changes in the production process, and 
opponPnts of the Mond-Turner conferences like A.J.Cook, the miners' 
leader, were easily defeated. 
Rather, the moves to forge a "producers' alliance" foundered at 
this stage OVer the intransigence of the "ba.ckwoodsmentt on the employ-
ers' side. From the start the talks had been hampered by the division 
of the industrialists into several organizations. The members of the 
FBI and the National Confederation of Employers' Organizations sat 
only in an individual capacity as those associations refused to give 
the meetings official sanction. In the end hostile opinion in both 
precluded the formation of either a National Industrial Council or the 
Joint Conciliation Boards for industrial arbitration, and both sides 
rapidly lost interest in further conferences. However, at least one 
of their proposals was enacted under the MacDonald government which 
followed 800n after, na~ely the establishment of a committee to review 
financial policy and the provision of credit to industry. 
At this point in time industrial capital for the most part was 
not yet willing to undertake such a radical critique of financial 
management and the revision of political alignments that such a 
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critique implied. They simply moved ahead with the drive for ration-
alization and amalgamation as the main solution for the problem of 
industrial decline and even received considerable support from finan-
cial institutions in the course of this process. Indeed, as we shall 
indicate later, even the Bank of England dropped its narrow definition 
of its proper role for a time and actually conducted some of the efforts 
at combination, although more for reasons of financial necessity than 
for any change of its ideological commitments. Yet, industry discovered 
limits to the process of rationalization and amalgamation, not, as 
indicated above from obstruction on the part of organized labour, 
but rather in the restrictions imposed by the financial environment in 
which it operated. Rationalization could only lead to further over-
capacity if markets continued to dry up at home and abroad and if the 
vicissitudes of government economic policy undermined their confidence 
and ability to undertake the massive investment involved in restructur-
ing. Consequently, many industrial leaders pressed forward the logic 
of "planning" beyond methods of production or the structure of the 
firm to encompass relations between firms (industrial associations or 
cartelS) and the provision of credit and the framework of state econom-
ic policy. 
The writings of Lord Melchett (Alfred Mond) trace the development 
of this logic in the 1920s. An early advocate of rationalization and 
scientific management, founder of rCI and International Nickel and 
chief proponant of collaboration with the leaders of organized labour, 
Melchett expressed the aim of progressive industrialists to extend the 
process of rationalization to the whole economy and, ultimately, the 
political system. FOrhim the rational organization of industry included 
the elimination of "cut-throat" competition and financial stringency. 
National orsanizat1on was a necessity if British firms were to survive 
against superior German and American competition. The latter had the 
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advantage of close relations with their financial institutions. 
facili~~ting the process of amalgamation and the creation of cartels. 
Howpver, given the unavoidable involvement of British banks in the 
industrial crisis, he doubted whether the financial sector would be 
able to maintain its traditional distance from the affairs of man-
agement: "They will either have to incur very heavy losses when those 
concerns go into liquidation. or they will have to take into their 
own hands a redistribution and reconstruction of those businesses 
(Mond. 1927. p. 2)3)." 
National amalgamation in his view in turn laid the basis for 
international cartel agreements on prices and production quotas. 
However, the very fact that the creation of "trusts" took place on 
a national basis created obstacles in the way of international 
settlements, as national competition could simply displace that of 
individual firms. The solution offered here was once again to util-
ize the framework of the Empire as a means of both protecting industry 
in the period of transition and securing markets for British goods 
when expansion returned. Imperial development in short seemed the 
answer to both problems of over-capacity and foreign competition. 
the only means to prevent further erosion of the export trade now that 
Britain had lost its industrial superiority (ibid. and Melchett, 1st, 
19'30). These same threads became the basis of the industrialists' 
critique of orthodox economic policy when the crisis broke in the 
wake of the Wall Sreet crash. 
The MacMillan Comaittee Report and its Minutes of Evidence are 
the most important docuuents of this period as they exposed those 
in command of econo.ic policy to such criticisms. More than any 
other official inquiry into the financial system before or since, 
they displayed the attitudes of the City, the Bank and the Treasury 
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before the close questioning of various economists, especially Keynes, 
and other inter~sted parties. The Committee developed in the end 
a thorough critique of the operation of the financial system and 
the state institutions responsible for economic policy and offered 
at least a partial programme for the radical restructuring of both 
with the aim of subordinating finance to the requirements of domestic 
industry. 
The views expressed by the representatives of the City, the 
Bank and the Treasury were characteristically vague and complacent. 
They uniformly favoured the status quo envisioning only minor reforms 
to deal with the exigencies of those "abnormal conditions." The inter-
views with Montagu Norman have since become infamous for his wooly-
headedness and disregard for the domestic consequences of the Bank's 
policies. None the less, it is worth reviewing some of his statements 
to demonstrate some of the main points. 
For Norman the difficulties of the industrial sector were pri-
marily the result of external factors and its antiquated structure 
and production methods. Consequently. "the salvation of industry in 
this country. without which commerce and finance cannot long. or in-
definitely continue. lies in the process of rationalization." Indeed. 
his opening remarks went so far as to commit the Bank of England to 
furthering tha t process. wh i ch cou Id on ly be achieved by "the marriage 
of finance and industry (MacMillan Committee, Minutes of Evidence. Vol. 
1, p.211)." This marriage was to be achieved, however. not through 
a wholesale restructuring of the relations between the two sectors nor 
the goals and methods of econolllic policy. but by the Bank's sponsor-
ship of one or two comp&nies which would assist in the process of 
combination, an initiative which we will consider in greater detail 
below. 
Wi th regard to the effects of monetary policy Norman was un-
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characteristically ~xplicit. In reply to a question as to whether 
the Bank considered the consequences to industry of movements in the 
Bank rate, Norman stated, "we have them in view, yes, but .•• the main 
consideration in connection with movements in the Bank Rate is the 
international consideration." Moreover, the internal effects were 
"grea tly exagera ted" and "the disadvantages to the internal position 
were relatively small when compared w~th the advantages to the ex-
ternal position (ibid., p.2l2)." Priority had to be accorded to the 
la t ter because, 
The whole international position has preserved for us in this 
country the wonderful position which we have inherited, which 
was thought for a while perhaps to be in jeopardy, which to a 
large extent. though not to the full extent, has been re-estab-
lished. We are still to a large extent international bankers. 
We ha. ve great interne. tional trade and commerce ••• we do Jll8.intain 
huge international urkets. a free gold market, a free exchange 
market ••. and all of those things, and the confidence and credit 
which go with them are in the long run greatly to the interest 
of industry as well as to the interest of finance and commerce 
( i bid. p. 21) ) . 
The rest of the Governor's testimony was Idevoted to the defense 
of his faith that the financial system and the return to the gold 
standard had little if anything to do with the industrial depression. 
In his claim that the return to the gold standard had no necessary 
effect on price levels Norman displayed both his ignorance of the 
operation of economic policy and his virtual blind faith in his approach 
to monetary policy. His vague and contradictory statements before the 
pointed questioning of Keynes have been often reported in other works, 
but it is worth repeating his summary commentsl 
Of course, you may complain of me ••• or of those bankers you 
have seen, that the evidence they have given you comes through 
their nose and is not sufficiently technical or expert. Of 
course, that may in some measure be true; I plead guilty to 
it .yself to a certain extent, and it is a curious thing, the 
extent to which .any of those who inhabit the City of London 
find difficulty 1n statiDg the reasons for the faith that is in 
them. Mr. Keynes must know that very well (ibid., p.22l). 
The other bankers called before the Committee echoed that same 
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faith and werf- less willing than Norman to stipulate any steps that 
might If-ad to a "marriage of finance and industry." They defended 
thpir policy of aiding individual client firms if they got into 
financial difficulties but denied that it was the proper function 
of a joint-stocK bank "to take the initiative in dictating that some 
stpps of that sort {reorganizatiod ought to be taken(ibid., p.l30)." 
They ad~itted that their involvement in industrial restructuring had 
beer. ~orp or lpss forced upon them by exceptional circumstances, and 
that that role was one properly confined to the abnormal situation. 
The banks contended, quite rightly, that they did not have the experts 
or technical knowledge which would enable them to take a leading role 
in rationalization. In their comments on the monetary policies of 
the Bank of Sngland they proved equally defensive. John Rae, Director 
of Westminster Bank, betrayed the basis of his concern with questions 
on this "dangerous topic:" "If you wish to expand credit in this country 
you have got to alter your attitude towards gold, and you have got to 
alter, I think, at the same time, the position of Britain as the money 
centre of the world (ibid., p.l4J)." In short while City spokesmen 
were willing to support some measures of reorganization like the Bankers' 
Industrial Development Corporation, they refused to question the pol-
icies of the Bank of ~ngland and the role of finance in general. 
Industrialists called before the committee on the other hand were 
uniformly critical and evidently moving towards a much wider question-
ing of the role of the Bank of England and the financial sector gener-
ally. The fBI's evidence was the most comprehensive, dealing separately 
with the operation of the gold standard and with the inadequacies of 
national industrial finance. Reviewing its previous evidence to 
government committees before the return to gold, the representatives 
of the Federation priaarily attempted to justify their earlier reser-
vations and fpars. Documenting the continuing industrial depression 
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they concluded unambiguously I 
(a) That British monetary policy during the past five years 
cannot be acquitted of an important share of responsibility 
for thp lamentable conditions of trade and employment during 
that ~priod, and for the lack of expansion of our overseas 
acti vi ties. 
(b) That the sacrifices of industry to the needs of finance 
which that policy has entailed have not been adequately counter-
balanced by benefits conferred on other sections of the community. 
(c) That from the point of view of British industry and commerce 
the essential pre-requisite of a proper functioning of the gold 
standard is that it should be international both in scope and 
operation. 
(d) That there is no indication that the post-war gold standard 
is likely to resume its pre-war "automatic" regulatory functions 
in the near future, unless conscious and deliberate steps to this 
end are taken by the Central Banking Authorities of the world in 
concert. 
(e) That having regard to the recent policy of certain gold-using 
countries, notably the U.S.A., there is no reason to anticipate 
that the necessary element of international co-operation will be 
forthcoming, unless much more vigorous action is taken, despite 
the lip-service paid to the underlying principle in such universally 
acclaimed resolutions as those adopted at the Genoa Conference 
in 1922 (ibid., p.l88). 
Given such a pessimistic appraisal of the possibilities of central 
bank co-operation the FBI representatives could only conclude that "we 
are no longer justified in looking for a resumption of our foreign trade 
activities on pre-war lines, however successful ~ reorganization and 
rationalization .2!! .!:h! industrial ~ may be. et The impact of disaster 
in the staple industries, they argued, had only been limited and partic-
ular in range, while restriction of the money supply had a general effect. 
Consequently, it was useless to seek salvation by concentrating efforts 
on reconstructing those sectors I "A permanent cure will not be possible 
unless international financial arrangements are set up to replace 
the system destroyed by the war." Given the lack of co-operatiCtl and 
the emergence of "national financial policies" and "self-contained and 
exclusive groups," such new arrangements cou1d only be made on a national 
basis (ibid., p.l89). While the representatives of the FBI would not 
be drawn out too explicitly as to the exact meaning of these terms, the 
implications were clear enough. They wanted an elastic monetary system 
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catnble of p.xpanding or contracting to meet the needs of industry. 
an abandonment of laissez-faire foreign trade policies, in particu-
lar tying foreign invp.stment to the purchase of British goods ano some 
kind of protection from foreign competition, but one which allowed for 
the continuation of considerable overseas investment which they saw 
as a precondition for expanded exports. In short industrialists were 
beginning to link up the reform of economic policy with the old issue 
of imperial preference, although that particular term was not used 
(ibid., pp.199-Z10). 
With regard to national industrial finance the Federation was again 
plagued with internal conflict so could only offer a majority rather than 
a unanimous opinion. Its criticisms here were mainly aimed at defects 
in the banking system taken as a whole, focussing in particular on 
the lack of intermediate credit facilities between short-term over-
draughts and shares offered to the public. Industrial spokesmen also 
/ 
expressed concern that long-term facilities denied to them might be 
offered to their rivals abroad through the international operations 
of the City. More generally they worried about the lack of co-ordina-
tion between industry and finance, but here as well internal conflicts 
precluded bold suggestions for reorganization, such as calling for 
investment by the banks in industry, 
The difficulty which faced our Committee in framing recommenda-
tions with the view to securing this end co-ordinating finacial 
informa tion wi th the banks has already been partly referred to 
above. the danger that close co-ordination between the banks 
might lead. to the development of some form of "Money Trust," 
which would not only destroy the already somewhat limited com-
petition between the banks, but, in addition, give them an un-
due element of control over the development of our national in-
dustries. In addition, while it was felt highly desirable that 
the banks should be adequately informed in regard to such matters 
as the general productive capacity, market prospects and other 
relevant statistics in connection with the major industries, the 
Coui t tee were not anxious to encoura.ge anything in the nature of 
a direct participation of the banks in industry (ibid., Vol.Z, p.Z4l). 
-~-
ThP evidpnce of the two other industrial associations called 
beforp the Committee confirms the increasing unity within industrial 
~1piUll on ~ny of these points despite continuing divisions on some 
asppcts. The National Union of Manufacturers, speaking on behalf of 
smal: business. emphasized the need of the latter for securing ade-
quatp long-term credit. particularly in the cases of short-term dif-
ficulties. They suggested state guarentees on all long-term bank 
advances to industry. One of their representatives, Edward Berkeley, 
went on to suggest the emancipation of the provision of credit from 
thp. tie to gold, arguing instead that the money system should be based 
on the resources of the Empire. He also proposed that the state should 
fund a British Trade Bank modeled on the German industrial banks, which 
would finance imperial trade and take a lead in reorganizing British 
industry (ibid., Vol.l, pp.l45-l)6). Likewise the Federation of Mas-
ter Cotton Spinners' Association, a bastion of free-trade opinion in 
earlier times, gave evidence indicating the shift in their views: 
The Federation is of the opinion that the present monetary 
system is acting very adversely towards the Cotton Trade, and 
feels that the present deplorable condition of the industry is 
in great measure due to the existing monetary system, which 
undoubtedly is detrimental to producers (ibid., Vol.2, p.109). 
Highly critical of the operation of the gold standard their submission 
went on to suggest a national financial system "designed to promote 
nnd intensify production within the home market." They believed that 
a proper monetary policy would do away with the debate over protection 
vp.rsus free trade, since neither was the key to the industrial depres-
sion (ibid •• pp.109-12J). 
When finally published in 1931 the Repert of the MacMillan 
Committee incorporated some of these objections. While rejecting 
the abandonment of the gold standard or devaluation, it noted that 
"the relations between the British financial world and British industry, 
~s distinct fro", British commerce, have never been so close as be-
twe~n German financ~ and German industry or between American finance 
(1nri AmpricRn i.nrju~,try (~laci'lillan 80mmittee, Report, para. 376)." 
It advocated associating a single bank with competing firms in the 
Mme industry to facilitate rationalization on the German model: 
British companies in the iron and steel, electrical and other 
industries must meet in the gate their great American and German 
competi tors who are generally financially powerful and closely 
supported by banking and financial groups, with whom they have 
continuous relationships. British Industry, without similar 
support, will undoubtedly be at a disadvantage. But, such effec-
tive support cannot be obtained merely for a particular occais-
ion. It can only be the result of intimate co-operation over 
years during which the financial interests get an insight into 
the problems and the requirements of the industry in question 
(ibid., para.)e4). 
It also recommended that an institution like the Bankers' Industrial 
Development Corporation be set up on a permanent basis in order to 
supply intermediate and long-term credit to industry and facilitate 
closer relations between the two sectors (para. 403), A similar insti-
tution could be set up to meet the equivalent needs of small businesses 
( para. 4(4). 
In the meantime industrialists were hardly inactive in their 
attempts to organize the productive sector. The movement for ration-
alization had occupied most of their energy in the late 1920s, but by 
1929 slump conditions created a new fear that rationalization would 
simply add to existing problems of over-capacity and unemployment. 
As indicated in the evidence to the MacMillan Committee industrial 
leaders werP. faced with the contradiction between their need to restruc-
ture and the apparent intractability of low demand. They needed changes 
in the economic environment in addition to internal restructuring and 
many of th~ leaders of the rationalization movement turned their ef-
forts towards the desired reforms of British poll tical economy. In 
particular, in those years of international economic disorganization 
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they renewed active promotion of their long-standing commitment to 
an i~perial tariff, now increasingly coupled with a demand for an end 
to thp gold standard basis of British monetary policy (Pollard, 1969, 
ThP activity of the FBI developed rapidly following a survey of 
members indicating 96% of those replying were in favour of changing 
"the existing Free Trade fiscal system," including a majority in every 
single industrial sector (FBI, Fiscal Policy Committee, Sept. 1930). 
On 13 October, 1930, the Grand Council resolved that "the Federation 
of British Industries shall press by every means in its power for the 
establishment of a fiscal system which will combine protection of our 
industrial interests at home with the widest possible extension of 
Inter-Empire Preference (FBI, Grand Council Minutes, 1J Oct., 1930). 
As a result the FBI set up two committees, one on fiscal policy and the 
other on industrial policy, to thrash out and promote policies for 
., 
imperial preference and related questions like the gold standard. 
The Fiscal Policy group set up a co-ordinating committee includ-
ing their representatives, Henry Mond (son of Alfred) and the FBI 
President - Sir James Lithgow, along with representatives from Lord 
Melchett's Empire Economic Union, the Empire Industries Association, 
the National Union of Manufacturers and the National Council of Indus-
try and Commerce. This committee took charge of the united efforts 
of industrial capital in lobbying and conducting a publicity campaign 
over the next two years in favour of imperial preference. Soon recon-
stituted as the League of Industry, its main activities were concen-
trated in strenuous propoganda efforts, including meetings, press re-
leases and advertisements, leaflets and even toying with the notion of 
demonstrations in the .ain industrial centres. As in the previous 
Tariff Reform campaign they had to contend with opposition from the 
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Liberal Free Trade movement, but the members of the committee at any 
rdte considered the latter thwarted by June, '1931 (FBI, Co-ordinating 
Committep. on Fiscal Policy, Minutes, 1930-31), 
The Industrial Policy Committee had to work out the thornier 
issues about the gold standard about which there was much less unan-
imity. While some advocated devaluation or abandoning the gold stand-
ard, the President expressed the ambiguity of their situation, pointing 
out that, 
While the oplnlon of bankers was popularly held to be author-
itative on these matters and while they pursued their policy of 
vigorously opposing any inflation, if the Federation were to 
make such a recommendation it might weaken the importance that 
would attach to the rest of their recommendations in other di-
rections and would probably be of no avail in any event (FBI, 
Industrial Policy Committee Minutes, 6 December, 19)0). 
Given these considerations the Committee agreed to concentrate on the 
aims of the preference campaign and lower taxation, which dominated the 
public statement released in March, 1931, Industry and the Nation (see 
Blank, 197). p.26). By September, 1931, however, the members of the 
Fiscal Policy Committee were in agreement that the implementation of 
the tariff policy had to be accompanied by going off gold if it were 
to make any difference to the industrial situation and the financial 
crisis (FBI, Fiscal Policy Committee Minutes, 16 Sept., 1931). 
Yet, despite these prodigious efforts the organizational weakness 
of industrial capital at the political level and the structural and 
ideological predominance of theCity precluded any serious change in 
monetary and fiscal policy. Even on the question of Empire preference 
the FBI had not played a leading role but was moving along with the 
drift in responsible opinion. The campaign had been initiated outside 
the auspices of the FBI by industrial leaders like Lord Nuffield (Wil 
liam Morris) and Lord Helchett and by imperial propagandists such as 
Lord Hilner, L.S.Aaery and Lord Beaverbrook. By July, 1930, even some 
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prominent h~nkers, Reginald McKenna, Beaumont Pease, R.H.Tennant, 
Sir Henry Goschen, Sir Guy Grant and F.C.Goodenough, had come out in 
support of imperial protection (S.~.Thomas. r.h.? and Skidelsky, 1967 
p.229n). By the autumn of that year when the FBI finally threw itself 
into the campaign, the only dogmatic free traders left were some Lib-
eral MPs, a large section of the City and of course key figures in 
the MacDonald Cabinet, especially the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Philip Snowden (ibid.). 
The labour government remained wedded to fiscal and monetary 
orthodoxy despite the efforts of these groups and others operating 
within the labour movement. The explanation for the "failure of 
nerve" of the MacDonald government has less to do with their wooly-
headed vision of socialism and lack of an intermediate programme, as 
Skidelsky has argued, and much more to do with the institutional 
and ideological hold of the City on the state apparatus. By the time 
of the final crisis political opinion was thoroughly fractured, the 
Liberals dropping their earlier support for expanding public spending 
but still opposing protection, the Conservatives predominantly pro-
tectionist but calling for cuts in taxes and expenditure, and Labour 
riddled with divisions on every issue. In this confusion the bankers' 
view simply prevailed. Neither industry nor the Labour movement 
could mobilize sufficient forces or even reach a consensus on an 
alternative programme, and the major parties were equally at sea 
(see Skidelsky, 1967, chs.lO and 11). 
The debate among economic historians over the return to the gold 
standard has largely centered on the question of the effects of re-
valuation entailed in returning at the pre-war parity rate. While it 
is not my intention here to engage in a detailed examination of this 
controverny, a few comments are in order. First, the focus on the rate 
of exchange is no doubt a result of the famous attack by Keynes in 
"The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill." Yet, while the choice 
of the higher rate certainly resulted in an immediate over-valuation of 
the pound (Moggridge, l~~/), the selection of a lower rate of exchange 
of say 14.40 might not have made a great deal of difference. The 
countries which followed Britain onto gold could easily have chosen 
a rate for themselves that would still have devalued their own curren-
cies by an equivalent amount. Second. given the return to the gold 
standard and the limited reserves available to the Bank of England, its 
policies on credit would have been inevitable oriented towards maintain-
ing or increasing those reserves. Thus, the Bank rate was subordinated 
to the continuing attempts to balance short-term financial inflows with 
long-term outflows under the very strict conditions imposed by the re-
serves. Its central efforts were directed towards raising the reserves. 
so the Bank was more inclined to raise the Bank rate when it was loosing 
gold than lower it when conditions improved (Howson. p.)6). The condi-
tions involved in re-establishing the gold standard at any rate of ex-
change. i. e.. the attempt to regain the "top currency" role for sterling. 
pre-empted a credit policy designed for the immediate needs of the indus-
trialists. namely reflation. Third. the Bank did in fact increase its 
reserves considerably in the years following 1925. but they none the 
less proved inadequate when the final crunch came in 1931 (Sayers. Vol.l. 
p.2l8). The question of the exact rate of exchange therefore seems less 
significant, at least as an explanation of the final crisis. although 
it no doubt hurt the industrial sector and indicated the ideological 
hold of the City on state institutions. The Treasury's ability to use 
debt management and budgetary policy for reflation was likewise con-
strained by the structure of the financial system. It accepted as well 
the overriding need to reduce the floating debt. the level of which had 
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been set by the wartime practices of finance, and were avers to 
increasing government expenditure through borrowing on the terms set 
by thf" financl(\ ~ sector. The Treasury's adherence to orthodoxy sim-
ply confirmed thf" overwhelming ideological and institutional hegemony 
of financial capital (Tomlinson, 1~81, pp. 101-) and Moggridge, 1972, p. 142). 
In thf" fina. ~ resu 1 t the political efforts of industrialists and 
various intelectuals like Keynes and G.D.H.Cole to bring about 
a changf" in the priorities of economic policy came to nothing. Rather, 
it was the world financial crisis that began in the United States that 
brought down the gold standard system. Following the Dawes Plan of 
1924 U.S. lending overseas increased dramatically, sustaining the Ger-
man economy until 1928. This flow was then diverted to the feverish 
speculation on .all Street until ultimately disrupted by the Great 
Crash. The speculative frenzy preceeding the crash drew off funds 
from London into the hot New York market, putting the gold standard 
under great strain even then as London depended on the inflow of short-
term funds from Amnica to balance the long-term outflow. The Bank 
rate stayed a notch above that of New York, reaching 6.5% in September, 
1929. as authorities on both sides of the Atlantic tried vainly to 
control the effects of the American boom. In fact the Bank of England's 
immediate reaction to the news of the Wall Street collapse was one of 
relief as it promised to remove the main source of strain and offer 
the prospect of lower interst rates (Howson, p.66). However, the dis-
ruption of the U.S. financial system resulted eventually in a severe 
decrease in international lending in turn forcing Britain off of the 
gold standard in 1931 (Kindleberger. ch.6 and Howson. ch.4). 
The final crisis began in May, 1931, with the failure of the 
Kredit-Anstalt. an Austrian universal bank on the German model. In-
solvency grew to major proportions. especially for the short-term 
creditor nations like the U.S. and France. As Howson describes it, 
--r;-
The ;7i;-l.d ~cr:l:::t-~f' for :iquidity in mid-19Jl could not be sto;Jped 
by crpdits fro~ thp. Ban~ for International Settlements, the 
B?nk of ~:ngl,\nd, top Bank of France and the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York to the Reichsbank, nor by U.S. Presidnt Hoover's 
offer of a onp-year moratorium on all inter-government debts on 
?0 Jun p ; on 1, ~uly the Darmstadter Bank failed ane thereupon the 
entire G~rmar. banking system ~dS closed (Hawson, p.7S). 
The Austrian crisis ~\rk~ "the end of Britain as the lender of last 
resort" for the international financial system (Kindleberger, p.l5l). 
The crisis next :>t:-uCf. London,and :J. failuI'P of confidence in the pound 
drew off £12m in ~old within two weeks despite a two per cent rise in 
the Bank rate. Montagu Norman himself collapsed at a meeting of the 
Bank of ~ng1and's :o~mittee of the Treasury on 29 July and was removed 
from the scene for the duration of the panic. England remained tied to 
gold until 19 September, when the Deputy Governor finally requested 
the government to end the obligation to sell gold on demand. 
The domestic problems exacerbated by the return to gold did not 
thus have a direct bearing on its ultimate collapse. The causes of the 
final crisis were in i .. ediate terms financial. Conversely, pace Keynes, 
alternative policies were never simply a matter of the limited intellects 
of those presiding over the policy-making process or the need for 
persuasive arguaent against old shiboleths. For, in Pollard's words, 
Thectpcis inn of the monetary authorities in this period cannot 
become fully intelligible until it is realized that they were 
dominated by a narrow section of the City, the section concerned 
with international finance. both long-term and short-term, and 
by its spokesman and representative, the Bank of England (Pollard, 
1970, p. n). 
Thp. s1ne qua non of the City's position within the state system was, 
in turn, tht" gold standard with its "automatic" regulation of credit. 
Going off gold was a necessary, although evidently not a sufficient, 
precondition for fo~ulating & national employment policy. Such a re-
orientation was only possible on the basis of a political mobilization 
against t~ City's control of the key state institutions. Such a 
mobiliZAtion prov~d iapossible in the years before the final crisis 
'im~ pv"n lr. t~f' w~i<p :)f the economic dislocations of the 19305 for 
rei1!';ons which! sh.-1.11 outline below. 
;h" i~mpdiatp political consequence of monetary crisis was the 
~own:~l: 0: the ~ubour government of Ramsay MacDonald. The history 
of that gov~rnment illustrates the disarray of the potential political 
oppositior. ~nd the complete ideological domination of finance as illus-
trated i~ the ir.flexible orthodoxy of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
~~illi~ ~nowden, who constantly sought to prove himself plus catholigue 
que le ~~;. :ts :cllapse capped a two-year period of almost total 
political incapacity and demonstrated the power of the banks in very 
concrete terms. On 23 August, 1931, the Deputy Governor of the Bank of 
Englanrl cabled !'1organ IS of New York regarding the possibility of a 
joint F'rpnch-American loan to support the pound. Morganls replied that 
they :c.u ~d on~y bP.ck 9C'-day Treasury bills but offer nothing more 
substantia: until the programme of the already shaky government was 
settled. 
Are we right in assuming [the telegram read] that the programme 
under consideration will have the sincere approval and support 
of the Bank of Erl8land and the Cl ty generally and thus go a 
long WRy towards restoring internal confidence in Great Britain. 
ef course our ability to do anything depends on the response 
of public opinion particularly in Great Britain to the Govern-
ment's announcement of the programme (cited in Clay, p.392). 
The prograll\1lle demanded was of course the imposition of "fiscal respon-
sibility," Le., the reduction of the budgetary deficit forecast at 
£l20m in thp May Co~mittee Report on August 1st. The Report itself 
simply confirmed the fears of foreign bankers as to the weakness of 
sterling, a.nd its :najority proposals for £96m worth of cuts in public 
exppnditur~. inc:u~ing a 20% cut in unemployment benefit, was the essence 
of their notion of "public confidence." Given the hostility of the unions 
and th~ left win~ of the Labour Party to such measures, their imposition 
necesniL~ted the split of the Party and the dissolution of the govern-
mpnt (spp Skidpls~y, 1967. ch.13. Williams,anc McKibben). 
Thf' t'·olitica: progr-d.mme of British finance did suffer a major 
gPtbiLC'k wi th thp toppling of the gold standard, even if it managed 
to bring down thp ~~cDonald government as well. This ought to have 
afforded British industry the opportunity for a reassessment of their 
own position, faced with the prospect of a major depresseion in world 
trade ann thp pvident inadequacy of the City's perspective. In fact 
a degrpp. of rethinking did occur. The MacMillan Committee opened 
up one iiVenUf' for consideration with its recommendation for a "German 
solution:" thf' association of the banks with different industries to 
follow through with the process of rationalization and the elimination 
of "destructive competition." 
Industrial capital did in fact achieve a significant degree of 
concpntration in thp late 1920s and 1930s. The rationalization move-
ment more or less transformed the industrial landscape through the 
creation of major monopoly corporations, albeit two decades later than 
similar developments in the United States or Germany. The merger 
movement was not, however, accompanied by closer organizational links 
between the banks and industry. The main consequences of the amalga-
mation process in Britain were, first, the further decline of the family 
firm and. second, the heightened role of the stock exchange. The private 
family company had placed certain limits on the degree of concentration 
of capital, namf'ly those imposed by the resources of one family or the 
ability of the firm to generate a surplus. In practice. apart from a 
few new expandin~ industries like automobiles, combination was a precondi-
tion for capital concentration on a level with other advanced nations. 
The altprnativr of state finance was not yet necessary nor desirable 
as far as industrialists were concerned except in the case of public 
utilities. Th~ stock market provided the means for overcoming the 
limi~~tions of the existing form of enterprise, both through the issue 
of new securities and the trade in existing assets. 
Provided that the prospects of large-scale enterprise were 
sufficiently attractive to call forth such investment, the cap-
ital resources of a number of wealthy individuals could in prin-
ciple, through the medium of the stock market, be aggregated to 
provide enough finance for the largest of firms. It was on this 
pattern, rather than in the nineteenth century mould, that the 
financing of large enterprise was to be achieved (Hannah, p.63). 
The entry of new issues onto the market created the preconditions 
for increased speculation, as both owners and promoters tried to cash 
in on the financial promise of combined firms as expressed in rising 
share prices. The possibilities of reaping speculative rewards thus 
fueled the take-over boom as share prices rose rapidly with merger 
activity. By the eve of World War Two the number and value of public-
ly-quoted firms had risen dramatically comprising the vast majority 
of the manufacturing sector. Yet, if the stock market was crucial 
in the process of centralization of ownership, new investment projects 
were still financed primarily through the internal generation of funds, 
an estimated four-fifths of the total of home investment in the mid-1920s 
(Hannah, pp.64-70). The government supported the merger movement at 
least in the sense of not placing any legal obstacle in its path, but 
this did not extend to state support for rationalization schemes in a 
financial sense as neither industrialists nor government ministers and 
officials wanted state finance or control. However, the existence of 
a degree of political pressure for greater state support of rational-
ization schemes was enough to force the Bank of England to undertake 
several initiatives if only to ward off greater state intervention 
(Hannah, ch.4 and Clay, ch.8). 
The Bank of England was, paradoxical as it may seem, a major force 
in the reorganization of British industry in the late 1920s and early 
19)os, albeit inadvertently and only on an ad hoc basis. It was drawn 
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initially into rpstructuring measures through its involvement in two 
northern i nc:ustries hi t by the depression. The armaments concern, 
:.rnstr.:1nr"': .. r.:i ·,.rh~tw0!'th. had run up larp;e debts with the Bank's New-
castle branch as a result of its efforts to diversify into locomotives 
ans ship-buildil"'.g. The Bank had undertaken a number of financial re-
constructions in the 1920s, but by 1928 it was forced to merge the re-
maining sr~ments section with Vickers and found itself in the position 
of controling shareholder. The second case was the formation of the 
Lancashire Textile Corporation in which the Bank again played an instru-
mental role. Norman's motivation in this matter was laid out in the 
minutes of a ~eeting the Bank's Committee of the Treasury on 19 September, 
1928: 
he considered it to be necessary for the Bank to support and sub-
scribe to a satisfactory scheme, partly to help the cotton indus-
try, partly to keep the question away from politics, but more 
especially to relieve certain of the banks from a dangerous 
position. The growing advances of those banks to the cotton in-
dustry were already unduly large and unless they obtained relief 
there was danger that the Bank might be compelled to asses them 
(cited in Sayers, Vol.l, p.)l?). 
One should not assume in other words that the Bank's involvement in/indust-
rial reorganization stemmed from an ideological conversion to the 
German system of finance capitalism. 
Governor Norman also committed the Bank of England to the ration-
alization of the shipbuilding industry, offering temporary advances 
of up to £300,000, and was pulled into the restructuring of the Lanca-
shire stpel industry as well as a rescue operation for the Glasgow 
armaments firm, Bearchmores. He recruited City backing for the reorg-
aniza tion of the Lancashire Steel Corporation, launched in early 1930, 
out of which emerged the Bankers' Industrial Development Corporation. 
The latter incorporated the Bank's erstwhile industrial adjunct, the 
Securities Management Trust, and was floated with an initial nominal 
capital of £6m, of which the Bank subscribed one-quarter and various 
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financial institutions the rest. The BIDe, while it lasted or.ly until 
194), at least offered a symbolic break with the City's hands off 
relationship with industry as its avowed purpose was 
To receive and consider schemes for the re-organisation and re-
equipment of the basic industries of the country when brought 
forward from within the particular industry, and, if approved, 
to procure the supply of the necessary financial support for 
carrying out the schemes (Sayers, Vol.I, p.J26). 
Norman's reasons for involvement with industrial finance were, 
however, hardly such as to encourage any long-term commitment. 2ven 
his apologists admit that warding of an increase in state intervention 
was a major concern behind his activities. In the final analysis these 
efforts hardly amounted to a "marriage of industry and finance." The 
merger boom and the phase of capital concentration had largely petered 
out by the mid-thirties so there was less scope for financial restruc-
turing. In the course of the slow recovery of that decade bank advances 
to industry decreased as firms were able to repay their loans, so even 
short-term lending to industry declined (Pollard, 1969, p.2)4). 
The major poli tical "victory" for industrialists during the slump 
w~s the conversion of the National government to the cause of protection, 
even if rathpr late in the day and only to a limited extent. The fall 
of the gold standard dealt a severe blow to free traders and paved the 
way for some form of imperial preference. After a perfunctory inquiry 
by the &~lance of Trade Committee under Neville Chamberlain the Import 
Dutips Act of February, 1932, ushered in protection as official policy. 
In the initial bill free entry was granted only to the countries of the 
dependent empire, while the position of the dominions was made con-
ditional on the results of the Ottawa Conference later that year. The 
latter produced at least a formal version of the "imperial vision" with 
regard to tariff policy. Except for South Africa the dominions agreed 
"to protect only plausible industries," "to submit their duties to 
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impartia 1 Tariff Boards, which would decide how much ?rotection the 
(!omestic industrif's really needed," and "to impose only 'scientific 
t~riffs' on British goods. which would then enter their territories 
wi th the status of domestic competitors (Drummond, PF. 92 and 100)." 
Thf'.1cmi nions and India also agreed to adjust their rates downward, 
'Ino Britain. which had imported as much as 8)% of the total duty free 
in lO~O. managed to reduce the proportion to about one-quarter in the 
;.pxt cou?1e of years. The effects of insituting this system are nat-
urally difficult to determine with any precision. but, while protection 
probably had little impact on the structure of British industry, it no 
noubt diverted existing foreign trade into the imperial system. While 
from 191] to 1931 Britain had imported around 25% of its goods from 
~mpire countries. by 1937 the total had risen to around 37%. Similarly, 
British exports to the empire had grown from 34% to nearly 40% of the 
to~l (Pollard. 1969. pp. 197-8 and Landes, 1969, p.475). 
The Colonial Office also promoted production or commodity control 
programmes in the dependent empire, largely, it seems, to restore 
colonial state budgets to a position of "fiscal soundness," that is 
eliminate any deficits. Production control amounted to a form of 
out}Jut restriction to raise prices of primary goods, either through 
statA-supported schemes or international cartels, usually American 
sp:lfl50n,;. Yet, even these efforts seem to have been mainly for the 
benf~fit of financia 1 shareholders. "Production control, in other words, 
reflected th~ Britisn tendency to see 'recovery' and stability in terms 
of financial security for shareholders and financial institutions 
(Drummond, p.ll,)." Moreover, as Pollard rightly cOlllp1ains, "what was 
remarkable was not so much the adoption of protection, but its delay 
until 1931 in the face of the protectionism of all the other leading 
industrial states (Pollard, 1969, p.l92)." 
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Thp City was in fact able to utilize the imperial framework to 
rp-ps~,blish its dominance at least within the British economy in 
l~~~r ~ecrtctp~. The termination of the gold standard was without a 
doubt a ~jor blow to the position and prestige of financial interests. 
Norm,in himself rpgarded it as a personal defeat. The Bank and the 
Treasury wp-re forced to control international borrowings and capi ~l 
flows much ~ore tightly than before, with deliberate discrimination in 
favour of the Empire. "The results were striking: foreign loans 
accounted for a far smaller proportion of the new issues in the thirties 
than in the twenties, and Empire borrowings were six times as large as 
foreign borrowings, though still much lower than in the twenties (Drurn-
mone, p.ll9). However, it is again here difficult to say how much of 
this shift was due to discriminatory government policies and how much 
simply to the collapse of world trade and investment posibilities out-
side the Enpire. 
The most significant financial development of the decade was the 
emergence of the sterling area, in effect the direct result of going 
off gold and the signal for the transformation of ster ling "as the Mas-
ter Currency used by Britain's political associates of the old Empire 
into a Negotiated Currency used by Britain's political associates in the 
Commonwealth (Strange, p.55)." Montagu Norman was in fact still arguing 
.1 t the Ottawa Conference that the main objective of economic policy 
ought to be a return to the gold standard as quickly as possible, but 
this proved impracticable. Instead, with several dominions in dire need 
of loans to prevent default on their debts, London extended £29m in 
external loans in 1932, virtually the total amount going to countries 
of the F.mpire. In this way financial backing was given to the effort 
to stabilize the various currencies against a floating pound, more or 
less successfUlly and without a return to the gold standard (Clay, p.412). 
ThP arrangement re~ined a rather loose one, and thus unsatisfactory 
:ro~ the ~oint of view of :inancial interests, until the conditions of 
;';:IT TPVf'rf,(,C! thp situ.:ltion andmoulded the form of the post-war relation-
shi? 0 
The Sxcha!'lgp £qualization i.ccount and the policy of "cheap money," 
101' •• Cl ~ Bank r'dte, might also be taken as pro-industry measures. The 
former was a fund of gold and foreign currency utilized for the mainten-
,:ncr- of :1 stable exchange rate but also serving as a means of insulating 
.iompstic credit from the international financial system. The deliberate 
policy of cheap money deprived the Bank of its favoured instrument of 
credit control, the Bank rate, and in that sense represented"a shift in 
the ba lance of power from the Bank to the Treasury (Howson, p.95)," 
that is, the increasingly political direction of monetary policy. 
According to Clay Norman resented these intrusions into his domain: 
He wanted to counter-attack when the Account's gold reserves 
were replenished from Issue; and he put to the Chancellor, but 
without results, the alternative policy of ending cheap money 
and facing some sacrifice in the domestic field for the benefit 
of increasing London's international market (Clay, p.44l). 
Yet, even these policies were designed to preserve a free market in 
currency and securities in London, at a time when a fixed rate of the 
pound a~dinst gold would have meant an immediate run on the reserves 
.1nd was therefore out of the question (ibid., p.440). Despite Norman's 
qualms about inroads into the Bank's area of jurisdiction City influence 
was by no means simply overturned in this period, although there were 
unquestionable setbacks. 
The thirties thus constituted an era when the political power 
of finance was considerably diminished, although there is a tendency 
among particularly Keynesian historians to overplay the significance 
of dropping thE' gold standard. The old system was finiShed, but there 
remained the possibility, later realized, of reconstituting the ancien 
-96-
regime under different auspices. Given the depth of the crisis and the 
vast political upheavals of other advanced capitalist nations like 
Germany, France, Italy or the United States one can only be struck by 
the paltriness of the changes instituted by the National government. 
In most industrial countries protectionist policies went much further 
than in Britain as a response to industrial pressure for state-supported 
cartels or other "corporatist" measures under the guise of economic 
"planning." In the United states, for example, the limits of "industrial 
self-government" or "business syndicalism" had more or less been reached 
by tile time of the 1929 crash. Cartels which had flourished in the 1920s 
simply could not hold the line against their weaker members who cut prices 
when economic conditions deteriorated. The National Industrial Recov-
ery Act, introduced as a "partnership in planning" between the state 
and business, created the basis for legally binding industrial codes, 
signifying the complete interpenetration of big business and the regu-
latory commissions (see Kolko, 1976, ch.4). Germany, of course, went 
much further towards the establishment of a corporate state. While 
working class organizations were suppressed and replaced by the more 
amenable Nazi Labour Front, industrial qartels increased in number and 
scope and became compulsory organizations, especially in small business 
where the problems of over-capacity and cut-throat competition had been 
endemic. The cartels were transofrmed into "total institutions" govern-
ing the economy with sole legal rights for fixing prices and output 
quotas. Big capital, at least until the period of war mobilization, 
effectively used the state institutions to promote its self-organiza-
tion, facilitating the trend towards politically controlled markets and 
a national export strategy. According to one famous study, "In con-
sequence many of the economic agencies of the state became parts of 
the institutional arrangements of organized capitalism (Schweitzer, 
p. 528, see also ch.6 and Neumann, pt.2)." 
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In Britain on the other hand there was no attempt to construct 
a full-scale corporate state or even embark on the widespread if con-
tradictory experimentation of the New Deal model. There were, it is 
true, some measures of state support for rationalization efforts. The 
Coal Mines Acts of 1930 and 19}6, the Spindles Act of 1936 and the 
Cotton Industries Reorganization Act of 1939 as well as the creation 
of the British Iron and Steel Federation, measures of restrictive 
licensing for road traffic and the Agricultural Marketing Acts of 1931-
33 all constituted instances of state support for cartel arrangements 
fixing prices and output (Allen, 1970, pp.65-7). Yet, these measures were 
largely ad hoc and limited in their impact to the most troubled indus-
tries. While representing certainly a shift of policy from acquiescence 
to support for rationalization or "planning" as it came to be known, 
they were far less comprehensive than similar acts introduced by the 
Roosevelt administration in the United States. The change in govern-
ment policy was perhaps best summarized in a repast published in later 
years by the FBI: 
The Government, although not prepared to exact a general law 
prescribing a 'cut and dried' method of trade organisation ap-
plicable to all industries, expressed its readiness to sponsor 
Acts of Parliament designed to encourage schemes of self-gov-
ernment in particular industries and prepared to assist ad hoc 
schemes for the reduction of redundant plant ••• This principle 
was given official recognition in the Finance Act of 1935, which 
provided that if a scheme had been certified by the Board of 
Trade as being of assistance in reducing excess capacity, con-
tributions to it might be deducted from income tax (FBI, 1944. 
pp. 15-16). 
Some industrialists, however, proposed p01icies far beyond the 
official ad hoc intervention within existing economic and political 
\ 
constraints. After his father's death in 1930 the second Lord Mel-
chett. Henry Mond, beoa.me a foroeful advocate of radical measures. 
Besides support for oomprehensive rationalization and imperial pref-
erenoe. Melshett extended his critioisms to both the financial and 
political systems. With regard to finanoe he essentially wanted the 
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co~pletp insulation of domestic credit from international monetary 
flows, ~ proposal partially realized through the Exchange Equalization 
,:'.ccount (~ielchett, 1932, chs. 1-3). It is his proposals for :poli tical 
change, however, which are of greater interest. 
Melchett was highly critical of the role of the Treasury, the 
Bank of t':ngland and Parliament. Treasury control of expenditure he 
viewed as 2'. method "of so hindering the action of the Ministry in a 
thousanc detCt Ds, that they become impotent." Moreover, the Treasury 
worked "very closely with the Bank of England, and between the two 
they can bring a pretty heavy squeeze on the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
i bid., p .167) • " Whi le the Treasury was thus chided as being too cautious 
and conservative to meet modern challenges, the party system tied Min-
isters to their various and conflicting constituencies. He cited as 
criticism of party politics a personal communique from Mussolini: 
"'there is no time for it; the party system was based on friction. The 
modern world is based on efficient lubrication (ibid., p.175) : •• 
Indeed. the second Lord Melchett was clearly very favourably 
impressed by his investigation into fascist organization. He particu-
larly admired the state system of syndicates, the National Council of 
Corporation~and the methods of compulsory arbitration, all of which 
provided for "economic self-discipline under the law of the state (ibid., 
p .182)." In defense he invoked the parallel between the corpora tist 
solution of industrial disputes and the proposals resulting from the 
Mond-Turner conferences a few years earlier (ibid., p.l80). For him 
state corporatism offered a model for extending the programme of ration-
alization, scientific management and planning, which his father had 
pioneered in the industrial sector, into the political system~ 
Here we see a political construction, based upon the unity of a 
nation, and a Government which desires to develop the State as 
a planned and well-organised unit to achieve the greatest poten-
tinl rlevelopment of its popu·lation and territory ••• it is certainly 
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an advance in certain directions, and an interesting ex~er­
iment in all directions in the science of Government; ar.j above 
all in the science of human social organization. The liberty of 
the individual is precious; but it is not, and never has been, 
as precious as the life of the nation (ibid., pp.183-4). 
His proposals for Britain did not go so far as to advocc~e the 
complete adoption of Italian fascism but rather the adaptation of 
corporatist elements to national institutions. His central p:ank was 
an Economic Supreme Council "to co-ordinate and develop the fi~ancial 
and industrial resources. firstly of Great Britain, and secondly, in 
conjunction with the Dominion Governments, of the Empire (ibid., p. 
206) • .. He recognized the similarity of hi s ideas with the pro ~osa Is 
put forward by the TUC for an "Imperial general staff" but insisted that 
such a body should have executive powers, in particular control over 
the Bank of England. and argued as well for a Discount Corpora~ion 
to secure financia 1 liquidity in crisis si tua tions with wide powers 
to aid industrial development and handle labour issues. In its compo-
sition such a council would include primarily representatives of 
business, plus trade unionists, government ministers and leading civil 
servants and various independent members. In short it was a proposal 
for a third (or second if one eliminated the Lords) chamber of Parlia-
ment based on functional representation and in control of the key levers 
of economic policy. One should note that he did not imagine any need 
for the supression of the unions but felt their leaders could be incorp-
orated as council members (ibid. ch.?). As such his proposals were a 
harbinger of later developments, especially the widespread adoption of 
tripartite modes of representation during the Second World War and in 
the 1960s. 
Other industrial and political leaders put forward similar schemes 
throughout the decade of the 1930s. Lord Eustace Percy, Sir Basil Black-
ett, Sir Arthur Salter. Roy Glenday, L.S. Amery and Hugh Sellon all 
-100-
advocated a National Industrial Council along the same lines as that of 
f'lelchett, although they differed on the extent to which such an insti-
tution should be under state control. Harold MacHillan, Robert Boothby, 
Oliver Stanley and John Loder, all Tory MPs with northern industrial 
constituencies, likewise included corporatist aspects in the proposals 
put forward in Industry and the State in 1927. Max Nicholson's programme 
for a National Planning Commission, published in the Week-End Review in 
early 1931, led to the formation of the propoganda and pressure group, 
Political and Economic Planning, whose publications supported industrial 
self-government throughout the period (Carpenter, pp.4-ll). 
The TUC similarly followed up its earlier support for a National 
Industrial Council in the Mond-Turner talks with other reports in 1932-3 
giving a cautious recommendation for a similar institution, as well as 
to industrial self-government. In their case, however, the emphasis was 
on the consultative and advisory role that the unions could exercise 
in councils at different levels of the economy, harking back to the 
Whitley Commission at the end of World War One. They were also inclined 
to package these proposals as part of a "transitional stage" on the red-
brick road to socialism to allay the fears of left-wing elements in 
the Labour movement (Carpenter, pp.l6-l7 and Harris, ch.3). 
Harold MacMillan reached asimilar position to that of t1elchett 
by the time of his 1933 publication, Reconstruction. WhiE still adopt-
ing in the main the restrictionist and defensive tone common to circles 
of industrial opinion, he was already under the influence of Keynes, 
as expressed in his growing concern with the disequilibrium between 
savings and investment. Protection was not an end in itself but a means 
for securing planned future expansion. Industrial self-government through 
councils for each industrial sector, while necessary to regulate output 
and restrict "haphazard and unco-ordinated competition," had to be com-
plemented by a Central Industrial Council under the hegemony of industrial 
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interests and with certain executive powers under Parliamentary 
scrutiny. The main tasks of such a body would be maintaining economic 
equilibrium through contra ling imports and overproduction and equal-
izing savings and investment by means of a cheap money policy. To 
promote growth it would have the power to secure new avenues for prof-
itable investment, if necessary through public works "to preserve the 
stability of the market until the balance between savings and invest-
ment had been restored (MacMillan, 1933, p.59i see also Carpenter, p.ll)." 
Yet, all of these efforts remained restricted to simple propogandizing, 
and none of them got much of a hearing with the National government. 
More serious if more limited in scope was the attempt by MacMillan 
and Lord Melchett to launch the Industrial Reorganization League in the 
summer of 19)4 to promote the passage of an Enabling Act which would 
give statutory backing to schemes of industrial reconstruction, much 
like the NlRA in the U.S. Such legislation would give a majority of 
producers in anyone industry the possibility of establishing a central 
authority with legal control over all firms. Though apparently sup-
ported by wide sections of industry and with the stamp of approval of 
the newly-formed PEP. it was opposed by the leadership of the FBI. The 
hostility of the latter was most likely due to the opposition of the 
smaller or more backward firms which feared the growing power of the 
new monopoly corporations. and to the FBI's ever-present concern for 
unity at the soct of supporting radical policy positions. At any rate 
Melchett had enough support to force a special committee and a canvass 
of the member trade associations of the FBI, and half of the fourteen 
that responded agreed with the proposal for further government powers. 
However. the opponents of the bill included such heavy weights as the 
Iron and Steel Federation and the Electrical and Allied Machinery 
Association. and the Federation remained committed to a policy of 
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voluntary self-regulation. Melchett also introduced a bill into the 
House of Lords and 18d deputations to the Board of Trade, but as far 
as the govprnment was concerned the issue hand been settled by the 
position of the FBI; they would support ad hoc legislation for re-
organization but no general enabling act (Carpenter, P. 13 and Blank, 
1973, pp. 28-31). 
Despite these setbacks liberal corporatists continued to make 
various proposals into the second half of the decade. Harold Mac-
Millan's The Middle Way was the most comprehensive of thEse statements. 
Reaffirming support for an enabling act, as well as statutory recogni-
tion of trade unioo rights, he was the most eloquent "New Dealer" of the 
period. He even pr~ppsed the extension of public ownership to aging 
and unprofitable industries which were deemed necessary for national 
economic or social reasons. Yet, by then the influence of Keynes's 
General Theory was increasingly evident, as MacMillan stressed more force-
fully than before the importance of expnasionary investment to supplant 
the programme of industrial self-organization (MacMillan, 1938, esp. chs. 
10 and 11). Increasingly, especially in the wake of World War Two, the 
emphasis in the pronouncements of industrialists and their political 
allies shifted towards the control of fiscal and monetary policies and 
away from restrictive schemes of industrial self-government with or 
without statutory backing as the means to resolve the contradictions of 
advanced capitalism. 
As a final comment on the inter-war period it is necessary to 
consider the alternative and highly influential account offered by 
Middlemas (1979). For this author these years mark the transition 
to a new "triangular pattern of cooperation between government and the 
two sides of industry" and "the elevation of trade unions and employers' 
associations to a new sort of status: from interest groups they became 
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'governing institutions' (ibid., p. 20)." Middlemas sees this emerging 
system of "corporate bias" as largely responsible for the lack of class 
conflict in Britain in those and subsequent years up to the 1970s. As 
he concentrates on labour issues and consequently on TUC relations with 
the NCEO, his ana~ysis is partly based on a different set of issues 
that the broader trade, economic and industrial questions treated here. 
However, two important points of criticism follow from the preceding 
discussion. In the first place the various informal discussions between 
unions and employers' organizations did not actually achieve very much 
in the way of agreement (Dintenfass, 1980). Particularly in the crucial 
areas of unemployment benefit and state spending the unions and employers 
were at complete odds with one another. Secondly, the influence of these 
'governing institutions' on actual government policy was highly marginal. 
As argued above the constraining aspects of government economic policy 
for the inter-war period were the return to the gold standard and the 
funding of the national debt, and these were essentially framed around 
the interests and priorities of the City. As Middlemas himself admits, 
"In all the great pitched battles over the allocation of resources and 
fiscal policy during the inter-war years ..• the Treasury won (op. cit., 
p. 228)." 
In contrast with this view I have argued that the politics of a 
"producers' alliance~' while articulated at various points, remained sub-
merged. The dominant financial power bloc and the City-Bank-Treasury 
axis remained intact if badly bruised throughout these years. In terms 
of government economic policy, patterns of representation and mode of 
procedure, what is notable is the minimal nature of the concessions 
and changes introduced. If a case can be made for a "governing insti tu-
tion" in this period. it concerns the continuing if somewhat fragile 
hold of financial capital rather than the rise of unions and trade 
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associations. Conversely, the explanation for the relative social 
peace of that period is more fruitfully aimed at attitudes and 
behaviour at the social base rather than relations at an institutional 
level. It took another world war to bring significant changes to 
the relationships between the state and the major socio-economic forces. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Rise and Fall of 'Supervised Self-Government:' 
Economic Planning during World War 11 and the Attlee Governments, 1949-51 
The Second World War even more than the First ushered in a sea 
change in the formation and operation of economic policy as well as in 
the relations between business and the state. At the height of the 
wa.r public expenditure accounted for 64% of the national product. More 
important than simply the quantitative growth of government expenditure 
were the qualitative aspects, the change in the methods and aims of 
economic the imposition of a vast apparatus of controls both 
"-..v" physical and financial. in short the changes necessitated by the require-
ments of a total war economy. maximum production guided by the needs of 
the war effort. 
Equally significantly the war created a climate of altered expecta-
tions on the proper role of the state in the economy and society. 
More precisely the war broke down opposition to the expansion of the 
state's economic and social functions within the ranks of the dominant 
class which had proved so formidable during the decades of depression. 
The war-time experience of full employment and maximum production con-
vinced many business leaders that depression was not a necessary feature 
of advanced capitalism and that social benefits on a massive scale had 
to be extel¥ied to the working class if the sense of natiQl8.1 community 
was not to collapse again into the hostile relations of the "two nations" 
of labour and capital once peace retumed·~ 
'lbe labour government of Clement Attlee can be seen as a more or 
less successful attempt to consolidate these g,ains, roughly summarized 
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as the institution of Keynesianism in economic policy and the welfare 
state in the social realm. Even if it disappointed, perhaps demoral-
ized, many of its supporters who expected far more in the way of tran-
sitiona1 policies to a socialist society, the Attlee government deliv-
ered on its promise of carrying through serious and long overdue 
reforms in the social and economic fields. In essence Labour took 
seriously the "new sense of communal responsibility" created by the 
war effort and pushed through a reformist programme in the space pro-
vided by the temporary re1xation of administrative conservatism and the 
shift in opinion within the dominant class away from obstinate resistance 
to any expansion of the role of the government. Yet, it is none the 
less the case that much of labour's programme had already been proposed 
under the National government, most notably in the case of the Beveridge 
Report of 1942, and it is for this reason that I will treat both govern-
ments as JB.rt of a single period, -one which laid down the parameters of 
state activity for the next twenty-five years. 
The system of economic controls erected somewhat hesitantly by the 
National government was modelled on that in operatia'l during the latter 
stages of World War One. As in that earlier gilobal conflict the govern-
ment was slow to institute the necessary changes, at least while under 
the timid leadership of Chamberlain, the "phoney war" in effect reflected 
in the lack of economic steps toward full mobilization. 
The control of civilian trade and consumption, the control over 
the foreign exchanges and capital movements, the control over 
labour demand and supply, rationing of food and the expansion of 
munition-making and machine tool capacity all appeared as belated 
mechanisms forced on the government by the march of events than 
as the orderly stages of the creation of a war economy (Pollard, 
1969, p. 298). 
However, by 1941 under the impact of the Battle of Britain and the 
overwhelming need for aircraft production, the system of direct economic 
controls was gradually imposed. Although there was no use of self-con-
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sistent and comprehensive plans, the use of direct controls did repre-
sent something like economic planning within the framework of a cap-
italist mode of production, more so than any time before or since. 
The planning apparatus involved a system of allocation whereby every 
department and the appropriate manufacturers were allowed a proportion 
of the available supplies corresponding to their share of the national 
total. Gradually, this system of physical controls spread to the var-
ious sectors of war production, which in a total war with limited supplies 
implied direct controls over supplies, prices, exports and imports as 
well as indirect controls over many aspects of finance. 
The institution of economic planning even in this limited sense 
required a transformation of the policy-making system. While at the 
start of the war the Treasury was still the chief department in charge 
of economic affairs, after the ascension of Churchill its role gradually 
diminished. By June, 1940, a series of committees, the Production 
Council, the Economic Policy Committee, the Food Policy Committee, the 
Home Policy Coamittee and the Lord President's Committee, had largely 
displaced the Treasury as the core machinery for economic policy. After 
January, 1941, the Lord President's Committee consolidated its directive 
role over the other bodies, its increasing importance corresponding to 
the imposition of direct controls on the economy. Likewise, the Econ-
omic Section with several newly recruited economists took over the Treas-
ury role as the agency providing economic information to the government, 
by-passing Treasury influence over its activities through direct attach-
ment to the War Cabinet. These institutional changes were necessary be-
cause, pace the official accounts of British government machinery, depart-
ments do make policy, and given the entrenched orthodoxy of the Treasury 
the new prograue of "econolllic planning" required corresponding a.dJai.n-
istrative changes to outflank Treasury opposition (Chester, 1951, and 
Winch, ch. 12). 
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The installation of the planning system in turn implied a modif-
ication in the relations between industry and the state. For although 
the market mechanism was more or less suspended for the duration of the 
war. the administration of the allocation system was itself in large 
part delegated to the leaders of the major businesses through their 
trade associations and peak organizations. Direct controls in the 
immediate hands of the state were limited to certain basic industries 
and services and to the issue of certain directives like the orders to 
concentrate non-essential manufacturing in certain firms in order to 
create more factory space for war production. In general. controls were 
operated through the trade associations which were given official recog-
nition as either the government's agent or on a "compulsory-voluntary" 
basis where the trade association on its own authority at the govern-
mentes request (PEP, 19.52, pp. 71-2). Though the degree of legal com-
pulsion varied, the effect in each case was more or less the Same: 
The distinction between the three types - compulsory control oper-
ated by the Government, compulsory control operated through an 
agency, and voluntary control - was not always as ~ea t as might 
at first appear. Many of the official 'controls' lusin~ the term 
in the sense of the controlling section of the Ministry) were 
staffed by people from the industry itself; some were scarcely 
distinguishable in composition from the pre-war headquarters 
offices of the trade associations (ibid., p. 72). 
William Wallace, at the time the Director of Rowntree's and a 
Director at the Ministry of Food. described the operation of this sys-
tem of "supervised self-government" for the confectionery industry in 
the following terms: 
(1) The Ministry would determine major questions of policy (such 
as the broad types of goods to be made and the principles of price 
control) in the light of national interests in general and of 
consumer needs in particular; 
(2) it would discuss with the industry the best means of achiev-
ing the ends in view with a minimum of avoidable hardship and 
with a maximum opportunity for the exercise of initiative; 
(3) it would leave such matters to be carried out so far as pos-
sible by individual businesses with a minimum of regulation; 
(4) where adminstrative control was called for, this would be 
delegated as far as possible to a body representative of the 
industry, working as agent for the Ministry and under its super-
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vision (Wallace. p.5l). 
What this method entailed was the conversion of the voluntary trade 
association. which had typically had large but incomplete coverage of 
an industry. into a compulsory organization with full membership assured 
by the ability to withold a license to manufacture. The compulsory 
war-time associations represented the industries in the negotiations 
about supply. allocation and utilization of raw materials, price con-
trol, labou snpply, the concentration of production and the zoning of 
markets as well as administering the decisions on these matters (ibid., 
ch, 7). 
What the government did in other words was simply to utilize the 
existing framework of trade associations to administer the war system 
of economic planning. in essence a state-sponsored network of compul-
sory cartels directed in an overall way towards military needs. As the 
Economist recoginized early on in the conflict, this meant that, 
under the cover of wartime needs, the principle of Self-govern-
ment of Industry has been given an official blessing. This is, 
in effect, merely the expansion and continuation of the Industrial 
policy that has been pursued by the Conservative Government for the 
past eight years, for in their hands control has mea.rly always 
meant the conferment of legal privileges on the organized pro-
ducers already established in industry ••• industries are being 
encouraged to control themselves (cited in Brady, p.182). 
The parallels between this "feudalistic system of cartel controls" 
and the corporate state of the fascist nations were not lost on some 
contemporary observers, most notably the interesting if somewhat alarm-
ist study of the compara ti ve poU tics of "organized capitalism" by 
Robert Brady. While there was no doubt a shift from the liberal 
corporatistemphasis of the 1930s towards a system of state corporatism 
necessitated by the massive government intervention of a war economy, 
it was a shift within the overall framework of the "corporate idea." 
As Brady quite correctly noted, "British war organization rests squarely 
on the associational machinery evolved over the peacetime interlude 
(Brady, p. 181). It Yet, at the same time the shift in relAtions between 
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business and the state, epitomized in the change in trade associations 
from voluntary and partial to compulsory and total organizations. ought 
not to he underestimated. The institution of a state corporatist regime, 
albeit under the temporary and exceptional circumstances of war. marked 
the general acceptance by British industry of government sanctions in the 
effort to organize business interests and control the market. 
While the state corporatism of the War economy was only a temp-
orary phenomenon, many industrialists and, indeed, leading trade union-
ists sought to utilize the experience of this system of economic plan-
ning as a model for business-state relations for the reconstruction 
period. The "second wave" of corporatist proposals which appeared in 
the latter stages of the war effort attempted to combine many of the 
ideas of the inter-war era with the new sentiment of national unity and 
class collaboration. Various proposals including elements of a corpor-
atist structure, in JBrticular the usual nations of industrial self-gov-
ernment and a national economic council, emerged in the years after 1942, 
not only from Conservative politicians like Leo Amery and Robert Boothby, 
but also from business organizations, like the FBI and the Association of 
Bri tish Chambers of Commerce, ad hoc groups like the "120 Industrialists'~ 
or the Central Committee of Export Groups, and individual industialists 
such as Samuel Courtauld and William Wallace. both of whom had been 
actively involved in the wartime system of "supervised self-government" 
Carpenter, pp. 18-24). While these proposals para lleled in many respects 
those of the 1930s, they differed mainly in their de-emphasis of the 
role of an economic general staff, eschewing in particular any notion 
of executive powers for such an agency in the post-war period, and more 
generally in their increasing concern to limit the powers of the state 
to the task of setting national priorities during and after reconstruc-
tion. The association between corporatist ideas and the industrial 
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framework of fascist Italy had by now discredited the more explicit 
versions of a corporate state. and industrialists were increasingly 
turning to Keynesianism as a cornerstone for national economic policy 
which could guarantee their independence from government as well as 
offer the promise of an end to depression and the co-operation of organ-
ized labour. All of the "second wave" corporatists recognized the need 
to place "national interest" above sectional concerns, but were equally 
convinced of the need to prevent direct state control over business and 
to encourage the return as quickly as possible to some form of voluntary 
self-regulation of business (ibid.). 
'Ibe policy of the "120 Industrialists" as advocated in the widely 
publicised document, "A National Policy for Industry," is instructive 
as to the new mood in the business world. This report, published in 
1942, urged that "relations between firms within the industry, between 
different industries and between industry as a whole and Government 
should be fully and more comprehensively organized in some form of 
permanent association. t. It suggested that industry ought to be classified 
and organized in sections in order to further various aims, such as 
maximum output, greater collaboration to ensure efficiency, the dis-
couragement of "wasteful and destructive competit~on" and the encourage-
ment of "such forms of industrial competition as are conducive to the 
public interest," standardization of wages and conditions, and so forth. 
( ci ted in Wallace, pp. 4.5-6). '!he problem with these proposals as with 
the FBI report on Reconstruction issued the same year was that they of-
fered no means of rectifying potential abuse by trade associations if 
their status of more or less compulosory cartels was given official 
sanction. The FBI report was extremely pessimistic about postwar pros-
pects and consequently took a highly restrictive view about the future 
role of industrial associations. Like the book published two years 
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later by its chic: industrial organizer, Roy Glenday, it foresaw 
little likelihood fo future industrial growth and thus looked to 
other sectors to soak up the inevitable return of widespread unemploy-
ment (FBI, 1942, and Gleriday, 1944). While other corporatist likewise 
took for granted that the new found strength of the trade associations 
would continue into the postwar period, they recognized that greater 
concessions had to be made to the principle of public supervision and 
concentrated instead on the means of limiting the growing role of the 
state (Carpenter, ibid.). 
In particular it was those businessmen'and other public figures 
who were directly involved. in the state administration who began to 
articulate the idea of expanded public supervision with considerable 
enthusiasm. SamlR 1 Courtauld outlined his views as a series of questions 
at the invitation of the Conservative Party committee on postwar recon-
struction, lat-er published by request of Keynes in the Economic Journal 
(April, 1942) and elaborated further in various speeches. Courtauld, who 
felt that his self-proclaimed "progressive views" were widely shared in 
industrial circles, believed that certain changes were inevitable and 
embraced them in any case as part of a national service ethic. He as-
sumed that, 
Government control is here to stay. With the growth and progres-
sive combination of industries until their boundaries are practic-
ally coterminous with those of the nation, it is the duty of the 
Government to take power to control them, for no Government can 
tolerate the existence within its borders of an organized and 
completely independent power with a radius of action as wide as 
its own (Courtauld, p. 2). 
The government would also have to plan industrial growth which would 
necessitate public control of investment, public ownership of certain 
'tasic industries, reform of the trade associations to make them more 
representative, merger of the FBI and the BEe, consumer protection, 
reform of the 18 tent laws to prevent monopoly power, etc. However, 
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he felt that industrialists would not object to various controls so long 
as the civil service were reformed to make it more business-like and 
"TreasuI"J control" was removed to prevent the "dead hand of Whitehall" 
from being inflicted on the supervised firms. In the area of labour 
relations Courtauld noted that "the worker is going to have a much more 
intimate and more effective share in the management of industry (ibid., 
p.)l)," but such additional privileges would not be granted without an 
equivalent exercise of responsibility. Trade unions were "another 
kind of nation-wide organization whose interests were not necessarily 
identical with the national interest" and which consequently had to 
be subject to some measures of state control. Contracts between unions 
and employers would have to be made legally enforceable, and union reform 
might be necessary (ibid., p. 10). 
William (later Lord) Beveridge was another public figure whose 
Full Employment in a Free Society had a considerable appeal in wide 
circles. Beveridge was of course heavily influenced by Keynes and took 
seriously the latter's notion of "socializing investment." For Bever-
idge public control would be established through a National Investment 
Board which would have the power to collect information and regulate 
investment in both private and public sectors Itin pursuance of a nation-
al plan prepared for and approved by Parliament (Beveridge, 1944, para. 
241)." 'Ibis would be constituted under a Ministry of National Fianance 
in charge of macroeconomic planning outside the control of the Treas-
ury (whose powers would be limited to controling the cost-effectiveness 
of public expenditure). Likewise the banking system would be brought 
to heel through effective control over the Bank of England and thus the 
cash basis of the monetary systell (pa.ra.s. 209-212 aJXl 2)8-245). Vi th 
regard to business regulation Beveridge felt that full employment i t-
self would ellllinate u.ny restrictive practices, but, in those sectors 
where monopoly collaboration seemed the rule, he proposed a three-stage 
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system of state control in order to ensure "the co-operd. tion of work-
ing people" in the full-employment progranune. The first stage would 
be supervision, including powers to collect information and the 
registration of trade associations. The second stage, which he termed 
regulation, included the authority to veto any restrictive agreements 
and "as the ultimate sanction, to cancel registration." He was agnos-
tic on the question of whether statutory powers should be given to the 
trade associations but insisted that in those cases "the use of that 
power must be subject to effective control by the state." The third 
stage of control, public ownership, should be imposed only on monopoly 
industries (paras. 29)-295). On labour issues Beveridge proved more 
reticent in advocating state controls, but he recognized that under full 
employment "industrial discipline and private enterprise may be found to 
be mutually incompatible (para. 277)." He discounted the possibility 
of spiralling wage inflation, trusting the unions' new sense of responsi-
bilityand the provision of arbitration services (paras. 28)-288). 
Similar influences were expressed in the report of the NUffield 
College conferences which took place in the latter stages of the war. 
Although ignored in most of the literature on the period, these confer-
ences were in effect a repetition of the Mond-Turner talks of fifteen 
years before, including prominent trade union leaders, progressive 
industrialists like P.S. Cadbury, R, Coppock, Courtauld, V.A. Grierson, 
and of course the son of Alfred Mond - lord Melchett, and a host of 
economists and intellectuals associated with socialist op~ion like 
T. Balogh, G.D.H. Cole, E.F.M. Durbin, N. KaIdor and Joan Robinson. 
While Beveridge's name did not appear on the report he was clearly 
associated with the group and submitted sections of the draft of his 
book for collective .criticiBlll (Beveridge, pp. 13-14). 'Ibe postwar 
consensus on economic and social policy did not simply materialize 
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out of the spirit of the time~and it was the task of these conference 
like the Mond-Turner talks to hash out the basis of a compromise pro-
gramme among the amenable leaders from both sides of industry. The 
thrust of the policy document they produced, Employment Policy and 
Organization after the War, was remarkably similar to that expressed 
by Beveridge, with a parallel emphasis on the need for full employment, 
efficiency and policies designed to win "the workers' willing consent" 
to prevent restrictive practices. The problem of legitimacy for the post-
war order was packaged, again like Beveridge, in the public service 
ethic of "war socialism," as most clearly expressed in the following: 
The purpose of instilling public 'confidence' must be to secure 
that directors, managers, technicians, and clerical and manual 
workers all put first in their relations to industry the aim of 
serving the public, and that the associations and unions that 
bind them together for trade, pro~essional, and protective 
objects shall also accept the aim of this service, and regard it 
as one of their essential functions to promote the efficiency 
of the industries to which their members are attached. The pro-
tective objects of these bodies are fully legitimate and indeed 
necessary as long as they are not allowed to stand in the way of 
the adoption of new methods of production or to exercise restric-
tive or monopolistic powers in the interest of any limited group 
(Nuffield College, 1944, p. 63). 
The practical aspects of the programme outlined in the statement 
were much the same as those proposed by Beveridge and others associated 
with the war administration •. Investment was to be stabilized through 
an expanded public sector and the creation of a National Development 
Board, in charge of the funds available for public investment, capital 
issue licensing, foreign investment, etc. (ibid., p. 32). Such a Board 
would fall under the supervision of a new Ministry for National Devel-
opment served by an advisory planning commission and established on an 
equal footing with the Treasury. The extension of powers to such a 
.. 
public organization would necessitate a change in the recruitment 
policies of the civil service to encourage mobility between it and the 
private sector (ibid., pp. 39-40). Industry was again divided into 
three sections, 1. the basic industries suitable for public ownership, 
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2. other oligopolistic industries, and J. those in whid1 small firms 
predominated. For the second group the report advocated Public Indust-
rial Boards "responsible, in consultation with the economic organs 
of Government, for the formulation of general economic policy for the 
industries concerned, It consisting of joint representa ti ves of labour 
and management, and serving as the state-recognized liason body. These 
Boards were not intended to act as state-sanctioned cartels but were 
rather to meet "the legitimate case for better organization and self-
government, to prevent the growth of monopoly practices or control 
and to ensure a framework within which individual businesses can oper-
ate with the utmost efficiency and in the public interest." As such their 
primary tasks were to be the promotion of standardization and specializa-
tion, concentration of production, pooling patent rights, etc., but 
they were not to have the power to fix minimu prices, limit entry or 
output or pool finances. The statement did recognize, however, that such 
powers might be appropriate in special cases of "crisis industries" 
but aimed at securing substantial public supervision before the exten-
sion of compulsory authority. Trade associations which did not come 
under the supervision of an industrial board should be registered in 
order to place them under public scrutiny and prevent the possibility 
of cartel practices. The aim in short was to use state supervision 
as a means of promoting efficiency, organizational co-operation and 
the reversal of the Itdefeatist and restrictive attitude which has 
affected much thinking about industrial problems in recent years {ibid., 
pp. 44-.54)." 
On the labour side the docWllent, as mentioned above, stressed 
the importance of securing worker collaboration to achieve greater 
flexibility in work practices especially among the skilled trades as 
a quid pro quo for full employment and the extension of social security 
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(ibid., pp. 16-18). It also supported retaining and extending works 
councils, joint production committees or similar bodies "in order 
to secure the continued co-operation of all grades of workers in the 
maintenance of industrial efficiency, and to recognize the claim of 
labour to a share of workshop control (ibid., p. 67)." In short its 
discussion of the labour issue was dominated by a concern for legiti-
macy and flexibility as it was feared that labour groups might take 
advantage of full employment to press wage claims without a corresponding 
increase in productivity. 
While it is impossible to asses the overall importance of the 
Nuffield conferences, the influence Is clear in such documents as the 
Faba~n Research Group's Government and Industry (1944) and the TUC 
report on Reconstruction published the same year. Both drew heavily 
on the proposals outlined in the Nuffield College statement as did 
the Conservative Party report, Work, the Future of British Inddustry 
(1944), and the labour Party statement, The Old World and the New Society 
(1943). 
Industrialists might not have supported the whole programme of 
the Nuffield group, but the acceptance of at least some measure of 
public control was fairly widespread. Some like Willian Wallace, 
while highly critical of any system of institutionalized cartels and 
appreciative of the wartime system of "supervised self-government," 
were perhaps more typical of the business world in expressing concern 
that state intervention should have definite limits. Wallace's proposals 
were more defensive in that they were primarily aimed at securing a 
greater degree of independence for private capital within the post-
war framework, 
we should look to the State first and primarily to provide a 
suitable economic setting and to determine the objectives and 
lay down principles and exercise oversight; and, secondly, 
where the State must intervene in the actual operation of indus-
try we should seek to do this in a way which leaves the greatest 
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practicable degree of initiative and responsibility to those in 
the particular industry concerned (Wallace, p. 49). 
In other words Nallace along with many other industrialists 
had largely accepted the expanded role of the state in the areas of 
Keynesian management, i.e., the use of the budget to influence invest-
ment and consumption. His concern had shifted towards the organizational 
forms which might provide industrial influence over the details of 
economic policy as well as prevent state interference in the everyday 
management of firms. Keynesianism seemed the best alternative to the 
twin dangers of unstable laissez-faire capitalism on the one hand and 
directive state socialism on the other, for, 
To perform these functions effectively [demand managemen~ the 
State must consult industry. It must inform industry not only 
as to its policies and aims. rut as to the reasons behind them, 
so that intelligent co-operation may be possible. It must pro-
vide a free and ready means whereby industry can submit its own 
views. For this, organization is essential (ibid., p. 80). 
The organizational form appropriate for this linkage between the state 
and industrial capital was naturally enough the system of intimate 
relations between the trade associations and the various Whitehall 
departments. While recognizing the need for some kind of public 
control in cases of monopoly and restrictive practices, for the rest 
Wallace simply wanted the accep"k~nce of trade associations as "the 
officially recognized organ of consultation on behalf of industry 
(ibid., p. 96)." In his view membership of the trade association 
ought to be purely voluntary, the only penalty to non-members being the 
loss of information and influence. In those sections still requiring 
direct controls or where the need for restrictive practices had been 
established, the appropriate linking agency would be an Industrial 
Board, in effect the postwar application of the model of "supervised 
self-government" or state-sanctioned cartels (ibid., pp. 97-101). 
By 1944 the FBI as well had. shifted towards a more positive, 
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less restrictionist policy than indicated in the 1942 report on 
Reconstruction. While the earlier document had followed the 1930s 
belief that the chief problem of the future would be chronic over-
production and consequently stressed the need for virtually autonomous 
control of production by the trade associations, the 1944 report, 
The Organization of Industry, reflected the wartime experience of 
"supervised self-government." Recognizing the enhanced role of the 
Keynesian state, in particular the commitment to full employment, it 
repeated industry's main objective of securing its independent self-
management within overall policy considerations. The aim was substan-
tially the same as that of Wallace, namely, "that the Government should 
confine itself to producing a framewokk of national economic policy 
leaving the details to be filled in by working organizations provided 
by the industries themselves (FBI, 1944, p. 5)." The ultimate goal of 
indastry remained "ultimate decontrol." and the way to minimize govern-
ment interference was "for private enterprise tp provide the effective 
machinery required through the trade associations." Reflecting a can-
vass of industrial opinion which was overwhelmingly against the contin-
uation of compulsory membership and legally binding powers for trade 
associations, the report proposed that the Latter maintain the »ole of 
being the "official channel of communication" between industry and the 
state on all matters of commercial and industrial policy. However, 
branches of industry still affected by over-production might require 
some form of compulsory control. although no mention was made of possible 
public supervision (ibid., pp. 6-10, see also Blank, 197), pp. )1-8). 
The various proposals enumerated above were significant not be-
cause they were implemented an full. which was not the case although 
aspects of many of them were incorporated into the reconstruction pro-
gramme. but because they indicated the extent to which corporatist or 
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quasi-corporatist ideas were still dominant in British industry, the 
trade unions and political circles through the war years, indeed in 
some respects more prominent than before. Given the range of views 
from the FBI's reiteration of the demand for ultimate decontrol and 
unfettered undustrial self-government on the one hand to the much greater 
extension envisioned by Beveridge on the other, it was the task of 
foru~s liKe the Nuffield conferences to hammer out a compromise posi-
tion that would elicit support on "bOth sides of industry." By the 
latter stages of the war the "middle way" proposals of the Nuffield 
group seemed to have found the right mix of Keynesian demand-mangement 
policies and quasi-corporatist controls capable of ensuring the collabor-
ation of at l@ast the agents of labour and capital, whoever won the 
postwar elections. It was more or less this recipe that the Attlee 
government served up as the political-economic basis for the "new 
society." given official blessiPig as the institution of "democratic 
planning. It Yet, to the surpise of the Labour government it found itself 
facing increasing opposition from industrial capital to the programme 
which various representatives of the latter had been instrumental in 
drafting as business opinion hardened against any form of public super-
vision in the private sector, a conflict whose history I shall return to 
shortly. 
The position of the City was likewise greatly affected by govern-
ment supervision of external relations. International financial trans-
actions came under state direction, but the new forms of control were 
undermined from the start by the reconstruction of the imperial rela-
tionship under a new, if less stable, guise, the sterling area. Import 
and financial controls were gradually imposed with food importing taken 
over entirely by the state. 'Ibe Treasury assumed direction of all deal-
ings in gold and foreign exchange, reducing the authority of the Bank of 
-121-
England still further. However, payments within the newly erected 
sterling area were left uncontrolled. In fact the creation of the 
sterling area under the pressures of war reversed the trend of the 
previous decade towards a looser currency area. Although voluntary in 
principle the sterling area amounted to a near monetary union, thus 
laying the foundations 
which made possible the post-war development of a dollar-discrim-
inating club and a banker-client relationship between Britain 
(with depleted reserves behind her) and her sterling-area asso-
ciates (strange, p. 56). 
In this alliance the members held their exchange rates in line 
with the pound and pooled their reserves in London under British and 
later Anglo-American control. For the countries of the Empire this 
helped secure the viability of Britain both as a military power and as 
their chief trading partner, a mixed blessing from their point of view. 
For Britain a fairly severe price was paid for this union, namely in-
creasing indebtedness to primarily sterling area countries, the so-called 
sterling balances. The degree of debt grew at a rate of about £600m 
per year during the second half of the war, allowing Britain to run a 
substantial trade deficit and still wage war but leaving a tremendous 
burden at the end, completely overturning the traditional position of 
London as a net world lender. 
Until October, 1943, these growing debts were balanced by the in-
flow of dollars through the Lend-Lease Agreement with the United States. 
However, after that date the U.S. ceased supplying industrial goods 
gratis, and British reserves began to be depleted, leaving a total of 
around S250m by the war's end and liabilities some fifteen times greater, 
i.e., a sum close to the total overseas holdings at the start of the 
conflict. American policy thus meant that the sterling balances kept 
rising while reserves remained slightly reduced, but by the end of the 
war the American administration had a very different line on the prob-
lem: 
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The United States took the view that the sterling balances 
should be very largely written' off, as a sterling area contrib-
ution to the Mutual Aid pystem of wartime finance. The British 
delegation in Washington, which included Lord Keynes, reacted to 
the suggestion with incomprehension. Bri tain saw herself as bank-
er to an association of countries whose support Britain still 
needed politically as much as sterling needed their financial 
confidence. They took the opposite view that it was not for the 
hAnker to default (Strange, p. 60, see also Pollard, 1969, p. 3)4, 
and Gardner). 
When in the end the U. S. became the financial guarantor of the 
sterling area, it also tacitly accepted the importance of reconstitu-
ting an international role for the pound, even if limited to the coun-
tries of the Empire. For the United States never forced a reduction of 
British liabilities through requisition or confiscation. In this way 
the U.S. promoted and continued to finance an international association 
which discriminated against American products, largely out of political 
considerations and the need to reconstruct the world financial system 
after the disintegration of the 1930s. The war had created conditions 
favouring a new financial unity in the old Empire, but this was only 
possible with American support through the 1946 Loan Agreement and later 
through Marshall Aid. In Strange's terms the gradual disintegration of 
sterling's role as a master currency in the Commonwealth was concealed 
and delayed in part through American aid as one facet of a new world 
financial system in which the dollar now occupied the position of 
top currency. 
The Labour Government and Economic Planning, 1245-51 
When Labour came to power in 1945 in a landslide election few 
could have expected its relations with business to be as agreeable as 
they proved in the next few years. '!he" concorda t tI between Labour and. 
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capital, though somewhat strained in the final years of the govern-
ment, was perh~ps the most remarkable feature of the Attlee administra-
tion. Yet, the reasons behind this lack of overt hostility are not 
that difficult to comprehend. In the first place the overwhelming 
victory at the polls bequeathed such a firm legitimacy to Labour that 
a policy of obstinate obstruction was unlik~ly to provide much in the 
way of political dividends. Secondly, and more significantly, Labour's 
programme was firmly imbedded in the con census on economic and social 
policy that had emerged in the latter years of the war. Despite a 
certain degree of socialist rhetoric the economic measures actually 
implemented were the same melange of Keynesianism and quasi-corporatism 
that had been advocated by industrialists and leading trade unionists 
during the closing stages of the war. Even nationalization had been 
anticipated and accepted as legitimate by progressive industrialists and 
Conserva ti ves so long as it was pursued on a case by case basis and 
limited to "sick" industies mainly providing the infrastructure for 
private manufacturing. This was precisely the approach taken by the 
government and only when it appeared to breech this model of responsible 
social democratic behaviour, as in the case of the nationalization of 
iron and steel, did industrialists adopt a postition of active opposi-
tion. For the most part, however, relations remained cordial if not 
always intimate, and what is most notable is the continuity between 
labour's programme and wartime policy, rather than the break that might 
have been expected from Britain's first majority socialist government. 
Economic planning had not received much attention in Labour's 
electoral programme, an oversight that was symptomatic of the views of 
the Party's leadership. In so far as the term was used during the life-
time of the government, it served largely as a justification for two 
main aspects of economic policy, first, the retention of direct controls 
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during the period of reconversion while supplies were still short and 
the balance of payments constraint paramount, and second, the use of 
the budget as the central mechanism for the regulation of demand. 
Planning in any wider sense was quite simply never even contemplated, 
let alone attempted, by the Attlee government. Given the commitment 
to wind up physical controls as quickly as possible, the pattern of 
state intervention was dictated by economic circumstances rather than 
by ideological motives. Controls were gradually removed as the conver-
sion to a peacetime economy proceeded, only being reimposed or prolonged 
when economic pressure became overpowering, as most notably during the 
Korean conflict. 
The new government did not initiate any significant changes in 
administrative mabhinery, opting rather to continue with the existing 
policy-making apparatus. However, one of its first acts was to wind 
up the Ministry of Production, transferring most of its functions to 
the Board of Trade. While this department might have been used as 
the basis of a planning department, its hasty abolition indicated the 
overall direction of Labour's economic programme, that is, reducing 
rather than extending state intervention into the private sector. 
Herbert Morrison as Lord President was nominally responsible for econ-
omic co-ordination but in fact shared authority for economic policy with 
Hugh Dalton as Chancellor of the Exchequer and Stafford Cripps as Pres-
ident of the Board of Trade. The basic structure of the war administra-
tion remained intact throughout the first years of the government, 
reflecting the consensus politics that guided Labour's leaders. When 
explici tly questioned about the adequacy of the planning machinery, a 
point that proved to be apt when the fuel crisis erupted unforeseen in 
the winter of 1947, Morrison complacently defended the existing organi-
za. tion • He rejected any idea of alteration, in particular the ever-pres-
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ent proposal for an "economic general staff" in charge of a planning 
office (Leruez, pp. 37-40). 
la bour 's rather be la ted jus tifica tion I!Jf its claim to a programme 
of economic planning appeared with the publication of the Economic Sur-
vey for 1947 in February of that year. !his document attempted to 
legitimate the government's economic policies as an exercise in demo-
cratic rather than totalitarian planning. Whereas the latter implied the 
subordination of private decisions to state directives, "democratic 
planning" meant, in the words of Stafford Cripps. "a minimum of compul-
sion and a maximum of agreement, persuasion, consultation and other free 
democratic mehtods (cited in Rogow, p. 13)." In the alternative form-
ulation of the Economic Survey, HA democratic Government must ••• con-
duct its economic planning in a manner which preserves the maximum 
possible freedom of choice to the individual citizen (p. 5)." In point 
of fact this process of "democratic consultation" with businessmen 
adamently opposed to the continuation of wartime comtrols in any long 
term sense, much less anything like measures smacking of a real com-
mitment to a programme of socialist transition, led the government 
r'd.pidly away from anything like a co-ordinated planning exercise. The 
political constraints implied in the commitment to consensus politics 
and the soliciting of business collaboration effectively precluded 
any serious effort to plan the economy. As Rogow explains in his 
apologia for the Attlee government, 
le.bour leaders, in partiCUlar Sir Stafford Cri pps , were increas-
ingly persuaded that the objectives of private industry harmon-
ized rather than conflicted with the aims of the Labour Govern-
ment. Given this conception, controls which inevitably cause ill 
will and friction with industry, are far less desirable than vol-
untary co-operation and, indeed, if the argument is carried to 
its logical conclusion, controls become scarcely necessary at all 
(Rogow, p. 44). 
Despite the inevitable consequence of this reliance on business 
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co-operat~on, the government continued with the charade of democratic 
planning, both as a means of self-justification and as a response to 
en LClS:n of its inability to foresee the fuel crisis of the winter 
of 1947, an event which demonstrated the inadequacy of economic information. 
In March, 1947. Attlee announce the establishment of a Central Edon-
omic Planning Staff (CEPS) with Sir Edwin Plowden as first Chief 
Planning Officer as well as an Economic Planning Board (EPB). The 
CEPS was supposed to act as the "think tank" for long-term economic 
planning, providing information to the various departments and ministers. 
The EPB represented one of the first attempts at tripartite machinery, 
including the CPO as chairman and with members drawn from the employers' 
organizations, the TUC, the ministries directly concerned and the CEPS. 
Both bodies were strictly advisory, having no authority to act indepen-
dently of government ministers. In effect they were simply window 
dressing; the planning staff supposedly in charge of co-ordinating the 
experiment was never allowed to gain the size or the influence that 
would have justified even a part of Labour's pretensions. While the 
Economic Survey of 1947 spoke optimistically of "targets~ by 1949 there 
was only a mention of "estimates." In the succeeding years the Economic 
Surveys became less detailed and dropped all reference to even the 
notion of "democratic economic planning" proclaimed in the hard winter 
of 1947. Indeed, these documents were forgotten as soon as they were 
published and evidently exerted no influence whatever on the actual 
course of economic policy (Leruez, pp. 48-61). 
The other administrative shake-up of 1947. the appointment of 
Stafford Cri pps in September as Minister for Economic Affairs, indicated 
more clearly the actual direction of labour policy. Cripps took over 
the tasks of the ailing Lord President, Hom-ison, namely the responsi-
bility for economic co-ordination, and the Lord President's Committee 
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·...-c.:.s re~lace,i by two others, the Economic Policy Committee and a 
ministerial Steering Committee. With the resignation of Dalton in 
Nove~ber Cripps beca~e Chancellor of the Exchequer, effectively re-
turning the responsibility for economic policy to the Treasury for the 
first time since 1942. The ascent of the Treasury symbolized the real 
~lth of t~e government, its primary commitment to a Keynesian economic 
programme through budgetary control. In fact, while 1947 ~ a water-
shed for the governmen t, it marked the turning point.!!2i toward a co-
ordinated strategy of long-tenn economic planning but rather towards 
the increasing relaxation of existing direct controls whenever economic 
circumstances permitted. While the fuel and balance of payments crises 
of 1947 prolonged the retension of the wartime system for the remainder 
of that year, by November, 1948, two major "bonfires" had removed the need 
for issuing 200,000 licenses per year, and a further "bonfire" in March, 
1949, reduced the total by a further 9)0,000, effectively removing the 
greater portion of direct controls (Chester, 1952, and Worswick, 1952). 
As mentioned above Labour's relations with industry were remark-
ably cordial although increasing strain marked the latter years of the 
government. This amicable relationship was hardly surprising given the 
commitment to work within the ideological consensus that had emerged out 
of the Second World War. For all the talk of planning the system of 
direct controls was in all essentials the extension of the system 
developed in the war only for as long as necessary during reconstruction. 
Industrialists could hardly complain too loudly about the system since 
they were still in charge of it. As Rogow describes it in his peculiar 
and uncritical manner, 
Although the planning operation was often thought of, or at least 
discussed, as the chief concern of the Ministers and the Civil 
Service, it devolved in great part on industry itself, and ' 
especially the leading firms and trade associations. Indeed, 
the extent to which the labour Government made use of business 
to plan and administer controls must be accounted one of its 
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most remarkable and contradictory characteristics (Rogow. p. 60). 
In fact this "remarkable characteristic" involved nothing more 
than the continuation of the state corporatist framework of the war 
economy. The first CPO, Sir Edwin Plowden, wasAdirector of British 
Aluminium among other firms. The Capital Issues Committee consisted 
of seven bankers. stock brokers and industrialists. The Chairman of the 
British Rayon Federation was a principal advisor to the Board of Trade. 
Unilever management occupied no fewer than ninety posts in the Ministry 
of Food. The leather controller was an official of the United Tanners' 
Federation, and so on. Virtually every producer department was headed 
by the appropriate business representative, often still on the payroll 
of their respective firms or trade associations. The defects of the 
system were particularly evident in the field of price controls in which 
the Central Price Regulation Committee, again staffed largely with 
business representatives, played akey role. Prices were consequently 
set at the levels requested by the trade associations based on their 
estimates of cost and desired profit levels. As a result the government 
was increasingly bedevilled with inflation, and "the resulting high prices 
were reflected in profits which for most of the period were the highest 
in the history of British industry (Rogow, p.68)." More genera lIly 
the system meant not only that industrial capital was well placed to 
apply pressure for the control "bonfires" of 194-8-.50, but that the 
state was effective sanctioning a cartel arrangement which supported 
restrictive practices and the dominance of the traditionally powerful 
firms. The point is not that "democratic planning" was particularly 
open to corruption, but rather that it had an overwhelmingly corporatist 
flavour with the official backing of the government (see Rogow, pp. 60-
68 and Leruez, pp. 61-67). 
With the gradual relaxation of direct controls in the latter years 
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of the Attlee~administration the relationship between industry and the 
state shifted towards a "semi-voluntary system" in which the sponsoring 
or producer departments were -linked with the corresponding trade as-
sociations. While the departments had ill-defined responsibility for 
particular industries even during the inter-war era, the relationship 
WO.s solidified during the period of direct controls. The continuing 
contols over some imports, capital issues and building licenses neces-
sitated close contact in any case, and the links between the sponsor-
ing departments and trade associations became the essential communi-
cation network between industry and the state for the postwar period. 
Wi th the Board of Trade as the central ministry concerned with industrial 
and commercial affairs, this system was the main mechanism by which 
matters of government policy which impinged on business interests could 
be discussed and amended. Supplementing the sponorship network was what 
one observer termed a "vast system of advisory and liason bodies whose 
orbits lie between the departments of Government and the purely indust-
rial organizations (PEP, 1952, p. 113)." While these bodies had like-
wise existed before World War Two, they had similarly gained in sig-
nificance with the transition to a looser relationship between industry 
and the government. From the high level committees like the Economic 
Planning Board through middle level organizations such as the National 
Production Advisory Council for Industry down to specific industrial 
agengies which dealt only with particular aspects of individual inustries, 
these advisory councils and committees acquired a permanent status in 
the Keynesian era. Their brief for discussion was as wide as that 
of the sponsorship-trade association nexus, and, indeed, the activities 
of all these organizations overlapped considerably (see PEP, 1952, chs. 
5 and 6 and PEi~ 1957. chs. 1 and 3 and U.K. Treasury, 1948). 
However, if the informal links between industrial capital and the 
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state proliferated in the years following World War 11, Labour's 
attempt to structure this relationship more formally met with a dis-
tinct rebuff. Crip:ps had set up 3. nlunber of working parties, seven-
teen in all, primarily in industries which were dominated by large 
numbers of small producers and in need of rationalization and capital 
concentra tion. As a result of "l number of reports by these tripartite 
committees the government passed the Industrial Organization and Devel-
opment Act in July, 1947. This empowered the government to set up 
development councils in the industries concerned, also on a tripartite 
basis, but with no authority to order restructuring. They were to be 
strictly advisory bodies, providing information, training, scientific 
ann industrial research, etc., and certainly there was no basis for the 
fear among some Conservatives and businessmen that the hct amounted to 
back door nationalization. In fact the proposed industrial development 
councils resembled nothing so much as the earlier programme put forward 
by industrial leaders, but business opposition had hardened by this time, 
and the Act was a resounding flop. In essence restrictionist bodies of 
a corporatist character were no longer necessary given the expansion of 
production then taking place. Industrialists now wanted fewer controls 
not more, and the provisions for trade union representation did not 
increase the appeal of the development councils. In addition industrial 
leaders were concerned that the councils, whose members were appointed 
by the Ministers, should not displace the by now legitimate role ac-
quired by the trade associations, that of industrial representative to 
the government. In the end only three new councils were created, and 
these had no more than minor influence. The Industrial Development Act, 
like the experiment in "democratic planning" in general, was a total 
failure (Leruez, pp. 67-72, PEP, 1952, pp. 126-9, Blank, 1973, pp. 85-8, 
and Rogow, pp. 80-98). 
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The other area of increasing friction between industry and the 
Attlee government was of course that of nationalization. While the 
ellployers' organi7..ations ha,; not exactly welcomed the early national-
ization measures (the Bank of England, coal, gas, electricity, the rail-
roads and road haulage), they had confined their activities to securing 
concessions on the final Jeta Us of the various bills, rather than risk 
a campaign of all-out opposition. In this industrial representatives 
were highly successful. Not only was the structure of the public corp-
orations to their liking, modelled on the organization of private firms 
with no concession to workers' control and incorporating the former 
managements into the new hierarchy, but the generous terms of compensa-
tion released much needed funds for investment in mOFe profitable areas. 
The coal owners alone received some £300m from the nationalization of the 
mines. However, the case of iron and steel seemed to breach the 1945 
consensus, since this was neither a sick industry nor a public utility, 
although it was badly in need of massive investment and rationalization 
(HcEachern, 1980). Business opposition to labour's proposals intensified 
as the bill for public ownership was postponed in a hopeless effort by 
the government to secure an acceptable compromise. In the end the in-
dustry was nationalized, but only in part, and the various component firms 
were never merged into a single unified corporation. Consequently, the 
door was left open for rapid denationalization if Labour lost the next 
election, which is of course exactly what occured. In this industry as 
in the others the industrial representatives managed to win their main 
objectives through the effective if indirect use of pressure on the 
details of the bill when they realized the inevitability of its passage 
through Parliament. Even Rogow noted the impotence of labour in the 
face of this kind of opposition on the part of capital. "'!he steel 
dispute," he remarked, "at least suggests that sOlRe of the effective 
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limits of planning are determined not at the ballot box or by the plan-
ners themselves, but by the power interests of the affected groups 
(Rogow, p. 171)." 
Relations between industrial capital and the government were 
put under further strain by the attempt to control prices and incomes 
in wake of incr.;asing inflation. The "planning" initiatve in fact 
corresponded with a shift from direct controls towards the greater 
reliance upon indirect economic management through the budget. The 
revival of Treasury control meant that Labour's relationship with in-
dustry was increasingly based on a policy of voluntarism, but this was 
quickly put to the test as inflation became the chief concern. By 
February, 1948, the government had secured a voluntary wage freeze 
from the TUC in return for voluntary prices and dividends restraint 
on the part of employers' organizations. These voluntary arrangements 
lasted for over a year, but by the summer of 1949 they were already 
being shredded by the combined pressure of rank and file unionists and 
recalci trant employers. 'The devaluation of the pound in September ham-
mered the last nail in the coffin of the voluntary wage freeze, although 
it took another year for the TUC Conference to reject the policy outright. 
By then relations with business had deteriorated over the issues of 
steel nationalization and the development councils, so that the leading 
organizations were under considerable pressure to end the voluntary 
policy from the employers~ side as well. By the fall of 1950 the FBI 
was no longer willing to recommend a continuation of the policy of re-
straint to its members, which had in any case become more or less 
meaningless given the inflationary boom then being fueled by the Korean 
War (Blank, pp. 97-104 and Panitch, ch. 1). 
By the end of labour's turn of office industrial capital should 
have been well pleased with its efforts to influence Britain's first 
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majority socialist government. Relations with the Attlee administra-
tion had been agreeable if not cozy. The only two areas in which 
substantial disagreements had arisen, steel nationalization and the 
development councils, had been effectively debilitated although not 
exactly vetoed. Besides compensation for public purchase of shares 
industry was now the recipient of a large variety of direct and indirect 
subsidies. Not only could firms discount part of the cost of capital 
investment through the tax allowance scheme, but grants and loans 
facilitated specific projects, such as the £40m loan to British Aluminium 
in September, 1951, and the £lOm re-equipment grant for the cotton 
industry in 1947-8. The government likewise provided one-third of the 
share capital for the new Finance Corporation for Industry, set up by 
the Bank of England together with the major clearing banks. The In-
dustrial and Commercial Finance Corporation was erected on a similar 
basis to fund loans under £20Om to aid smaller firms in an effort to 
close the "MacMillan gap" still yawning widely nearly two decades after 
its initial discovery. The government had in addition financed a 
number of new organizations to aid with research and development, inclu-
ding the Department of Industrial and Scientific Research, the Council of 
Industrial Design, the Agricultural Research and Advisory Council, the 
British Institute of Management and the British Standards Institute. 
Yet, for all these efforts the politics of the "producers' alliance" 
had lost momentum by 1950, and relations between industry and the state 
were removed to arms length after a decade-long embrace. The reasons 
for this were fairly simple as indicated above. Corporatist politics 
had presupposed an economic climate of depression. They were essentially 
restrictionist in outlook, industrialists seeking state support in 
cartel arrangements to guarantee their existing shares of the market. 
While these policies worked well in wartime conditions when access to 
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a limited volume of supplies was the chief concern, postwar expan-
sion seemed to demand a new relationship with the government. From 
1947 there was a shift awa.y from corporatist policies in the ranks of 
industry parallel to the emergence of neo-liberalism in the Conserva-
tive Party. In the immediate postwar period industrial capital support-
ed measures 0: co~trol and even the welfare state as these promised to 
prevent a return to ruinous depression conditions. However, the very 
success of the reconversion to a peacetime economy and the experience of 
full-employment created a new set of fears about the possible inflation-
ary results of public sector expenditure and trade union power, not to 
mention the former's role as a competing consumer of the nation's re-
sources. By 1950 planning was identified with the system of direct 
controls, even though in practice it had meant decontrol, and was con-
sequently out of favour with industry as the latter looked increasingly 
for a return to the simple virtues of a market-regulated economy. In-
dustry by now showed less and less concern with its relations with the 
state, except in so far as it wanted intervention in the private sec-
tor minimized. Economic liberalism had revived as the dominant ideology 
of industrial capital to an extent unseen in Britain for thirty years 
(Blank, pp. 108-110 and Harris, ch. 5). 
In conclusion this period was marked by two important breaks in 
the relations between industry and the state and in the conduct of 
economic policy. The first came in 1941 with the development of the 
war-time planning apparatus and the installation of Keynes in the 
Treasury. From that point economic policy was formulated in Keynesian 
terms. However, what remained unclear until 1947 was the political-
economic context in which such a policy would be embedded. In the 
latter years of the war it seemed possible that the representational 
links between industry and the state would assume a more formal, perhaps 
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even statutory casting. Similarly, the extent of state intervention 
and control over the private sector and the degree to which fiscal 
policy would be subordinated to a national planning procedure had 
not been settled. From 1947 the general trend towards decontrol was 
apparent despite various setbacks. Relations between industry and 
the state were institutionalized on an informal basis via the sponsor-
ship network. As direct controls were removed and the nationalization 
programme largely completed, the limits to state intervention were 
established. The rather weak impulse to develop a voluntary planning 
framework was abandoned in the face of employer hostility. Instead 
budgetary policy assumed centre stage as the key instrument of economic 
regulation, and with it the Treasury resumed its pivotal role as the 
central department in charge of economic policy. In effect this implied 
a reversion to a bureaucratic mode of procedure , although the context 
of "Treasury control" in the post-war period obviously implied a;signif-
ieant break with pre-war practices. Given the vastly expanded role of 
the public sector and the commitment to full ~mployment and a whole 
range of welfare provisions, macro-economic policy could no longer 
be formulated with reference to the position of state finances alone. 
What emerged out of this period along with the informal set of state-
in~ustry relations was a form of indirect economic regulation without 
much in the way of institutional support (apart from the brief flirtation 
with prices and incomes policy), a programme which might best be 
termed "pure and simple Keynesianism." While in the short run this 
proved to be relatively successful, it left successive governments 
ill-equipped when faced with a new set of dilemmas consequent of 
the return to full employment, mainly inflation and structural change. 
These tensions are the theme of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Conservative Liberalism and the Return of the City, 1951-60 
By the time the Conservatives returned to power in October, 1951, 
the stage had been set for a broad bi-pa.rtisan consensus on the para-
meters of economic and social policy that became known as 'Butskellism," 
after the Labour leader, Hugh Gaitskell, and the Tory Chancellor, R.A. 
Butler. The Labour leadership's experience of strong opposition to 
planks associated with the left wing of the Party (the use of direct 
controls and rationing, the extension of nationalization to profitable 
sections of industry and economic planning) had convinced it that such 
prop:ammes were an electoral liability. Subsequent development in 
social democratic theory in the 1950s added legitimacy to this essentially 
prgamatic position by asserting that such measures were not only polit-
ically inexpedient but economically superfluous. As most cogently 
expressed in Anthony Crosland 's, The Future of Socialism, the basic 
objectives of full employment and social welfare were now accepted by 
capital and the public at large, and public ownership was increasingly 
irrelevant to the aims of socialists. Socialist policy in this view 
ought to be confined to greater social equality through fiscal redistri-
bution and the expansion of educational opportunities and social welfare 
measures, while planning was redefined as the combination of Keynesian 
management and ad hoc state intervention in areas where market allocation 
of resources was deemed inefficient or socially disruptive, i.e., in 
industries requiring high and risky capital outlays, to secure region-
al 'talance, etc. (Crosland, 196), esp. pt, 5). '!he Conservatives, while 
they might express different priorities in their taxation and spending 
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policies, !-lad for their ikirt largely accepted the inveitability of 
the welfare state, the existing sphere of public ownership apart from 
iron and steel l.n-i ro':.Cl ha.ulage a.nc the expc.mle.J :cGle of the ::Jt3.. tc a.s 
the primary customer of the private sector and guarantor of full em-
ployment. Keynesian demand management ha.d apparently secured polit-
iCed legi ti:7::1CY, :tr.:i thp reviva.l of the Tresury with CL free hand ir_ 
determining the budget unequalled in any of the other advanced capit-
alist states offered an ideal locus for counter-cyclical economic pol-
icy through fiscal and monetary instruments outside the direct party 
political influence of Parliament. 
Yet, by the end of the decade rumblings of discontent with "Treas-
ury control," "stop-go" policies, and the sluggish rate of economic 
growth could be heard in Parliament, the national press and most sig-
nificantly within the ranks of industrial capital. While there had 
been no return to the dismal economic perfomance of the inter-war years, 
the trade cycle still manifested itself in an attenuated but increasing-
ly severe manner, ami the balance of payments, so it 3.ppeared, exercised 
a limiting constraint on the pace of economic activity. The decade that 
began with a celebration of "Tory freedom" ended with growing dismay 
at the decline of Britain's position vis-a-vis her chief econo~ic com-
petitors and a renewed enthusiasm for the once discredited programme 
of economic planning, particularly within the ranks of large industry. 
Industry's flirtation with economic liberalism was thus very brief in 
historical terms, and the background for this about face is the chief 
subject of the following section. 
The Conservative return to office after their marginal victory over 
an intellectually exhausted Labour government thus signalled no great 
deJBrture in economic policy. While pledged to "set the country free" 
from La.beur dirigisme and austerity, the new government initially 
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clamped down controls somewhat tighter than they had been under ~tlee. 
However, as before the election these measures were largely dictated by 
the statE' ,,): t~l'::' ~C0nO::ly, 3.nd the Tories continued the programme of 
decontrol as quickly as circumstances permitted, indeed often pre-
maturely. If the Conservatives moved cautiously at first, the success 
of reconversion to ~ ~ar~et Jominated economy inspired greater enthusias::l, 
and the pragmatic steps of the initial stages soon hardened into a 
doctrinaire commitment to free market ideology whatever the economic 
cost. 
The success of the policies of decontrol were not due to any in-
herent superiority of market forces over politically set controls as an 
allocator of resources, however. Conservative freedom worked in the 
early fifties essentially because the terms of trade turned very ad-
vantageously in Britain' s favour once the Korean War boom had dissipated. 
The drop in price of imported primary goods and foodstuffs stabilized 
the cost of living and allowed for a dramatic increase in home consump-
tion and production without affecting the balance of payments. Likewise, 
investment remained low until 1954, partly due to the cutbacks in the 
initial allowances, and consequently did not compete with domestic con-
sumption for the nation's resources. \~hen investment finally revived 
in 1954-5, partly spurred on by an increase in the initial allowances 
in the budget of 1954. and the price of imports began to rise as well. 
the bottlenecks of a strained economy became all too apparent. With 
the stagnation of labour productivity in 1955-6 coupled with accelerat-
ing wage increases to the order of 7% per annum, the economy began to 
suffer from the combined effects of inflation, stagnation and balance 
of payments deficits that has afflicted it ever since. Conservative 
liberalism. it seemed, did not always live up to its promised results. 
(Shonfield. 1958. ch. 2). 
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By 1955 in other words Britain was beginning to experience ~ 
combination of negative features that led Shonfield for one to speak 
of "the clbn.cteric of 1)55." drawing th"! appropriate ?e.rallel with the 
circumstances of decline in the late 19th century. In brief the central 
problem was that the twin policy goals of a high investment rate and 
~xpanding rsonomy or. the one hand and a strong and ultimately convert-
ible currency on the other now appeared conflicting rather than com-
plementary aims. This complex was officially recognized with the pub-
lication of a government White Paper. The Economic Implications of Full 
Employment, in 1956. which drew attention to the possible lack of com-
patibility of the three Keynesian policy aims. full employment, price 
stability and economic growth. and questioned for the first time since 
the war the priority of the first over the other two (see also Crouch, 
1977. p. xiv). '!he ingredients of the sterling crises of the 1950s 
were indeed largely the same as those vicious cycles of previous decades. 
Various interests centred on the City and the Bank of England success-
fully pressed for an early return to convertibility a.nd a revived 
international role for sterling, and the result was a clampdown on 
home investment and the debilitating effects of stop-go policies. The 
crisis of 1955 set a pattern for successive years, a failure of con-
fidence in the pound. largely due to speculative movements by overseas 
holders. was countered by deflationary measures at home. on the ground-
less basis that the key problem was domestic inflation, thus restricting 
investment and economic growth. From then on economic policy was 
largely determined by the state of confidence in sterling. which meant 
three years of more or less deflationary policies (Shonfield. 1958. ch. 8). 
To explain this course of events it is necessary to look more closely 
at the "problem of sterling," the role of the City and the Bank of 
England and the relationship of these to Conservative free market ideol-
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051· 
As noted above during the course of the war the sterling area 
had been welded into a monetary union with London in a controlling 
position. In the post-war years the sterling area emerged as the 
key economic link between the countries of the former Empire, a kind 
()f dub which rliscriminated aga.ir.st dollar imports (with American fi-
nanci~l backing) and in which the British goverlli~ent perceivea its 
role as that of banker to various client states. The sterling system 
was dependent in the post-war years on an open door policy for capital 
exports from the City of London. The banker-client relationship meant 
that in return for holding their sterling balances in London the member 
countries were supplied with such foreign currencies as they required 
for imports and more importantly that the British government would assist 
their investment needs by providing the means for capital export and by 
giving them priority in foreign aid. The net cost on the capital account 
of the balance of payments was in the order of £15Dm per year in the 19.50s, 
two-thirds of which was private investment. While Britain had ended the 
war as a large debtor for perhaps the first time in her history, this 
loss of overseas holdings had been made good by 19.50; yet, heavy capital 
outflow was allowed, even encouraged, throughout the decade. While the 
British government saw its role as that of a banker with the traditional 
notion that such a position would give it the power to discipline the 
various client countries to "live within their means," the latter looked 
upon their sterling balances more as an investment fund which would 
either guarantee that they received loans and investment capital from 
the metropolis or could simply be run down as needed to finance current 
account deficits. Particularly in the latter half of the 19.50s this 
depletion of the sterling balances had a significant impact on the bal-
ance of I8yments. Moreover, the main beneficiaries of the sterling 
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area system were not the underdeveloped colonies but the independent 
white dominions, as the dollar surpluses of the former were transferred 
to cover the .:f>ficits 0': ~rlC ~i:1.t~::;r (see Shor.fit:l,l,:h. 6, Conan, c:hs. 
2 and 4 and Polk). 
The use of Marshall Aid funds offers one index of the effects of 
governmen t i)rlori tie; '.n pCClrlQr:1ic policy. Un the Continent these funds 
were for the most part channelled into industrial reconstruction, thus 
forming the basis for the "economic miracles" of the 1950s. In Germany 
for example industrial capacity had not been so badly damaged as often 
imagined, but the capital market was ina shambles. The stock market 
did not play a major role in industrial investment as new issues re-
mained nearly as low in 1948-52 as they had been in 1908-12. Yet, in-
vestment was maintained, largely through the use of short-term credit 
facilities of the major banks. Marshall Aid counterpart funds in other 
words were diverted into industrial investment through the agency of 
the banking network, breathing new life into German finance capitalism. 
The counterpart funds re~resent~:\l 44% of tota 1 long-term industrial 
finance in 1949, declining thereafter. The German state later aided the 
banks by placing considerable deposits in their hands, accounting for a 
considerable proportion of the increase in their assets and their cap-
acity to lend to industry. Thus behind the "social market" ideology of 
the F.R.G ot which so enticed Young Conservatives in the 1950s and later, 
lay a high concentration of oredit through state support of the banks 
and the careful use of Marshall Aid. Similarly, in France in the period 
of 1949-52 Marshall funds were used to finance abour one-quarter of 
public investment which again through the planning agencies and state 
banking system werefunne11ed into industrial restructuring. In Britain 
by way of contrast the counterpart funds were used to redeem government 
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securities and thus reduce the national debt, largely out of consid-
eration for the country's international and military obligations, 
especially to the sterling area (Hu, pp. 14-27 and Shonfie1d, 1958, 
p. 268). 
The balance of payments nid exercise a constraint on economic 
policies in the 1950s but not, as sometimes thought, because of a short-
term weakness in British exports. The current account was in surplus 
thrOughout the decade apart from 1955, yet rather than using this sur-
plus to build up reserves the government allowed it to be invested abroad. 
Indeed, official policy was to achieve a positive balance on the current 
account just in order to finance capital export. The real sources of 
strain on the balance of payments were primarily these co~mitments to 
maintain and revive Britain's overseas presence; capital export and 
military expenditure drained off the surplus on the crrent account. The 
pattern of capital investment was distinctly different from the pre-war 
variety as it now took the form of direct rather than portfolio hold-
ings, i.e., British companies were extending their operations in a multi-
national direction. However, interestingly enough the return on such 
investments hardly justified the exercise since it was on average no 
higher and possibly lower than the net after-tax return on domestic 
investment in manufacturing industry (Caves et al, p. 176). Moreover, 
even apart from balance of payments considerations home investment of 
course improves productivity much more directly than overseas invest-
ment. While the usual justification for the latter is that it increases 
the demand for exports, this is much less obviously the case when such 
investment goes primarily to other industrial nations, e.g. the white 
independent countries of the Commonwealth. In addi tion the return on 
such investment overseas must be balanced against the military cost of 
maintaining governments abroad friendly to British interests (Shonfield, 
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chs. 4 and 5 and Worswick and Ady. 1962. ch.6). 
The top priority of Tory economic policy was then the revival of 
::.i!l interr:~~ :'i~n::.2. r.~,:::"e for sterling anti ul ti.lna tc~y a convcrti bIe cur-
rency. From 1951 when London reopened as an international market in; 
foreign exchange to the return to convertibility in 1958, the story in 
e",:::;encp. 1:.:; c,'L" _'1 .Jllcc'~::;si"e removals -:>1' the restrictions on fir:.:::.nci3.~ 
transactions in an attempt to restore sterling and London to their for-
mer positions in world finance. The increased use of sterling in inter-
national transactions was buttressed by its role in the protected ster-
ling area. both functions in effect sustaining the illusion that it was 
possible to return to the golden age of the by then distant past. How-
ever. besides the negative effects on economic policy the whole system 
was as dependent on contingent factors as the gold standard system of 
the 1920s1 1. the necessity of American tolerance and support of an 
economic system which discriminated against the dollar, 2. a continuous 
massive outflow of capital, and 3. the capacity and willingness of the 
dependent coun tri~s to earn dollars and exchange the surplus for larger 
sterling balances in London, all of which allowed the system to continue 
on the basis of extremely low reserves even by British standards (strange, 
ch. 2 .:1nd Polk). 
The policies of the various Tory governments of restoring a free 
market economy, an international role for sterling and a discriminatory 
association of "Commonwealth preference" were thus mutually reinforcing. 
The end result was to delay the recognition of sterling's decline from 
what strange terms its top currency position in international financial 
transactions, and no doubt to contribute to the complacency of British 
exporters since they could rely on protected markets, though their share 
of even these was steadily on the decline. The acceptance of these 
constraints. p.specially the need for a surplus on the balance o~ pay_ 
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ments, made the management of the domestic economy that much more dif-
ficult and constituted the major factor behind the deflationary policies 
that characterized the latter half of the 1950s (Strange, p. 71). 
The programme of liberalizing controls on exchange made the pound 
much more susceptible to the whims of world financial confidence. It 
constraint which fostered the three-year sterling crisis that began in 
1955. While there was a deficit in that first year, it was not as 
great as that of 1938, yet the latter had not been accompanied by a 
run on the pound. In any case the pressure on sterling continued tbrough-
out 1956 and most of 1957, when the balance of payments had returned to 
the black. The source of speculation was the widespread belief at the 
time that sterling was about to become completely convertible and that 
the government would adopt a floating exchange rate. 'Ibe basis for the 
rumours was not hard to find since the Conservatives had long been 
flirting with the notion of a "two lever" control over the economy, 
that is limiting the exercise of state manipulation to the Bank rate 
and the exchange level. From 1952 when the Tories had seriously con-
sidered the dramatic introduction of such "automatic" regulators under 
the appropriate code name of "Operation Robot" up through the crises of 
1955-57, the usefulness of employing foreign confidence to discipline the 
domestic economy had exercised an understandable attraction for Tory 
free marketers. Given the balance of payments weakness in 1955 and the 
low state of the reserves, these rumours of a rapid move to convertibil-
ity and a floating pound were quite enough for foreign holders of ster-
ling to anticiIate the removal of controls by making a run on the already 
porous defences of the pound. The crises were in a word essentially 
speculative (Shonfield, 1958, ch. 8). 
-14.5-
However, it was not merely expectation and rumour that fueled 
speculation against sterling at this time. It was the realisation that 
the Bank of F'.ngland was regaining the u.pper hand in determining the 
thrust of economic policy and that this return to its former position 
of dominance could only mean convertibility at the earliest practicable 
rr:oment, l: not b('for~. ,:s Shonfielc. reports, 
The impression of many observers at this time, in the first half 
of 1955, was that the Bank had more or less taken over the dir-
ection of British policy, and that the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
was prepared to do whatever was necessary at home in order to sus-
tain the appearance of a continued movement towards sterling 
convertibility abroad (ibid., p. 201). 
The revival of the Bank rate as a key instrument of policy and the in-
itiation of operations by the Bank in overseas markets to ensure that 
the unofficial rate kept in line with the official rate confirmed these 
impressions. By pushing up the rate in overseas markets the Bank hoped 
to demonstrate the ripeness of the moment for convertibility and thus 
make the final "dash for freedom." Paradoxically, the rumours of such 
a move were enough to prevent its actual occurence, for the subsequent 
flurry of speculation against the pound forced the Bank to disavow its 
rather too overt courtship with floating rates and persuade in turn the 
Chancellor to make public pronouncements to the same effect in order 
to stem the crisis (Shonfield, ibid., ch. 8 and Brittan, 1971, pp. 197-
200). 
The Bank of England's support for floating exchange rates is some-
what surprising given its previous and subsequent hostility to such pro-
posals. The reasons for this temporary conversion are, however, rather 
simple. In essence it was seen as a necessary if regrettable sacrifice 
for the overriding goal of converti bili ty. In the earlier case of 
Operation Robot the Bank had expected devaluation in any case owing to 
the rearmament programme and the collapse of the Korean War boom and 
wanted to make a virtue of necessity by securing convertibility as part 
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of a package deal. Put another way the City was, as the Economist 
noted at the time. "for the first time, willing to accept a fluctuating 
exchan5~ r:~"CC' for :sterline; as the ~)ri(;e that has to be pale. for this 
step toware.s convertibility (cited in Dow, 1970, p.83). While this step 
had been rejected in 1952 as too drastic, similar ideas remained current 
up t,) the SU;Tner ,)~' ~)5.5 as part ·Jf :> "collecti ve approach to converlibil-
i ty" on either Cl. sterling-area or European basis. For the Bank such un-
orthodox measures as floating rates were deemed acceptable if distaste-
tu1 concessions in order to achieve a convertible pound, which was as-
sumed (much like the gold standard in 1925) to be an end in itself. '1lle 
parallels between the two conjunctures are rightly emphasized by Shonfield: 
behind the foreign exchange policies pursued by the Bank in the 
1950s. it is possible to discern the same larger objective as that 
which was ultimately obtained by Montagu Norman in the 1920s. The 
advent of convertibility, like the restoration of the gold stand-
ard in its day, would prove to be a ruthless and effective dis-
ciplinarian of the home economy (Shonfield, ibid., p. 208). 
The Bank was simply attempting to reassert the effective veto of finance 
over the Keynesian state by exposing the exercise of economic policy 
to the confidence of foreign (and domestic) holders of sterling, thus 
ensuring that structural constraints could compensate for whatever 
political weakness the future might bring for it and its City patrons. 
The government and the Bank of England baulked at convertibility 
at the last moment, just as they had in 1952, when it became clear that 
the experiment was premature. In the case of Robot the plan had. been 
vetoed by Churchill, who was influenced by Lord Cherwell and Sir Arthur 
Salter (the corporatist ideologue) . Cherwell in turn relied on the advice 
of G.D.A. MacDougall and Salter on that of Sir Robert Hall, the Chief 
Economic Advisor to the Treasury from 1947 to 1961, and Lord Plowen, 
the CPO until 1953. These expansionists and anti-liberals within the 
Treasury continued to argue for caution in the middle years of the 
decade. Likewise, Conservative Chancellors in the fifties, Butler, 
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MacMillan and even Thorneycroft, and no doubt Sir Winston himself, 
were somewhat chary of adopting tout court the Bank's programe of a 
"dash for freedo;r," given the experience of blindly folluwing the 
advice of r-1ontagu Norman in the 1920s. Consequently, the next few years 
witnessed continued vacillation in economic policy, the result of the 
"unending c:rict:e: :rta tcb" between the Bank and the Treasury expan:;;ionists, 
the end product of which is better described as a drift rather than a 
dash towards convertibility (Brittan, 19'71, pp. 95-96 and 196 and 
Shonfield, 1958, pp. 212-224). 
From 1955 through 1958 the government pursued deflationary pol-
icies, although the same conflicts within the administrative machinery 
produced a pattern of vacillation and about turns, punctuated by sterling 
crises at the end of 1956 and the summer of 19S1. 'Ibe appointment of 
Sir Edward Boyle as Economic Secretary to the Treasury in the spring 
of 1955 and Harold MacMillan as Chancellor of the Exchequer 
later in that year added two expansionist voices in key positions. 
Their reign did not last very long, however, as Macllillan became Prime 
Minister in the wake of the Suez crisis and Boyle was replaced by Nigel 
Birch in early 1957, who was ".by training and tellperment a City man 
(Shonfie Id. i bid., p. 231)." Consequently, the prevalence wi thin the 
Treasury of a highly circumspect attitude towards the efficacy of Bank 
rate changes and market forces had a short life and was hardly well 
entrenched in any case. 'Ibe new Chancellor, Peter (now Lord) Thorney-
craft, was politically aligned with the free market, orthodox finance 
wing of the Tories, but initially at least he followed the cautious line 
of the expansionists. At this point he was apparently influenced by Sir 
Robert Hall. and evidently proposed the introduction of an incomes 
policy or wage norm of the voluntary sort later favoured by labour. 
'Ibis plan did not pass muster with the Cabinet. however, and the only 
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coneession to the notion was the creation of the Council for Prices, 
Productivity and Incomes, which in any case came out in favour of 
monet-'3.ry ~0:1aticn (Brittan. 1971, pp. 207 and 210, Shonfielcl, 1958, 
pp. 229-232 and Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes, First 
and Second Reports). 
ThG::n<:>ycroft's instincts got the better of his advice as a result 
of the third run on the reserves in as many years in September, 1957 and 
o he effected a rapid 180 turn. This crisis was more or less equivalent 
to those of the two previous years, al though unlike the first there was 
not even the plausible excuse of a balance of payments deficit. Again 
it was purely a question of foreign confidence and the expectation of an 
exchange realignment as a result of the French devaluation and the chron-
ic surplus on the German current aocount. While the Treasury continued 
its public commitment to the existing rate, there was no doubt a contin-
uing debate on the matter within the policy-making apparatus, and in 
any case. "The immanent likelihood of a new policy was widely believed 
in the City (Dow, 1970, p.87)." The movE' to convertibility was postponed 
once again, but overnight Thorneycroft was transformed into a hard 
money man. Although one of his first acts as Chancellor had been to 
lower the Bank rate, he now boosted it to a post war record of 7% 
following the bankers' logic that interna.l inflation was to blame for 
the crisis. Wage rates had in fact been decelerating and unemployment 
was on the increase when he decided to call for a new dose of austerity. 
Moreover, while investment had been rising for several years despite the 
TOry attempt to restrain it, production had only just returned to its 
1955 level after the previous deflationary measures. Treasury economists 
were expecting a recession in any case and believed that the already 
su bstantial slack in the economy would increase in the next few months. 
'lbe crisis was purely one of loss of confidence in the financial world,' 
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which looked agast on wage increases in excess of productivity and 
sought severe monetary discipline as an antidote. Thorneycroft simply 
adopted the advice of his new mentors, the moneta,i~t, Lord Robbir.s, anci. 
the Governor of the Bank of England, lord Kindersley, who advocated 
at the time that the "Bank rate had got to be raised and raised prop-
erly (Dow, 1970, p.lOO)." 
Thorneycroft's "September measures" besides jumping the Bank rate 
from 5 to ~ included cuts in public investment and restrictions on 
capital issues and a directive to the banks to limit their advances. 
The Chancellor was now working in close concert with Enoch Powell, the 
Financial Secretary and noted free marketer, and the aforementioned 
Nigel Birch, who together "were largely responsible for turning the 
anti-inflationary policies into a crusade (Brittan, 1971, p. 213)." 
The neo-liberal programme suffered another reversal, however, in Jan-
uary, 19.58, when the doctrinaire commitment to cuts in public expendi-
ture failed to win the support of the Prime Minister or the Cabinet, 
and the trio handed in their resignations in a dramatic if superfluous 
gesture. Thorneycroft was replaced by Heathcote Amory as Chancellor, 
and the post of Economic Secretary was left unfilled until Anthony 
Barber took over after the general election in October, 1959. While 
Amory had supported the "September measures" and was as orthodox as 
Thorneycroft as regards inflation, he eventually succumbed to expansion-
ist pressure. However, his first budget was still dominated by the fear 
of upsetting financial confidence and was thus only mildly expansionist 
despite rising unemployment and a predicted balance of payments surplus. 
While Amory did not share Thomeycroft's theological temperment, he was 
devoted to the same priorities and apparently not at all distressed by 
the prospect of a rate of economic growth of no more than 1% despite the 
possibili ty of greater expansion. Price stability was his central concern 
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as he himself expressed: "We want to see production and employment just 
as high as we can, consistent with maintaining the value of money 
(cited in Brittan, 1971, p. 221)." 
Favourable changes in the terms of trade allowed Amory to pursue 
modest expansion in 1958 and still maintain price stability as well as 
add something to the reserves. Yet, the recession continued through 
1958, as the policies designed to please the financial world were not 
compatible with the counter-cyclical measures which Keynesian theory 
deemed appropriate. In December, 1958, sterling was finally made con-
vertible for foreign holders thus removing the last of the flimsy defenses 
which had been breeched repeatedly in any case over the previous few 
years. '!he recession became increasingly worrying to the government, 
however, and Asory responded vi th a series of concessions on hire pur-
chase controls, public spending, bank lending and initial allowances. 
Unemployment reached. 620,000 in January, 1959, and in the wake of en-
thusiasm over the success,of convertibility and with due consideration 
for the forthcoming election, the Chancellor introduced the most expan-
sionary budget of the post-war period., offering tax reliefs in the order 
of £36Om. In fact production had already begun to turn round when the 
budget was brought in, and Amory was simply playing the "go" card in 
electoral politics. Economic activity rapidly heated up, resulting this 
time in a serious balance of payments deficit, the vicious cycle that 
was to dominate efforts at steering the economy for the next decade aM 
more. 
Relations with industrial capital had in the meantime come under 
increasing strain as low investment and. growth undercut the competi ti ve-
ness of British u.nufacturers and as the gradual but inexorable dis-
solution of the imperial network forced a reappraisal of industry's 
dominant strategy for the past half century or sore, i.e. its reliance 
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on using a protected export market as a buttress for its domestic 
position. By the end of the decade leading industrialists were joining 
the chorus of criticism of neo-liberal political economy and deflation-
ary policies of which, lBradoxically, they had earlier been among the 
most prominent advocates. In 1960-61 they were first off the blocks 
in the "dash for planning" which marked the about turn in relations 
between business and the state that characterized economic policy in 
the 1960s. However, it took a decade of negative experience of the 
politics of decontrol to achieve this reversal of attitudes, and for the 
lIlost part of that period industry was critical of the Conservatives for 
being too hesitant in the application of deflationary measures and the 
general progra..ae of "economic discipline." Industrialists were in short 
caught in a contradictory conjuncture as on the one hand they saw the 
restoration of u.rket forces as the only alternative to the wartlae 
syate. of controls and planning, which, while totally dominated. by their 
spokes.en and agents, contained the seeds of an a.l ternative econoaic 
framework that promised only danger for the long term no matter how com-
pliant the leadership of the Labour Party; on the other hand the hands-
off policies of decontrol and the exposure of British economic policy 
to the effective veto of sterling holders were so disruptive in the 
long term to their investment strategies and position in both foreign 
and domestic aarkets that they were forced to return to the only programme 
that had paid off in terms of concrete results in the past, that of 
"democratic planning," particularly as this seemed to be a key ingredient 
in the "economic miracles" of their Continental rivals. I shall return 
to the planning ini tia ti ve in the following chapter. '!he focus of this 
section is rather the growing realization on the part of sOIle industrialists 
that they were paying the price for Tory freedom and the City's revival. 
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'Ibe period of 1951-60 was one not just of a gradual loosening of 
the re la tions between industry and the state but one of a gradual de-
cline in the authority of the FBI over its constituent aembers. Even 
before 1951 the Federation had been one of the louder voices in the 
neo-libera1 choir and, indeed, was frustrated by the hesitation of the 
Consevatives in pursuing the free market strategy. 'Ibe FBI was dis-
illusioned with the government's evident slowness in taking up tits. 
policies, e.g •• rapid denationalization of steel, large cuts in pulbic 
expenditure and taxaticm, ending the excess profits tax and dividend 
restraint and the general lifting of other direct controls which re-
stricted corporate autonomy. '!he change of orientation dated back to 
1947, and the demand. for public expenditure cuts and lower taxation was 
the central repetitive thelle in FBI statements from that date onwards. 
However, the force of the Federation~s arguaents was undercut by its 
inability to specify where cuts ought to be made, and in later years 
by the apparent lack of unAnimity on such questions as incomes policies. 
While there might have been discontent over the Conservatives unwilling-
ness to force the pace of decontrol given the international economic 
situation, there could be little doubt ,that the goals of the govezmaent 
and industry's central peak organization were in the main convergent. 
In any case the rapid expansion after the Korean impasse diffused the 
urgency of such criticisms and relations between the two were cordial, 
if less than intimate for as long as the boom lasted (Blank, 19'73, pp. 
119-127). 
The movement away from close collaboration with industry over econ-
omic policy was thus continued despite the change of goYezmaent. '!his 
was largely a product of econollic liberalization; since the state was 
no longer intervening in the economy in such a detailed fashion, there 
was saply no need for business representatives to staff·the various 
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state agencies. '!he latter were not so much abolished as allowed to decay 
so that by the middle years of the decade little was left of that "vast 
system of advisory and 1iason bodies" which had seemed so characteristic 
of modem capitalism as late as 1951 (PEP, 1952, ch. 6). '!he Conserva-
tives in any case preferred informal consulatation in the clubs and 
private homes to the formal system necessary to a Labour government or 
an interventionist state, and the political necessity of not associating 
too directly with big capital tailored well with neo-liberal ideology 
and the preference for the simple if somewhat brutal instruments of 
monetary policy. '!his hands off attitude suited industry's mood as 
well, since the FBI was by now highly sensitive to accusations levelled 
against it of acting increasingly as a state agent. '!he leaders of the 
Federation were far less willing to be the initiators of any policies 
that would tie them to the systea of state regulation, preferring to 
reflect the essentially negative posture of the FBI's members and its 
rival organizations, i.e., less government, lower taxation and the res-
toration of market discipline. So by 1955 the system of government-
industry relations had been reduced to informal and infrequent contacts 
at the higher levels on ~tters of macroeconomic policy and the contin-
uation of the sponsorship network between state departments and their 
respective industries on the details of such policies and goverment 
legisl&tion (PEP, 19.57). '!his situation was well suited to all the 
parties concerned so long as the economic boom continued despite the 
fact that "with less contact between government and industry, and less 
desire to maintain close relations, habits of consul:t.a.tion were for-
gotten (Blank, 1973, p. 125)." When the series of sterling crises 
broke in the latter years of the decade, however, this relationship did 
not turn out to be quite 80 symbiotic. 
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The immediate reaction of the FBI to the sterling crises, however, 
was simply to become more strident in its demands for deflationary 
measures. It concurred with the orthodox view that the source of thp. 
problem was the high level of internal demand and that consequently 
it was the government's responsibility to remedy the situation with the 
traditional medicine of public expenditure cuts and greater unemploy-
ment. In particular the FBI refused to countenance any voluntary re-
straint of prices or dividends on its own part, believing along with 
most industrialists that the earlier experience of 1948 had been un-
fair and objecting to the "increasing tendency to thrust the burden of 
readjustment on to industry" and. the same time as it demanded further 
deflation (cited in Blank, 1973, p. 129). This rather bizarre position 
was matched by the dopatic insis~ce that cuts in public investaent be 
made as a precondition to any consideration of private sector restraint, 
despite the fact that the Conservatives had already made considerable 
incursions in precisely that direction. The appointment of Arthur 
Shenfield as Economic Advisor in 1955 reinforced the dogmatism and in-
flexibility of the FBI's orthodoxy as his theological adherence to the 
"dell&lld ptll" analysis of inflation was soon reflected in policy state-
ments, especially Britain's Economic Problems and Policies, a pamphlet 
published by the Economic Policy Committee in early 1957 (FBI, EPC, 1957 
and Blank, ibid., pp. 127-31). 
'!his confusing picture ot industrial attitudes in the mid-19.50s 
is further coaplicated by the divisions on the question ot incomes 
policies. In the wake of the sterling crisis of the summer of 1955, the 
Bri tish Employers' ConfederatiOll called for wide-ranging discussions 
with the rue on the state of the econollY. The FBI was deterained more 
than anything elae to avoid a return to the voluntary restraint policies 
that had characterized the latter stages of the Attlee government, and 
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relations with the Conservatives had truely soured as a result of 
this flanking II&noeuvre. In March, 19.56, the FBI refused the Mac-
MilIan government's request to co-sponsor with the TUC a White Paper 
on inflation which ellphasized. the increasing costs in the private 
sector as the l18.in factor. Only in July were the FBI and BEC, joined 
by the NUM and the ABCC, finally won to the government's view of the 
need for a "price plateau." TIle price wa.s a pledge from the heads of 
tha. nationalized industries to freeze their prices as well as a £100m 
reduction in public expenditure. Here again, however, the FBI was 
not so JlUch initiating a new policy direction as falling in with the 
increasingly militant mood of employers in general in the drive to hold 
the line against spiralling wage claims and sta.g:na.nt producti vi ty • TIle 
rejection at the 'lUC Conference in Septe.ber of any policy of voluntary 
restraint -.de the whole issue a dead letter. Industry's preferred pol-
icy of sharp deflaticmary aeasures was in any case put into effect in 
Septelllber, 1957, under '!borneycroft with an enthusiastic response from 
the FBI despite the recognition that industry would have to pay part of 
the cost of going to "the root of inflation." As expressed in an edi tor-
ial in the FBI Review, "'!bough the new Jleaaures will bear heavily on soae 
sections of industry, the FBI could hardly condemn the Chancellor for 
carrying out policies with it has frequently recommended. to him (FBI Re-
~, Oct •• 19S1; and Blank. ibid., pp. 131-38). Industrial leaders 
were fully in agree.ent with a policy that treated domestic inflation 
as the main enelllY and were willing at this point to put up with industrial 
stagnation to achieve zero inflation. 
While approval of the "Septeaber Jleasures" was reaffirmed in the 
state.ent, Fighting Inflation, issued in March, 1958 (also penned by 
Shentield), as the recession began to bite the FBI becaae increasingly 
concerned with the results of the aea.aures it had 80 persistently advo-
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cated (FBI, 19.58). With a rapid decline in the growth of fixed invest-
ment down to a zero level in 1958 and an equally dangerous rise in un-
employment to the highest levels since the Second World War, industrial-
ists began to rethink the course of the general economic programme they 
had supported. for the past ten years. The fimst two of the Industrial 
Trends Surveys initiated in the early months of 1958 confirmed the depth 
of the recession and credit sueeze, and the Federation now added its 
voice to the rising clamour for expansionist measures, even reversing 
its previous stands on public expenditure and investment. The result 
was a substantial jab for the econoay after the recession had already 
bottomed out, as described above . (FBI Review, March, 1959). The econ-
omy soon overheated once again with subsequent balance of payments prob-
lems in 1960 and the reimposition of credit restrictions and hire pur-
chase controls in April of that 1ea:r. This time, however, the FBI 
objected to the iaposi tion of measures designed to resolve the short-
term problems of the economy. In the spring of 1960 industrial capital 
was beginning to perceive that the "stop-go" po1iices of the past decade 
were destabilizing to industrial investment in the long run and were no 
aid in the atte.pts to expand British exports. Econollic planning, which 
had been the dirty word of the 19.50s, was once again taken out of Iloth-
OOlls and launched as the new redeemer of the British economy. (Blank, 197.3, 
pp. 1.39-142). 
'nle evidence su'blli tted to the RBdcliffe eoai ttee, established by 
Thorneycroft in the wake of the financial crisis of 19.56 to investigate 
the working of the monetary system, offers some insight into the contra-
dictory pressures and conflicts both within industrial capital and between 
industry and finance in this period. In general one _y 8&y the. t the Bank 
and financial inati tutions expressed _tiataction over the -.in linea 01' 
of .onetary policy. Fro. their perspective the fault lay not in orthodox 
-157-
monetary instruments nor in the financial system but in the.f\eatures of 
the Keynesian state that undercut the effectiveness of the above, prin-
cipally "over-full"employment and public sector borrowing. The views of 
industrial representatives were on the other hand considerably divided, 
especially on the question of the eficacy of Bank rate IlOveDlents as an 
instrument of credit restriction. Spokesmen for big industrial capital 
were unifoDm in their view that monetary measures before 1958 had no sig-
nificant impact on their investment plans, while small industrial capital 
fel t the pinch of dear .oney Jluch .ore directly. '!bis pe~ps IIOre than 
anything explains the continued support on the part of such organiza. tions 
as the FBI for deflationary policies, as the large, and increasingly IlUlti-
national. firms did not suffer directly from such measures at least in the 
short run. They were able to finance investment out of their own liquid 
resources and thus concurred with the orthOdox view that fighting infla-
tion and aaintaining a surplus on the overseas account ought to be the 
priorities of goverruaent econoaic policy. Representatives of saall industry 
were much more critical of the general operation of monetary policy, 
having felt the cradi t squeeze aore drastically, especially since many 
811&11 fins relied on bank overdraUlhts for the finance of capital expen-
diture. They sindlarly reproached the City for rlQ'Uca.tering to their mediwa 
and long-term f~nancial needs, reaffirming in contrast to big industrial 
capital the continued presence of the "Macllillan lap." Finally, there was 
virtually no questioning by any of the I&rticipants, including the TUC, of 
the external cou1taents of the British state or the programme of reviving 
the overseas presence of British capital through massive foreign investment. 
The evidence of the Bank of England. was characteristically self-
satisfied and defenBive. The Governor _w monetary measures as "coDaiderabl1 
successful" over the past few years. More particuikly, "in 1952 , &Dd 
again in late 1955 and 19.56, aonetary aeaaures he.jIed sign1fiCBDtly to 
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restrain the boom, and, if they had not been used, the present economic sit-
uation would be much less healthy than it is." The Bank admitted at 
this point (July, 1957) that altered conditions of the post-war period 
had meant that Mit was impracticable to rely in monetary policy on any 
automa. tic remedy to meet any particular change in the si tua tion. " Full 
employment had changed business expectations about economic trends and 
consequently "control by monetary authorities is more difficult than at 
at times when good and bad trade altemated more sharply." Other factors 
underaining aonetary control were state encouragement of capital expendi-
ture outside the influence of monetary Ileasures (like public sector invest-
ment), the large liquid balances of big companies, and the low level of bank 
advances which the financial institutions were anxious to increase. 
None the less the':Bank affirud that, 
Experience has shown that, in the general objectives of moderating 
fluctuations in the econoay, the Treasury and the Bank, acting to-
gether and with the co-operation of the banking cODlJlunity, can do 
much by foraal and inforul methods to control the level of advances, 
the banks' policies towards securities, liquidity and so on. But 
the basic need reaains the ability to regulate the total quantity 
of currency and bank deposits. Monetary measures will, in the long 
run, only be effective if Government policy as a whole is directed 
to keepUg the aoney supply under control and the public are persuaded 
that this objectiye will be achieved (CoJllldttee on the Working of 
the Monetary Systea, Principal Meaoranda of Evidence, Vol. l, pp. 3 
and )6, see also Minutes of Evidence, paras. 22.51-2319). 
The Bank likewise .aintained that the role of interest rates was 
an integral and effective aspect of monetary policy, given the above pro-
visos about general conditions and other aspects of policy. 'Ibe effect of 
interest rates was deemed Mpt.rtly actual and partly psychological," and 
consequently difficult to specify in exact terms. The post-war situation, 
especially the higher rates of taxation and the expectation of continued 
lnfla tiOD. had also underliined the effectiveness of higher interest ra tea 
mdiscouraging borrowing and the ability to sell long-ter. fixed-interest 
governaent bills. The iaporta.nce of the latter point, i.e. the need to turn 
to Treasury bills to fUnd the public debt, thereby increasing the liquid-
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ity of the banks, led to the ultimate suggestion that "a formal limit 
should be set to the size of the debt (ibid., p. 38)," a suggestion 
that was to return in later years. On the foreign exchange market as 
well the Bank still felt that Bank rate changes influenced the flow 
of funds to and froa Britain. In this case as well, however, various 
conditions impeded the functioning of traditional monetary instruments: 
The actual change in the level of interest rates is subsidiary 
nowadays to the effect on confidence in sterling which a change 
of Bank Rate can exercise, when it is taken abroad. as a sign 
that measures are in hand which will fundamentally improve the 
econollY. In post-war year&., there have been periods when con-
fidence has been lacking and a level of interest rates in London hiBher 
than in other countries has failed to 8. ttract funds from abroad 
(ibid.). 
The Bank dealt rather abruptly with any proposed changes in monetary 
policy that would sustitute "a measure of com~ion" for the traditional 
relationship of inforaal understanding or "aoral sua,sion" between the 
Bank and the tiDancia1 insti tutioDs in an a tteapt to reaedJ the above 
situation. It em~sized the utility of the existing co-operation between 
the bankers and the authorities I 
To introduce an arbitrary standard on a compulsory basis must 
give the banks an incentive to rearrange their affairs so as to 
secure the greatest advantage that the law allowed. '!he virtues 
of inforaal &Dd fiexible methods of persua,sion would. be lost, and 
this would. not be without influence on international optmion. 
If invoking this ultimate threat of foreign confidence once was not enough, 
the Bank re pea ted the point with regard to the overseas operations of 
Bri tish banks. 
I t cannot, 'be pre81llled that COJl.p.1lsory measures could be limited to 
banks whose business is priu.rily in the Un! ted XiJ18do.. '!he U.K. 
business of Bri tiah and other b81 ks operating mainly overseas is 
highly individual. To a.pply uniform methods of regua.1tion would be 
difficult, might prejudice the standing and operations overseas of 
Bri tish banks, and might even provoke unpleasant poll tical and mon-
etary reaf:tions in their lI&in centres of operation (ibid.). 
After listing the various coapulsory techniques that aight be invoked, the 
Bank rejected &11 with the partial exception that Special Deposits soheaes 
were the least objectionable of the a.lternatives. Yet, the general approach 
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to compulsory measures was at the same time unequivocally ne~tive. 
None of the suggestions is free from serious drawbacks arising from 
the introduction of compuls~on and rigidity into a banking system 
doing a large volume of international business. They are all likely 
to prejudice the close and helpful co-operation which exists between 
the authorities and the banking system. They all operate primarily 
on the business of credit-giving; :and therefore do not replace instru-
ments, such as Bank Rate, which effect also the willingness to take 
credit. The Bank would stress these drawbacks, and do not at present 
consider that an amendment to the present system is necessary or 
would on balance be advantageous (ibid., pp. 41-2). 
The Treasury was somewhat less sanguine about the effectiveness of 
tradi tional aonetary policy in the post-war era, although largely accepting 
its general objectives. It too noted that the expectation of governement 
support for full employment had undercut the psychological impact of a 
rise in Bank rates 
In the past it was possible to create, or at least reinforce. the 
expectation of a geneml recession in trade, and increases ·.in Bank 
Rate were often resarded as a signal that such recessions were 
imainent ••• It is now, however, taken for granted:.t.hat the Government 
will do all in its power to prevent the advent of a general reces-
sion, and the experience of price movements over the past twenty 
years has greatly weakened the that goodsi'.may sometimes be got more 
cheaply by waiting. Today, therefore, restraint of capital expendi-
ture by monitary means has to rely more on restraining people from 
raising money (ibid., p. 94). 
'!bus, the lillitations of the traditional method (raising Bank rate) made 
it necessary to exercise direct controls on the financial sector, i.e. 
restrictions on capital issues, direct requests to commercial banks about 
the level and purposes of their advances and hire purchase controls. The 
experience of monetary policy had not, however, been highly encouraging 
in the 19.50s, even with the use of direct controls (ibid., pps. 96-99). 
While offering no direct coaaent on the Bank's rejection of alternative 
techniques of monetary control, the Treasury did maintain that, 
this control cannot in present circuastance.,be adequately exer-
cised by existing techniques of aonetary policy alone J and that 
these have to be supple.ented by controls of capital issues, 
hire purchase controls nad requests to the Banks, or a cOIIlbination 
of all three(ibid., p. 120). 
Admitting a "presuaption in favour of minimum interference with the nor-
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mal working of the existing system," it too rejected the introduction 
of additional compulsory measures but agreed with the Bank of England 
about the relative desirability of special deposits placed at the Bank 
in comparison to &1 terna ti ve schemes. (i bid. ) • 
On the question of external policy the Treasury's evidence was 
largely again in accord with that of the Bank of England. The importance 
of an international role for sterling was unquestioned,and consequently the 
two dominant objectives of external policy were reaffirmed, namely mai.n-
, taining confidence in sterling and earning an adequate balance of pay-
ments surplus to finance private capital outflow, long-term government 
lending and the capital repayments of govemment overseas debt. The 
stability of the sterling balances was dependent on Itcon:fidence which has 
to be maintained by United Kingdom policy and need~ to be continually 
refreshed." Sterling holdings ~;by countries outside the sterling area 
were even more li&ble to sharp fluctuations owing to loss of confidence, 
not to mention the internal "trading comaunity," which could vary the 
It leads and lags It in the purchase and sale of goods and evade exchange 
controls to invest in non-sterling currencies if the exchange rate were 
threa tened (ibid., p. 111). In consequence, with regard to monetary 
effects on short-term capital movements, "confidence factors" had pre-
dominated over "normal fa.ctors," i.e. had impinged upon the ability of 
rises in the Bank rate to influence such movements. Moreover, "The 
central feature of 'confidence' has been that, having regard to the lim-
ita. tions of our external aonetary po si tion, doubt has existed over our 
capacity to carry out our domestic programmes without running into in-
flation (ibid., p. 119).1t 
Representatives of the financial institutions concurred in every 
respect with the point of view expressed by the Bank of England. They 
supported the "inforMl and flexible" relationBhip with the Bank, the 
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reliance on traditional methods of monetary policy and the general 
aim of maintaining sterling's international role and opposed the use 
of direct controls, particularly when such methods impinged on their 
own field of operations, as well as any proposals for the retension or 
introduction of compulsory measures. Their criticisms were reserved for 
other aspects of government policy which undercut the eficacy of monetary 
instruments, namely continued finance of state expenditure through borrowing 
because of the cow went to full employment, the public corporations' 
inYestaent policies. ete. For exaaple the Accepting House. Cooi t7 
offered the opinion that 
that part of the monetary system with which [the Accepting Houses] 
are concerned, namely the London Money Market, functions with 
admirable smoothness and efficiency and is the best of its kind in 
the world. It provides a sensitive mechanism with the help of 
which the Authorities can influence the supply of short-term 
loanable funds. Provided that changes in Bank Rate are suitab~ 
backed up by open II&rket operations, any desired degree of credit 
reatrictiODCIUl be brought about (ibid., Vol. 2, p • .5). 
'Ibis eulogy was, however, subject to two reservations I 
In the first place the aechanism will not work if the Authorities 
Shrink from raising rates of interest to a level appropriate to 
the degree of restriction desired. In the second place the market 
will not react in the manner which could normally be expected if 
Governaent budgetary and debt management policy results in a con-
tinuous expansion of Treasury Bill issue I this must inevi tabl, 
frustrate any attempts to use normal open market techniques (ibid.). 
Thus, the general position was that the monetary system and the financial 
insti tutioDS were perforaing their proper functions in the British econ-
OIly; the fault lay elsewhere. 
It is nO good blaming the monetary system for difficulties which 
lie deeper. In particular it is no good blaming the system because 
the effective halting of inflation may be incompatible with the 
maintenance of a state of overfull employment, because a rate of 
interest high enough to eliminate comparatively unprofitable demand 
... y a180 stop such socially deab&ble objects as house building, 
or because when prices in the rest of the world rise or fall sa-
ul taneous -.1nteD&llce of both internal price stabi li ty and the 
excbanp value of the currency -y be impossible. No known Dlon-
etary syst_ can reconcile conflicts of this kind (ibid.). 
The thrust of the evidence of the Issuing Houses Association was 
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largely identical. Given the experience of and government commitment 
to full employment, the ability to restrict the supply of new issues 
was very limited. The expecta ti on of continued inflation had negated 
the impact of higher interest rates, and the government not been either 
able or willing to ration credit by means of comprehensive directives, 
which the Association opposed in any case. Thus, 
Since in our view the attempts at piecemeal rationing of credit 
by means of Letters of Guidance to the Capital Issues Committee 
have so far proved ineffective, and since we hold that a cOlllprehen-
si ve use of directives to control the flow of credit would prove i.· 
stultifying and moreover impracticable, it follows that reliance 
IIlUst be placed in the _in on the use of interest rates as a means 
of ra tioningccredi t (i bid., p. 44). 
For this prograIlIle to succeed the government would. have to control its 
budgetary am. financial policy as well as the borrowing requirements of 
the public corporations in order to eliminate inflation. In the interim 
before such aeasures would take their full effect, the Association sup-
ported the continuation of the Capital Issues Committee for as long as 
the deaand for fresh capital outran its supply. However, it proposed 
certain constitutional Changes for the Committee which would ensure its 
greater authority and autonomy from government control. These included 
streamlining and siaplifying the procedure for application, the estab-
lishment of general guidelines setting out investment priOrities, the 
inclusion on the Committee of "someone who is fully conversant with the 
technical probleas of Capital Issues and Issuing Houses," preferably 
"a leading partner of one of the eminent firms of Cl ty so1101 ters or 
accountants," and the selection of a Chairman "of an ability and stand-
ing in the financial world. which would give great weight to his views on 
the agreed instructions," namely a Chairman of one of the join~~stock 
banks (ibid., p. 47, see also pps. 42-48). 
'lbe CODi ttee of London Clearing Bankers echoed aany of the S&Ile 
points. Any inadequacies of monetary control over the past few years 
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were due "not to any defect in the mechanism but to the fact that 
the machine has been overloaded (ibid., p. 51). to '!he financial system 
was deemed sufficient in meeting any and all requirements for the fin-
ance of British industry. Compulsory controls and directives were op-
posed as both inflexible and undesirable. 
In our view, both restrictions on lending at Government request 
and the consequent diminution of competition among the banks in 
the lending sphere are undesirable expedients which were resorted 
to on a temporary basis tu t which have gone on too long for the 
good of the economy. We consider that both should be abandoned. 
as soon as practicable. However, if monetary measures need re-
inforceaent and if it is necessary for bank lending to be arti-
ficially restricted at any time, we consider that this is better 
accomplished inforally than by legislation (ibid., p. 59). 
Similarly, the ~ferred option of indirect influence through Bank rate 
Changes could only bee effective if budgetary deficits were curtailed. 
There is no doubt in our minds that the high level of expenditure 
which has been _intained by Government, Local Govermaent and the 
ltfa tionalised Industries in recent years is at the root of our 
trouble and this is not ~pable of being restrained by those' meas-
ures relating to the cost and volUllle of credit with which the banks 
are mainly concerned (i bid., p. 61, see also pps. 49-61). 
The submissions b,y industrial representatives were substantially 
more critical, although in general they too agreed with the overall 
policy objectives, especially the importance of maintaining an internation-
al role for sterling, the informal relationship between capital and the 
state and the need for tighter budgetary control and reduced taxation. 
It was in particular the organizations representing smaller firllls that 
displayed the greatest doubts regarding monetary policy. as they had been 
aore seriously affected by the credit sueeze than larger self-financing 
firms. The evidence offered by the FBI was the most completely in line 
with orthodox financial opinion, as it was at this point (November, 19.57) 
still under the spell of the excess demand model of British economic diff-
iculties •. The heavy hand of Arthur Shenfield was clearly behind the 
analysis of the Federation offered to the Collllllittee, as indicated by the 
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references to the pamphlet, Britain's Economic Problems and Policies, 
as in effect supplementary evidence, not to aention his place as part 
of the witness team sent to give verbal evidence. Consequently, the 
lIlemorandum was more or less a repetition of the arguments of that earlier 
document. 'Ibe effects of monetary policy at least before the September 
measures was judged to be minimal. Only hire purchase controls and the 
purchase tax were seen as potent, but these had. to be large to be effective 
and consequently had "damaging long-term consequences for the industries 
concerned (ibid., p. 115)." 
Raising interest rates was likewise deelRed appropriate in the battle 
against inflation. Indeed, they agreed that this weapon "must be used 
wi th grea. ter vigour that it was before September, 1951, It if excess de-
mand and inflation would ever be eliminated (ibid., p. 115). '!he real 
culpri ts were the aethod dcJi\mding and.,volwae of pqblic expenditure and 
the investment policies of the nationalized industries. The only answer 
was the tougher IIOnetary policy, a reduced reliance on budgetary planning 
and cutting government expenditure "down at the root." The FBI expressed 
its faith in the adequacy of financial institutions, even in bridging the 
"Ma.cMill.a.n gap" of lRedium and long-term finance for smaller flras, although 
it did note that, 
No corporate institution exists at present with the specified 
purpose of undertaking the obviously much more hazardous business 
of financing new am untried shcemes I and the question of whether 
such a corporation would be in the public interest remains un-
answered (ibid., p. 117). 
Yet, such an institution, it felt, should be left to the initiative of 
the pri va te sector, and no suggestion was made for the creation of a 
publicly funded investment bank (see also pps. 114-128). 
'Ibe British Employers' Confederation, :industy's other peak associa-
tion , concurred with the viewpoint that the problea was "overfu11 em-
p1oyment" and thus with the remedy of reduced budget deficits &Dd lower 
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taxation. However, it attacked the policy of credit restriction as 
"a blind instrument hitting both the just and the unjust," which moreover 
had "no effect upon such of the larger companies as are still in posses-
sion of surplus funds and need. not go to the banks, nor for that matter 
to the Capital Issues Colllllittee (ibid., p. 109).1t The Association of 
British Chambers of Commerce echoed these sentiments with regard to the 
effects and injustices of government policy. In addition it felt that 
financial institutions still had not closed the "MacMillan gap" in in-
dustrial finance. In particular it held. that 
there is scope for providing additional facilities for Iledium and 
long-term finance. The existing facilities for the financing 
of capital projects available through the Industrial and Commercial 
Finance Corporation, Ltd., and the Finance Corporation for Industry, 
Ltd., are felt to be inadequate on occa1sion, due to the fact that 
their policy is in effect that of a "super-bank." 
The City's answer to the problem of industrial finance was insufficient 
in other words because of the lilli ted funds availaltle to the above insti-
tutions, and consequently the ABCC also saw the need. ffl1r solle expanded 
source of risk capital to fill the place left ~ the demise of the 
individual entrepreneur, especially in the case of small business (ibid., 
p. 86). 
The Engineering Industries Association similarly observed that 
the credit squeeze had affected its constituent mellbers, especially the 
saaller firms. Since many engineering companies.had to rely on overdraught 
facilities to finance capital projects, despite the avowed policy of the 
clearing banks, "The continued and unpredictable iaposi tion of such 
restrictions is therefore harmful, it is extremely difficult for businesses 
to make long-term plans when monetary policies change so frequently (ibid. 
p. 110)." Such frustrations were particularly acute for saaller fims; 
especially in the case of directives to restrict bank advances and hire 
purchase controls. The EEA also saw a need for soae new !nsti tution to 
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fill the need for long-term finance for smaller firms and proposed 
either the establishment of industrial banks on the Continental model 
or the expansion of the facilities of local finance corporations (ibid., 
p. 112). 
One area of the financial system which was judged inadequate ~ 
virtually every section of British capital including the financial in-
stitutions was the provision of credit for long-term capital projects 
abroad. Proposals to deal with this situation varied considerably, 
however. Sections of industrial capital supported the establishment 
of an Export-Iaport Bank on the American model (the ABCC, the Export 
Group for the Constructional Industries and the British Engineers' Asso-
ciation). Such' a proposal had already been rejected ~ the Bank of 
England in early 19.56, and the Accepting Houses Couittee had appointed. 
a subcowttee to investigate the provision 01' this type of credit. 
The position of the latter was that it was not a question of funding 
a new 1Rstitution but rather one of altering the policy of the Export,~ 
Credits Guarentee Department in order to extend state guazantees to cap-
ital projects of up to fifteen years. Given the extension of such guar-
antees the Coaa1ttee was willing to countenance at least the consideration 
of an Exim Bank, as such institutions had already proved successful in 
other advanced capitalist countries, especially the United States (ibid., 
pps. 7-9). This position was also supported by the Committee of London 
Clearing Bankers (ibid., p. 6() and the FBI (ibid., pps. 127-8). The 
exact opinion of the latter was tna t the preferred option was a better 
co-ordination of policy among existing institutions. However, it held 
that soae initiative was needed if. British capital exporters were to 
match the competition of state-sponsored projects from the socialist 
block as well as the activities of Aaerioan and Japanese EXim Banks. 
and that a special lasti tution would be necessary if other means could 
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not be found. 
Lastly, the submission of the TUC was more explicitly critical 
of the overall framework of monetary policy, a position w~ich followed 
directly from its understandable view that "the first and foremost aim 
of economic policy should be the maintenance of full employment." Re-
peating the usual c~iticisms of the ineffectiveness of monetary policy 
on influencing either the balance of payments or internal demand, the 
WC objected to the "air of aystery that still surrounds the operation 
of monetary policy and the part played in it by the Bank (ibid., p. 145)." 
More particularly it noted that the real significance of recent measures 
was that the government was no longer "giving priority to full employ-
ment and expansion," and that in any case the effects of monetary measures 
were likely to be contradictory as interest rate rises aggravated budget-
ary problems by increasing the C?~!t or. the national debt and the external 
situation through effects on the interest payments due on the sterling 
bailances (ibid., p. 146). Consequently, the TUC advocated a two-pronged 
programme to secure a growth-oriented framework for economic policy. On 
the one hand it wanted a greater emphasis placed on direct controls over 
fiaance to enforce monetary measures (compulsory liquidity ratios and/or 
the re vi val of the war-time system of Treasury Deposit Receipts to finance 
short-term government borrowing without raising the banks' liquidity 
ratios). On the other hand it repeated the call for a National Investment 
Board, proposed earlier in both the TUC's evidence to the MacMillan Com-
mi ttee and its report on reconstruction, although in this case it requested 
tha t the Board have only advisory powers. Such a body would take respon-
si bill ty for looking at the longer-term programae for economic policy, 
"for reviewing a.ncl co-ordinating all forae of capi tal expenditure" "'-to 
ensure balanced growth aM the continuation of full eaployaent (ibid., 
p. 149). Yet, at the aa.ae tiae the TOO's evid_ce was reu.rJcably con-
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ciliatory with regard to City institutions. Noting the reorientation 
of the merchant banks and issuing houses away from overseas projects 
and towards domestic industry, as well as the activities of the insti-
tutional investors and clearing banks, it felt that the gaps in industrial 
finance discovered by the MacMillan Committee had been "largely filled" 
in the intervening decades, a perspective which small capital, of 
course, did not seem to share (ibid., pps. 149-1.50). 
'!he publication of the Radcliffe Report in August, 1959, added an 
official voice to those that were beginning to doubt the efficacy of 
Tory economic policies. While cautious in tone and hardly radical in 
its recoJlJllencia. tions, particularly in comparison to the MacMillan Report 
several decades previously, the Radcliffe Report did at least clear away 
some of the .ysticism surrounding the Bank of England's favoured instru-
I18nt of monetary policy. In particular it cast doubt on the effects of. 
changes in interest rates on the level of demand,andJtftus'·on the ability 
to improve the balance of payments position· in thi s manner. In addition 
movements in the Bank rate no longer had an appreciable effect on short-
term capital movements as traditionally supposed I "a jump in short-term 
rates seells on "st evidence to have lost much of its power to effect 
any real iaaediate improvement in Britain's international balance sheet 
(committee on the Working of the Monetary System, Report, para. 439)." 
None the less the Report accepted the point of view of the Bank and the 
Treasury that however ineffective in real terms, "'!he rise in Bank Rate 
is symbolical tit is evidence that the United Kingdom author! ties have 
the determination to take unpleasant steps to check inflation." lbus, 
lIoveaents in the Bank rate aight have a psychological effect on foreign 
confidence based on the traditions of the Bank of England, Le. as evi-
dence of who was in couanci, but the ColIJIittee doubted that "such vener-
ation for Bank Rate can persist if there develops a general scepticiSll of 
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the power of interest rates over the internal economic situation (ibid., 
para. 441)." The really quick effects of monetary policy were secured 
through the use of hire purchase controls and cuts in public investment, 
blt these had the result that, "The light engineering industries have 
been frustrated in their planning, and the public corporations have had 
almost equally disheartening experience (ibid., para. 472) .. t The squeeze 
on bank credit in 1955-56 had probably had a considerable if slower im-
pact in the sense of a "diffused difficulty of borrowing," buth these 
measures if less discriminatory had had the defect of leaving large sections 
of the economy unaffected. 
The monetary instruments employed 1ef* untouched the large indust-
rial corporations that control more than half the investment in 
manufacturing industry I and neither their planning nor that of the 
public corporations appears to have responded seriously to changes 
in interest rates (ibid.). 
'!bus, only those areas which could be directly hit by adIlinistrative 
decisions had been strongly affected by the attempts to restrict credit, 
and here the actions had been discriminatory and abrupt. 
It is far removed from the smooth and widespread adjustment 
sometimes claimed as the virtue of monetary action; this is no 
gentle hand on the steering wheel that keeps a well-driven car 
in its right plactl on the road. (i bid. ) • 
With regard to relations between the Bank of England and the govern-
ment the Report was equally cautious but implicitly critical of some of 
the more grandiose aiJls of financial spokesmen. While agnostic on the 
question Of whether nationalization had III&de any changes in the respective 
roles of the Bank and the Treasury, it noted that lithe power to direct 
[the Bank] has never been employed (para. 766). tt Moreover, "the affairs 
of the Bank" included only a part of the measures tha. t influenced the 
monetary system, and thus, 
effectively to plan and implement the monetary policy of the coun-
try as a whole requires a constant co-operation, strategic and 
tactical, between the central bank on the one band and those re-
sponsible for alternative or supplementary Ilonetary measures, es-
pecially the Treasury or the Board of Trade. on the other. More 
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than that, monetary policy ••• cannot be envisaged. as a form of 
economic strategy which pursues its own independent objectives 
[my italics] (para. 767). 
Likewise, the Committee felt that the role of the Bank ought to be that 
of "executant" of government policy and explicitly disassociated itself 
from the view that a central bank should be independent of political 
influence. This position was invalid because, 
it either contemplates two separate and independent agencies of 
government of which each is capable of initiating and pursuing 
its own conception of what economic policy requires or else as-
sumes that the true objective of a central bank is one single 
and unvarying purpose, the stability of the currence and the 
exchanges (paras. 768-9). 
Finally, the Committee noted various gaps in the credit market, in 
particular long-term finance for capital exports and medium-term credit 
for small firms, although here too the recommendations were rather min-
imal. lii th regard to the former the Committee criticized the stance of 
the Export Credits Guarentee Department that five years represented "the 
horizon of insurable ris~ for the provision of state guarentees for 
export credit. Having a virtual monopoly in the field and as a govern-
ment department the ECGD had to take a wider view than that of a "com-
mercial credit insurers" "'nle maximWll period of cover cannot in fact be 
determined in advance by reference to some general principle of credit 
insurance; it has to be related to the domestic and international econ-
omic situation at the time (paras. 887-891)." Given an extension of the 
time length of such guaTentees the Committee did not specifically recom-
mend the founding of a new institution but felt that such an Export 
Finance Corporation, funded ei ther publi cly or private ly, might be neceS9-
ary if existing financial institut~ons failed to meet the demand, i.e. 
it simply restated the position of the financial sector on the matter 
(paras. 89:3-898). On the question of long-term loans and the provision 
of risk capital for small industry the CollDlittee held that the "MacMill.an 
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gap" had been at least partially filled by the changed practices of the 
financial sector and the development of new institutions. Rather than 
recommending the establishment of a new corporation to cater to the 
long-term loan needs of small business. the Committee proposed that 
such a gap could be met through the slightly altered practice of the 
joint-stock banks as well as by raising the limit on investments by the 
ICFC. The problem of the risk involved in new commercial or technical 
developments by small businesses could be overcome through the creation of 
a state-backed Industrial Guarantee Corporation. which would limi t:- the 
losses financial institutions might incur by backing such ventures (paras. 
932-9.52) • 
By 1960 the us.e of Keynesian demand managementto iron out the trade 
cycle and maintain ~ll employment within the constraints of the neo-
liberal political econoay had hardly provided grounds for enthusiastic 
support. Cri tical discussion beginning with the Radcliffe Report on the 
monetary system focussed increasingly on the poor performance of the Brit-
ish economy and the extent to which this seemed to be the result of state 
activities rather than defects intrinsic to the economic structure. In-
deed. the two periods in"which demand had expanded faster than productive 
capacity, 1952-55 and 19,,58-60, as well as the two recessions, 1952 and 
19.56-58, appeared to be largely the result of the stop-go measures taken 
by successive Tory governments. 'lbe most famous survey of the period 
came to the conclusion that "the major variations of fiscal policy were 
in fact not stabilizing, but rather themselves one of the major causes of 
instability; and that demand would have remained much more nearly in bal-
ance vi th supply if fiscal policy had. throughout the whole period. been 
les8 actively interventionist (Dew. 1970. P.211)." For all its fine tuning 
it see.ed that the steered economy mi~ have done better without a driver. 
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One reason for the desultory performance of economic policy was 
technical, the lack of adequate information about the economy. Official 
forecasts used in aid of budgetary decisions were essentially short term, 
referring to the future financial year alone. Yet, even these were as 
often in error as not, sometimes leading to negative consequences when 
translated into policy. Under the Labour governments of the 1940s fore-
casts of government expenditure were off on average by £lOOm while esti-
mates of GNP lIissed by some £200-JOOm, roughly one-third of the actual 
increase. Under the Tories the forecasters demonstrated particular weak-
ness in their inability to predict the large increases in imports that 
took place during the years of expansion. '!be average annual error as 
regards imports and GNP during the 1950s were in the area of £125m and 
£1.5011, respectively, although the general direction of the economy was 
usually correctly foreseen. '!bere were, consequently, three occaisiCllS 
when technical inadequacy may have affected government policy, the failure 
to observe the stock recession in 1952 and the underestimation of the 
growth of demand in 1954 and 1959. However, on balance these errors were 
not that significant as a source of the malfunctioning of economic po 1-
icy (Dow, 1970, pps.132-43)· 
The central reason behind the stop-go economics of the 1950s 
was the fact that policy was subordinated to short-term considerations 
which in turn were dictated by poll tical-economic factors. Bri ttan 
has caricatured the Chancellors of the period. as "Pavlovian dogs respond-
ing to two main stillluli lone was la run on the reserves I and the other 
was '.500','000 unemployed (Bri ttain, 1971, p. 455)." While there is cer-
tainly considerable truth in thls observation, it Jlissed out one key fea~ 
ure of the political-economic situation. Budgetary stillulua~,was indeed 
applied when uneaployaent breached unacceptable levels, particularly if 
an election was in the offing. '!he cOllURitment to full employment 8y be 
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a necessary price for the continuation of a democratic regime in advanced 
capitalist society, not to mention the economic and social effects of 
any alternative course. The same cannot be said about the other limit 
on economic policy, the exposure of sterling to crises of confidence 
as part of a deliberate and unnecessary programme of restoring sterling 
and London to their previous international positions in behalf of City 
interests. While this programme accorded well with both the neo-liberal 
ideology dominant in the Conservative Party at the time and the interests 
of financial capi tal, it was a key factor behind the "poll tical business 
cycles" of that decade and. in that sense hardly functional to either 
balanced economic growth or the general interests of British capital. 
The end result of economic policy based on short-term considerations 
and subject to the effective veto of world finance was a particular pat-
tern of events th&t beoue known as a low growth syndrome. Restrictionist 
policies hit investaent strategies in particular, especially those of 
the public sector, the consumer godds industries and small industry in 
general through, 1. cuts in public investment, especially in the nation-
alized industries, 2. measures designed to curtail private investment, i.e. 
higher interest rates, credit restriction, direct controls and cuts in 
investment allowances, and 3. the indirect effects of lowering business 
expectations induced by the stop-go pattern of economic policy. The 
lower level of investaant and sluggish growth of productive capacity 
thus generated at least in part by government policy in turn contributed 
to the low rate of increase in productivity and the slow growth of the 
national econollY, reducing the cost competitiveness;'of British goods and 
laying the groundwork for future ba.lance of payments problems that would 
be far 1I0re serious than those of the 19.50s, in turn requiring deflationary 
aeaaures of ever greater severity (Pollard, 1969, pps. 442-449). 
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By the end of the decade industrial capital was becoming increas-
ingly disillusioned with the progress of a decontrolled economy. The 
neo-corporatists who had laid dormant for most of the period emerged 
once again to lead the initiative for some form of "democratic" or, as 
it was now termed. wi th due regard to post-war continental experience, 
indicative planning. While somewhat differently packaged the new programme 
was in most respects no more than the revival of the policies and in-
stitutions of the Attlee government which had been blocked b.Y industry's 
non-eo-operation in the first place. While it is hardly surprising that 
industrialists could think of no new solution to the problems of the 
Bri tish econollY, what is less excusable is the way some of the industrial 
leaders who had been at the forefront of the "dash for freedom" could 
turn and blame the government for following the policies they had advo-
ca. ted, indeed i_edia tely following a period when they had been constant-
ly pleading for another lash of the deflationary whip. 'Ibe memoires of 
the FBI's Director-General, Sir NOJ:JD&n Kipping, can only be read as some-
what hypocritical: 
So throughout 195.5-7 we groped our way again and again t.hroufJh 
crises. Our reaction to plateaux, pauses, freezes and squeezes 
was that they might on occa.ision by a means to an end., but they 
were not a policy or an end in themselves. The fact is that we 
were out of touch with economic policy-making, and the govern-
ment was out of touch with us. For outside advice it relied 
mainly on private consultation with men of its own choosing, more 
of whoa, I euspect, were men of the City than of industry. As 
tools of economic management, the government relied on orthodox 
fiscal and Ilonetary measures (Kipping, p. 90). 
While all this is perfectly true, especially the leading role of 
finance in the determination of economic priorities, it is equally true 
that both the hands off relationship with the government and the use of 
orthodox methods of economic regulation were applauded by the leading 
industrial organizations. 'Ibey did not challenge the rise of the finan-
cial power bloc, indeed they aore or less paved the way. One looks in 
..-.. -
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vain for any critical comments from industrial spokesmen on the inter-
national role of sterling, the return to convertibility, the main pol-
icy objective of raising a surplus on the current account on or~er to 
pay for foreign investment, or the growing reliance on deflationary 
economic policies, for industrialists were firmly in support of all 
of these goals and methods throughout the decade of the fifties. Sim-
ilarly, the FBI was one of the major forces demanding the destabilising 
budget of 19.58. Any consequent lIlutterings about the effects of stop-
go policies and industrial stagantion must be seen in this light. If the 
Conservatives had actually followed the course advocated by the Federation, 
the resulting situation would have been that much worse for British in-
dustry. As in the inter-war era the industrial challenge focussed much 
more on the effects rather than the structural basis of British decline, 
and the alternative framework for economic policy could only be a some-
wha t superficial call for a return to planning, i. e. the resurrection of 
more formal ties to the policy-making apparatus of the state. 
The renewed interest in planning received a further impetus from 
the growing concern over the emergence of the EEC and the question of 
whether or not to join it. On the one hand the greater success of the 
European economies offered an obvious contrast to British performance, so 
naturally enough there was consideration of whether this was due to dif-
ferent methods of formulating economic policy. In addition any govern-
mental initiative on entering a European trade bloc required close con-
sultation with industrial interests as the Rome Treaty impinged on vir-
tually every aspect of commercial policy • British industry was somewhat 
chary of the whole affair, since entering the EEC would have entailed 
a'ba.ndoning their central internati<l'l8.l strategy for the past half cen-
tury, na,aely the exploitation of the imperial framework. Consequently, 
the FBI had shown little interest during the early stages of the forma-
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tion of the EEC and only became concerned when the inadequacies of 
Bri tish performance became painfully obvious in 1959-61. A joint 
report by the FBI, NUM and ABCC completed in August, 1957, indicated 
the extent to which industrial capital was still wedded at that date 
to the existing arrangements. This report laid down various precondi-
tions for British entry into a free trade area which were totally in-
compatible with EEC membership, Le. that such arrangements should not 
conflict with the continuing imperial preference network, that Britain 
should retain its own external tariff and that food, feeding stuffs, 
drink and tobacco should be excluded from any agreement. The prevailing 
suspicion of state intervention was emphasized in the final paragraph of 
the report: 
We do not relish supra-national institutions of the ECSC or EEC 
type nor the 'dirigiste' tendencies that go with them, and we do 
not believe that op'nion in the U.K. would be prepared to sur-
render our freedoll of action to anything like the extent envisaged 
by the Six in the Treaty of Rome (cited in Blank, 197:3, p. 145). 
The parties to the Treaty could not accept such proposals as a 
basis for discussion, as those finally put forward by the MacMillan 
government were virtually identical, and the end result was the forma-
tion of two rival trade blocs. This situation was very much against the 
wishes of British industry but the only possibility given the unwilling-
ness to surrender key policy powers or the system of imperial preference. 
However, the continuing decline of the proportion of British trade with 
the sterling area coupled with the growth of trade with advanced capi t-
alist countries forced a reconsideration of the issue within a few years. 
Despite the protectionist system eperating under the aegis of the ster-
ling arrangements, British industry found its traditional satellites 
increasingly peDetrated by foreign powers and its growth markets outside 
of what was left of the imperial system. While it took another decade 
for the :final demise of the sterling area, the changin8 plttem of trade 
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made entry into the EEC an:inevitalble concern. In the meantime 
those industrialists looking over their shoulder at the emerging 
continental system could only notice the apparent ability of t.hose 
countries to avoid the stop-go policies that seemed to plague Britain 
and began to wonder if this had something to do with the quasi-corp-
oratist arrangements that British industry had shunned for the past 
decade. 
111e triumph of nee-liberalism was never total even in the 19.50s, 
and in certain industries corporatist arrangements remained the rule. 
'!be se cases were isolated. instances of a discred.i ted approach, but they 
did serve as the germs of an alternative programme when industry's love 
affair with the open market came to a rather abrupt end. The cotton 
industry offered one example, plagued as usual with competition from 
cheap imports froa the underdeveloped countries of the Commonwealth. 
'!be Conservatives stood firm against any notion of tariffs or import 
controls tl1at would threaten their free trade commitments or the rem-
nants of the imperial system, but they did offer state assistance 
through the Cotton Industry Act of 1959. This closely paralled pre-
vious attempts at restructuring the by then moribund textile industry. 
'!be state provided two-thirds of the cost of scrapping redundant plant 
while the remaining one-third was raised by a compulsory loan on the af-
fected firms. Providing that the companies complied with the requisite 
standards on closure, the state then offered a further 2-" toward 
modernization and re-equipment, all Subject to various time limits. 
The whole scheme was administered through the Cotton Board, one of the 
two statutory developaent councils left from the 1947 act, operating 
under the Board of Trade, and the total cost of the operation was estim-
ated at £~ (HeDdereon, 1962, pps. 3.50-1). 
More s1gDificantly for later developaents was the case of iron 
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and steel since this was neither a declining nor a peripheral industry. 
Denationalization had not meant the end of state intervention in the 
industry as the Iron and Steel Act of 1953 provided for a statutory, 
government appointed regulatory agency, the Iron and Steel Board. 'Ibe 
Board had spervisory powers over the industry which paradoxically were 
more substantial than those of the various state departments over the 
public corporations. Among its specific powers the Board could 1. set 
maximum prices, 2. review and teject schemes for expanding productive 
ca.pa.ci ty, 3. consult and report to the responsible ministers on the ad-
equacy of forward plans for the industry, 4. make arrangeaents for se-
curing the necessary iaports and 5. collect information. While its 
powers were quite extensive, its freedom from actual political control 
was virtually complete. Moreover, it did Rot act simply as a restrictive 
cartel but atteDlpted to plan for future expLnsion on the basis of estiaates 
of growth of dem.a.nd and capacity to ensure the co-ordinatiCll of the two. 
'!be arrangement for iron and steel was thus the most purely corporatist of 
the decade, but it was adapted to the economics of expansion rather than 
contraction and thus offered a more adequate model for state planning 
in a growing capitalist economy. Moreover, the insulation of the Iron 
and Steel Board from political interference allowed it to develop for-
ward investaent plans based on five-year projections in contrast to the 
nationalized industries whose programmes were invariably disrupted by the 
exigencies of macro-economic policy. In practice the Board did little to 
promote the rationalization or modernization of the industry, and the 
problems of low profitability and the small size of many firms returned 
with a vengence in the 1960s. However, at the time of industry's dis-
illusiollllent with neo-liberalism in 1960 the experience of the Iron and 
Steel Board offered at least one practicable answer to the difficulty of 
finding the "1Iiddle way" between laissez-faire capitalism and state 8Ocial-
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ism (ibid., pps.;54-)60 and McEachern, 19BO, ch.7). 
One fiftal current entered the growing stream of criticism of 
Tory policies in the late 1950s,and that concerned the question of 
"Treasury control" of public expenditure. "Treasury control" signified 
that policies aimed at steering the economy in the areas of both taxa-
tion and expenditure were arrived at primarily through bureaucratic 
modes of procedure within the state administration. By means of a 
process of bargaining between the Treasury and the various departments 
of the Civil Service, utilizing the short-term projections provided by 
Treasury economists and statisticians, the government's priorities were 
asserted in specific spending and taxation proposals. '!here is inev-
itably a mix of procedures behind any set of government policies, but 
using the typology set out above, I have designated three main types, 
bureaucratic, purposive-rational (technocratic) and consensual (see Ch. 1,& 
offe, ·19'75). In the post-war period the" re-establishment of Treasury 
control ensured the continuation of a primar,~ bureaucratic mode of 
procedure within the given political economic framework. As described 
earlier bureaucratic processes are oriented primarily towards inputs, 
i.e. politically set ends, and utilize the traditional resources of the 
state, taxation and expenditure policies, to meet the objectives determined 
in the process of bargaining between the administration and the govern-
ment. In the case of Britain the political weight of the Treasury and 
the banking interests enforced through the Bank of England the dominance 
of the short-term interests of the City over other considerations. 
'Ibe basis of Treasury control layy in its traditional power to turn 
down the programaes of the spending departments, i.e. a negative control 
evolved during the Gladsonian era of balanced budgets and a low govern-
.ent profile. In a Civil Service famou'S for its cor];Orate organizatiCll. 
Treasury influence wae and is exerted through constant ba.rgaining between 
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the different administrative units of this tight social network. 
The self-enclosed exclusiveness of Whitehall and the fact that govern-
mental policies largely orginated from within its ranks necessitates 
some kind of compromise between the various departments allowing in 
turn a degree of room for the assertion of political priorities through 
the Cabinet. However. this need for agreement extends to the Cabinet as 
well. where the Chancellor of the Exchequer has had a unique power in 
comparison to other advanced capi tallst poll ties in determining both 
policy areas of experMiiture and taxation. To cite one American admirer 
of the British adainistrative system, "[This power] means that the tendeD-
cy to agreement produces not simply compromises but decisions shaped 
around the Treasury view (Beer, 1957. p. 124)." 
If this procedure was admirably shaped for the impleaentation of 
political ends, sO long as these were concurrent with the doDdnant "Treas-
ury view," it proved destabilizing when the ends themselves were sub-
ordinated to short-term considerations like sterling crises. The budget 
offered at least the potential of fulfilling a programme of counter-
cyclical Keynesian _nagellent prilllarily through changes in fiscal policy, 
even if it failed in this task. However, as regards the whole array of 
state expenditures, Treasury control proved a pretty crude and disfunctional 
instrument. To note once again Beer's relatively early perception of 
the problem, 
So complicated a problem as the effects of state expenditure 
would see. to call for a high degree of system I a system of 
thought, such as that provided by the 'input-output' approach 
to economic analysis, which would enable planners to evaluate 
accurately all factors in the econolllY and the bearing of govern-
ment activity upon themJ and a system of procedure in administra-
tion which would ensure that the vast multitude of government 
decisions would. actually be guided by the conclusions of such 
analysis (ibid., p. 9.5). 
However, the proceS8 of bureaucratic decsion-making allowing for changes 
only at the arg1ns of expenditure policies ruled out any "dee;ree of sys-
-182-
tem which was incompatible with the short-term management of macro-
economic policy. 
By the 1960s Treasury control of economic policy had come under 
attack, pri~ily because of the apparent failure of this mode of 
administrative procedure to achieve a satisfactory rate of economic 
expansion. An additional, interrelated incapacity arose from the state's 
involvement in certain areas of production itself. While state expend-
iture as a whole is not oriented towards the production of goods and 
services, significant portions of it are, and these must be governed 
by criteria appropriate to the particular area. of production. When the 
government ls involved in projects that take several years to complete, 
such as the investment plans of the public corporations, capital programmes 
in the social services and education of trained staffs, decisions about 
expenditure on those projects cannot simply be budgeted on a yearly 
basis subject to the buffeting of Treasury economizing without dis-
loca tion and frustration. Moreover, there was the concern within the 
Treasury itself over its apparent inability to control the growth of 
public expenditure or to make sizeable reductions in the latter during 
periods of deflation. While originating from the Treasury's own concern 
about its lack of control over public spending.and thus limited in its 
criticius by its status as an internal document, the report of the 
Plowden Couittee (under the Chairmanship of the former Chief Planning 
Officer, Lord Plowden) gave official recognition to the problem of 
reconciling traditional methods of procedure with the extended role of 
the statel 
In our judgement, the social, political and economc changes 
of the last twenty years have created a new situation. First, 
the scale of public expenditure is far grea.ter ••• Second , public 
expend! ture pe become Ilore coJlplex including. &e it doee. the 
coat of the iK>st advanced technological projects and of ecientif-
ic research. the financing of coJUlercial risks that the private 
-183-
sector cannot take; aid of many different kinds to avariety of 
underdeveloped countries; and social insurance schemes of un-
precedented scope. All of these activities involve commitments, 
con tractual or moral, extending several years ahead.. '!hird. , 
there has taken place a great change in economic thought; the 
Keynesian revolution in the role of public finance and its rela-
tionship to the national economy as a whole. '!he Budget is seen, 
not as a siJllple balancing of tax receipts against expenditure, but 
as a sophisticated process in which the instruments of taxation 
and expenditure are used to influence the course of the economy 
(Plowden Committee, p. 6). 
The Plowden report went on to observe that "the traditional system 
of decision-making can no longer be effective in containing the growth of 
expenditure within whatever lilllit the government have set (ibid.).- It 
then recommended a reconstruction of the system of central government 
procedure, including as its core proposal the "development and use by 
Government of long-term surveys of expenditure and resources (ibid)." 
While the report UlOunted to little more than a re'iival of the techniques 
introduced. under the Attlee government, it did indicate quite vividly a 
point of contradiction in the expanded role of the state in the advanced. 
ca pi talist economy. First, there exist a whole range of services, usually 
the provision of cheap inputs into the private production system of a 
social nature, the expenditure on which cannot be varied radically from 
year to year without incurring a great deal of waste. 'lbeir particular 
budgets must be programmed over a future time span, just as the invest-
ment plans of large, capital intensive firms must be planned on more than 
a financial year basis. '!he traditional Treasury system, :'"ad hocery" 
gone mad, in whiob annual bargaining over the entire range of public 
expenditure was subordinated to the more pressing problems of short-term 
economic management, was inimicable to these considerations. Secondly, 
even apart frOIl the particular projects of the state in support of the 
private process of accumulation, the socialization of externalities, 
ar¥1 the conflict of functions thereby confronting the deeision-aaking 
process, the general effect of stop-go, i ••. the policy ends to which 
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all else had been sacrificed, was increasingly perceived as in itself 
a drag on the national economy. Not only had the Treasury created a 
whole variety of particular wastes for those involved in state-sponored 
activities, but the ends to which these policies were directed were 
seen as actually disrupting the process of accumulation. I will dis-
tinguish the first set of problems from the second as those of admin-
istrative planning as against those of economic planning. While inter-
re la ted the two areas are analytically seperable, and my concern here is 
primarily with the latter. 
nte Plowden report was thus not just the official recognition of 
the problems of administrative planning and the inadequacy of the trad-
i tional methods for controlling public expenditure. It was also another 
signpost on the road away from a purely bureaucratic mode of procedure 
and towards one that may be termed technocratic. 'Ibe extended network 
of relations between the state and the private economy had created at 
least the rationale for orienting economic policy more towards outputs, 
that is specific economic requirements, and away from inputs, or the 
politically determined ends of specific economic interests or class 
fractions as filtered through the various bureacratic agencies. 
The formation of economic policy in the 1950s had been circumscribed 
by two major poll tical forces. On the one hand financial interests 
through their relationship with the Bank of England had managed to I18.ke 
their particular concerns the focus of the government,ts economic strategy. 
On the other hand labour had extracted a commitment to the welfare state, 
full employment and increasing incomes from Conservative as well as 
I.&bour governments. '!he political domination of City interests threatened 
the long-term viability of British capitalism, while full employment 
limited the range of optiOlls open to successive governments. '!he latter 
barrier was only aS8ulted over ten years later once the former had proved 
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too formidable. However, at the beginning of the 1960s, after a 
decade of Conservative rule, the City cast a much longer shadow over 
the poU tical landscape than organized labour, and any perceptive 
observer might have thought that it would. be this venerable institu-
tion that would be the first to give way before a state initiative. 
One such observer, 1homas (now Lord) Balogh, Labour economist and 
advisor to Harold. Wilson, indicated what particular section of capital 
was likely to colle under attack in a planning initiative. 
What the Treasury officials never seemed to grasp was the fact 
that the restrictions which seemed to them necessary to main-
t.&d.n 'freedom' (that is, freedom of the financial interests 
sponsored by the Bank of England) were bound to weaken the competi-
tive position of the economy. Each time investment was cut, demand 
fell and imports dropped off; and productivity also suffered. 
The polUld could. be saved, but only at the price of weakening 
Britain against her COllpetitors and setting the scene for yet 
another crisis once the iIIIledi&te pressure was relieved (Balogh, 
1965, p. 60). 
'Ibe a tteapt to lIove towa.rds a more technocra. tic mode of proceedure, 
linking economic policies with the requirements of the accumulation pro-
cess taken as a whole, as interpreted by a planning staff not under the 
direction of any one fraction of capital, or at least more closely linked 
with industrial rather than financial interests, implied a greater 
degree of autonomy of the state system from the class structure or at 
minimum a political break with City domination. National economic plan-
ning, even in the indicative mould, required the formation of an actual 
planning staff with the power to collect the necessary information and 
the necessary administrative innovation to provide functional representa-
tion for the interests of industry, in order to formulate policies in 
line w1 th the requirellents of the capitalist economy taken as a whole 
rather than those dictated by the politically dominant fraction. 'Ibis 
confllct runs through the next decade like the silver thread in a pound 
note, clearly visible beneath the cluttered surface of crises and policy 
-186-
reversals. The City, having made itself indispensable in the short-run 
through its ability to draw in international finance and shore up the 
reserves during a crisis, often with very liquid money, imposed very 
rigid limits on the manoeuvrability of the various governments, limits 
which were evident to many of the political actors and against which 
various strategies were articulated but never carried through success-
fully. This contraposi tion of the particular versus the general inter-
ests of capital, the domination of the state by financial interests as 
against the need on the put of industry for alternative policies and the 
political subordination of a bureaucratic apparatus against the need 
for an output-oriented system-stabilizing administration, these were 
the expressions of a tension anchored in the process of production but 
structured by a particular national form of capitallst',-,social relations, 
involving both an unusually Sharp distinction between financial and 
industrial capital and the long-standing subordination of the latter to 
the former. A conflict which had laid dormant for some years returned 
to the politics of economic policy in the 1960s. 
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eRA P'!'SR SIX 
Indicative Planning and Volunt&ristic Corporatism: 
The Industrial Initiative, 1960-64 
National economic planning in capitalist societies is typically 
associated with the political programmes of social democratic govern-
ments despite the fact that its .ost successful example was instituted 
in France under a series of conservative a.dIIlinistra tions. In Britain as 
well the planning revival occurred under a Tory goverl1llent in the early 
19605. Th~ particular conjuncture that generated the renewed interest 
in planning, as described in the previous chapter, can be sUlllWU'ized as 
followS. First, there was a genera.l recognition that Britain was lagging 
behind her major competitors, as most generally expressed in the relative-
ly slow rate of growth and the declining share of world trade. Second, 
while the immediate source of decline was the low rate of investment and 
slow growth of productivity, government economic policy was seen as 
having a serious deleterious effect through the stop-go, low-growth syn-
drome. Third, as the conflict between macro-economic objectives, especially 
full employment and high growth on the one hand and steady prices and a 
balance of payments surplus on the other, was irresolvable within the 
existing context, such that policy had to swing towards one or the other 
set of priorities but could not pursue both simultaneously, the only 
possibility of harmonization lay in the creation of a new political-
economic framework. It seemed possible, that is, that if the economy 
could be reoriented, persuaded or cajoled towards a higher rate of econ-
olDic growth, British capital would be.,lle more c~petitive. eH.inating 
the balance of p&)'Mnts probleJl, and workers would prove more willing 
• 
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to accept pay settlements in line with the higher rate of growth of 
productivi ty. Finally, there were a range of secondary issues which, 
while not immediately pertaining to the question of growth, dovetailed 
into the planning initiative, e.g., the discrediting of monetary policy 
as a result of the Radcliffe Report, the concern over the planning and 
control of public expenditure expressed in the Plowden Report, the new 
interest in and ultimate attempt to join the European Community, and, 
lastly wt, as we shall see, in the end most significantly, the revival 
of incolles policy as a key aspect of eoonollic poli c:y • 
Indicative planning in essence was seen as the means to raise the 
growth rate without entailing a vast extension of compUlsory state con-
trols or nationalization, and as such it appeared the ideal prescription 
froll the points of view of both industrial capital and the government for 
the British sickness. For the "dash for planning" heralded a rapproche-
ment between industry and the Conservatives, as it was from the beginning 
a project of industrial capital to ~hich the government responded favour-
ably despite the doubts and opposition within its ranks and from sections 
of the economic policy establishment. Although ultimately a failure, the 
planning initiative represented a substantial shift in lihe priorities of 
both the state and industry, back towards the old dream of a producers' 
alliance on the basis of a high-wage, high-growth economy, a restatement 
of the Keynesian programme first exptessed in the Mond-Turner talks of 
the 1920s, redefined in the period of reconstruction but largely forgotten 
in the heady days of the early 1950s when economic liberalism seemed the 
only alternative to the gradual displacement of capitalism by state social-
iu. Indicative planning in other wOrds offered the formula that had 
eluded the Attlee government in the period after 1947. 'Ibe machinery of 
planning as it evolved in the 1960s was hardly different in any respect 
to th&t proposed by labour and vetoed by industrt'~1i obstruction in that 
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first post-war government. What was new in the 1960s was the reversal 
of industrial attitudes, for industrial capital, far from impeding or 
reluctantly complying, actually spearheaded the planning offensive. 
The first hints of the changing mood within the ranks of industry 
came with the formation of a private dining club of industrialists and 
economists in early 1960 to discuss a variety of topics relating to 
economic growth. Hugh Weeks, the chairman of the FBI's Economic Policy 
Committee and a foraer aember of the Industrial and CommerCial Finance 
Corporation set up by City institutions during the Attlee government, 
was the eminence grise of the club. While kept as a private affair and 
quite separate from the FBI at his insistance, these gatherings cleared 
the road for the much more public debate at Brighton at the end of the year 
(Brittan, 1971, p. 241 and Leruez, p. 85). 
In the aeantille within the FBI itself discussion intensified on the 
general themes of economic policy, stimulated primarily by the concern 
with inflation and the possibility of promoting some form of voluntary 
prices and incomes policy. Following the "September measures" of 1957 
some industrialists, realizing the consequences of prolonged deflation, 
began to feel out the alternatives to the orthodox approach. lord. Chandos, 
then President of the Institute of Directors, proposed a system of longer-
term wage contracts including guaranteed increments, while Sir Hugh Beaver, 
the FBI President, in the course of discussions with the Cohen Council, 
revived the notion of voluntary price restraint. These initiatives, and 
a subsequent one along the same lines by the Chancellor, Amory, in late 
1959 were, however, blocked by opposition within the Federation, and its 
official policy reained. that as expressed in the submissions to the 
Radc1iffe Committee (Blank, 1973, p. 151). 
Yet, the Third Report of the Cohen Council, published in July, 1959, 
again ra.ised the topic of prices and incolles policy in contrast to the 
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orthodox liberal position expressed in the first two reports. The 
Third Report questioned openly the earlier approach of the Council 
that. curtailing demand was the key t.o economic policy and offered 
instead a survey of alternative proposals for acting directly on wage 
and price increases. In particular it raised the notion of "a nation-
al conference representing the trade unions, employers' associations, 
the boards of the nationalised industries and probably also the govern-
ment, as being responsible for na. tional economic policy (para. 128)." 
It likewise broached. the subject of relating pay increases to the general 
rise of productivity and discussed various ways in which this might be 
achieved (paras. IJ4-8). While the Council was careful to avoid specific-
ally advocating any of these suggestions. merely raising the issue of 
incomes policy sufficed to provoke another row within the FBI. A new 
• 
Economic study Group was set up in the wake of the Report to investigate 
incomes policies in the context of the "problem of econoJllic growth." 
Over the next year it continued to debate the various aspects of alterna~ 
tives to stop-go policies, such as planning and the Common Market, even 
as the FBI rebuffed the Chancellor's initiative on price restraint (Blank, 
19'73, p. 151). 
These various efforts coalesced in the Brighton Conference of 
November. 1960, of a group of (appropriately enough) "120 industrialists" 
plus thirty others including the permanent secretaries to the Treasury and 
the Board of Trade, some leading executives from the nationalized industries, 
the Chairman of Lloyds and some economists on the topic of "The Next Five 
Years." The Conference divided into five groups, and it was the third 
group, considering the subject of economic growth, which proved the most 
innovative. Headed by Sir Hugh Beaver, it included most of the Weeks club 
as well as Sir Ray Geddes, the managing director of Dunlop who had ear-
lier spoken in support of an institution which paralleled the eventual 
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planning body. 'Ibe opening address to the Conference by Lord bory, 
recently deputed from the Treasury, repeated the official line on 
economic priorities, putting sterling and price stability first and 
leaving growth as a feature contingent on the success of the first two 
aims. Group three parted. radically froll this perspective, and Beaver's 
report to the Conference explicitly criticized. the orthodox view. '!he 
other goals of policy, he asserted, could only be secured. if the rate 
of growth was raised in the first place, and the latter was only poss-
ible throu6h the institution of soae kind of national plan. Pointing 
specifically to the five-year prOjections of the Iron and Steel Board the 
Beaver group suggested the use of industry-wide studies of a siJIilar 
kind and the co-oerd.1nation of these with projections of state expendi-
ture, in effect proposing the adopt.ion of a five-year indica t1 ve plan 
(FBI, 'lbe Next Five Years, Brlttan, 1971, pp. 2J9-40, ~ruez, pp. 8,5-6 and 
Blank, 197J, pp. 151-J). 
While the Br1#lton Conference hardly succeeded in an iDed.1ate 
reversal of industry's approach, it did produce one important convert 
to planning, naaely Selwyn Lloyd, who had recently replaced A:aory at the 
Treasury. Lloyd had alrea.dy aocepted that long-ten planning was nec-
essary as far as government expenditure was concerned along the lines 
then being considered by the Plowden Coui ttee, but the Conference dis-
cussions convinced h1a that the private seotor could gain benefits from 
a joint exercise. When he brought the issue to the attention of the Pru.e 
Minister, Mac:Millan, soon afterwaJ.'ds, he found an eager supporter, but 
one who. none the less, let hi. carry the burden of the 1nl tia ti ve • 
Lloyd ran into t-ed1ate oppositiCl1 both within the cabinet and fro. the 
Treasury, particularly on the question of whether the eventual planning 
office should be iDdependent froa Vbiteba.ll. Ll01d's backers were in 
fact a ainori ty within the CabiB.t w1 th Reginald Maudling, then President 
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of the Board of Trade, one of the leaders of the opposition. While 
some Treasury officials sympathized with the general notion of plan-
ning, primarily as a means of surreptitiously introducing an incomes 
policy to the unions, they were at the same time generally hostile to 
the creation of an agency outside their control. In the months fol-
lowing the Conference the Treasury put forward its objections to the 
Lloyd proposals at aeetinge of the so-called Economc Plamdng Board, 
another relic of the Crlpps era which met IlOnthly for discussions between 
Treasury officials and business and trade union leaders. There the 
Treasury expressed its view that the planning experiaent should be con-
fined to an expansion of the Plamdng Board and strongly opposed the 
notion of an independent office (Brittan, ibid., pp. 241-4). 
Meanwhile, discussions outside the state machinery focusaed on 
two u.in models of capitalist pJ.ann1Dg. The first indigenous exaaple was 
the Iron and Steel Board, whose operations were described earlier. While 
acting in any respects &8 a cartel in the old moad of "industrial self-
government," it had pioneered five-year projections of demand and supply 
in the industry, having nearly cOllpleted its second plan by the tille of 
the Conference. The second .odel had a Continental origin, namely French 
planification indicative, appropriate given the sillUltaneous initiative 
to join the Co_on Market. Indicative planning had already inspired solle 
prosilytizers in the OEEC, Political and Economic Planning (PEP), the 
pressure group founded in the thirties which was rapidly reversing its 
neo-liberal stance of the 19.5Os and which had some standing "i th the 
senior Civil Service, and the equally influential Ha tional !nsti tute 
for Econaaic and Social Research (NIESR). These three organizations 
conspired in organizing a second conference, chaired by Beaver, in Easter, 
1961, for the purpose of ta.ki1l8 a closer look at the econoaie concert8e, 
a systea of what Shonfield has aptly termed "voluntary collusion between 
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senior civil servants and senior managers of big business (Shonfield, 
1965, p. 128). to Staff from the CODlDlissariat ~ ~ and French bus-
inessmen attended the conference to both explain the French system 
and reassure British industrialists that indicative planning mvolved 
no more than the name implied, i.e. that the Commissariat did not have 
powers of intervention or direction but rather served as a forum for 
sta te functionaries and big capital. While the French coDlllissioner-
general of the plan, Pierre MasH, focussed on the "psychological factors" 
ard the advantages of liai ted coapeti tion within the context of expanded. 
growth, Sir Robert Shone, a leading figure of the Iron and Steel Board, 
raised the more findaIlental issue that the point of French planning was 
to increase and co-ordinate the investment progr&llJle of the nation. In 
any case by the end of the conference indicative planning had found ano-
ther enthusiast (apart froa Shone) in the person of &iward Boyle, Finan-
cial Secretary to the Treasury , although the Treasury as a whole, not 
surprisingly, reMined unconvinced (PEP, Planning, No. 4.54, ChrlstoPl, 
pp. 62-4 and Leruez, pp. 8'7-9). 
Industrialists within the FBI cmtinued to give the lead in JIOV-
ing Britain towards some form of indicative planning. In the months 
following Brighton an FBI study group, the Coud ttee on Economc Prograaaes 
and Targets (CEPl'), was set up under the chairmanship of Beaver to in-
vestigate planning, its iaplications for industry and possible institu-
tions. 'lbe Cowttee concentrated its efforts on looking at the al-..r-
natives to the liberal econolllY of the 1950s as the latter was now per-
ceived as impossible under conditions of full employment and the increased 
illportance of public sector investaent. As far as CEPT was concerned 
planning in any proper sense would only apply to the state sector, while 
private industry its own industry-based targets. Such projectiOll8 
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would then be couunica ted to the planning bureau where industrial-
ists, trade unionists and government officials could. discuss thell 
with reference to the implications for economic growth. The structure 
of the planning institution followed. the by""now falliliar tripartite 
fonula, but fro. the start they assumed that it would be independent 
of the government and the Treasury and have its own staff of economists 
and statisticians. The view of planning was still hazy at this point, 
but the Beaver Coaaittee approached very close to what they considered 
as the French aode1, which of course bore a striking reaeabl_ce to the 
failed progr&lUle of the A ttlee governaent. As their ideas for an Office 
for Econonc Development crystallized in the spring of 1961, the CEPT 
realized that their proposals were too advanced to get through the FBI's 
Grand Co1mcil. Yet, through their efforts in collbina tion with the Easter 
conference and a subsequent trip of industrialists to France organized. 
by the FBI, acceptance of at least the notion of indicative planning was 
apreading rapidly in the ranks of industial capital (Blank, ibid., pp. 
167-70). 
As the cliaate .of industrial opinion moved rapidly in favour of a 
planning bureau outside the Treasury, the government flowed with the cur-
rent and appointed the growth-minded economist, Alec (now Sir) Cairncross, 
as Chief Economic Advisor to the Treasury replacing Sir Robert Hall, who 
had filled the post since 1947. Lloyd also supported the establishment 
of a body outside the Treasury in part as a source of independent infor-
Mtim and advice. But the whole process was in danger of being bogged 
down in the Cabinet and departmental colDlllittees when the economic cliaate 
racei ved a cold abock as yet another exchange crisis broke in the su.aer 
of 1961. 
'lbe Jul1 crisis ate_ad from the underlying deterioration of the 
balance of paJaents, unlike the previoua failure of confidence. Yet, 
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the authorities had not perceived this erosion because a large volume 
of "hot aoney" had been attracted into London taat more than made up for 
the current account deficit. The money flowed in partly in response to 
anxieties about the dollar and partly owing to the deliberate Treasury 
policy of raising interest rates from four to six per cent between Jan-
uary and February on top of the iSsue of government bonds which foreigners 
could purchase tax-free. 'Ibe attempt to use monetary policy to influence 
dOllestic dell&lld thus succeeded only in disguising the underlying deter-
ioration in the balance of payaents. With a revaluation in the Geraan 
ark in March, 1961, and renewed ruaours of a sterling devaluation, the 
t.50OIl tide began to ebb. 'Ibe complacencY' of the Treasury and Bank author-
i ties, who did not realize tha. t the outflow of such a SWl is a c:li£ferent 
atter froll its inflow siaply because it raises the question ot confidence 
in an acute and pressing W&7,. did not aid in coping with tbe problea be-
fore it reached a cn-sis stage. In the end the Chancellor responded in 
the sue fashion as previous ainisters to the inevitable run on the poind: 
he imposed a deflationary package, raising the "regulator" purchase tax 
the uxiJIWI allowable l~, cuttins governaent spending and bank advances 
and raising the interest rate another notch. Again, as in previous cases, 
the stop policy was imposed after the trade cycle had. already peaked of its 
own accord, giving the econollY a fin pash in a downward direction. Tbe 
July aeasures were inf'licted, moreover, in a period when the balance of 
pB.yments bad been steadily iJIlproving and were already back in the black 
(Brittan, ibid., pp. 251-4). 
Lloyd at the saae tille had to resist pressure froa Treasury officials 
for even aore drastic, i. e., aore disruptive. measures. Moreover. they 
were backed in their extnaisa by a voice wlaich becaae aore influential 
&8 the volume of public debt in its hands increased, naaely that ot the 
Intematiooal Monet&r1 Fund. According to Br! ttan Dr. Per Jacobuon, 
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then Managing Director of the IMF, wanted a cut of £.50Om in govemment 
expenditure on top of the tax measures. "Although he did not receive 
satisfaction on this particular point, there is no doubt that - as on 
other occasions - a supporting deflationary progr8.lllDle was a condition of 
the IMF oredi t Britain was then given (i bid., p. 2:J)." 
However, perhaps the most politically important step initiated at 
the same conjuncture was the implementation, following strong pressure 
froa the Bank of England, of the so-called "pay pause" in the public 
sector. '!'be latter uounted to a wage freeze but only for state workers, 
not the first nor the last time that a British government wou1d atteapt 
to coapensa te for its lack of control over the economy as a whole by 
clamping down on public ellployees. As a result of this first exercise in 
an incomes policy since Attlee (Which of course did not apply to all in-
coaes but only to wages), the TUC beC&lle hishly suspicious of all efforts 
to draw the unions into national planning negotiations. '!hey feared that 
the whole process consisted of no aore than a back-door wage freeze, just 
as under labour the CBI came to distrust the endeavour as a hidden form 
of nationalizatia'l. In the end the fears of the unionists proved the 
more justified. 
'!he July crisis brought matters to a head in the Cabinet. In his 
"crisis budget" speech of 25 July Lloyd, desperate to show that the 
governaent had some long-term policy in mind in the midst of the panic, 
sUpped in a reference to planning after listing the various short-term 
measures without apparently consulting his colleagues on the substance 
of that section of his statement (Leruez. p. 92). In the meantime the 
ilea of planning, or at least some kind of incomes policy, had received 
an additional fillip fro. the Fourth Report of the Cohen Council, published 
in July. '!'his arked the conversion of the CPP! to emphasizing a cos't-
push llOdel of inflationary pressure with the conllary that the governm.t 
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had to act directly on incomes, prices and the rate of productivity 
in addition to regulating demand. With regard to productivity the 
Report recommended the creation of projections of manpower requirements, 
especially for skilled labour, assurances that higher productivity would 
not lead to redundancy and the "programming" of investment to ensure 
that budgetary measures did not fall disproportionately on this aspect of 
the economy as they had in the past. Moreover, given the interlocking 
nature of investaent decisions, the national need for a higher rate could 
only be secured throU8h establishing a conseD8Us on a general progr&lllle 
of faster growth. "'!'bis llight be done if the prograaaes froll the JIain 
sectors were collated in a national projection of investmentintenBions," 
thus co-ordinating capacity and demand of the various sectors. Pointing 
to the experience of the Iron and Steel Board in the U.K., it also drew 
attention to the siail&r exercises carried out by the CoMissa.ria.t ~ El!!! 
and concluded that "the United Kingdoa has soaething to learn froa this 
experi.ent (para. 48)." 
On the question of prices and incomes policy the Report rejected de-
tailed controls on the grounds of "adJdnistrative coaplenty," preferring 
instead of price restraint the lowering of tariffs as a spur to competi-
tion (and noting, incidently, the general erosion tif the sterling prefer-
ence network). With regard to wages it noted for the first tille the 
divergence between the local (informal) and national (formal) bargaining 
aysteas and proposed both strengthening the latter and attellpt1ng to tie 
it aore closely to the actual rise of productivity. Here as well as with 
prices it proposed not direct controls but a:nnational projection of the 
expected rise in productivity. Moreover, 
SUch & projeotion could be related to a planned investaent pro-
graae t and to forward aS8es8llenta of II&I'1power needs and resources. 
It eould be an iDdice.tor of the anticipated pace of growth of the 
whole econolQ't and would be a guide for those responsible in their 
own particular fields for the planning of production, the fix-
ing of prices and profit margins. and settlement of wages and 
salaries (para. 67). 
This line of approach received additional support from an OEEC report. 
The Problem of Rising Prices, published shortly before the July crisis. 
which gave further evidence concurring with a wage-push theory of infla-
tion for Britain as well as for other advanced capitalist nations and 
apparently made sOlle iJlpact on those Treasury hard-liners still favouring 
financial measures (O~, 1961). 
'Ibe Chancellor at any rate felt iapelled by the situation to speed 
up the institution of a planning council. If the TUC was somewhat reluctant 
in the Jl8.tter, and in fact had played no role in the discussions up 
to that point. their suspicions were mollified by their desire to exert 
at least sOlle influence, however aeagre, on the structure of the eventual 
planning _chinery. '!he industrialists on the other hand displayed no 
such reticence. As one observed noted, 
it was saply a atter of industry's using its influence to get 
the kind of planning agreements it considered desirable. Its 
representatives made a strong case for an almost total transfer of 
the French model, particularly its use of 'indicative planning' by 
a council of government officials, industrialists, and trade union-
ists, supported by a strong 'developaent office' of experts. What 
the FBI did not want was a continuation of the Treasury's monopoly 
of planning (Christoph. p. 71). 
The FBI's reaction to the "July crisis" was a distinct departure 
froll its previous stand in 1957. While accepting tba t the ellergency 
measures were necessary to stell the panic, it now added its official 
voice to the growing clamour for longer-tel1ll planning to co-ordinate 
economic development. The announcement of the government's intention 
to negotiate entry into the EEC coming a few days after the special 
budget fitted well with industrial opinion bestdes linking the two issues, 
planning am the EEC. in the public IIlind. 1he Federation's leaders 
found in subsequent consultations tha.t the Chancel10r was t.hinldns along 
virtually the saae lines. '!binge were now proceeding so SIlOothly that 
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Uoyd announced a few weeks la. ter his intention to establish "a 
closer link between Government and industry in order to create a climate 
fa voura ble to expansion ('Ibe Times, 29 Sept., 1961), M name ly the 
National Econonc Development Council (NEDC). The only hitch remaining 
from industry's point of view was to establish the independence of the 
NEDC and especially the planning bureau or National Economic Development 
Office (NEOO) from governaent, and particularly Treasury, control. 'Ibis 
conflict focusaed on the different roles that industry and the Chancellor 
wanted the pl&nning apparatus to fulfill. While for Lloyd the new or-
ganization should serve Minly aa a aeans of aobilizing support from 
"both sides of indastry" for economic policies or as a kind of "Royal 
CoJllllission for Growth," for the FBI (as well as the ruC) its value con-
sisted in offering more direct influence On econOllic pollcy-mldng or as 
a "presaure group for growth. "1'hese two conceptions were not that far 
apart, however, particularly as IJ.oyd too wanted to ensure the NElX>s 
autonoay from the Treasury ( (Shanks. 1962, p. 3.56. Lloyd, 1963, and. 
Blank, 1973, pp. 171-7). 
Negotiations with the TUC on the other hand proved mch aore pro-
tracted, _inly because of the "paYJ.'pause" introduced with the July aeas-
ures. Although the General Council agreed with the principle that incomes 
should keep in pace with productivity, it objected to the discriminatory 
aspects of a public sector freeze as well as with the fact that it had 
been implemented without prior oonsultation. At pains to both disa.sso-
ciate itself from this emergency measure and ensure that it would not 
unwi ttingly be drawn in to support an incomes poll cy, the rue dragged 
its heels OD participation in the plamdng dialogue. Caution was well 
advised since it was quite plain that for .ost of the govemaent and 
the Treaaur;y the whole BDC venture .... pr1ariq a means of involving 
the unions in just pm a progzuae of wate controls (Panitch, 1976, pp. 48-9). 
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Consequently, the unions stipulated that the planning council should 
1. have the authority to set its own agenda, \i.e., discuss profits 
as well as wages. 2. not raise the question of an incomes policy at 
least in the short run, and ). include only TUC nolllinated delegates a.s 
labour representatives. '!hey likewise refused to participate in the 
NEOC until the pay pause had been lifted (Christoph). In other respects, 
however, their view of the proposed council was remarkably similar to 
that of the eaployers' orpnimations. The;y too wanted indepemence:froa 
governaent and Treasury control and were Minl;y concerned to secure 
access to the policy.-aaking aaddner;y. 'lhe;y differed froa industrialists 
only in tending to see the NEDC in the rather f'uiliar mode of' "a second 
parliament with a corporatist character - and because of that character, 
expected to be able to conclude binding agreeaents between aajor interest 
groups of' a t;ype which a traditional Brit1~ parliaaent could. not compass 
(Shonfield, 196.5, p. 1.5)." '!'he TUC thus view_ the Council's role in 
tentS of a cross between a corporatist and a collective bargaining aodel, 
while the industrialists took a position somewhere between that and the 
governaent·'s. 'nle industrialist~ could not condone the notion of binding 
agreements, nor even the proposal that Council liMbers be delegates 
from their respective organizations, particularly since the FBI hardly 
had a monopoly position in that market (Blank, 19'13, pp. 173-4). 
By aid winter the fled«ling planning organism had eaerged tenta ti vely 
trOll its Westainster shell. Lloyd's distrust of the Tresury concurred 
wi th the wishes of the FBI, and Neddy, as the NEDC was affections. tely 
christened, was set up as a quasi-non-sovernaental or~ization or quango, 
the peculiar sort of' half-breed that now populates the advanced capitalist 
landscape. 'lbe unions' wishes were taken into account to the extent that 
only TUC ae.oars neei ved invi ta tioDs to join the Council, out the gov-
ernaent retained tne right of appointaent, after the u.ndator;y coDsulta-
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tions witn union leaders. 'Ibe General Council continued to haggle 
over the form of tne NEDC but eventually decided to join in January, 
1962. The "pay pause" in tne puolic sector continued to oe a thorn in 
their side, out pra.gu.tism dictated that they join the Doard in order 
to ma.ke the "voice of labour" heard. 
Two other points are worth noting about the NEDC venture. Fi rat, 
although some elements of City opinion were not totally nostile to in-
dicative planning, at least in its early staps (no doubt fro. the BaIle 
concern as the Bank for establillhing &Ild.iicomes policy), no financial 
representatives were appointed to the Council, at least in the first five 
years, nor any non-'1UC unionists (leruez, p. 86). Second, me employers' 
representatives were handicapped by the existence of three distinct peak 
organizations, aeaning that industrialists could only be chosen as in-
dividuds (Brittan, 1971, p. ,4,5). Onl1 under labour was this weakness 
in the representation of capital rectified. 
Besides the BOO the MacMillan governaent instituted the techno-
cratic branch of the new planning agency, the NEOO. The Development Office 
wi tit a staff of ? 5 was tne brains of the operation; its task was to draw 
up indicative plans for the BritiahecoDOIIY in consultation with the HEre 
memDers. In its searcn for administrative talent for the new bureau 
the government naturally fell upon the ste'l industry t whose Irdn and 
Steel Board had pioneered corporate planning in the private sector, 
again with state sJ*)nsorarUp and under a Tory govemment. As one observer 
rell&rked, 
'lbe third five-year developaent prograaae issued in 1961 was in 
sOlle wa,ya a pilot project for the full .. scale planning operation 
on wilich the Bri tiab Govermaent _barked ",i th the establishaent 
of the lational Econoaic Develo]lMnt Council in 1962. It was not 
accidental that the first Director-General of the BOO, Sir Robert 
Shone, was an outstandina steel eco."ollist lilo as & .. aer fSf the 
Iron and Steel Boud bad been responsible tor workiDg out the long .. 
1'&np 1Ilvest.ent progruaes ot the iDdUB~ (Shonfield, 1965. p. 96). 
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Shone, indeed, .had been associated for a long time with economic plan-
ning, not merely in his capacity on the Iron and Steel Board but as 
chairman of an FBI study group which had originally accepted the Cri pps 
initiative in 1941 (Blank, 191:3. p. 90. n. 34). He was thus an arche-
type of the progressive industrialist with considerable experience in 
the interface between capital and the state and ideally suited for the 
post. 
'nle relatiCllship of the BEJX) to the governaent reflected. the con-
cern of both industrial capital and labour to guarantee its independence 
from political-adainistrative control. Unlike the French Genea.l Planning 
COllUllissariat which was in essence an integral part of the French civil 
service, it was totally autonoaous froa Whitehall, deriving its ulti_te 
legitiaacy from its subordination to the Dsvelopaent Council (Leruez, 
p. 99 and J. " A.M. Hackett. 1963. ch. 1). 
Fro. all this it would seea that the British "drift towards planning" 
had gathered so.e .0mentUll by IIid-l962. As it all fell into place the 
central characteristics of the planning agency, to repeat the main points. 
were, first, that leddy was independent from the Treasury and even, to an 
extent, from the governaent. Second, it was a semi-public body formed 
wi th the intention of incorporating the uidons and industry within a 
truework influenced by the govemment. 'lb11'd, the aajor difference with 
French planning (besides its separation from Whitehall) was in the in-
clusion of representatives of the labour movement. In France the unions 
had refused to participate4 whereas the TUC was only initially reluctant. 
From the point of view of the govermaent and the FBI the a.ia of imple-
Mnting SOH kind of wage control waa predicated on the pa.rt1cipaticn of 
the TUC in the plaDDing prograue. and wage control defined the aubataace 
of the whole endeavour. For even the first Jeddy plan. Growth . of the 
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Uni ted Kingdoa Econo!y to 1966, assWled that consumption would increase 
at a rate below that of GNP; that ia, it presumed an incoMs policy 
even if it did not stipulate one outright for fear of antagonizing the 
unions at the very start (lfEOO, Feb., 1963, paras. 191-6). 
It was in relation to the unions that the corporatist aspects of 
the NEOC came out most strongly. For the whole exercise can be inte~ 
preted as an atteapt at "consent u.nageaent." Alternatively put, the 
iaplicit object of the governllent 8S to widen the SpielraUll of the state 
beyond. the lialt8 set by two per cent une.plo)'llent on the one hand and 
the defense of sterling on the other. '!he "drive for growth" in those 
last years of Tory rule, 1963-4, involved the exchange of higher growth 
in return for a voluntary wages policy. at least in theory. '!he unions 
in other words were supposed to collaboD.te with tbe state and big 
business tbroup the DDC and thus _Cure the acceptability of the con-
certed econo81 to the working class. 
While the roc had agreed to take tart in the planning Council, 
this by no aeans iIlplied its acceptance of the covert aiJI of the gov-
ernaent, na.aely acreeaant on so.e fora of w.ge restraint. Indeed, the 
latter proved the _jor stWlbllng block to Conservative planning, for 
the Tories concentrated their efforts over the next two years on secur-
ring just such an agree.ent, .largely without success. With the form-
atiCll of the REDO several other advi~ory bodies on econoaic policy were 
wouad up .... sly the virtually aoribund Econolllic Pl.anidDg Board, the 
Ha tional Production Advisory Council and, more notably, the CPP! (Cohen 
Council). '1he TUC apparently used its participation in Xeddy as a 
bargaining counter to force the govermaent to withdraw the public sec-
tor freeH, 80 at least in the short run incomes policy _s effectively 
vetoed (Dortan, 1974, pp.109-1.5). However, the government indicated its 
general intention with the publication of a Treasury White Paper, InCOMe 
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Policy; the Next step, in February, 1962. Despite its title this doc-
ument did not in fact spell out any policy measures but simply rei ter-
ated the general criterion that wage increases should be based on actual 
growth of productivity rather tba.n increases in the cost of living. Its 
only innovation was the announcement of a "guiding light" on wage in-
creases to serve as the base reference for the (not yet established) 
arbitration tribunals with the wage norm for 1962 set at 2.,. 
However, the Priae Minister 1I&S frustrated with both the con-
tinuing divisions within his Cabinet &Dd the slow pace of consultation 
within the REDC. Independently of the latter, he drew together some 
senior civil servants with a view to establishing sOlle sort of arbitra-
tion comssion without the prior consent of the TUC. 'Ibe creation of 
the Ma tional IncOll8s Cou.1ssion (IIC) was dull announced at the tiae of 
LloJd's diais_l as Chancellor in July, -1962 (Leruez, pp. 114-S). '!he 
IIC (or licky) took the previous Vhi te Paper as its point of refereace. 
i.e •• "fair" wage increases were those which contoraed to the 2., nora. 
However. its powers were limited to those of a Royal Commission. that is. 
it could consider settlements brought to its attention by the govemaent 
or another concemed party and compel attendance of witnesses, but it had 
no sanctions to apply in cases where its decisions were simply disregarded. 
In the event the whole effort of voluntary incomes policy was a resounding 
flop. 'Ibe unions refused to participate from the beginning, as the exis-
tence of the IIC violated the spirit of the agreement prior to joining 
Neddy. 'Ibe employers. while offering at least nominal support. barely 
concealed their displeasure with a aove that could only antagonize the 
TUC at a point when the latter's origiDal suspicions of the lfEDC had only 
just been alla,ed. Moreover, they were coaing round to the view that it 
1I&S iapossible to ia6late incoaes policy froa the whole paut of econ-
oaic aeaBUreS aSaing at faster growth, despite the continuiDs functional 
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division of employ_s' organizations along precisely those lines 
(Blank, 1973, pp. 178-9). As a result the HIC was at best ignored and 
at worst Genounced by those it was intended to influence, and it quickly 
fell into abeyance, publishing only four reports in its two-year life-
time. Pem.ps its only "positive" achievement was a degree of ground-
breaking in the field of productivity bargaining and a more intervention-
ist approach to wage policiea, but even such a limited conclusion is 
highly tenuoua (aee Crouch, Im, pp. 14-81). 
stYllied by union non-co-operation with the HIC the government turned 
its attention once .ore to the JEJX: as the only lIeans of securing an 
~e8llent on wage reatraint. Here as well the Tories obtained little in 
the way of concrete action, although the a tti tude of the TUC was far lIore 
coneilia.tory. 'Ibe unions were tbuaelves split even on the question of 
participating in )faddy, as indicated by & defeated.left-w1ng aotion as 
early as the 1962 Congress calling for withdrawel. Yet, the TUC rep-
resentatives did endorse the second HEDC report, Conditions Favourable to 
Faster Growth, which explicitly referred to the need for wage restraint 
(NEDC, 1963, para. 214). 'Ibis lead to a I118.jor row in the 1963 Congress, 
only headed off by the passa.p of two contradictory resolutions, one 
supporting the General Council's role in the HEDC and implicitly its 
app~val of the NEDC stateaent on incomes, the other rejecting all forms 
of wage policies (Crouch, 1JVl1, pp. 209-10 and Leruez, pp. 116-7). 
Tbe extent to which the General Council had moved in a con cilia tory 
direction was fully revealed in its report to that Congress. approved in 
the first resolution and later published as Economic Development and 
Planniy .. (ruC, 1963). 'Itds dOCUllent reaffirlled. the role of the unions 
in "the forfront of the advocates of econoaic planning (p. 6)." While 
insisting on the "consultative buis" of the planning approach as well 
as on the neceuit1 for ·volunt&r7 &8sociatioDs such aa trade unions," 
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it none the less accepted the need for making '~ctions and attitudes 
conform to the needs of the community as a whole, as expressed in an 
agreed plan" which would "provide a method of reconciling sectional 
interests with national needs and allocating responsibilities to those 
best able to carry them. (pp. 6-7)." 'Ibe report emphasized the co-op-
erative and consensual aspects of the NEDC project, re~ffing the al-
ternative model of drawing up a plan within a government department 
and then submitting it to the Council for approval or rejection (pp. lO-
ll). On the question of incomes it attempted to skirt the issue of 
restraint by framing it in terms of "making better use of the nation's 
economic resources." Nevertheless, it agreed with the NEDC requirement 
that growth depended on "creating a situation in which money incomes 
(profits as well as wages and salaries) did not rise more rapidly than 
output." 'Ibis would only be possible "if everybody concerned was con-
vinced that it was a necessary part of a wider programme for the growth 
of real incomes, and tha. t restraint by one section of the community would 
not aerely result in a gain b.J other sections (pp. 12-13)." 
More generally the report envisaged the planning process as an 
exercise in national collective bargaining, raising its implications 
for the unions in terms of a trade off between various economic and 
social priorities, e.g., better wages, mOre leisure, income redistribu-
tion. social benefits, etc. (p. 15). Lastly, it raised the issue of the 
planning process as an exercise in "industrial democracy." Planning in 
this sense offered a means of "influencing decisions which are made by 
business organisations and by Governments and which affect the lives of 
working people (pp. 15-16)." '!bus, the General Council at least had moved 
qui te some way towards accepting the framework of voluntaristic' corpora-
tism inherent in the NEDC project, even if it interpreted it in the 
traditional terms of collective bargaining. Yet, while the "consensus 
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management" aspect of Neddy achieved a degree of success in that the 
TUC assented to the ultimate necessity of a wages policy, opposition 
wi thin the labour movement prevented any further progress. As the 
election year of 1964 appDOached, the unions proved less and less 
willing to make even such symbolic concessions. 
If the limits of voluntaristic corporatism under the Tories were 
exhibited quite starkly in the relations with labour, i.e., the failure 
to secure anJincoaes policy. they were no less clearly illustrated in 
the relations between Neddy, the established policy-aaking apparatus and 
the governaent, that is, on the range ot econoadc measures apart from 
incomes policy. For if indicative planning was to make any lasting apact 
on economic growth and Britain's competitive position, it had to d8llonstrate 
its capacity tor altering not just expectations but the actual course of 
short-term econoaic policy. Here &8 well the vemict was decisively neg-
a ti ve. Re 1& tions between the HEDC and the Trea.sury were, of course, 
bare ly comlal from the start. As noted above the Treasury mandarins lost 
the first battle in that the Council and planning bureau were set up out-
side their COIltrol, but they quite clarly won the war (or at least its 
opening stages) in that control of policy 'Was never relinquished to the 
new organizations. Indeed, even the indirect influence of the NEDC on 
economic policy aaounted to ao aore than a change in the governaent's 
ideological stance, especially given the failure to produce the primary 
object - an incoaes policy, since the actual course of economc policy 
remained firmly within the stop-go Rlold. 
In the wake of the Plowden Report the Treasury was reorganized along 
functional lines to confor. with ita modern responsibilities in October, 
1962. Whereas historically Trea.aur;y divisions had corresponded with the 
various depe.rtaents of the state ad.inistration (to facilitate ita -.in 
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as spending watchdog), now it was split down the middle by function into 
two Sides, Pay and Management on the one hand and Finance and Economic 
on the other. These in turn included five subdivisions, the Pay and 
Manage.ent Groups within the fomer and the Finance, Public Sector and. 
National EconollY Croups within the latter. This reorganization repre-
sented in effect the rather belated institution of the Keynesian revol-
ution, a shift tro. the tr&ditiona1 DegativiSll ot Treasury "control" towards 
a .ore outp.tt-oriented approach to "u.nageaent" ot both public finance and 
expendi ture. 'Iba t is, it reflected the technocratic concern of P1owden, 
the restructuring of the adainistrative apparatus in line with a functional, 
output-oriented .ode1 geared to the overall requirements of capital accum-
ulation in the advanced capitalist ecanoay. However, at the same time 
this effort cannot be lileparated froa the potential rivalry that Neddy 
entailed to the 1'reaBUr1's hepaony of policy-aking, nor from the "mood 
of profound distrust which bad pthered round the Treasury by the tiae of 
the 1961 sterling crisis (Brittan, 1971, p. 244)." 'Ibe adJRinistrative 
changes, along with the introduction ot the "regulator" tax on consump-
tion, thus constituted the Istablisbaent's response to the current challenge, 
the hope of deflecting _jor reform by aaking the minimum necessary changes J 
that is, shifting the burden ot short-term adjustment onto a non-dis-
crlainatory, variable tax and functional reorganization with a view to 
long-ten prograuing of public expenditure (Briqes, ebs. 14 cl 15 a.nd 
Roseveare, pp. 299-3(1). 
'lbe illlllediate result was considerable dislocation, both physical 
&Dd conceptual, within the Treasury. But, the mane .... succeeded in 
preserving the Tre&ll\l%'1's field at opezatiOlls intact, at least for the 
lensth of the ConsenaUve governaent.. As one recent study of this an-
cient and YeIlerable institution re-.rked, "In ita construction of the 
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powerful 'Rational Econoay' and 'Public Sector' Groups of divisions it 
was a ti.ely readjustaent of the balance of power in economic manage-
ment - and the adjustment. it need. hardly be said. was in the Treas-
ury's favour (Roseveare. p. 332)." The National Economy Group, in-
corporating the economists from the now-dissolved. Economic Section, cer-
tainly z:i valled the HEro as a prospective agency for eoonomic planning. 
'n\is Group was in turn constructed of two divisions, the first dealing 
with econoaic forecasting, bOth ahort-a.nd-long-tera, wbereas the second 
had responsibill ty for the co-ordination of general policies on econoaic 
growth. 'lbe connection between lleddy and. the adainistrative apparatus 
was effectively confined to this latter division. The Finance Group 
re_tned separated froll Ha tional Econoay. however, and retained its 
close links with the Bank of a.,land &8 well as its orthodox view of 
econo.ic policy, i.e •• giving priority to the w.lue of sterling and 
distrusting the planning prograaae (Lemes, p. 101). Thus. the split 
between long-and-short-tera policy was II1rrored in the functional division 
of Treasury departaents, and there could be little doubt about which would 
have the upper hand if expansion le4~;once &88in to a bal&nce of payments 
deficit and/or a sterling crisis. 
'lbe HEOC was consequently excluded from the short-term management 
of the econoll)' and not even consulted on budgetary Jlatters (Brittan, 1964. 
p. :n2). 'lbe ... croeconoaic stage had. been set with the deflationary 
pLckage of July. 1961. Yet, into 1962 and even 1963 Treasury officials 
had expected a rise in hOlle demand and to "make room for exports" had 
encouraged the Chancellor to follow a restrictionist policy. Despite 
rising une.ployaent Lloyd Dade no atteapt to rellate over the course of 
1962, 'bellerlng the predictions of his Treasury advisors that the econoay 
__ atill in an upswing and had to be held in check. Indeed. bis budget 
speech of that year indicates how wrong his inforaation was, 
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I understand the natimal desire to throw off the discipline 
and restraints of the past year t but that must be a steady pro-
cess timed to fit in with actual achievement and not wishful 
thinking. I have great confidence in our capacity to take ad-
vantage of our opportunities. It lD8.y sound hopeful to say this, 
but I believe that events will prove the soundness of our pol-
icy and the wiadoa of our action (cited in C.D.Cohen, p. 21). 
In fact the Treasury forecast was woefully wrong, and Lloyd was shocked 
to discover in July that the projection for unemployment for the next 
winter had been raised to 525,000 fro. the original 4.50,000 (Brittan, 
19'71. pp. 266-7). 
MacM1llan SUIIIUL1"ily diaaisaed Lloyd as Chancellor on 12 July for 
reasons which reain \U'lclear but .ost probably steamed from the Prime 
Minister's impatience with his inability to secure a pay policy or force 
the pace of the HEDC discussions, as well as his lack of familiarity with 
econoaic .ttara &Dd. his inevitable association with the unpopular pay 
pause (ibid., pp. 268-9). His replacement, Reg1nald Maudling, was of course 
bardly enaaoured of leddy, h&vins earlier acted as leader of Cabinet 
opposition to the plamdng initiative. as noted above. Maudling's 
approach to reflation started on a cautious note, _inly out of continued 
concern for the state of sterl1D8, as he postponed aiDor adjustments in 
the purchase tax and the introduction of investment allowances for areas 
of high unemployaent until Hovember. Yet, his first budget in April, 
1963. seeaed to mark a victory for the planning conception within the 
governaent or & t least was interpreted as such at the time. 'Ibis com t-
ted the governaent to the ~ growth tate that had been previously adopted 
by the NEDC as the average target for the years 1961-6. Maudling obliged 
with eXpIUlsionary tax reliefs in the order of £2.50m. Indeed, even the 
contents of his budget speech seeaed to follow the very structure of the 
Ifaddy report, Conditions Favourable to hater Growth [see Hansard, 675, 
col. 4'5 (3 April, 1963)]. By December of that year the governaent had 
likewise published 1 te first 1'i V8-rear progr&IIIe of public expenditure 
-211-
~, Public Expenditure in 1963-4 and 1967-8. Indicative planning, 
it seemed, had finally come of age, and various contemporary observers 
felt that Neddy had at last established a. powerful position of influence 
on the course of econoaic policy (see e.g. Mitchell, 1966, p. 143). 
Yet, the victory of 1963 soon proved pyrrhic. In fa.ct the govern-
ment had already delayed too long on the reflationary move, and as a 
result the tiaing of the budget was wrong, and the econoay entered a 
rapid booa. According to one study, 
By the fourth quarter of 196:3 GDP in real teras was already se 
above its level a year earlier, and deM.nd was rising cia.ngerously 
f'ast. (It increased at an annual :tate of l~ between the third and 
final quarters of' 1963 [C680hen, p. 73J). 
Thus. largely owing to government policy the economy was stimulated 
to an unsustainable level in 1963-4. '!he current account was already in 
defici t by the tiae of' preparation of the 1964 budget, but Maudling's 
package was only aildly deflatiCllYLl7. While the forecasts of the eventual 
deficit for that financial year underestimated the real Shortfall by some 
£280m. the main consideration informing the budget was undoubtedly the 
coming election and the political need to keep unemployment down for the 
coiling caa}B1p. So, if' anything, tbe political utilization of the IEDC 
programme. 11 terally ~ or bust. proved destabilizing in the short run 
and was a _jor factor in the drawn out deflation of 1964-7. '!hat is. 
by the end of this period of' Conservatifterule the plan had served as 
an excuse to stiaulate the economy in the traditional unner but had not 
offered any means of' controlling the boom thus generated. '!he Conservatives 
used the timing of the budgetar,y expansion to give the appearance of a 
whole-hearted conversion to the ccmcerted eoonomy, all the while pursuing 
negotiations with the unions ofer pay policy. In the end the experiment 
in indicative p1uning failed to deliver the goods on both accounts. 
'!he 196:3-4 expansion texainated in the .... e eoonoalc .orass as previous 
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go periods, to be distin6uished only by the greater sever! ty of' the 
problems raised, and the unions could not be induced to abandon their 
commitment to free collective bargaining, at least not as yet. Disil1u-
siOlUlent with the whole idea of planning, which had never struck very 
deep roots in the bedrock of Establishment opinion, set in with the 
realization that the process of planning by exhortation had not really 
extended the paraaeters of the state' s field of action. 
'!he only area in which the IBDC project achieved lilli ted success 
was in cMeDting the Dew relationship t.tween industrial capital and the 
state, leading in tum to structural changes in the peak organizations 
of industry itself. In the course of preparing its first "development 
plan," Growth of the United KiDcdoa Bcono!y to 1966, the NElX) conducted 
an "industrial inquiry" of seventeen industries in the sWllller of 1962. 
It pursued this through the existingaachinery of corporate representa-
tion, that is, the trade associatioDs, supplemented by individual firas, 
state officials, unions and specialists when necessary. 'Ibis survey led 
to the conclusion that for the industries covered a growth rate of around 
4.~ was perfectly teasi'le, and u1t1aately to a conflict with the Treas-
ury which viewed the growth target as totally unrealistic. None the less. 
it did constitute the .ost systeu.tic and reliable analysis of the state 
of the econoll)' ever produced up to that point, certainly lIore so than the 
pieceaeal ap~ch of the existing sovernaent departments (Mltchel1. 1966. 
p. 139). 
More significantly the experience convinced industry of the need 
for a peraanent structure of planning sroups at the industrial level. 
Discussions bep.n in the spring of 196). and b1 autumn a consensus was 
reached on the tora and function ot such groups. As announced by the 
BOO in Deceaber, the Iconoaic DeveloPlGt Coa1ttees (EDes or Little 
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Meddies as they were immediately named) would, 
1. Exaune the economic performance and plans of the industry, 
and assess from time to time the industry's progress in relation 
to the national growth objectives, and provide information and 
forecasts to the Council on these matters. 
2. Consider ways of impmoving the industry's econollic performance, 
coapeti tive power and efficiency and formulate reports and. recoa-
mendations of these atters 8.S appropriate (NEIX>, Activity Report, 
1964). 
The TUC members had also pressed for inclusion in the planning process 
at the industry level, so the structure of the Little Meddies again 
followed the triparti te'lmodel of voluntaristic corporatiBII. but in practice 
at this level aa.nageaent was mueb .ore strongly represented than either 
labour or the state. Nothing indicated the ideological change in industry 
so much as the formation of these committees; for they duplicated almost 
identically the proposed Developaent Councils of the Attlee period (then 
vetoed by industrial oppoai tion), intended not so IIUch as cartels (they 
had no sanctions or coapulsory powera) but IRore as a syste. of consensus 
foru.tion (the producers' alliance) and closer linkage with the state 
machinery tha.n could be offered by the trade asaociation/sponsoring depart-
ment nexus. The institution If the new systea, however, continued at a 
very alow pace I by the end of 1964 only e16ht JIDCs had been establlshed 
(Leruez, pp. 109-10 a.nd Blank, 1973. pp. 184-6). 
The experience of the concerted econoa)' likewise affected the struc-
ture of industrial capital's peak organizations. For it beCUle apparent 
that the traditional separation of industrial and economic affairs, rep-
reaenteci by the di viaion 'between the FBI and the BEe; was siaply un-
workable in an era. when incomes policy was the linch-pin in the develop-
ment of an integrated approach to faster growth. 'Ibe imperative for work-
ing out a ooaon atrategy within Jade!)' stimulated a rapid centralization 
of industrial orpnizations. St.art1Jla with an inforu.l group co-ordin&-
tiDg policy between the FBI. BIXl and RABM (fO%'ll8r1y the lWM, renaaed the 
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National Association of Bri tiBh Manufacturers), the leaders of those 
respective organizations announced their intention of appointing a 
couittee with the object of concluding a merger in July, 1963. Ne-
gotiations proceeded over the next year, and by the SUlUler of 196.5 they con-
cluded in the foru.tion of a single peak organization, the Confederation 
of Brt tish Industry. 'Ibe reasons for the merger were quite plainly spelled 
out by the FBI President, Sir Peter Runge a 
'lbe basic cause of the situation is the policy of full eaployaent, 
for no GoYemaent can st&lld aside froa the social consequences of 
econoa1c fluctuation. And so wa.!ind that the interpla,y of wages, 
profits, prices, productivity, spending,exports and investaent is 
inevitable. It becoaes nonsense to think that they can any 10nger 
be coapartaentalised. '!bey !lUst be studied, debated, am. if need 
be, negotiated, together (FBI, Grand Council minutes, 10 July. 1963). 
'!bus, while industry continued to reject any hint of state compulsion in 
the institutions of the concerted ecollOltY. the very process of indicative 
planning iapelled a f'unda.Mntal cb&nge in the structure of industrial 
associations, one which bad eluded corporate leaders for close on to 
halt a century (Blank, 19'13, pp. 181-). 
1heoretical Evaluation of Conservative Pl.a.nning 
Given the liaitations of thi;s~i:~second experilllent" in "democratic 
planning." it isq,quite easy to dimes the entire exercise as a public 
relations aanoeu~t9to covertly secure trade union agreement on incolles 
policy. While there is considerable truth in this viewpoint, the Neddy 
venture did at the aaae ti.e represent something more, that is a shift 
in the relationship between the state and the ... jor constituent classes 
of advanced capitalist society. 'lbe institution of indicative planning 
in however & ttenua ted fora collsti tuted a tr&nai tion t by no aeans irre-
versible, froa the econoaic li'ber&l1_ of the 1950s to the voluntarlstic 
corporatiaa that characterised the 1960s &Dd, in part, the 19708. 'lbese 
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distinct paradigms of state-society relations can be defined along 
three dimensions I 1. the representation of major interest groups, 
classes or class fractions in 80 far as they are organized, or the 
input diaensionl 2. the econoaic{(and social) role of the state, the 
degree of intervention or the output side; and :3. the internal struc-
ture and mode of procedure of the state administration. In the follow-
ing I shall briefly sketch these two aod.els, but in 80 doing I wish to 
re-eapha.si.e that the distinctions between the. are by no aea.ns hard and 
fast, that they represent points on a continUWI rather than sharply de-
fined alternatives, which is perhaps a lI&jor reason why definitions of 
corporatiBJll proliferate in a geometric relationship to the number of 
studies on the subject (see Panitch, 1979). I will also attempt to show 
following the earlier &D&iysis that all three diaensions, input, output 
and structure/procedure, not onI.)' mISe out ot the cont.radictory process 
of capitalist develoPlent but expreuthe saae in their very iaplellent&-
tion, that is they displace the contradictions to the political level but 
cannot arrive at a final resolution. As such the atteapt to introduce 
any systea of representation, econollic policy a:t1d/or mode of procedure 
produces within itself conflict am 1na.d.equacy that negates the utility 
of any strategy, and no Dount of Idxing of the various types along any 
diaension is capable ot achievil1l a sufficient resolution.(see ch.l, pp. 
17-19 ). 
'!he post-war regiae as consolidated in the early 1950s atteapted at 
i_at a partia.l return to the aodel of econoaic liberalisa. In fact 
this was iapossi ble given the vast changes in the structure of the oap-
i talist econoay, lncreaeing concentration, the enhanced position of work-
ing lcaaa orpniations, etc., not to aention the institution of the wel-
tare state and above &11 elae the couitaent to full eaplo1Jlent. '!he 
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resulting hybrid, described in the previous chapter and lmown at the 
time under the logo of Butskelli8ll, is best subsumed by Crouch's concept 
of liberal collectiviBll (Crouch, 1971. pp. 30-3). 'nlus, with regard to 
representation, a1 though the fo~l systea remained defined by the 
characteristics of classical liberalism (geographic representation on the 
basis of aggregations of individual preferences as mediated through Par1-
i8JIent), the int"onal network of functional mediation emerged with an 
iaportant role, if greatly diluted by comparison to the war and reconstruc-
tion periods. in a roughly pluralist fora; that is, the trade associa.tion 
{or trade uaion)/sponsoring departaent nexus retained a pluralist eaphasis. 
Trade associations, while aonopolizing the representation of their part-
icular sectors. did not substitute an.i nistered for competi ti ve re la tions 
internally, they vere _IlQt .~.PJ11SQU !!I,nd, :thoUflh hardly deaocratic, ha4 
no specific II&!lctions over me_ber8 or non-llembers, nor a:tr1 legal prl vi leges 
(apart from prirlleged access of .. lillited nature via the sponsoring de-
partaents). Likewise, their goals remained largely self-determined, outside 
of any fOrDl or inforMl coercion on the part of the state, although of 
course they were influenced ind1rectly by the existence of full employment 
and the high taxation generated by the welfare state. 'lbe same applies 
more or les8 to the unions , although their influen ce was even less under 
the Conservatives with the lBportant exception of the continued collllllitllent 
to full eaployment despite considerable pressure from all fractions of 
capital against it. 
On the output side (the state' s function in the economy), the term 
Butskelli8ll disguises certain iIlportant differences between the labour 
and Conservative approaches. For Labour, at least until the 1970s, 
reained fairlJ consietently leyneeian, lihereas the Tories, as noted. in 
Cbapter .5. tllrted with IIOnetari_ tbroupout the decade. Siailarly. the 
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Conservatives, while not atteapting to roll back the role of the state 
(apart from a few examples like the denationalization of steel), ser-
tainly succeeded in curtailing its growth at least in proportional 
teras. Keynesianisa was in other words reduced to its mini mal sense, 
a commitment to full employment but through the least degree of state 
intervention possible, an approach wbich reached its apogee with the 
"two lever" theory embodied in Operation Robot. This strategy of course 
ultill&tely broke down as it resulted in stop-go econoncs and the dis-
ruption of both public and private investaent-progr&llJles. "Monetaristlc 
Keynesianisa" contained as a&n1 contradictions as the nue implies, and 
at least at this point it was monetarism that fell by the wayside. 
The internal structure and aode of procedure of the state a.d.ministra-
tion were, like other aspects of liberal collectivism, essentially hybrid, 
though heavily weighted toward the ancien regiae. '!he structure, that is, 
reaained predominantly bureaucratic and the procedure traditional. '!he 
revival of the Treasmoy and its tradttional system of ad hoc negative 
control largely reversed any earlier attempts to functionalize the system 
of econoaic policy--kiD8, al thoup inevitably certain elements associated 
wi th Keynesian aacroeconoaic II&nI.gell8nt, such as the preparation If nation-
al income and expenditure tables, preserved functional and technocratic 
aspects. Taken as a whole, bureaUcratic structure and traditional pro-
cedure aeant that the doainant political forces detemned the direction 
of econoaic policies. Given its privileged structural position in the 
state adIlinistration via the Bank of England and the Treasury and the 
ideological adRnt&8e afforded by neo-liberal rivivalisa, the priorities 
of financial capital dictated the al. of the poliCY-lI&king ape.ratus, 
although of course it was restmined by the iJlpoaaibili t1 from the gov-
ernaent's point of view of tbro1d.ng off either full employment or the 
welfare state. 'Ibe result was ada1nistrative as well as econoaic oon-
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fusion and conflict, the disfunctional consequences of stop-go policies 
and Treasury control. 
The NEDC experiment involved innovation along all three axes, 
which together can be described as a shift to voluntaristic (Crouch, 
19'79, pp. :33-40) or pluralistic (Harris, 19'72, p. 2)6) corporatiSJI. 
While the experiaent rell&ined incollplete, since it was interrupted by 
the return of a Labour governaent in the 1964 election, it is possible 
to outline the _in features of the new syate., particularly as labour 
was in the end restricted to consolidating thea with a few eabellishllents. 
As reprds representation the nre itself was paradipatic of the 
aove towards corporatia. Constituted. on the functional representation 
of the _jor class divisions, labour and capital, it preserved a purely 
voluntaristic, non-coerc1ve status. At the sue tille aaabers of the 
Council and the lOOs were appointed, not elected, on the basis of prior 
consultations, a :ta1r~ effective IleanS of IICm8IIibac out undesirables, 
eepecially OD the trade union aide but also in the case of business 
(e.g., the exclusion of City representatives). While there was no at-
teapt to restrict internal coapeti tion within the different sectors of 
the advanced capi tali8t econo.,., there was a rapid move towards central-
ization of the ain organizations of capital and labour. '!he TUC was 
granted eole recognition for representing labour, and within the first 
year it .s increasingly called upon to centralize and "aodemize" its 
direction of the labour !IOveaent, although in the end this proved totally 
unsuccesafUL(Blank. 1973. p. 182). 'lbe peak associations of industrial 
cap! tal rapidly concluded a aerger agreement, as described above, but in 
neither caae were the Council ._bers delegated executive powers. 'lbe 
ste. te thua preserved it not aanctions (except indirectly through denial 
of acc ... to iDfluenoe and inforatiOl1) then at least controls o~er the 
aeabere, nor was it obligated to observe the Council's recoaeDdatiOlls. 
-219-
While the extent to which the actual course of economic policy 
was actually influenced by the NEOO plan is highly suspect, there was 
without doubt a. change of emphasis. '!he government at least had. to pack-
age its policy ... slireS in the laD8U&ge of planning, introducing a new 
vocabulary of targets, five-year programmes, etc., and was thus subject 
in the longer run (had it won the election) to criticism on the basis of 
those projections. Given the voluntaristic nature of the exercise and the 
deep concem on the part of both industrial capital and labour to block 
tile use of coercive powers in either at their respective do_ins, the 
extension of state intervention was confined to the institution of the 
industrial survey on the one hand and negotiations on incomes policy on 
the other. If the ends had ct..nged, the means remained the same, that is, 
the govemaent eabarked on a classical lCeynesian expansion without taJdng 
any steps to prevent it ending in ei tber a balance ot p&)'lIents deficit 
or a financial crisis or both.Vh11e the Conservative had apparently 
ruled out aonetary restriction and deflation as the Ile8l1S to stop econ-
ouc overheating, they had as yet found nOialternative, although certain 
possibilities existed which I shall co.e to shortly. 
'!he changes in intemal structure and IlOde of procedure I have al-
ready described in detail. To SUJlUDarize, the key innova.tion was the intro-
duction of technocratic aspects both in the NEDO and the reorganization of 
the Treasury. The logic of this approach is to p&T'~ formation of 
economc policy to the needs of national capital taken as a whole within 
a long-ten perspective, i. e., deterlli:na tion by ou tput instead of input. 
'!he "staf'f of experts" in charge of setting economic goal. bad to be 
. 
eancipa.ted fro. the shorl-si6hted determination of the 8&118 by the 40.-
inant political forces within the state &yste., that is, the relative aut-
onolt)' of the state fro. the priary political forces had to be enhanced. 
'Jlds strategy could not succeed for the following reasons. In the first 
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pla.ce, as argued before (Ch. 1, pp.17-l9 ), the instrumental goals of 
such a strategy must be formulated outside the state system itself; 
they are the givens, while the point of technocratic practice is sim-
ply to devise the most effective means of meeting them. In Offe's terms, 
"the state in its specific capitalist form is unable to impose on its 
environment its ~ definition of a set of goals that it could pursue 
according to instruaental rationality (Offe in Lindberg et aI, p. 138)." 
Neddy atteapted to overcome this particular weakness by arriving at those 
goals throue;b a restricted. consensual procedure, or what I have called 
following Crouch voluntaristic corporatism. '!he implicit idea behind 
this strategy was that the Council could reach an acceptable consensus 
on general econoaic priorities or, alternatively, that the goals of 
industrial capital could be lI&de pa.la.table to the union leadership and 
thus acquire needed leg:ltiu.cy in the labour IIOveaent, Le., the as yet 
unfulfilled proaise of the producers' alliance. NEIX> and/or the Treas-
\1r1's laticmal £conolQ' GJJoup would siaply work out the iaplications of 
and appropriate aeans for securing those ends. 
Indicative planning in its first stage fell apart at this point. 
On the one hand the uniCl'ls would not accept their designated role in the 
producers' alliance as the policellen of the wages' structure. In this 
they were no doubt aotivated on the one hand by the approach of an elec-
tion which proaised a Labour victory and on the other by apprehension of 
a possible etatutorJ pay policy as implied in the "pay pause" of 1961, 
fears which were confirmed by la.ter events. On the other hand the illple-
aentatioD of technocratic procedure bad only been partial; the Treasury 
retained ita control over the key levers of econOllic policy, and the 
Cl ty-Bank-Tre&1A.1X'1 uie reained unbroken. Ulti-. tely, the iapossibill ty 
of a "pure'" technocratic procedure rested on the need for the deteraina.-
tion of policy ends outside the state adwinistra.tion proper. In oilher 
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words the ends pursued could only be arrived at poll tically, whether 
through the traditional mediation of Parliament, the "functional parl-
iament" as institutionalized in !feddy or the political domination of 
the various bureaucratic agenCies. While the planning systell was never 
put to the test under the Conservatives, the failure to break the insti-
tutional hold of financial capital could only mean that its particular 
needs and interests would predoainate in the long or even short run. 
In the end the Tories received a per1dd of grace while they pursued a 
pre-election reflation. Howthey would have coped had they won at the 
polls can only be a II&tter for conjecture, but given the above analysis 
the prognosis for planning was decidedly dill. 
Bene& th the failure of Tory plazlning lay the 8&IIe basic fault that 
fractured the earlier efforts of the Attlee government, naael.y the lWts 
placed on the process by its volunt&ristic nature. If the narrative of 
events under the Conservatives differed tro. that under labour, this was 
due simply to the "revolution in industrial attitudes," Le., the fact 
that industrial capital now spearheaded the planning offensive, while the 
unions baulked at the first sound of gunfire, ri6bttully sensing that 
they would provide the cannon fodder of technocratic capitalism. However, 
the fruework of voluntarism could not contain the inherent contradiction 
between the logic o~ planning and the logic of the market. While this 
contradiction was displaced to the political level and thus found ex-
pression in the political and adainistrative conflict over priorities 
and means of iapleaent&tion, it none the less remained the unresolved 
core of the inadequacy of indicative plazlning. For to achieve even aod-
erate success planning aplled. a correspondence between ends and aeans. 
'lbe projection, coapa.risOD and haraonization of the most detailed tar-
geta waa & useless exercise without stipalat1Dg effective Il8IUlS 0'1 .... 
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curing thea, tha. t is, solle degree of coercive measures. Otherwi se , 
the old problea of short-versus-Iong-term economic policies, balance 
of payments deficits, a run on the pound, etc., was bound to shatter 
the prograaae sooner or later. Likewise, firms opera tiBg within a 
competitive capitalist framework would not simply be cheer-led into 
investing their surpluses into unprofitable ventures in the interest of 
national rationalization. Planning, to put it in sillplest terms, meant 
coapulsion • 
A brief look at the reasons for the relative success of French plan-
ning confiJ:t18 this diae;nosis. For the Conservatives certainly misconstrued 
the basis of that achievement. 'Ibis was perfectly understandable since 
the compulsory aspects of 1& planification franoaise were ruled out 
politically in the first place I both industry and labour were highly' jeal-
ous of their independence froa the state. Likewise, the French an., nis-
tTators and businesSll8n recru1 ted in the effort of selling their syste. 
to British industry eap..sized. the indicative aspects, portraying it as 
no acre than a piece of collective urket research . and downplaying the 
eoercive eleaents (lAm1ez, pp. 88-9). Yet, a closer look reveals that 
the period of ascendency of French planning was precisely that when the 
planners had control of the greatest weapons of compliance. As indicated 
in the previous chapter this occurred in the mediate post-war period, 
when the Marshall Plan placed large funds in their hands, when Monnet 
convinced the _ployers that the altema.tive was nationalization and when 
in any case the 1& tter rel1ed,"on the state for two-thirds of their inves~ 
Mnt funds since they could finance only a quarter from intemal sources 
(S. Cohen, 1969, CBs. 1 l 2). In the course of the 1950s the proportion 
raised fro. coapally profi ta recovered to around half, al thout;h this wa.a 
still well below the Britillb equiva.lent wbich va.ried between 75 and 6", 
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over that decade, only declining in the 1960s to a level in line with 
or even below that of the French (Glyn and Sutcliffe, 1972, p. 122 and 
NEOO, 1975, p. 53). Consequently. French planning ran into the B8J1e 
probleas that later faced Britain in IlUch aore serious fora, namely the 
disjunction between short-term policy and long-term projections rel£ected 
in administrative conflict between the Ministry of Finance and the Treas-
ury (with the latter promoting expansion), the difficulty of progra.DUlling 
and controlling public sector growth and an influx of imports during ex-
pansionary periods. 'lbe result of these developellnts 11&8 that by the 
1960s the plans were increasingly deva.lued, not that they had web influ-
ence o.er the actual course of economic policy in theH950s in any case. 
'lbe Fourth Plan (1962-5) could not influence the rise of prices, imports 
and incoaes in the context of an increasingly open econollY due to parti-
cipation in the DC, with the result that the 80vernaent relied upon the 
usual stop-so aeasures. By the fifth Plan (196.5-10) the whole exercise of 
Plysica1 targetry was downgraded and stress placed instead upon "fiBancia1 
balances" (including incomes policy) and "structural objectives," Le. t 
industrial concentration (S. Cohell. 1969. Cbs. 15. 191 • 18). The chief 
difference between French and British policy in the 1950s was that when 
faced with the problellS of inflation and import penetration in 19..57. the 
foner eabarked on a coapetitive devaluation while the latter deflated and 
saved the polDld in a repeat perforu.nce of the 1920s. 
In the Bri tieb case the success of' p1a.nning eyen in the Mai"tet1,leense 
of continuing the higher rate of expansion past the election of 1964 de-
pended upon the introduction of' collpulsory aeasures, in particular con-
trols on incaaes to baIt inflation and channel resources into investaent 
and action to prevent a balance of' PB1Jl_ta def1c1 t froa beCOlling a run 
on the pound. such as restriction. on ahort-and-long-tera capital aove-
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IIlents. governaent spending overseas and devaluation. Given the restraints 
of voluntarism the Conservatives proved unable to make steps along 
any of these lines. Trade union recalcitrance prevented the formulation 
of an agreement on incomes policy. while with regard to measures dealing 
wi th sterling and the balance of payments the Tories at least overtly 
showed. signs of preparing any of the necessary measures. From the avail-
able evidence on the government's intentions and actions it is safe to 
conclude. as stated above. that Conserva ti ve planning was in reality a 
fairly elaborate packaging of traditional expansionist policies with a 
view to both securing an incomes policy and winning an election. 
'!here is a sense. however. in which the exercise was a "Ilissed. oppor-
tunity" as i .. s defenders always lI&intained. in the face of later criticiBII 
on the part of both labour and the Cl ty • (Bri ttan. 1971, p. 2)0). For if 
the govemaent's lack of coMitaent to the full iJlp~caticms of pl.amling 
was apparent, the aaae cannot be said of the NEDC. I have already dealt 
wi th the Council's efforts on the questiQn of incomes policy, but i t lik~ 
wise gave full and prescient consideration to the balance of payments and 
sterUng problell8. '!he first report. Growth of the United Kingdoa ECODOIIl 
to 1966. projected & surplus on the balance of payments of £3QOIl as neces-
sary to finance public and private investment abroad and leave £50m over 
for an increaee in the reserves as security against another financial pan-
ic (parae. 267-71). However, this analysis simply &SSUlled that the COil-
petitive position of British products would improve ... en the expansionary 
climate, that the government would hold interest rates below the 1961 levels 
and that the reserves would be adequate to meet the strain of a balance 
of payaents deficit in 1963 or 1964 (paras. 272-87). 
By the time of Conditions Favourable to Faster Growth (April, 1963), 
such ass1mptions looked increasingly fatuous. and this report consid-
ered a variety of aeasures to contain the problem. Such measures included 
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full use of the available lending facilities, reserves and foreign 
securities, tightening up exCbange controls over short-term capital 
movements (even up to repatriation of surplus funds held in non-sterling 
eo.ntries), 10nger-tera loans for saall firlls entering the export mar-
kets (as advocated to the Radcliffe Committee) as well as aid to the 
shipping industry, a tighter reign on government spending abroad., and 
fiscal changes to tax aports on the saae basis as 110.e products (re-
aitted in the case of exports)(paras. 114-29). Should these have proved 
ineffective the report also considered 't:a use of aore powerful sanctions. 
such as export subsidy. quanti ta ti ve import contro ls, long-term funding 
of the sterling balances through the IMF, and restrictions on private 
investaent abroad (paraS1l' 117-.59). However, with regard to the latter the 
curtailaent of investaent into even the developed countries of the sterling 
area was ruled out because aaong 'ther reasons "they are substantial 
holders of sterling balances whose willingness to hold the. aight be af-
fected by such a aove (para. 1,54)." lone of these latter aeasures were 
seen as long-tera steps to "secure a permanent improveaent in the bal-
ance of paJllenta (para. 160)." But. the Council's consideration of' such 
actions even as emergency lleasures testifies·to the radical nature of its 
thinking at the tille. 'Ibe iaporta.nt point is that they foresaw the 
likely run of events and were willing to contemplate the necessary co.-
ulsory aeasures to aeet a crisis. In the words of the report. 
If' it was apparent that a.sures were in hand which would tend 
to iaprove the balance of payaents.-then it should be poBSible 
to cushion the impact of the deficit on the reserves by substan-
tial . drawings froa the IMF or by other official borrowing abroad ••• 
In addition. a teaporary rise in short-term···ratea of interest in 
this countrJ would probab~ attract an appreciable voluae of funds 
froa abroad, and it would be poaaible to oHeat any undesired de-
f'laticmary effects this II1ght have on the doaeatic econoay. In 
these circuastances it II1sht be poaaible to tolerate a substantial 
delie! t for a fear or so before additional action would have to be 
taken to iaprove tbe balance of P8lIlenta. 
It. however, no ae&aUrea were in hand which oould be expected 
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to improve the balance of payments, such a deficit would soon 
lead to adverse capital .ovements. It would be difficult to 
borrow abroad, and higher interest rates might fail to attract 
much foreign capital. The whole impact of the deficit, aggrav-
ated by speculative capital movements, would fall on the reserves. 
In these circwastances it would be a matter of only a few months 
before action of SOIle kind would have to be taken (paras. 118-9). 
It is impossible to gauge how deep support for such measures had 
penetrated into industrial capital, even given the approval of the in-
dustrialists on the NEDC. The next report, 'Ibe Growth of the ~.:Econo!y, 
published in March, 1964, ude no aention of the. but siaply revised 
the estima.tes of the expected current account surplus downward to £22.5Ja, 
e limina ting aaong other i teas an increase in the reserves to cope with 
an emergency (paras. 1.50-2). Yet, industry had favourably received the 
expansionary budget of 1963 and certainly continued to back the planning 
initiative up through 1964 (see e.g. FBI Review, May, 1963, p. 20). 
Given effecti-ve leadership froa the BEOO along with assurances on the 
teaporary na tury of coapulsory aeasures and rue concessions on wage re-
straint, industry aight well bave swung behind them. '!he baxd core op-
position would inevitably have centered on the City and the Bank of Eng-
land, which had pushed throughout the previous decade in precisely the 
opposi te direction, for the reaoval of exchange conu-ols and the return 
to convertibility. While consideration of historical possibilities can-
not be in any sense conclusive, it seeas likely that the~c~.pletion of 
this "unfinished experi.ent" would have faced its greatest test with the 
growing balance of p&1JIenta deficit in 1964. In any case it failed long 
before, and it was left to the incoJling labour govemment to try and 
plt planning b&ck on the agenda. 
Before turning to the policies of the Wilson governaenta, it is 
worth while investigating briefly the ideological aspect of planning 
for both indwstrial capital and labour, particular 11 since the sya-
bolic aspects of the whole business were, if anything, aore s1pificant 
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than its substantive effects. Winkler's discussion of corporatism, 
while deficient in other respects, serves quite well as a paradigm of 
this ideology, particularly his for themes of unity, order, success and 
naticnalism (Vinkler, lrn6). As regards unity 
the underlying theme of planning was certainly in favour of co-operation 
ra. ther than colllpeti tion, both within capital and between capital and labour, 
although of course in the voluntaristic stage no steps were taken to back 
this eapbasis with specific sanctions against strl.kes or "wasteful compe-
tition." Planning thus mediated .,.~cally between the opposing claims 
of capital and labour, stressing their collJlon goals of a full-employment, 
high-wage economy as preferable to fighting over the fruits of decline. 
As such it was very much the grandchild of the Mond-'IUrner talks of the 
1920s, following the ... e logic, though UDSta.ted, of a producers' alliance. 
'lbe order iaplici t in the planning programae had a strong lIILIl&gerial 
flavour. For no consideration was given to reducing the inequalities of 
ca pi talist society, indeed thia ·was ruled out as distributional squabbling, 
which the whole effort 11&8 designed to avoid. Rather, the aims of the 
exercise were centralization and control of conflicting elements as they 
had eaerged under the period of liberal collectivism and harnessing them 
to the creation of an ever greater ~conoRdc pie. Nei ther democracy nor 
workers' participation were included in the terms of reference of the NEOO, 
and the subsequent focus on wage restraint followed from the aanagerial 
perspective. Likewise, the general suspicion of the liMral econoll1 
emodied in the planning initiative stemmed at least in part from industrial 
management's self-legitimation in teras of administrative rather than ~ 
ket rationality (Crouch, Im, pp. 36-8). Success, as Winkler points out, 
aeant "efficacy in the attainaent of collective ends (p. 108)," ends 
which again cormtsponded with an industrial Mnager's view of tbe British 
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disease, i.e., rationalization, efficiency, growth, greater productivity, 
national competitiveness, etc. The technocratic elements of the plan-
ning process, although ultimately subordinated to political determina-
tion, exemplified the output orientation implied in this notion. Po li t-
ieal adequacy was redefined as the achievement of specified general econ-
omic targets rather than the fulfillment of political responsibilities 
or moral cow tIIen ts. 
Finally, nationaliSll like unity mediated between the conflicting 
demands of capital and labour, emphasizing their CODon ground. before an 
external threat. In the British context it served the S8lIle purpose as 
government control over the selection of Council members, placing liai. ts 
on the expression of class conflict and turning such feelings towards the 
challengers beyond the Channel. Lest the accompanying attempt to enter 
the EEC should be seen as in conflict w1 th this taeme, it should be noted 
that this, too, could be portrayed in national colours. It was certainly 
possible to depict the move towards Europe as a means of "strengthening" 
Bri tain, of maJdng a break with the imperial past and opening up a who le 
new pattern of trade that would act as a spur to econoaic growth. Indeed, 
the Move was depicted in exactiy those terms by one prominent industrialist, 
Sir Frederick Catherwood (later head. of the NEOO). In one article under 
the heading of "'Ibe National Interest" he argued that, 
We Bave to plan on the basis that this shift [from trade with the 
Commonwealth to trade with the advanced capitalist nations] will 
continue, which means planning to 11 ve with and cope w1 th vig-
orous competition of advanced, high-wage, capital intensive econ-
omies rather than the closed-trading system inherited from the 
Eapire in which we made .. tl:i'.JOil4i".~verything frOll teapots to motor-
cars in return for sugar, rubber, coffee and all other prillBX1 
products (Ca.therwood, 1969, p. 6). 
If the progra.ame of voluntaristic corporatism made up to a degree 
in ideological coherence what it lacked along the other axes of thls anal-
ysis, 1. e ., political representation, econoJlic policy, and aode of procedure, 
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this leaves the Labour government that followed an even greater enigma. 
For seemingly the greatest spanners in the planning works were, first, 
the continued poll tical suzerainty of the City, a.rxi, second. the re-
fusal of the roc to support an incomes policy. 'Ibe Wilson government 
was certainly well placed to overcome these political hindrances. It 
might have precipitated a more complete dissolution of the City/Bank of 
England/Treasury axis and could certainly have induced the roc to support 
llai ted wage control in return for convincing 80cial reforlls and a stronger 
voice in econoaic policy. Moreover, the concept of national econolldc plan-
ning was no anatheu. to Ia.bour's front bench. On the contrary it appealed 
both to Ia.bour's nationalism. and its need for a symbolic substitute for 
public ownership, one whibh involved the co-operation of capital and labour 
rather than the disu.ntl1Dg of the class system. 'Ibe failure of the Wilson 
gover!lJlents to iIlpleaent this strategy, despite the electoral rhetoric of 
the "white heat of the techological revolution" and the need for "socialist 
planning," is both mysterious and explicable t as we shall see in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPl'ER SEVEN 
'Ibe Apotheosis of Indicative Planning a 
'Ibe Labour Governments of 1964-70 
Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of great 
iaportance in world history occur as,it were, twice. He forgot 
to add, the first time as tragedy the second as farce. [Harold 
Wileon for Raaeay JllacDould, Cal;!.aghan for SIlowden, Balogh for 
Keynes, lDrd Croaer for Montagu lora&n, the SiP for the &AC, 
the DV' for J.P .Morgan. ]. And the aaae caricature occurs in· the 
eircuastances attending the second edition of the [bankers- ramp]. 
[Apologies to] ICarl Karx, 1he 18th BrulIai:r:e of Louis 
Bonoparte • 
We're about as fantastic and sensational a failure as any govern-
.ent could be. '!'he situation is so bad that I've warned the Priae 
Minister that I'd have to raise the subject of devalu&~ion. 
Richard Crosuan, '!he Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, 
lov8llber 21st, 1966. 
If Labour had ~l.aiaed i teel! the "party of growth" in the run 
up to the 1964 election, it hardly deaonstrated any greater ability in 
breaking out of the stop-go cycle than the preceeding Conservative gov-
ernaents. labour's progruae for the sixties was hardly radical.. 
While it had not thrown out Cla1lse Four of the Party constitution, the 
emphasis at the election was placed far more on modexnizatlon, the need 
to develop new industries (with state aid if necessary), to foster a 
technological revolution and to enactl'various social reforms espeoially 
in education to secure wider opportunities as part of a general platfOrll 
of bringing Britain ba.ck to the ranks of the advanced capitalist nations 
of the West. However, the continUity with the Conservative approach to 
planning was far greater than the cba.n&e of ruling party aight lead one 
to suppose. Labour was oouitted to voluntarisa. at least in ita early 
stages, and thus equa1~ restricted by the bounds of a capit&list JaOde 
of production and the need to secure the acceptability to the representa-
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tives of capital and labour of the main planks of its programme. To the 
extent that this principle was violated, this occured mainly against 
the wishes of the trade union movement. Consequently, the approach 
to planning reaained throughout in the indicative .old, sanctions were 
to be used spu-ingly and temporarily, if at all. 'Ibe new government 
thus ran head on into the same problems that had bedevilled Tory planning, 
the disjunction between short-term measures and long-term projections, 
the inability to deal effectively with balance of payaents deficits and 
most notably the veto power of crises of confidence as expressed in the 
foreign exchanges. From the start the Vilson governaents were caught in 
bind forseen by the NEre report of some two years previous I lacking a 
set of measures to cope with a balance of ~.ts deficit and rejecting 
the obvious option of devaluation, its only course was to react to the 
inevitable sterling crisis with deflationary measures and increasingly 
severe wage restrictions in a vain attempt to save the pound. '!he re-
fusal to devalue either on asSUllption of office or in the following two 
years, explains much of the failure of Labour's technocratic and social 
programme, including the National Plan. What needs to be explained in 
the first instance is the obstinaqy on this key issue. 
Planning, the City and De~luation 
When the Labour government returned with a slight majority on 16 
October, 1964, it faced the iuediate problem of a balance of p&)'Ilents 
defici t far in excess of what had been expected. 'Ibe choice before the 
new goverruaent was both urgent and highly significant in that the pol-
cies of the next six years were tightly constrained by Labour's reactions 
to the first crisis. In simplest terms it boiled down to devaluation or 
deflation, although Harold Wilson did his best to avoid that choice for 
his fiTst nine aonths in office. Vi thin the first few days the new 
Prime Minister declared himself against devaluation, a view which re-
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ceived strong support from the Bank of England and the Treasury, 
although his most important economic advisors, Thomas Balogh, Nic-
olas Kaldor and Robert Neild, argued the alternative case (Brandon, ch.4 
and Crossman, Vol.l, p.?l). Wilson's priorities on matters of econ-
omic policy' :were subsequently revealed in an interview printed in the 
Guardian about a year later. 
Although [devaluation] would have given us a year or two breathing 
space free from all anxiety about foreign balances, we felt that, 
whatever the temptation froll the party point of view, the national 
interest was one hundred per cent the other way... I do:nnot deny 
it would have made life more tolerable with our narrow II&joritYJ 
that it would have enabled us to carry through generous progr:amaes 
of social refora, but it would. bot have been right. [Indeed, it 
would. have been] totally wrong [since] there are JI8JlY people over-
seas, including governments, marketing boards, central banks and 
others, who left their IIOney in the form of' sterling balances, 
on the assuaption that the value of sterling would. be aaintained. 
To have let the. down would have been not only a betrayal of trust, 
it would. have shaken their faith about holding any further llOney in 
the fora of sterling (cited in Miliband, 1972, p. 362). 
One could. hardly ask for a IlOre straightforward statement of the Bank of 
England~s point of view. Wilson's wholehearted embrace of the priorities 
of the City gives the essential clue to the course of Labour policies 
over the next few years. For in essence the weakening position of the 
pound strengthened the hand of the Bank and the .essengers of interna-
tional finance in setting the tacties of a governaent coaaitted trOll 
the start to saving the international role of sterling at the expense of 
virtually every other aspect of its progr&lllle. 
Rejecting iJlUlled1ate devaluation the government fell back on al-
ternative proposals prepared under the Tories for either aport quotas 
or an import surcharge of short duration. 'Ibe latter option was an-
nounced in the White Paper, 'Ibe Economic Situation, issued on 26 October, 
set at 1". 'llle 88Jle docwaent l18Daged in the saae breath to disavow 
"any policy based on a return to stop-go econoll1cs" and announce an 
annual balance of payments deficit projection of £8oOa. 
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If international confidence was hardly reassured by this first 
statement on economic policies, it received a major jolt with the 
announcement of an interim budget on November 11. ThfJ latter con-
firmed the government's intention of pursuing various social measures 
including the abolition of health service charges as well as the intro-
duction of Corporation and Capital Gains Tax in the first full budget 
the following April. 'n1e economics of the social reforms were not really 
at issue, since they were basically non-inflationary. 7he reaction of the 
market was based far more on the implied priorities of the budget, that 
Labour was putting welfare before orthodox financial stringency. 'Ibis 
first crisis set the ];8.ttern for later years. Heavy selling of sterling 
followed iaaediately and quickly gathered momentum to becoae one of the 
worst runs on the pound up to that point. 7he new Priae Minister and 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Jaaes Callaghan., were ib a.laost constant 
session with the Governor of the Bank of England, Lord eroJler, and senior 
Bank and Treasury officials. By Wilson's own account. ·we had to listen 
night after night to demands that there should be immediate cuts in Gov-
ernJlent expenditure, and particularly in those parts of Government expendi-
ture which related to the social services (Wi1son, 1971, pp. 61-2).· 
Word soon spread to circles of foreign bankers (highly sensitive to 
suggestions of governmental incompetence by the Bank Of England) that 
the Bank was recollJlending an increase in Bank rate. When this was refused 
far the second Thursday in a row, the speculative wave really aounted. 7he 
crisis mood was reinforced by neWtS froll Geneva that the British representa-
tives at the EFT! conference were under heavy pressure for assurances 
that the teaporary import surcharge would be reduced in a utter of aonths, 
an aSSUDnce that Wilson iJulediately offered (ibid., p. 63). Selling 
continued at such a heavy rate, however, that Bank rate h!a to be raised 
on MOnday, 23 Nove.ber, froll 5 to "" (Hirsdl, p. 129). Even this failed 
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to stem the tide, and with the reserves at the lowest level since the 
war the "inner Cabinet" held an emergency meeting with the Governor 
the next evening. Wilson's account of this meeting with Lord Cromer 
demanding "all-round cuts of expenditure, regardless of social and 
even economic priorities" illustrates well the pressures on the govern-
ment: 
Not for the first time, I said that we had now reached a situation 
where a newly elected Government with a mandate from the people 
was being told, not so nch by the Governor of the Bank of England 
but by international speculators, that the policies on ... lIhich we 
had fought the election could not be impleaented, that the Govern-
aent was to be forced into adoption of Tory po 11cies to which it 
was fundaaentally opposed. '!be Governor confined that this was 
indeed the ~ •• 
I asked him if this meant that it was impossible for any Gov-
ernment, whatever its party label, whatever its manifesto or the pol-
icies on which it fought an election, to continue, unless it iJl-
aediately reverted to fUll-scale Tory policies. He had. -to adait 
that that was what his arguaent aeant. because of the sheer coapul-
sion of the econoaic dictation of those who exercise decisive econ-
omic power (ft18on, 1971, p.6S). 
The Prime Minister replied that he was "not prepared to accept it" 
and suggested that he had no altemative to floating the pound. Faced 
with this situation Lord Cromer managed to raise £),ooOm in stand-by 
credits from the "Basle Club" of intemational central bankers, But, 
while the Prime Minister had successfully PIt off irrational demands for 
cuts "even to the point of stopping the road-building programme, or 
schools that were only half constructed (ibid., p. 62)." from that point 
on the goverDlllent was in debt to international finance and its freedoll of 
action correspondingly curtailed. Its facility in raising the interna-
tional funds increased the Governor's leverage,and in the following months 
Labour began to dose out deflationary medicine according to the Bank's 
prescription. '!be implicit conditions of the loan were two-fold. 1. 
Ilaintaining the value of sterling as the governaent's top priority and 
2. whittling down the proposed tax changes of the' next budget so as to 
strengthen "international confidence (Hirach. p. 122)." In this poker 
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game with international finance Labour had succeeded in holding 
on to existing levels of public expenditure but only at the expense of 
dropping most of its programme of social reform. 'lbereafter, devalua-
tion became known in Cabinet circles as "the unmentionable (Brandon, p.43)." 
Despite this international rescue operation and the gradual imposi-
tion of deflationary measures, the pound remained edgy throughout the 
winter and spring. In December the government withdrew £357m from the IMF 
to payoff the November bank credits. In February, 1965, continued 
pressure troll §'TA partners led to the announcellen t tha. t the iJRport sur-
charge would be reduced to la,C by the end of April. '!he April budget 
included both deflationary tax increases and direct action to improve the 
capital account of the balance of payments. The latter were suppleaaated 
by various measures in later years designed to restrict overseas inveet-
Il8nt and goverDllent spending abroad, but the total of such actions only 
JIaIl&ged to stabilize the outflow rather than substantially reduce it. 
More indicative of the underlying logic of Labour's policies was Wilson's 
mid-April speech to the Economic Club of American businesSllen in New York, 
in which the Prime Minister pledged his "unalterable determination to 
maintain the value of the pound (Brandon, ch. 8) • " 
Yet, even with these steps and furtAer credit restrictions in April 
and May the pound again came under heavy pressure in July and August 
resulting in another set of emergency measures on Zl JUly, including hire-
purchase restricti CIlS, postponement of the starting dates of public 
sector capital projects, limits on local authority lending and exchange 
controls. Lord eramer, who had been publicly sniping against the govern-
ment since February, argued that even such steps were inadequate and 
evidently felt that "the financial end of the world was near (Wilson, 1971, p. 
174) • " By this point he was even advising the f,DbenQnt.atktar iIlM,need 
to fom a National Government, but ae.ories of 1931 proved too strong for 
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Wilson to comply with such apocolyptic f8Jltasies (Brandon, ch. 9) • 
None the less, pressure on the pound fell off by the end of August, 
and the government received a respite from such bouts of specualtion 
for the following year. 
Meanwhile, Labour was attempting to l118ke good its claim to be the 
party of planning. One of its first acts brought much of the planning 
machinery within Whitehall in the form of the Department of Eoonoaic 
Affairs under Geerge Brown. The lEA structure was essentially techno-
cratic, composed of functional divisions, two concemed with co-ordiDa-
tion of btem&! and external econollic poli"" aDd one each for economic 
planning, ~ industrial policy and regional policy. '!he model for the IlEA 
certainly approached that of the war-t1ae Ministry of Production, and 
indeed the whole project closely paralleled the sillilar effort. under 
Attlee. Like the earlier exper1aent in "democratic planning" its .ost 
novel feature was the introduction of industrial advisors into the Civil 
Service staff, large~ on secondllent :rroa their ftrious firas. Frederick 
(later Sir) Catherwood entered as the first chief industrial advisor, an 
appropriate choice as a former head of Bri tiBh AluainiUll, itself founded 
only with state support under A ttlee. Supplementing hia as the "core 
group of !..industrial advisors were Frank (later Lord) Kearton of Courtaulds, 
George (later Lord) Cole of Unilever anch6iegmund (later Sir) Warburg and 
John Berkin of Shell, who together had. "an enormous i.n£luence on the 
apparatus we set up {George Brown, p. 94)." 
'lbe governaent in other words intended the DEA to act as the insti-
tutional voice of industrial capital, and industrialists proved ao re than 
willing to work closely with Labour as far aore of them were incorporated 
into the f'ruework of the state than under the preoeeding Tory goveruents. 
Although there were growing doubts in the later years of the governaent, 
at the early stages aan;y industrial leaders could no doubt have agreed 
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with Donald (later lord) Stokes of Leyland that Labour "has consulted 
industry much more than its predecessor and that he and his fellow 
directors aren't against it (Crossman, Vol, 1I, p. 26, also p. ,546)." 
'Ihese feelings were particularly focussed on George Brown, who for his 
part reciprocated, as he noted, "At the initial stage, and for quite a ,long 
time afterwards, the relationship between leading industrialists and 
the Labour Government was exceedingly close and good. (Brown, p. 94). tI 
Perhaps, the best symbol of this symbiotic relationship between Labour 
and "progressive industry" was the appointment of<-,the third Lord Melchett 
as head of the newly renationallzed steel industry in 1967. 
In theory the IBA was to take charge of co-ordinating the entire 
gamut of economic policies. Consequently, its brief overlapped that of 
the Treasury in virtually every respect. If' the Tories had established 
the NEIX: as a "pressure griup for growth," so Labour set up the DEA as 
the "spokeSll&Jl for industry," which would co-exist in "cre~tive tension" 
wi th the Treasury over the forlllUl.a.tion of econoaic policy. 'lllis view-
point of the role of the new agency, which prevailed in the short run, 
steued largely from the Prime Minister. Brown, however, had a distinctly 
different and more radical perspective. For him the essence of the "lEA 
revolution" was to institute "a wholly novel form of national social 
accountaney to replace the orthodox financial accountancy by which the 
Treasury [had] always dominated British life (ibid., p.S?)." As such the 
lEA would have been "s\lperior to the Trea.sury in determining the country's 
economic priorities (ibid., p.88), while the latter would have been re-
duced to a continental-style ministry of finance, siaply executing the 
decisions of the II'.A as a subordinate departaent. As it act~ un-
folded, the economc crisis which overwhelJaed the governaent in ita first 
few weeks generated considerable confusion over economic responsibilities 
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which was only resolved by a "Concordat" dividing the authority of the 
two departments. The DEA would concentrate on long-term policies and 
"physical resources" leaving the Treasury in control of short-term 
measures and financial issues (Leruez, pp. 1)6-7 and Brittan, 1971, p.312). 
Of course the Concordat begged the fundamental question of just 
how long-and-short-tenn policies would be co-ordinated with one another. 
Moving the planning apparatus within the framework of the state had. not 
resolved the lIlost glaring wealmess of the whole experiaent. Or, to put 
it another way, it ensured that the issue of the control of econollic 
policies would be settled by bureaucratic politics, ultimately gu&r:anteeing 
the predominance of orthodoxy. As Brown unhappily discovered, 
Once the heady first days had gone and the novelty bad worn off, 
the Treasury began to re-assert itself, and with its absolute 
superb II&Stery of the governaent aachine gradually either filched 
things back or - .ore to the point - l18de it rather difficult for 
us to effect the grand desip .. had in Ilind so that a coherent and 
continuous econo.ic policy could eaerge (Brown, p. 92). 
In fact the continuing crisis of confidence over the first year forced 
the governaent to take deflationary steps within its first few aonths, 
and the measures which mattered lay outside the DEA's terms of reference. 
Moreover, Brown devoted IlOst of his efforts. from the start to securing 
the c·onsensual basis for an incomes policy with the result that the 
gestation of even the framework of a planning programme was unnecessarily 
drawn out leaving the Treasury and its Cabinet spokesaan, Callaghan, 
totally in charge of economic affairs (CrOSSll&n, Vol. I, pp. 203 and 
247) • In teras of changing the priori ties of econoDdc policy the lEA 
experiment was doomed from the very beginning. 
'!he fate of the Nationali~~, publlshed as a White Paper in Septem-
ber, 196.5, indicated the true path of the planning prograame. '!he 
Chancellor, of course, had iaposed a deflationary packap only two 
months previous in defense of a sbakJ pound, and lIore perceptive critics 
were already convinced that it was not worth the paper it was printed on. 
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The method of the National ~ followed directly that of the earlier 
venture of the NEDC, not much of a surprise since the staff drawing 
it up was virtually identical. 'Ibe industrial survey canvassed a 
wider spread of industrial opinion, but again the "targets" were no 
more than optimistic assumptions about the possible growth rates of 
GNP, producti vi ty, exports, ete. 'Ibe document began with the usual 
hyperbole I "Prepared in the fullest consultation with industry, the plan 
for the first tiae represents a statesent of Government policy and a 
comaitaent to action by the Governaent ••• 'Ibe plan is a guide to action 
(p. iii)." However, the actions of the governaent demonstrated quite the 
opposi te I the plan exercised no discernible influence on economic policy. 
SilIply put the plan lacked teeth. It bad no effective means of controlling 
or even aodifiying the inputs into the planning process but relied on the 
hope that exhortation would. so.ehow draaatically transform the econoaic 
climate when all the government's concrete aeasures were working in the 
opposite direction. In the words of one supporter, 
Far from being directive, or even indicative. it;,was siJllply sub-
juncti ve. If prices and incOlles policy (which soon caae to be 
seen, with regional poliq, the II&in activity of the DEA and of 
its Minister) succeeded, and if productivity, investment and 
capacity all accelerated, then ••• But , each of these depended on 
the plausibility of the whole exercise, as well as being necessary 
conditions of this plausibility ({)pie in Beckerman. 1972, P.172). 
Even the theoretical aspects of the exercise lacked credibility. The 
input-output study which constituted the technical basis for the plan 
dated from 19.54. hardly adequate for the task. In the judgement of one 
member of the staff, 
We were faced with the difficult choice of either ignoriJut this 
U88 of inf'oraation r~. the Industrial Inquiry ];;lor of -making 
arbitrary&dJqeiIIaeDW to final deaands or to input-output c0-
efficients, or both, to bring the .odel into line. We teBded to 
40 the latter except where the industrial estiaa:tes were deaonstably 
absurd (leCOllber in Go8l1Dg. p. 114). 
EVen then the lEA only had one person working full-tiDle on such projections 
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and never had access to an adequate high speed computer (ibid •• p. 175). 
Few were subsequently surprised by the formal abandonment of the 
National Plan in the summer of 1966 before even one year of its supposed 
operation. While the effort was certainly taken seriously by some in the 
govemaent. the planning staff never established hegemony over the forma-
tion of economic policy. What was lacking was an overall strategy and 
the means for subordinating economic policy at both macro and micro levels 
to the plan's objectives (Opie. p. 177). When the crunch ca.rae, the defence 
of sterling took precedence over the strategy for econollic growth. Con-
junctura.! policy was s1aply never incorporated into the planning fraae-
work, just as the Treasury maintained its administative autonomy from 
the planning departaent and ultiaately recovered its unchalleged supremacy 
in deterJdning policy objectives. In deference to the City, to the foreign 
banks and to the Aaerican govemaent Labour deflated the econolll and threw 
much of its social policy out the window in the bargain (Pryke. 1967. p. 21). 
Despite the restrictive measures of the summer of 1965 the economy did 
not slow down much over the course of the next year. labour won an increased 
majority in the March. 1966. election with sterling already under increasing 
pressure. 1'he May budget was none the less fairly neutral. introducing 
a CorporatiC:rl Tax at 40!'. further restraint on overseas investment and 
its most significant aspect. a Selective Employment Tax, aimed at encouraging 
the movement of labour into the industrial sector. But, within a few 
weeks of the budget in the wake of a national seamen's strike and the 
return of a balance of payments deficit, the pressure on the pound inten-
sified to crisi5 proportions once again. '!he government likewise reacted 
with a severe deflationary package on 20 July. restricting credit and 
hire-purchase, increa.aing taxes on cOllSWllption, cutting public expen-
diture and .oat s1gntficantly imposing a statutory wage freeze for six 
months. 'lhia tiae, however. Wilson had to overcoae strong opposition 
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wi thin the Cabinet, since Brown with support from Richard Crossman, 
Roy Jenkins, Tony Crosland, Tony Benn and Barbara Castle were now 
pressing for an alternative package of floating the pound with the 
Europeanists among them also proposing a renewed attempt to join the 
EEC. Vilson aanaged to deflect this cri ticiSll offering only two con-
cessions: that he would reconsider the subject of devaluation if the 
unemployment rate rose above two per cent and that a special Cabinet 
cow ttee would be forJled to discuss the methods at hand, the so-called 
steering Coaaittee on Economic Policy (SEP) (Crossman, Vol. I, pp. 572-9). 
Vilson and Calaghan easily swung the Cabinet in support of this approach, 
so Brown offered his resignation, quickly withdrawn because of the effects 
this might have on the state of the reserves (Brown, pp. 106-7 and Brittan, 
1971, p.:3J5). 'Dle "July measures" did not immediately ste. the run on 
the pound, which slowed down but did not stop until new central bank 
"swap" arrangeaents were announced in SpeteJllber. '!hey did, however, signal 
the official abandonment of the National Plan, less than a year after 
its publication, the final nail in the coffin of indicative planning. 
'!bey likewise marked the high water point of the Prime Minister in 
the City of London. For, while Labour appreciated to a greater extent 
than the Conservatives the dileama posed by maintaining the value of 
sterling on the one hand and a growth programme on the other, and 
consequently hesitated in imposing full-scale deflation, when the crunch 
cue it iaposed the S&Ile package in a vain attempt to support the pound 
at virtually any cost. Perhaps the clearest expression of the recognition 
of this fact 8, .;'the part of the more articulate City ideologues appeared. 
in the "Couenta.r;y" colurms of l!!.! Banker in October, 1~7. After listing 
all the "bitter pills" which the City had been forced. to awallow under 
Labour, e.g. corporation tax, curbs on overseas investaent, special de-
posita, dividend f'reese, ,tc., the article went on to reurk that at the 
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saae time the relationship between the City and the government had been 
"relatively harmonious." It continued I 
the main reason for the City's acquiescent mood is that, contrary 
to expectations, the government has endorsed the City's order of 
priori ties. It has put sterling first. Many of the unpopular 
aeasures - such as the restraints on overseas invest.ent - have 
been aade necessary in order to achieve an overriding objective which 
the City also holds. the need to strengthen sterling. Furhteraore, 
the Government has endorsed not only the City's priorities, but also, 
to a considerable extent, its remedies. It is true that it post-
poned deflation for as long as it CQlld - thus aggravating the sit-
uation further. But, at the pinch, in July. 1966, it was prepared 
to be as ruthless in curbing demand as any Tory Government, and 
to sacrifice the National Plan and II8l1Y other dear sheae besides in 
the atteapt to cut iaports by deflation (The Banker, 1961, p. 827). 
'!'he article concluded with the observation that the whole strategy had 
not worked and reported a survey of bankers by the magazine which found 
thea decidedly against any movstowards devaluation or import controls, 
preferriDg furUler deflation as the only alternative. 
'.the City aDcl foreign financial interests (as well as the Bank) thus 
remained irresolutely opposed to devaluation throughout the econOllic trials 
of the govermaent. British finance received additional support in this 
from the Aaerican government and the IMF which were anxious to avoid 
putting pressure on the dollar. 'Ibis opposition more than any other 
factor shaped the course of Labour policies in the 19608, particularly 
when it found expression in its Blast vociferous and effective fora, the 
periodic crises of confidence in the foreign exchanges which jolted and 
reoriented Labour policy. 
501le have argued that for the first two years the governaent was 
hamstrung by its narrow majority and the iapending election that could 
only ftave ended in defeat had Labour been saddled with the blame for 
yet another drop in the value of sterling. The Prime Minister, of course, 
atgued virtually the opposite in the section of his speech· cited at the 
begiDDiDB of this chapter (n&Ilely that devaluation would have allowed 
the SOTeruent to appeal to the electorate on the basis of its refaraist 
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principles) and based his objections on the responsiblity to protect 
the value of the investments of sterling holders. Moreover, the failure 
to devalue in 1966 after Labour was returned with an increased majority 
puts the lie to that excuse. Nor will it do to simply affirm, as have 
the authors of one important study of the period, that the failure to 
devalue in the July crisis "is one of the major political puzzles of the 
1960s (GrahaJa and Beckerman in Beckerman, 1972, p. 22) ." This· political puzzle 
has an uncaDIIY faailiari ty about it. It bears the hallllarks of Labour 
govermaents before and since. 
Bor did the conflicts of the 1960s over economic pOlicy centre on 
the "utopianiSlll" of Labour's ideal of planning on the one hand and the 
realities of power on the other, as so_ have argued at least with regard 
to earlier Labour governaents (Skidelskt, 1967). For one there was little 
utopianiSll left by the start of that decade at least on the governaent 
front bench, whose progr&1llle was liaited to Ilodemte reforain and the 
modernization of British capitalism. If Labour's planning prograame was 
admi tedly vague from the start and a joke by the end, this was due to its 
essentially ideological role, its mediatory function betweentthe deands 
of Labour's rank and file for socialist measures as the only basis for 
incomes policy, the need to appeal to a largely non-socialist electorate 
and the desire on the part<)of:..'industrial capital for supportative actions 
from the state. '!be conflicts which shook and ult1Jl&tely derailed the 
line of attack of the govemaent were ratbll1" between tistinct collplexes 
of interests, purposes and ideas," and what is alllost bizarre about the 
conjuncture of these complexes is the close parallel with the situation 
of 19)1. The core of opposition to devahlation (as against the govern-
aent's 8Xpendi ture policies in the earlier case) was once again a coab1na-
tion of doaestic and foreign finance, together with the British and Aaer-
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iean financial authorities. It was they who delimited the parameters 
of "responsible behaviour" in 1966 as in 1931, the . only difference 
being Wilson's ability to carry the rest of the Cabinet with him while 
MacDonald's acquiesence to orthodoxy proved too much for an earlier 
generation to swallow. !he return of a similar complex of forces in the 
1970s in a different economic and political climate produced an even 
more definitive result, a sharp turn-round in labour policies and the 
virtual abandoning of lCeynesianisa, as we shall see, demonstrating the 
continuing importance of this financial block in the determination of 
British econollic policies (Harrison, 1970, esp. p. 73). 
As a result of the July measures the reformist focus of the government 
rapidly dissolved. One Cabinet minister has reported his feeling that 
there was "a COJIplete absence of effective central control" and that 
labour was "still working from hand to Ilouth trying to overcoae the i.aae-
diate short-teraproblems (CrOSSll8.n, Vol. 11, pp. 50-1)." '!he government 
in other words was siJlply drifting at least with regard to the key ques-
tions of, economic policy. If the Labour experiment in planning was suc-
ceeding in eliminating the "stop":go" syndrome, it began to seem if this 
was only by wiping out the "go" phase of the cycle. Much as forecast in 
the earlier NEDC dOCUllent, Conditions Favourable to Faster Growth, the 
failure to prepare a resolute prograaae for dealing with the balance of 
payaents constraint _ant that the government was forced to act in response 
to star ling,~crise8 by iJIlposing orthodox and economically disruptive JI8&8-
urea. When Labour did finally devaluef"in 1967, this action again was not 
so much a utter of deliberate decision in line l,fi th some general long-
tera Prosra-& as the only course left given the fur:Uer deterioration 
of the econoaic situation. 
'Ibe deflationary measures teaporarily resolved. the short-tera crisis, 
and by the first quarter of 1967 the balance of payments was back in the 
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black. Meanwhile. Callaghan had openly converted to the Paish view of 
inflation, i.e. seeing it as the result of excessive demand 'due to 
overfull employment, and resolutely pressed the Cabinet to allow 
unemployment to rise to a level between 2.2 and 2.~ (Crossman, ibid., 
p. 123). Brown had left the DEA for the Foreign Office once the immediate 
crisis had dissipated to be replaced by Michael stewert, who proved much 
more malleable by Treasury forces and consequently opposed the idea of 
introducing import quotas when the teaporary import surcharge expired at 
the end of tile year (ibid., pp. 39-40). The so-called Steering Committee 
on Econollic Policy, set up to appease the devaluationists in the July 
crisis, had virtually no effect on the government' s economic priE)ri ties, 
although b.Y Noveaber, 1961, the continuation of economic difficulties and 
the aim of joining the EEC had brought about the conversion of much of 
tile Whitehall establiShment to the view tilat devaluation was now desirabl~ 
and necese&r1 (ibid., p. 1)4). Outside of the Bank of &!gland only Vilson 
and Calaghan reJl&ined totally opposed to the idea, by now because they had 
personally staked so web on the opposite course (Brittan, 1911, p. )48). 
'Ibe real problems returned with the somewhat expansionary Budget 
of April, 1961. While the latter was officially announced as neutral, 
involving no net change in taxation, it allowed for a major burSt of 
public investment and expenditure (Brittan, ibid.., p. )44). Yet, un-
employment continued to creep upwards along with imports and visible trade 
returned to a deficit. Although the balance of I8YJlents had not yet re-
covered to surplus, the governaent began to introduce Ilore expansionary 
measures in the summer of 1961, mainly because of increasing unemployment, 
against strong opposition fro both the Treasury and the Bank. With the 
growing deterioration of the balance of payments from the middle of the 
year, tile Iabour leadership reopened discussion in Cabinet of various 
alternative courses, including aport quotas or special deposit schemes, 
and by October the Treasury and the Bank began to work out a contingency 
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plan for devaluation. 
If by mid-summer 196'7 devaluation was inevitable, this did not 
preclude hesitation until the last possible moment, when the circumstances 
of yet another sterling crisis virtually dictated the government's course 
of action. By the first week in November with the pound under unrelenting 
pressure Labour's leaders finally committed themselves to devaluatio~ and 
messages canvassing support were sent to the "Praetorian Guard of the in-
ternational monetary systes,· Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, Managing Director of 
the IMF, F. "ml'" , the US Under-Secretary of the Treasury, E. van Lennep, 
Nether lands' Finance Ministr,y, Dr. O. lYIainger. German Bundesbank, and 
Sr. Ossola, Bank of Italy. Sose of these responded favourably to the idea, 
but others, especially the AIlericans, wanted to extend further credits in 
support of the existing parity. By Monday, 1) November, ruaours of f'urt,ber 
stand-by credits steuin8 fro. a lleetin8 of central bankers at Basle fuelled 
renewed speculation which ripped through the sterling :u.rkets on Thursday 
afternoon (following the Cabinet's unannounced decision to devalue as of 
Saturday evening). Final efforts by the American authorities to raise 
supporting credits were by this time to little and. too late, and the 
decision was subsequently announced on Saturday, 18 No.ember, backed by 
£),000. in stand-by credits, nearly half of which came from the IMF. 
Treasury and Bank demands for a full-scale deflationary squeeze to accom-
pany devaluation were rebuffed by the government, which announced instead 
aoderate increases in hire-purchase controls, a hike in Bank rate fro. 6.S 
to ac, proaises of cuts in public,-.,expenditure and a slight increase in 
Corporation Tax'to sweeten the pill for the unions (Brittan, ibid., pp. 
).5'7-6)). Even teaporary aport controls, one should note, were not in-
cluded in the package, although they had. been discussed in Cabinet for over 
a year. 
'!bus, devaluation had been forced on the government in cirCUllstances 
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that were hardly of its own choosing, for by;.now devaluation could no 
longer act as a substitute forifJlleasures to hold down consumption. the 
Chancellor continued to oppose the idea of devaluation right up to the 
very week before the decision was finally made. Even then he saw it only 
as a means of iaposing a deflationary package which would "teach the 
people of this country what a fools' paradise they 've been living in 
(Crossaan, Vol.!!, p. 569)." By this point he, too, was in the grips of 
that peculiar perversity that has afflicted all labour Chancellors fro. 
Snowden through Cripps up to the present, whereby theiryonly pleasure 
COMS frOIl lashin6 their supporters with the harshest possible policies. 
yet, ifcallaghan at least recognized the decision to devalue as a personal 
defeat and tendered his resignation before the end of the month, the Prime 
Minister found no such scruples in his own conscience and proaptly con-
verted to the notion that devaluation would provide the space for further 
econoaic expansion. '!bis was of course ruled out by the econoaic and 
political conjuncture that now engulfed the Vil80n government. Labour 
introduced a massively deflationary package in the Budget of March, 1968, 
a policy which continued, though less severely through the following year. 
Yet, even with continued deflation .ore or less fro. the suuer of 1966 
up through the winter of 1969-70, the current account did not return to 
surplus until the beginning of 1969. indicating the scope for readjustment 
necessitated by years of an overvalued pound. The cost of llaintaining 
pari ty W&8 necessarily very high. As indicated above not only was the 
planning prograaae (for what it W&8 worth) aacrificed on the altar of 
sterling, but the whole range of social welfare measures had. to be jetti-
soned in the bargain in the effort to retain the confidence of particularly 
fiDancial capital. 'lbe subsequent defeat in the general election of 1970 
can likewise be laid at the feet of this unflexible stand against any 
breach of financial orthodoxy, for Labour in the end had to dio'bey the 
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basic rule of post-war electoral politics: don't go to the hustings 
until you have financed a major domestic boom (Beckerman, 1972, Intro. 
&: Ch. 1). 
An additional and by no means inconsequential result of Labour 
policies was the increasing intervention of international financial 
authorities in the direction of British economic policy, particularly 
in the form of the IMF, a feature which grew in importance in proportion 
to the disintegraticn of the Keynesian progr8JUl8 in the 1970s. '!he loan 
floated in the devaluation of 1967 necessarly entailed various conditions, 
laid Gut in a Letter of Intent on the part of the Chancellor. 'Ibis in-
cluded the deflationary measures designed to hold down consumption and 
make room for "export-led growth" that were iap18llented in the 1968 Bu<i8et. 
It likewise ruled out the iaposi tion of further oontrols on foreign ex-
change or iaports and, indeed. pledged the govemaent to r8llove existing 
controls as soon as practicable (Letter of Intent, Hansard, Vol. 755. cols. 
649-51) • More ominously, to work effectively this approach required SOlle 
form of wage restraint, which implied, as the Prime MinisterHater ex-
pressed it, "an incomes policy which by the very nature of things requires 
statutory backing (cited in Panitch, 1976, p.l.50)." This "in turn, as we shall 
see shortly, had serious ramifications for the relations between the 
unions and the Labour government, as it led ult~tely to intensified 
efforts to control the cost of labour in the absence of control over any 
other factor. Of even greater significance in the long run, however, 
was the Letter of Intent secured by the IMF when the 1965 credits came up 
for renewal in May, 1969. For this stipulated for the first tae a ceiling 
eol"doaestic creeli t expansion of £4ooa for the coaing financial year, thus 
aarking the turn towards aonet&rlsa that gathered aoaentUll in the following 
decade. especially when labour again had to turn to the 1MB for further 
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financial support (Brittan, 1971, pp. 165-7 & 396). 
One should not overemphasize the extent to which the IMF played a 
coercive role, dictating the terms of credit to an abdurate social dem-
ocratic government conmited to a course of social reform. For clearly 
there was plenty of support for such measures, not only in the expected 
qarters of orthodoxy, the Treasury and the Bank of England. but also within 
the Cabinet (Panitch, op.cit~. 'Ibe IMF has often appeared as a convenient 
whipping boy taking the blame for unpopular policies in recent experience, 
even though those at the helm of state were in essential agreement about the 
need for a nasty dose of deflationary aedicine. At the saIle tilte the 
government had succumbed to almost total paralysis by the winter of 1968, 
as devaluation was followed by continued balance of payments problems. 
presBUre on sterling &Dd ruaours of a second devaluation, a state of col-
lapse which left Labour little choice but to follow the course charted· ;' 
by the constellation of interests centered on financial capital. 'Ibe sit-
uation at the tue (March" 1968) is pe:rbaps best expressed by the ''conscience'' 
of the Cabinet, Richard Crossman: 
I've never felt a greater sense of this Government's impotence 
than I do now. The question whether we devalue again or not is 
entirely deterained by whether the Aaericans will let us have the 
cash to sustain the policy they want without f!bJ!Cing devaluation 
on us. 'Ibat's our situation two days ahead of a budget in which 
Roy [Jenkins] will ask for immense sacrifices in order that this 
Labour Governaent can at last get a firm control of the economy. 
'Ibe truth is that we shan tt get control of the economy (CrOSSlll8ll, 
Vol. 11, p. 111). 
One u.jor reason for the continuing edginess of the pound (apart 
from the balance of payments deficit) was the run down of the sterling 
balances by official holders fro. sterling area countries. 'Ibe latter 
had been badly shocked by devaluation, and between March and September 
their balances decreased by s~ £3l21l in the attempt to diversify into 
other currencies as a hedge against future devaluation (B. Cohen, 1971, pp. 
77-9) • 'Ibe increasing voli tili ty of even such official holdings prompted 
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the government to secure sOlle sort of international funding as an 
incentive to retain sterling deposits despite such fears. The result 
was the Basle agreement arranged through the Bank for International 
Settlements in the SUJUler of 1968. This provided a tz,OOOm stand-by 
credi t froll the major central banks to finance any further wi thdrawel 
of sterling-area balances whether private or official. It likewise guar-
anteed the dollar value of a portion of such holdings against devaluation 
provided that the paticipating countries agreed to saaintain a JIlinimum per-
centage of their total reserves in sterling. This effectively curtailed 
and reversed at least the short-tera outflow of such funds through the 
establishment 'of a medium-term hnding facility at potentially a serious 
cost to the UIC econoay. However, it also signalled the continuing COll-
lIi tment to·,~tain an international role for sterling as a reserve cur-
rency at least as far as the Treasury was concerned (U.K. Treasury, 1968, 
esp. p. 7 & B. COhen, ibid., pp. 150-60 & 222-33). 
'Ibe eventual devaluation of the pound in November, 1967. thus actually 
reinforced the position of international finance. While over the course 
of the 1950s short-term borrowing froll the IMF and other international 
agencies had been liquidated fairly quickly, during the sixties the alaost 
permanent deficits in the external account made this iDtpossible. '!he debacle 
began with the initial drawing frOIl the IMF in the 1961 crisis. Much of 
that was paid off in the following year, but from 1964 debt built up 
steadily.. '!be government borrowed again from the IMF to the tune of 
£3.5111 in 1964, £SOOa in 1965 and £44m in 1966, while a stand-by credit 
for '1,40011 was negotiated in the period. right after devaluation (Pollard, 
1969, p. 4.51). 'Ibe CUIlUlative total of these as well as other drawings 
fro. the various central banks reached a peak of £3,6oom in 1967-8. 'nle 
advance consultation with the forces of international finance in the criaia 
preceediDg the belated decision to devalue indicated as IlUch as anything 
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the new influence they exercised over the direction of economic policy. 
Afterwards, when stand-by credits approaching 13,OOOm had to be negotia-
ted, the influence of the IMF was expressed not only in the original 
Letter of Intent of 1967 but in the subsequent statements of 1968 and 
1969 when the teras of the credits had to be renewed. Together these 
entailed not only cuts in existing and planned public expenditure through-
out Labour's reuining years in office but precluded other policy options 
such as aport controls which .ight have allowed for a greater degree of 
dOJlestic expansion (see above and CroS8Jlan, Vol. Ill, pp • .502 de 539-41). 
In swmary, Labour' s planning programme was a singular failure in 
virtually every aspect. 'Ibe government could not or would. not reverse the 
priority given to sterling and the role of the City in the British economy. 
It was unable to extend planning in any sense beyond the limits set by 
the previous Conservative governaent, i.e. voluntarism, at least as far 
as capital was cOl1csrned. 'Ibe lEA never established hege.ony over the 
policy-aaking process, and consequently its credibility not to mention that 
of the whole notion of planning had effectively sunk before the first two 
years of the govermaent were co.pleted. The lEA paid its last respects 
to planning with the publication of '!he Task Ahead in 1969. Its deaotion 
fro. White Paper to Green Paper symbolized what had been a .atter of fact 
froll the outset. that the government had never pushed the plan.aerioual:y 
but had rather exploited it for other ends (securing the co-operation of 
the TUC in an incoaee policy) and that the planners had no real control 
over the state u.chinery, let alone the economy. in any case. By this 
point the actual policies of the government, continued restraint in order 
to divert soae ]C of GNP into reviving the balance of payaents, aade a 
.ockery of the docuaent even as a public relations exercise. 'Ibis is not 
to 88:1 that the govemaent had a. choice in the utter if it wanted to re-
tain foreisn credit but rather that its continuing efforts to placate the 
, 
· I 
· ' 
· I 
, 
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bankers had led it to the point where no other options were available. 
As Labour wound up the DEA in October, 1969, the Treasury published the 
final epitaph to indicative planning the following spring, Econoaic Pros-
pects to 1972 - A Revised Assessment (U.K. Treasury, 1970). As in the 
case of 'Ibe Task Ahead the Treasury Green Paper did not proport to be 
a plan.but rather "a basis for forward planning and decision-taking both 
by Governaent and industry (pp. 1-2)." Parallel to the experiaent in 
"dellocratic planning" in the 1940s, the use of teras llke "targets" in 
'Ibe National Plan was dropped in these latter two dOCUllents in favour" of 
"prospects" and "projections." The only difference between the Treasury 
and lEA Green Papers was that the former scaled down even further the 
expectations as to future growth of GNP , productivity, etc. 
Rather than breaking out of the stop-go syndroae of the Tory years, 
Labour found.~i teelf' at the end of its term having pursued alaost continual 
restraint froa the first year in office, presiding over an economy with 
increasing slack between potential and actual output and the hi8hest level 
of unemploYJlent since the Second World War. Far frOJll initiating an era 
of a high-w8.6e, high-growth econoay as the basis for a prograaae of social 
democratic reforaa, Labour was now saddled with an enormous debt to over-
seas finance with little room for manoeuvre or reform of any kind. Dis-
illusionment with even the basic methods of Keynesian deaand manageaent 
began to set in with the realizaticn, as expressed in one mador study, 
that over the course of the 1960s as with the previous decade, "budgetQy 
policy ••• has been destabilizing, in the sense that growth would have pro-
ceeded aore SIloothly in the absence of discretionary tax changes (C. D. Cohen, 
p. 68)." Virtually, the only area in which the \jplanning prograaae achieved 
a degree of "SUCC8BB" was that of incomes, or aore appropriately wages, 
policy, to which we &hall now turn. 
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Incomes Policy and Relations with the TUC 
If Labour's relations with capital were set by the limits of 
voluntarism and by the effective veto of the City suCh was not the case 
wi th the trade union movement. For increasingly throughout the period 
the inability of the government to introduce an economic plan in any 
sense led to the substitution of progressively more severe controls over 
the one area where it could act directly without incurring a aajor crisis 
of business confidence, naaely wages. '!he aodel of volunt&ristic corp-
oratiSJll was breached only with regard to those who supposedly formed the 
backbone of Labour's support, and the efforts in this direction served 
mainly to precipitate. la serious break in the relatials between the Party 
and the unions, the effects of which have continued to reverberate up to 
the present. Since the politics of incomes policy have been arJal.yzed in 
depth elsewhere, I shall only out.line the aajor events in so f'ar&8 they 
related to the rise and fall of indicative planning (see Crouch, 19n, 
Pani tch, 1976, Mitchell, 1972, and Fels,1972). 
As indicated above a national incomes policy of some kind was the 
chief assumption of both the BEDC and DEA plans. Productivity ~eeaents 
had previously come into fashion as a means of tying wage increases to 
the rise in productivity at a micro-economic level, of relaxing job de-
marcatiCl'l practices and of securing a "radical a,proach to the problem 
of systeaatic overtime (Flanders, 1964, p. 14)." '!he logic behind the 
approach to inCOMS policy was qui te<3BiJIlply ~o use the same basis for 
negotiations on a macro-economic level. '!he central problem with a nation-
al wages policy was that it required at least the co-operation of the union 
leaders if not their active adJRiniBtration if it was to bave a degree of 
success. Here of course . Labour was much better placed than the Conserva-
tivea, but even Labour was unlikely to win support for a siaple package at 
wage restraint. Much as in the case of the plans for post-war reconstruc-
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tion the key appeared to be to link the agreement for restraint and 
the relaxation of shop floor controls with a general commitment to 
faster growth and hence higher real wages in the long-term. Thus, 
from the beginning the policy on wages was closely linked to the planning 
prograuae. Indeed, there is substantial reason for viewing the latter as 
little more than a public relations exercise which was taken seriously 
by the government only so long as and in so far as it might assist in 
this central w. In the",,,ords of one protagonist of labour planning, 
'!'he unions will not co-operate in what they, and their Ilembers, 
recognize as wage restraint, but if it can be wrapped up as a 
'planned-growth-of-wages,' the,. may be prepared to help the govern-
ment (Denton, 196se.).· . 
'!he necessity of the linkage between incomes policy and planning was, 
moreover, underlined by the 1964 ruc, since it explicitly opposed wage 
restraint at the aaae tiae that it supported incomes policy within the 
fraIIewori of a planned ecODOIa1 and the extension of public ownership 
(TUC, 1964 Report, p. 446). 
'!'he efforts of George Brown on the wages front proved initially JlUch 
more successful than in other areas of the planning progra.am.e. By Decem-
ber 16th, 1964, he aanaged to get the representatives of ~ TUC as well 
as those of the -Jor emplo1ers' organizations (the CBI had. not yet fomed) 
to sign a "Joint Statement of Intent on Productivity, Prices and Incomes." 
'!'his included & pledge "to take urgent and vigorous action to raise pro-
ductivity throu8hout industry and cOllllllerce, to keep increases in total 
money incomes in line with increases in real national output and to lI&in-
tain a stable general price level (reprinted in Brittan, 1971, pp. 31:6-7)." 
FrOJl that point onwards develoPllents in incomes policy progressed in 
proportion to the setbacks in indicative planning. Within four IIOnths 
the government had published two White Papers on the subject, Machinery 
of Prices and Incomes POlicy in February, 1965, and Prices &Dd IncOlles 
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Policy in April. '!bese set up the National Board for Prices and Incomes 
as the vetting agency for what was still at this stage a voluntary policy 
on the basis of a norm of 3 to 3.,5%. To head the organization the gov-
ernJlent chose Aubrey Jones, a Conservative, whose corporatist outlook 
is perhaps best expressed in a statement from the previous decade: "[union] 
irresponsibility can be overcome only if Labour is made to feel that it 
has the saae purpose as capital, and that. while they remain rivals, their 
rivalry is subordinated to a unity (cited in Panitch, 19'16 ~p,;76r." The politics 
of the HBPI's Chairaan were likewise reflected in the ideological position 
of the organization itself, as it persistently voiced a managerial perspec-
tiTe in fraaing its judgements in terms of 1. an administrative rational-
i ty, 2. a monistic view of corporate hierarchy, and 3. an insistence on 
aanageria.l control over the production process (Crouch, 1977, pp. 123-8). 
B)' the suuer with .ouoting inflation at hOlle and .. the first of the 
star ling crises. the goverDll8nt began to press both the me and the newly 
foned CBI to approve statutory controls. 'Ibe General Council eventually 
relented after protracted negotiations and managed to win narrow support 
for their actions at the autUll.!l Congress. In November a tbird White Paper, 
Prices and InCOll8s Policy. Karly Warning Syste., outlined the new approach. 
'lbe ruc had now directly involved itself in policing the wage claims of 
its constituent unions through the "early warning system," although it 
had no a.ns of legally enforcing sanctions against those who transgressed 
the n01'll. The CBiI on the other hand eschewed any such involve.ent in the 
prices policy, and. indeed, the White Paper made no attempt to extend the 
systea to all prices. restricting it rather to conSUlter and public sector 
goods and services. Thus, even at this stage the degree of "voluntary 
co.pulsion" waa aore strict on the side of labour tJum that of capital, 
a basic aapaetr.Y that continued throushout Labour's term in power. 
The JUly crisis of 1966 ushered in the next phase in inco.es policy. 
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namely a six-month statutory freeze in wages followed by six months of 
"severe restraint" with similar controls applied to prices and dividends 
(Prices and. Incomes Standstill). In the same blow Labour had not only 
announced the end of planning but had abrogated every basis on which vol-
untary incomes policy had been agreed with the unions, i.e. full employment, 
planning, tripartite negotiations and voluntarism (Panitch, 19'76, p. 116). 
The WC expressed its regret over the introduction;,of these policies but 
nonetheless continued to co-operate and even ~inister the treeze through-
out its duration. 'lbe CBI was IlUch less acquiescent with the end result 
that wage rates remained static in the period between July and Bec8aber: 
and actual earnings increased by less than 1/2f1" while the retail price 
index rose by over ~ (ibid., p. 129). 
'lbe period of severe restraint following the six-month freeze wit-
nessed increasing tension between the government and the labour aove-
ment. 'lbe governaent continued the zero-nora policy excepting only the 
low paid and "genuine" productivity agreements but left the NBPI in charge 
of vetting any such exceptions.. Given the pro-business poll tics of the 
organization it refrained froa setting any ainhum figure for wages, 
choosing instead to deal with low-pay claias on a case-by-case basis. 
The demotion of the low-pay criterion by the Board corresponded with an 
increasing eaphasis on productivity as the only basis for exemption froll 
the aora. Yet, despite the severe nature of the policy, earnings began 
to rise in the second quarter of 1967, increasing a total of 6'f, over the 
year compared to only 2.jC for retail prices (Leruez, p. 200). If the 
end result of the wage freeze augured ill for Labour, the atteapt to 
spread the responsibility for the policy by reviving tripartite'c.negotiations 
fared no better. By this point rank and tile hostility to wage restraint 
was affecting even the upper echelons ot the TUC, and the latter refused 
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to be drawn into belated support for the government's unilateral actiQ'l 
(Panitch. 1976. p. 131). 
By the time of the September. 1967, Congress the General Council 
could no longer hold the line against the widespread opposition to its 
accommodative relations with the government. I~ consequently did not 
even attempt to oppose motions calling for repeal of the existing Prices 
and InCOlles Acts. However, when it did attempt to stop another motion 
condellning Labour's deflationary aeaaures and appealing for an extension 
of public ownership as the basis for future economic planning, it was 
defeated on the floor. At the labour Par» Conference a month later the 
government won only the narrowest aajority in support for the continuatiQ'l 
of statutory powers over wages. 'l'tlus. even before the devaluation in Novem-
ber the incomes policy Was showing signs of total breakdown with the trade 
union leadership aoving rapidly to the left of the Parliaaentary Party 
(i bid., pp. 146-8). Bonet.U1e less, the govemaent reJla.ined resolutely com-
mitted to wage restraint backed by statutory powers, a position reinforced 
by the intervention of the IMF in the course of devaluation, as noted 
above. 
'!be General Council supported devaluation and was even prepared to 
accept wage cuts as a means to solve the balance of payments problem. 
However, that was the liait of ita accord with the government's policies 
by the beginning of 1969. In March it issued its first Economic Review, 
a coaprehensi ve docuaent which far fro. backing further deflation called 
for the development of a new national plan and a revived programme of 
incoM redistribution (TUC, 1969). '!bus, even though planning was more 
or less abandoned by Labour and had lost favour with virtually everyone 
else, the TUC retained i te coaitaent to the progr&llJl8, largely because 
it offered the only alternative to deflation and continued wage restraint. 
Unfortuaate1y for the unions, planning was now a dead issue, and the only 
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alternative policies which might have offered some relief fro. the 
balance of payments pressure without deflation, namely import and ex-
change controls, were ruled out by the terms of agreement with the IMF. 
'Ibe thrust of the governaent's econonc policies, i.e. the attempt 
to substitute deflation and statutory wage::controls for econoaic planning, 
led it in an ever more pronounced state corporatist direction with regard 
to labour by the latter stages of its tera of office. For withtthe "wage 
explosion" that heralded the disintegration of ita ineomes policy, Labour 
turned increasingly ton:rds legal controls over the unions in an att_pt 
to centralize collective bargaining am. curb rank and file wage aill tancy • 
While the Donovan Report was an aabiguous landmark in that it did not 
recolUlend any extension of statutory controls over the Unions, Labour 
went beyond these reoaaencl&t.ioDB 1fi th the Plblica tiOD of In Place of strife. 
By the end of 1968 it 'baCUle clear that incomes policy wa.a no lonser 
tenable given the overwhelaing hostility of the trade union .ova.ent. 
Consequeatly, the govarmaent bepn to look for an UteJm&tive aeans of 
reinforcing ita relationship with -the TUC leadership, namely legislation 
aiaed at reinforcing the control of the latter over the rank and file and 
limited the right to in1tiate strikes from the shop fl00&'. While 1t did 
not represent a complete reversion to state corporatism, e.g. by trans-
forming the unions into state agencies with monopolistic and compulsory 
powers, In Place of Strife, certainly took lIlore than a few steps in that 
direction. For a key ele.ent in the proposals was t.b.e offer of a Couis-
sion on Industrial Relations to facilitate the extension of collective 
~.ga.in1ng and the develop.ent of "procedure" as the quid pro quo for 
union registration, restrictions oniinter-union disputes, ballots for 
official strikes and a legally backed "cooling-off period" for uno«1c1&1 
stoppaps (Industrial Relations Bill, 1969). 'lhese proposals thus rep-
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resented, as Crouch has argued, a transitional stage, paying lip service 
to liberal oollectivism, (by recognizing industrial conflict as inherent 
and the necessity for independent trade unions), while at the same time 
claiming that the existing situation called for the reinforce.ent of the 
governm~nt·s·objectives with statutOD;y measures.(Crouch, 1977, pp. 16)-6). 
In any ~vent the total opposition of the General Council and union mil-
itants to the proposals ensured that Labour remained within the limits of 
voluntaristic corporatisa. For in return for withdrawing the Bill the 
roc pledged to exercise its own authority in limiting unofficial disputes. 
'!bus, the attellpt to iApose wage restraint from above with or without 
the co-operation of the trade union movement brought Labour to the edge 
of breaking with the politics of voluntaristic corporatism. Such was not 
the case.b the relatiOl'l8 between the governaent and capital where coercive 
aeasures were lillited to the six-month price and dividend freeze following 
the July crisis of 1966 lIhich were of course iaposed in the course of 
attellpting to lIleet the priorities of financial capital. Labour w8uld not 
or could not envisage any extension of state direction over capital beyond 
the lillits of indicative planning (with the partial exception of the re-
nationalization of steel). 'Ibe effective collapse of the latter given the 
continued hege.ony of finance over the policy-making process left the 
government with little choice other than clamping down on its ostensible 
supporters even to the point of a complete breakdown in relations with the 
unions. '!he TUC nODe the less rell&ined cOllllttted to the planning progr&.IlIle 
more or less in the original form of 1964, i.e. on a voluntaristic tri-
partitevba.sis, :8.S the only alternative to wage control and deflation, or 
even worse. 'Ibe unavoidable contradiction of this atte.pt to aaintain an 
acco .. odative position vis-~-v1s the government was"as Panltch has force-
fully argued, that, "it couitted. the ruc to operating an incOlleS polic, 
in the context of a total econollic policy wliich the TUC did not have the 
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means to effect by itself (Panitch, 19'76, p. 150)." 
Given the hostility of industry to any extension of statutory 
controls over capital and the ability of finance to block and reverse 
any policy which remained within the volunt&ristic framework, the TUC 
and the union rank and file could do little ~t resort to negative 
reactions, condemning the continuation of incomes policy and refusing 
to co-operate with the legal intervention in industrial relations, while 
pursuing wage Ililitancy at the base. By the end. of the 1960s the col-
lapse of inco.es policy and the turn towards statutory controls over the 
unions indicated the complete failure of the governaent to widen the 
. 
spielraum of the state's field of action with regard to labour, just as 
the earlier dense of indicative planning demonstrated the effective lim-
iting power of capital. Only the a8SUJ1ption of statutory powers could. 
widen this room f01'lVllanoeu~e .in ope direction or the other. '!bat Labour 
chose to act against the unions in line with the priorities of capital, 
especially finance, deaoDstrated the continued hegemony of the latter oyer 
the machinery of the state. However, the ability of the unions to block 
at least the extre. iJRplications of such a move indicated their not 
insignificant strength, al~itJROst effective when expressed in a negative 
fashion, protecting existing rights rather than imposing its own economic 
and social programme on the government. 
Neddy and Relations with the CBI 
The role of the NEDC has not come into the discussion so far for 
the siaple reason that it was largely eclipsed with the foraation of the 
DEA, but it retained at least an ideological :function throughout the 
period. As discussed above the planning functiQl .,f Heddy had largely 
been taken up by the lEA, yet both the CBI and the rue wanted. to aa.in-
tain it at least as a forull for discussions on economic policy. The 
Wilson government was likewise anxious to encourage a favourable envir-
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onment for a "managed consensus," i.e. prevail upon the unions to accept 
the need for an incomes policy in return for the commitment to faster 
economic growth. The NEDC, while no longer involved in the actual 
wri ting of the plan, still served as a sounding board and a source of 
necessary inforaation about industrial plans. If the removal of''JIlost of 
the planning machinery indicated the,etatist bent of Labour in comparison 
to the Tories, the retention of the Council demonstrated the continued 
emphasis on producing under state guidance a consensus on the national 
needs of industrial capital and the organized working class, i.e. the 
orientation of Labour towards the poll tics of a "producers' alliance." 
'Ibe director of NEW for most of Labour's term of office, Sir 
Frederick Catherwood, was the prototype of the progressive industrialist. 
A "Christian socialist" and long-tiae proaoter of such causes as scientific 
and professional II&D8g8ment, technical education, rationalization and _ 
increased industrial investment, he strongly backed virtually every as-
pect of the planning programme.(Catherwood, 1966). His ideological 
background led him to promote corporatist solutions with a strong ma.nage~ 
ia1 flavour as tm answer to the problem of industrial retardation. Under 
Ca therwood the prime role of Neddy was to build an industrial COnSell81l8 
between capital and labour on the basis of a high-wage, high-growth econ-
omy, or in his own words, "Neddy's job is to influence the climate of 
opinion." Clearly, as far as he was concerned, this meant primarily 
cOlllbatting certain notions pervasive in the world of capital that a 
fixed relationship held between unemployment and the rate of wage increases, 
a view which "tended to put the country's very powerful financial and 
banking interests, together with a good lIanY influential econoaists, 
against the whole notion of encouragingt.the economy to grow fa.ster than 
the historic trend (Catherwood, 1971, p. 6)." At the sue tae Catherwood 
continued to propogate the case that "we need a auch hlpr rate of in-
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dustrial invest.ent with a much higher rate of replacement of obsolete 
plant, and that without this we are unlikely to hold our share of world 
trade, let alone regain any trade we have lost (ibid.)." Moreover, in 
his view measures to boost home investment and remove the balance of 
payments constraint had to include restrictions on overseas investment 
and government spending abroad (Ca.therwood, 1966, pp. 12)-4). 
!feddy in other words developed in this per~od as an agency for 
promoting a social contract between labour and. industry centred on the 
intertwined objectives of increased investaent and the restzaint of wages 
to the average growth of produoti vi ty • Of course the actual trend of 
the governaent's policies rendered most of this effort on the ideological 
plane totally futile. !feddy's effectiveness as an agency for consensus 
u.u.geaent dbiniehed once La.bour devalued tripartite negotiations and 
resorted to unilateral and. statutory action on inCoa8S and prices in the 
wake of the 1966 crisis. By 1968 the -ruC had. come to the conclusion that 
the BOO "no longer appeared to be fulfilling its original functi CI18 and 
was being used aore asa sounding board for Government policies (cited in 
Panitch, 1976, p. 1,52). Yet, despite Labour's inability to take up its 
"historic task" as the promoter of the producers' alliance, the work of 
the !mOC did have some lasting significance, mainly, as we shall see. in 
preparing the ideological ground for another assult on financial interests. 
'Ibe Economic Development Co_i ttees, or so-called Little lfeddies. 
siailarly picked up IlUch of the work in the ideological realJD. '!hey had 
also been introduced under the previous Conservative governaent 'but were 
aodel1ed on the Developllent Councils that the Attlee govemaent had hatched 
in the 194Oa. But, whereaa the earlier institutions had sprung froa the 
war sy.tea of "supervised self-government," the EDCs served aore as a 
connecting link between branches of industry and the state. At the saae 
time they differed from the prevailing form of state-industry linkage, 
the so-called sponsorship network, on several points. In the first place 
they included trade union representation, even if in a subordiate role. 
Unlike the NEDC the trade unions were clearly under-represented 
in comparison with industrial capital in the Ems I 4~ of the 
members of the latter were industrial managers, 23% "industrial experts," 
and only 2~ union representatives, Heaving l~ as the direct representa-
tives of the state, but allot whoa were appointed by the Director-General 
of the NEDC aftar: the appropriate consultaticms (Leruez, pp. 147-9). The 
corporatist character of Ifeddy' eaerged !lOst clearly in the Ems, where the 
donnation of the industrialists was secure along with, it was hoped, the 
co-operation of labour. ot course the latter could not be expected to be 
terribly concerned with the eUiciency of the production syste. without 
corresponcU.ng •• aaures to ensure ,.fU,.ll~llployaent and faster growth. As 
one observer put it, 
'lbe early co-operation of the trade unions in the Em system had, 
to a large extent, been obtained because of the initial emphasis 
on planning. When this was dissipated, the trade unions began to 
loose interest (Vaugh&ri; p. )80l. . . 
Secondly, the EDCs were distinguished fro. the sponsoring departments 
". 
in that they established a r88Ular and f6rma.l link between industry and 
the state, rather than relying on the intermittent and informal contact 
that had characterized the 1950s. Thirdly, they were entitled to dis-
cuss a whole r8M8 of issues and problems concernill8 each particular branch 
of industry instead of beill8 lai ted to soae specific problea steaaing 
from Whitehall policy. The sorts of issues that the Little NedcUes 
dealt with IlOSt otten, the uae of laltour and the developaent of sub-
sti tutes for aanufactured iaports, feU outside the scope ot a sponsoring 
departaent. In a word the role of the Eres in the planning process was 
to develop a "sen .. of responsibility" on the part of the unions and the 
state under the direction of leading industrialists. At the same time 
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they served a.s an important aspect of the propaganda drive against 
the ideological doaination of finance, attempting to integrate the 
two Sozialpartneren in a national drive for improved competitiveness, 
growth, efficiency and productivity (Fraser, pp. 16)-4). 
To put it in terms of my general analysis the EDCs attempted to 
rationalize the supportive function of" the state by giving direct rep-
resentation to industrial managers. In this way their needs could 
be met or at least articulated without the cumbersomaoand tenuous med-
iation of political parties and the .Parl.1a.mentary process. While the 
Conservatives aay be the party preference of lIlost businessaen~ the !act 
that they can be and are voted out of office necessitates the regulariza-
tion of contact between industry and the state. whatever party is in 
govem.ment. 'Ibe fact that Pa.r1iaaent only controls the state in the 
most fcmu.l andlillited.dseue-·II8&ftS-~as-well·thatdirect links with White-
hall are iaperative, patticu1arly given the scope of state intervention 
and the portion of the national income diverted through the fiscal system 
in the years since World War I!. And,_the impetus -towards planning state 
activity and expenditure. towards relating the whole process of state 
intervention to the needs of a- ~pi tallst econoJlj under inten8ified in-
ternational competition and. to the needs of an industrial sector badly 
wanting both reorganization and an increased level of investaent. like-
wise reinforces the aim of ensuring that the actual articulation of 
economic policy comes under the hegemony of industrial capital. 
'Ibe Wilson government. like that of Att1ee. was only too ready to 
oblige ~ While in 1945 Labour had attempted to institutionalize the 
progruae of "deaocratic planning" by retaining the wa.r-tille adldnistra-
tive Jl&chinery lI&IUled largely by corporate leaders and develop the new 
Developaent Councils on a voluntary tripartite basis, in 1964 it attempted 
-26.5-
the same by continuing the quasi-state agencies set up under the 
Conservatives after the industrial initiative. The hope here was 
to maintain the confidence of industry by ceding control over at least 
the infonaational inlUts into the planning process, by allowing industry 
a direct means for expressing the various needs of its different branches, 
for establishing a consensus on those needs with the suitably vetted 
representatives of organized labour and for relaying that consensus to 
the planning authorities. 
'Ibe do.iD&. tion of industrial capital in the EDCs was reflected in 
the reports produced in the late sixties and early seventies. These fo-
cussed on the means fOD improving producti vi ty, raising and improving 
investment, import substitution and increasing market share. In so far 
as they dealt with labour proble.s, -they were by no Mans anti-union,but 
fraaed their considerations within a ll8ll8.gerial perspective. Thus, labour 
matters were included in terms of reducing the eost of labour turnover, 
improving procedure in order to prevent industrial disputes and rational-
izing the structure of union (and employer) organization in order to 
eliainate frapentation and overlapping (EDC for Building, 1968, EOO for 
the Rubber Industry, 1968a. " b, " EOO for the Electronics Industry, 1970). 
While most did not comment on government policy directly, one consumer 
goods industry did complain about those aspects which it felt to be direct-
ly discriainatory against its products, e.g. taxation and the variability 
of dell8Jld, as well as about the need to recognize the requireaent for 
"a sufficient rate of return on capital" as a basis for future growth 
(EOO for Motor Manufacturing, 1968). If the work of the EOOs had little 
effect on government policy, they at least represented the syabolic con-
tinui ty of the "producers' alliance" progruuae. The studies also oon-
vinced at leut Catherwood that an acceleration of the growth of produc-
tivity was possible and that there was an urgent need for increasing 
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"direct productive investment" by at least £2.5Om per year (Catherwood, 
1968). The EDC studies also kept alive the notion of planning or at 
least "comprehensive consultations with industry", since they served as 
the basis for the final document of the Labour years, Economic Prospects 
to 1972, after the lEA itself had been wound up.(UK Treasury, 1970). 
The NEDC also began to turn much of its attention towards the ways 
of increasing industrial investment over this period. This process had 
begun under Sir Robert Shone. whose involvement in Neddy in the early 
years of the institution had reaffirmed his view that low investment was 
a I18.jor reason for declining British competitiveness (Shone, 1966). :!1:!!. 
National Plan had put investaent "at the heart of the plan" and had fore-
cast a needed rise of :J:$ between 1964 and 1970 in manufacturing if the 
plada targets would be met. In fact '!be Task Ahead and Economic Prospects 
to 1972 revealed that aanuf'acturing investment had risen by only IJ' between 
1964 and 1966, had fallen by , in 1967 1i.nder the impact of the deflation-
ary measures of the previous year and only began to rise again after de-
valuation, ending up in the second half of 1969 some 18.' higher than in 
the second half of 1961. The latter document pointed out that the pos-
sibility of increasing the rate of' investment in any penaanent sense did 
not seem very good. as '"Ibe BDC reports are not generally very buoyant 
about the medium-term prospect. and experience of past cycles would in any 
case suggest a slowing down in 1971 after two years of rat8er fast growth 
(U.K .Treasury. 1970, p. 17)." The EDC reports had singled out expected 
growthoof demand as the crucial variable in investment decisions and UD4er-
lined that in those industries with a long planning period like chemicals 
and aotors ... oat decisions affecting the period to 1972 have already been 
taken (ibid.)." 1s a result of these findings the governMllt had to rec-
ognize "the iaportance for industrial investaent of an adequate cash flow 
and [would] continue to have this in aind in developing their monetary and 
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credit policies (ibid.)." However, increasingly from the mid-sixties 
Neddy began to look at constraints on the supply side of investment as 
well. Its Investment Appraisal pamphlets publicized the utility of 
discounted cash flow techniques in part because "as a result of the use 
of faulty Jlethods of appraisal, investment decisions are made over-
cautiously (NEOO, 1967)." A few years later these efforts would. cul-
minate in the production of a _jar study of investment, the conclusions 
of which were iaplicitl1 critical of the relationship between the finan-
cial and industrial sectors, l.e. the dolldnant position and caution of 
the former, as we shall see in the following chapter. 
'Ibis whole effort to secure the hegemony of industrial capital was 
frustrated, however, by the actual lack of a planning authority with any 
real power, or altematively by the fact that the issue of political 
power 11&8 DeTer "faced equare~. '1he-. idea behind-the ·000 aDd the BOOs..-
was that the co-operation of the unioDs with industry could be secured 
through political collaboration on national economic goals, i.e. restruc-
tura.-tion of British capitalism so as to better compete in the world II8.I'-
ket and thereby iaprove the standard oflliving and social welfare in a 
regulated u.nner. But, the failure to take the basic Bteps to begin to 
meet theBe objectives, the inability of Labour to create effective plan-
ning inBtrwaents, eroded the basis of possible co-optation aB well. As 
a result Labour turned the guns back on the unionB. Its acceptance of or-
th040xy in econoaic policy paralleled its commitment to the political 
status quo, the doaination of financial capital in the power block. '!his 
in turn led the labour leadership to think of its task less in ten of 
presiding over an econoaic and technological revolution than in te IllS of 
rolUng back working cla.as power, especially at the point of production. 
The role of financial crises, that is the structural as well as the ideo-
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logical position of financial interests, obviously played a key part 
in reorienting Labour away from its professed programme towards the 
bankers' view of salvation, deflation and statutory wage freeze in 
defence of parity and the intemationa1 role of sterling. Neddy's 
function as the ideological prop for class collaboration on "both sides 
of industry" was largely eroded by the devaluation of tripartism and the 
abandonJllent of the planning prograJllllle. It none the less continued in 
more or less ita original role as a "pressure group" for growth with sOlle 
success, given its total lack of any substantive influence, at least in 
the sense that it outlived the IlEA and continued to p:ml~ the case fitr 
higher investment and growth and closer consultation with industry even 
after the return of the Conservatives. 
Relations between the CBI and the governaent remained on the whole 
aaicable throU8bout the period.·· Industrialists of course had. initiated 
indicative planning in the ea.rly aiRies, so they could hardly renounce 
it coapletely just because of a change of governaen t. Yet, there was 
a certain ambiguity in the considerations of planning under Labour by 
the tiae of the second. "Next Five Yea.rs" Conference at Eastbourne in Jan-
uary, 1965 of the BEe, the FBI and the NABM. Discussions at this meet-
ing saw a partial revival of industry's priorities of the previous decade 
&lions soae sections or the Conference. 'Ibe gI'mup investigating fiscal, 
Ilonetary and general economic policy pronounced that "'Ibe first ai. of the 
nation~laust be to live within ita Mans both nationally and internation-
ally (FBI, BEC & NABM, 1965, p. 16). It likewise emphasized the need for 
stable prices, reduced public expenditure am the advantages of "London's 
position as world banker" and condemned any extension of public ownership 
(ibid., pp. 16-19). 'lbe group considering labour issues underlined the 
necessity or keeping wage increases in line with productivity and called 
for the refo%ll of trade union structure, "particularly moves towards in-
dustrial unionism," as well as legal sanctions to enforce collective 
bargaining agreements (ibid., p. 32). 'Ihe group on economic planning 
similarly declared that "inevitablJ we place the greatest emphasis on 
the balance of payments," but at the same time it concluded that "plan-
ning can continue to make an important contribution to more rapid growth 
in the future«ibid., pp. 20-1)." So despite various reservations stem-
ming essentially from the previous negative experience of the NEDC 
project and no doubt fears of Labbur using planning as a technique of 
"back door nationalization," industry retained a coui taent to planning 
in some sense so long as it reuined free of statutory controls and the 
extension of public ownership. 
The CBI'S continued support for the planning exercise was likewise 
reflected in its enthusiasm for both the formation of the DEA and the 
National Plan. George Brown's active courting of industry was no doubt 
... : ,. '" ~ .......... ..,...'"-' ,- .. -'." . . 
a major factor in winning their favour not only for the "Joint Statellent 
on Prices and Incoaes" but throughout the first two jears of the govern-
Dl8nt. As Lord Stokes" Managing Director of BLMC, and a Member of the 
Industrial Reorganization Corporation, later reu.rked, 
We can never forget what ~ un did for us. He launched the 
prices &Dd inCOMS policy ~ as_ long as h~ was there we be-
lieved 1n 1 t and we believed in the LabGur GoverDllent. He made 
all that difference to you (Crossman, Vol. II, p • .546). 
So long as Labour rellained within the framework of voluntaristic corpor-
atis. and offered the real possibility of a consensus with the TUC on 
ineomes restraint and econollic growth, it retained the active co-operation 
of industrial capital, including "voluntary restaint" of prices, although, 
as noted above, this did not include the actual vetting of price increases 
by the CBI. 
'Ibe aeasures following the July crisis of 1966 did lead to soae 
fricticm with indUstry, but this did. not proceed to the brink of total 
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rupture &s with the unions. Once 84!&in it was the spectre of public 
enterprise which caused the greatest concern. Following the renational-
ization of steel and the setting up of the Industrial Reorganization 
Corporation a 8Jl8.11 group, including Sir Paul Chambers and Arthur Shen-
field',(again), attellpted to establish an alternative line within the 
CBI. The Industrial Policy Group, as it was christened, published a 
number of paJIlphlets attacking public expenditure, high taxation, calling 
for greater profitability and basically extoling the virtues of an un-
controli.ed aarllet economy (IFG, Nos. 1, 2, cl J) •. However, this group 
would bave to wait for the 19'70s for its ideas to colle back into fashion, 
for the CBI .intained friendly, if less than enthusiastic, relations 
wi th the governaent throughout its tem of office (Blank, p. 2JJ). If 
it was uneasy about the introduction of statutory inCOMs policy, even 
though this obviously violat~d. the lXt'1nc.;;p~~ of vol~tari_, ~ effective-
ness of the freeze in holding down wages quickly assuaged any fears at 
least for the short term. By 1968 the CBI was calling for reinforce.ent 
of statutory controls, and with the lapsing of the latter in 1969 it only 
reluctantly returned to the tripartitacformula (CBI, 1968 &: 1970). In 
f 
so far &8 it becaae thoroughly disillusioned with Labour, this uinly 
concerned the failure to pursue legal reform of industrial relaticms, 
which the CBI supported whole.-heartedly (ibid. &: Crouch, 19'77, pp. 227-8). 
If its enthusiasa for planning had. waned over the course of the 1960s, 
this had not a8 yet led to a complete return to the hands-off relationship 
with the state of the early fifties nor to the embrace of pure and saple 
monetarisa. 
Restructuring Capital 
After 1966 the National Plan can hardly be said to have had 8l1Y' in-
fluence on eeoaoaic policy. Following the logic of orthodox deund UIl-
age.ent the govemaent s1aply .oved froll crisis to crisis giving another 
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twist to the deflationary screw with each new sign that the balance of 
payments had not yet recovered. Consequently, the activities to restruc-
ture capital proceeded on an ad hoc basis without the guiding framework 
of the planning programme, but they did proceed. '!he two major arenas 
of restructuring were in industrial and regional policy, tha. t is par-
ticular policy outputs aiming at sectoral change (increasing export com-
petitiveness in manufacturing) and 10catimal changei·.:(funnel1ing new in-
vestme •• into declining areas to achieve Ilore balanced regional growth 
and relieve the pressure on skilled labour markets in solle areas). 
'lbe most important innovation in industrial policy at this pomnt 
was the creation of the Industrial Reorganization Corporation (IRC). 
'!'his institutl):on has been most aptly described as a state merchant bank, 
its character illustrated by the economc links of its leadersbip. Ita 
first Cha.iraan was Lord Kearton,. a -llember of the HEOO and head of Cour-
taulds, while Ronald Grierson, Executive Director of S.G. Warburg, took 
on the post of Deputy Chairman and Managing Director. Later, (now Sir) 
Charles Villiers, another merchant banker (of Schroder Wagg) succeeded 
Grierson at this top post. 
When it was e.tablished in 1966, the IRC had the capacity to draw 
on funds of up to £1.5011, not enough to have a great impact on the cap-
ital market but not negligible either if applied at propitious aomenta. 
Given the thrust of the government' s initial coui tIlents, it had the 
hardly surprising task of "promoting industrial effieiency and profi tabil-
ity and assisting the econo~ of the U.K.," a task it pursued aainly by 
promoting the concentration of capital assets (IRC ~, 1966). 'Ibe prior-
i ties of the IRC were firat tOi.;iaprove the export competi ti veness of 
British industry and second to iIlcrease productivity. 'lbis it atteapted 
to accoaplish by proaoting JRergera of major corporations and by uti ag 
loans which included reorganization as one of their conditions. While 
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IRC money came somewhat easier than that of the City, it sti 11 demanded 
a commercial return and the self-liquidation of all injections in order 
that the IRe might assume financial independence from the state within 
five years. Similarly, it did not take equity holdings in the private 
sector and must be seen therefore as quite distinct from state holding 
companies such as the Italian IRI or the NEB of the 1970s (see Holland, 
1972, for a description of the IRI). 
'!'he case for the IRC was premised on the view that British firllls 
were too saal1 to co.pete in a world increasingly dominated by multi-
national giants. While the government intended it to serve as a cat-
alyst for accelerating the rate of concentration, it like Neddy could 
only achieve results given the co-operation of industrialists. Its 
independence and disinterest as regards labour's politics were consequently 
stressed. Its first Managing .Direotor, Crierson,sought to make it "a 
forum where directors of large companies could discuss their ideas for 
mergers and reorganizations without feeling that they were talking to the 
Government but knowing that public money could be forthcoming (Young and 
Lowe, 1974, p. 41)." In the course of events it took up a more active 
role, serving not just &8 a forum for discussion but actively promoting 
mergers when deemed appropriate to its immediate aas, namely reduction of 
product:.differentiation and increasing the scale of individual enterprises. 
Concentration of market IX>werpand capital assets provided from this point 
of view the pivotal Ileans for all other ends of industrial policy. 
lJhe most spectacular mergers of the late 1960s often occurred under 
the auspices of the IRC or with its financial backing. In electronics 
it prollOtedtthe takeover of AEI by GEe, the merger of English Electric 
and Blllot Autoaation and ultiDately the creation of a "national cha&pion," 
GEC-EE-AEI. In autos it backed the formation of BUIIC with a £25m loan 
to central1.ze the British-owned t1ras in that increasingly troubled in-
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dustry. In ball bearings the IRC took part in a.,l.png, drawn out and 
in its terms successful struggle to bring together three British oomp-
anies, Ransome and Marles, Hoffman, and Pollard, without the partici-
pation of the largest producer in the UK, Skefco, which was tainted as 
a result of being a subsidiary of the Swedish firm, SKF. 'Ibe activities 
of the me in all three branches indicated its implicit aim to foster 
British-owned giants or so-called 'hational champions"(see Holland, 1972), 
rather than approving foreignbid.s or transaational linkages. However, 
since Chrysler was allowed to buy out Rootes Motors, one can see at least 
a degree of flexibility on the question of foreign penetration of Brit-
ish industrial ownership (Young and Lowe, 1974, pp. 74, 75, &: (2). 
It should cOlle as no surprise that the IRC was hardly unpopular 
with large sections of indu8~~ ~pital. Given its independence fro. 
the government, its co.plete_~o~ce ~y re~sentatives of capital, 
its self~blp08ed limitations and the fact that it offered availaltle, if 
niggardly, finance in a tight market. it could. hardly fail to attract 
some support. Why it managed to retain at least a publicly cordial re-
lationship with the City is another question, since it certainly could 
have been taken as an attempt to outflank the financial conserv.atism of 
the latter. No doubt the financial background of much of the IRC man-
agement and their active pursuit of City co-operation helped assuage 
some fears. Yet. since the Conservative government of Edward Heath 
wound up the IRC 800n after returning to power in 1970. one can presW18 
that hostility still existed in at least some quarters of big capital. 
The activities of the IRe may not have resulted in much actual 
reorganization of capital. except in so far as they contributed to the 
aerger boo. or the late 19608 and early 1970s (Young and Lowe, 1974, ch. 
8) • Of course the latter occurred all over the advanced capi tallst world 
and cannot be attributed aiaply to the pro-aoDopoly policies of the 
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labour government. Yet, Labour in no way impeded the trend towards 
concentration and certainly contributed to that movement by both en-
couraging a climate favourable to such developments and providing back-
ing to influence the outcome in several important cases. One should 
also note that the one area later touted as the sole example of success 
in Labour's economic policies, namely the slight increase in productivity 
in the late 1960s (Bacon and Eltis, pp. 8 - 15), can be attributed largely 
to the shedding of labour through the closure of old plant as a result of 
the government-backed merger boom. Paradoxically, this "success" contrib-
uted significantly to the decline of employment in manufacturing which 
more recently has been taken as a key index of British "de-industrializa-
tion (ibid., and George, 1979)." 
If nothing else the emergence of bodies like the IRC and the MEDC 
and their groNing acceptability to business indicated the extent to'which 
. 
regularized state intervention in the private sector had become not just 
a .onal but necessary and desirable feature of- the political economy of 
advanced capitalism from the point of view of major industrial managers 
themselves. In the words of one of the members of the Monopolies Com-
mission, 
What is new is the acceptance of this kind of intervention as a 
continuing acti vi ty • Former ly, it occurred simply for the purpose 
of rescuing industries in danger of collapse. Now the purpose has 
beca.e wider and more ambitious, namely, to raise the efficiency 
and competitive strength of developing industries upon which the 
future well-being of the economy is believed to depend (C.C. Allen, 
1970, p. 162). 
The Ministry of Technology or MinTeCh, as it was aphoristically titled, 
concentated its attention on potential, capital-intensive growth sectors 
as the major iJapulse behind Labour's quest for a new "technological rev-
olution." MinTech specialized as a sponsoring department for these core 
industries, computers, electronics, machine tools and. aanufacturing, 
vehicles and aebhanical engineering, aircraft, am. eventually shipbuilding, 
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where the cost of research, or in the case of shipbuilding simply re-
equipment, had become prohibitively expensive for private firms. Kin-
Tech in general had the responsibility for speeding "the application of 
new scientific methods to industrial production" with the growth of pro-
ductivity in the export field as top priority (Wilson, 1974, p. )0). The 
fledgling British computer industry, for example, received some £1).5m 
in government grants for R & D. 
In the same vein the Industrial ExP!P8ionAct widened the powers 
of linTech to use "loans, grants, guaJ:antees [and] the underwriting of 
losses of the subscr~ptiClrl of share capi :tal" to further expand efficiency, 
productive capacity and technological improvement (lEA, 1968). 'Ibe Act 
thus supple.ented the activities of the IRC. The government first applied 
it to prOllOte a DB. tional cOllputer holding company, lC (Holdings). Ltd., 
wi th & l~ stake by the state. I18rgiag~-the: computer intexests of English 
Electric, Plessey and lCT. Labour also encouraged the developl1eDt of 
alWlliniWll BIle 1 ters as a substitute for iaports by proldsing loans of up 
to £66m to the firms concerned as well as special electricity rates and 
the usual investMnt and building grants. 
'Ibe shipbuilding industry constituted enough of a special case to 
warrant its own act, the Shipbuilding Indus:b!y Act of 1967, but the style 
of intervention was much the same as above. In the first place the four 
• 
troubled Scottish yards were into a new private group, Upper Clyde Ship-
builders. Secondly, while ostensibly private, UCS received heavy state 
backing, 1ni tially through a guarantee of £4oom in bank loans to those 
shipowners who placed construction orders with U.K. firms and later, 
when that proved insufficient to thwart severe investment and liquidity 
problells. via outright grants. 
In essence then, whether through the IRC, the Industrial Expansion 
Act or individual acts tailored. to the specific needs of troubled indus-
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tries, the strategy of the government hinged on the creation in each 
case of large private monopolies capable of competing internationally. 
They remained in each case legally private but heavily dependent on 
state aid for their very existence and future viability. 'Ibe failure 
of this strategy only became apparent in the first half of the next 
decade, when some of these giants collapsed under severe financial pres-
sure, lIlost notably in the case of UCS and British Leyland. While the 
Wilson government proved extremely reluctant to extend public ownership 
into any new sectors (restricting nationalization to the rather unique 
case of the steel industry), this inhibition did not apply to spending 
vast quantities of public funds to support private accumulation. What 
is notable is that this prograJlJle t despite its relative llaS8iveness in 
coaparison to Tory efforts before and since t proved insuffieient to reverse 
the continued decline of British lI8llufacturing, raising new issues and 
strains for the labour leadership in opposition. the new Conservative 
government siailarly found its options rapidly curtailed by the same 
developments. 
The nationalization of iron and steel offers virtually the only 
exaaple where industry and labour clashed head on. Bothethe Iron and 
steel Federaticm and to a lesser extent the CBI (not to mention the Con-
servative Party) fought the Iron and Steel Act of 1967 through the various 
stages of Parliamentary procedure and implementation without success in 
securing its repeal. At the same time the arguments of those who employ 
this incident as an example of political pluralism., of the lftahili ty of 
capital to force its wishes on the government, lIlUSt be placed in the con-
text of Labour's total record in industrial and econOllic policy (Grant and 
Marsh, lW7 t pp. 168-73 & 203-7). Yes, the nationalization of steel was 
a concession to the wishes of the industry' s unions and counter to those 
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of the managers and owners. Yet , it can hardly be taken as a blow to 
the interests of industrial capital as a whole nor as a step along the 
"red brick road" of socializing the "commanding heights" of the ca pi tal-
ist economic system. For after twenty years in which an effectively 
state corporatist arrangement through the Iron and Steel Board had failed 
to produce the radical restructuring and concentration evidently necessary 
(as indicated by declinj,ng profitability and market share), steel had 
gradually slipped into the classic position of a sick, basic industry for 
which the only viable solution was- public ownership. Recent events have 
of course only confirmed this underlying trend. Nationalization in~ this 
case was far closer to the political mould of volun taristic corporatism 
than Bight at first seem the case, i. e. geared towards retaining a viable 
base for private lI8llufacturing rather than changing the structure of power 
of British society. This and the fact that as usual Labour relied on the 
co-operation of the more flexible leaders of the industry in designing the 
new orsanizational structure offer Boae clue as towwhy the CBI was some-
what reluctant to fight the issue tooth and. nail (McEa.chern, 1S60). 
At the same time that it was promoting mergers and concentration 
via the IRC and other interventionist policies, the Wilson government 
paradoxically attempted to inject a do~e of cpmpeti ti.on into British 
industry by enhancing the powers of the Monopolies Commission. The idea 
here was simply to put pressure on prices through a constant review by 
a public agency. 'lbe Commission also had the capacity to investigate 
proposed mergers, including those promoted by the IRC. However, as 
might be expected, it ended up reviewing only a tiny proportion of the 
mergers that actually took place in the second half of the 1960s and 
early 1970s. Only 20 of the 833 mergers coiling wi thing the scope of the 
Monopolies and Mergers Act of 1965 were actual~ referred to the Commission. 
er these seven were allowed to proceed in any case, seven were voluntarily 
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dropped by the interested parties and only six were found to be against 
the public interest and actually prevented or abandoned in the period. 
between 1965 and 1973. As a result the activities of the Monopolies 
Coamission were very much spitting into a wind, or rather a hurricane 
of JIlergers and take-overs, which left British industry one of the most 
highly concentrated in the capitalist world once the storm subsided 
(Hannah, 1976, pp. 172-7 and Beckerman, 1972, p. 193). 
As regards the control of prices,tthe National Board for Prices and 
Inco.es supported the efforts of the Monopolies Couission. It also 
exercised the power to review prioe rises, although the substance of its 
activities concemed the pr_otion of an incolles policy and productivity 
bargaining. The ultimate impact of both of these bodies on the control 
of prices seeas negligible; the Coaais.'an had little influence, and as 
noted above the imP! interested i tsel! . far more with 1AI8es and shop 
steward autono.y fro. union offiolaldoa than with the pricing policies 
of u.jor fins (see also D. Coates, 1975,· p. 125)· 
Labour also used the more traditional f'iscal incentives as part 
of the general scheme to restructure British capital without actually 
directing it. These were weighted in favour of 1. those branches of 
industry that would contribute to the balance of payments, 2. encouraging 
investment in the Development Areas, and 3. aiding those firms whose 
current invest.ent needs exoeeded their eurrent prof'i ts and therefore 
could. not utilize investaent al10wances to their full extent. Also the 
government felt that invest.ent grants were .ore visible and their iapact 
more immediate, an important consideration when it became clear that 
lI8lly fins appraised their investaent projects on a pre-tax basis, in-
dicating a total lack of consideration of' the available tax breaks 
(Beckeraan, 1972, p. 185). '!'he goverDaent attacked the other end of' 
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fiscal policy by introducing a Corporation Tax to replace the previous 
tax on profits. 'lbe idea were was to encourage the retension of earn-
ings rather than their distribution to share-holders in the hope that 
this would lead. to a higher rate of investllent. Rather than taxing all 
profits at saae rate of ~ (leaving no further burden on dividends un-
less the recipient paid surtax), the new system levied an initial "main-
streaa" rate of 4o,C plus inCOIl8 tax on distributed earnings. Against 
that 4O.\C rate firas could of course deduct the various allawances and 
deferaents for inveataent in new plant, Developaent Area grants, etc. 
(Beckeru.n, ibid.)and ~ and JC1Dg, 1978, ch. 12). 
In the interests of increasing produotivity the governaentiintro-
duced the Selective I.'IIployaent Tax. '!he sgr simply raised the east of 
labour in the servioe eector. owing to a refund given to the aanufacturing 
sector. The ala of the tax, derived froa the theories of Professor If. 
lCaldor, was both to aove labour into UDufaoturing mere productivity 
increases are IlUch aore rapid and en~ capital substitution in the 
service sector by raising labour costs in the latter by some 7%. As noted 
above in the context of the force of concentration and shake-out of eaploy-
aant Wmaanufacturing, the SET totally failed to reveree the tidal aove-
aent of labour froa aanufaoturing into services. Changes in the latter 
years of the government appertaining to these fiscal innovations did not 
~"'their substance but lUl%'ely the rates charged. In DeC8Ilber, 1966. 
investaent grants _re increased froll I.fo to 4, and froll 20 to 2-" inside 
and outside ~ the Developaent Areas. respectively. Likewise, the 
Corporation Tax was boosted froa 40 to 4", and the SET raised twioe 
during the two years of restriction following devaluation. 
'lbe ee40nd aajar area of restructuring polioy, as noted earlier. 
was that which atteapted to influence the locaticm of new investaent in 
order to achieve aore balanced geocra.Jtlical growth and thereby prevent 
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the increasing social ~st of urban concentration in the Southeast 
and the waste of labour through regional unemployment. Regional policy 
remained a subordinate aspect of Labour's economic game plan largely 
because, 
the aajor innovation which the labour Party proposed - that 
regional economies should in some sense be planned--- became lost 
in the wider issue of the management of the British economy, 
and subsequently cif the viability of the National Plan (Becker-
un, 1972, p. 218). 
One should not take this to aean that Labour did not sink a considerable 
aaount of state funds into regional incentives. One &nal,ais of state 
assistance to the private sector int-the Developaent Areas has estlJlated 
the increase over the previous Tory goverruaent to have been in the order 
of ten fold, fro. £3Oa in 1~/5 to sli8htly over £3QODa in 1969/70. Even 
accounting for the fact that 80_ Gf' the increase was due to policies 
ini tiated before the 1964 election -which did not -exert their -full lapa.ct 
for several yeara, the increaent due to Labour was still a&8si ve, in the 
area of 40~ (Hardie in ibid., p. 224). 
The instruments for influencing regional development thus eonsisted 
essentially of fiscal incentives, but the fate of at least one aspect of 
these, the IIitferentlal rate applied to inveswnt grants, indicated the 
11.1 ts of this type of intervention. While it amounted to a consider-
able outlay of state funds, according totthe S&Ile study, "It is likely ••• 
that the investaent grant system did not represent any substantial change 
in the !eTel of incentives to coapanies to switch investaent into the 
Developing Areas (ibid., p. 228)." '!he Regional Emplo)'JIent Pr_iua u.y 
have had SOM iJIpact in influencing decisions about location. It con-
sisted ot a subsidy for labour e.played in the regions, as opposed to the 
invesUent grants which subsidized capital costs. Together they 11&1 have 
reduced total operating costs of private flras in the DeveloPMtnt Areas 
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by up to " if fully utilized (ibid., p. 230). The SET, as mentioned 
above, was eaployed in tandea with the REP to raise the price of labour 
elsewhere in the country. 
'!be governaent had another inst.ru.ent of at least potential effect-
ivity in the control of industrial location, namely the Industrial Devel-
opment Certificates, another relic of the war-time and Attlee era. 
'lhese were issued through the Board of Trade and were required for all 
industrial construction over 3,000 square feet in the Southeast and Mid-
lands and over .5,000 square feet elsewhere. While the discriJlinatory 
use of IOOs obviously could and did liai t industrial construction in 
congested areas, it was a strictly negative control and could not be 
used to direct private capital to build its new plant in the priority 
areas. '!he actual iapact of these Certificates in teras of expanding 
the industrial- base of the decliDPs regions is far fro. clear (ibid. 
pp. 23)-46)· 
If the result of direct controls does not offer much conf1rlaation 
of the effectiv8a8ss of the loeational aspect of Labour "planning," the 
use of fiscal incentives was even more clearly of negative iaportance. 
'!bese suffered f'I1o. the sue insufficiency as licensing controls, the 
inability to direct capital to move in congress with national needs as 
defined by the state ad1dnistration, without having even the lliited 
advantage of the fOl!ller, i.e. restrictive influence. Even as a _ode 
of influence they see. tb have bad little, if any, effect despite the 
aaount of public funds invOibed. Even tiefore they were introduced, 
businesuen consulted by the Richardson ComLittee on turnover taxation 
stated that the possible changes in the fiscal system would have no 
effect on their investaent prograaes (DDC, 196.5, p. 1). Siailarly, 
stuart HollaDd has pointed out at a later date that, for exaaple. 
iD recent evidence to the CoIlllODS J:xpenditure Comaittee Unilever 
aulai tted that 'we are unable to produce evidence frOIl our own 
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experience that the Regional Employment Premium has increased 
investaent or ellployaant in the Development Areas.' Cadbury 
Schweppes submitted that neither labour nor ~pital incentives 
played a major role in location decisions. GKN stated that 'the 
attraction of the incentives has so far been inadequate.' Tube 
Investments·;a&6.d that 'there are not many projects where re~ional 
policy is of critical iaportance to the strategic decision (to lo-
cate).· Univao stated that 'we would have gone to a Development 
Area regardless of the grants offered.' And Dunlop frankly adJIlitted 
that it made a surplus froll J;egional aid which was useful for in-
vestment elsewhere (Holland, 1974, p. 4). 
Vi th the deaise of the la tional Plan the various measures enuaerated 
above, which attempted to facilltate the restructuring of capital along 
locatiooal and sectoral dimensions, were not integrated within a directive 
prograaae of action. None the less, while they were implemented in an 
ad hoc manner, they did imply a strategy or at least an order of prior-
i ties of the Labour governaent. In the first place, all of the various 
aspects of industrial and regional policy reUined within the bounds of 
voluntaristic corporatiSll, relying on the co-operation of the more l'pro- . 
gressive" sectiClll8 of industrial capital and fiscal incentives rather 
than coercive sanctions iJaposed from above or popular control iJIlpos8cl 
from below. As argued above, even th,e sole exception to this rule, the 
ease of steel, confirms its general application. Secondly, the underly-
ing logic of ad hoc intervention was to boost the profi tabil1 ty and coa-
peti ti veness of industry, mainly through concentn. tion or the encourage-
ment of national private monopolies, with only the Most paltry and insig-
nificant attempts to control the new giants or ensure so_e principle of 
accountability in the private receipt of vast state funds. 'lbirdly, in 
its rather thwarted attempts to influence corporate investment program.es 
the state reaained strictly within a supportive rather than directive role. 
deaonstrating in consequence the effective liaits oftthi8 mode of inter-
vention and initiating the gradual movement away froll taxing company pro-
fi ts which would reach its logical extreJIe in the middle of the neat decade. 
Most significantly, the pre-eaine.nt objective of the governaent 
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was to control the cost of labour, mainly through an incomes policy 
that would keep the growth of wages be line with that of productivity. 
The implementation of an incomes policy, however, soon met with a for-
midable barrier, the defensive strength of working class organizations 
especially at the plant level. For in the course of the post-war perilod 
a network of informal bargaining arrangements at the local rather than 
national level had emerged as a major determinant of actual pay rates. 
This "second tier" in the "industrial relations system" put limits on 
how far the "first tier';" naaely trade union officialdoa, could accoJl-
Ilod.ate the deaands of the state. '!he Labour government's successive 
efforts to exert control over at least this aspect of the national pro-
duction function led to the increasing awareness that under the given 
set of relationships its hands were tied from below as well as above. 
Given ita f'untiuental collllitaent to support a capitalist mode of produc-
tion, the focus of the governaent shifted irresolutely towards legal 
changes aiaed at centralilting the bargaining structure and curbing auton-
omous shop-floor mill tancy, paradoxically pushing the TUC in a greater 
co-ordinating role in opposition to state direction of industrial rela-
tions. Ultiaately, the Party had. to abandon this implicit stzategy, 
which had led it froll voluntary restraint supervised by the 'IUe to legal 
controls SUbordinating trade union leaders to the administrative machine, 
leaving office with only a highly unstable arra.ngeaent of "bargained 
corporatiu" in which the TUC agreed to implement some e&ntiral direction 
inlline with the recollllendations of the Donovan COJDlllission (Crouch, lm, 
pp. 16)-6 & 237-43)and Panitch, 1976, ch. 7 & Conclusion). It was left 
to the lncoaing Tory governaent to reintroduce that legislation in a 
aore punitive fo ... 
'ftleoretical Evaluation ot Labour Planning 
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In terms of the model outlined in the first chapter the experience 
of Labour planning saw first the completion and then tl'B partial break-
down of the innovations first instituted under the Conservatives along 
the dimensions of input}· output and mode of procedure. which I have termed 
voluntaristic corporatism. Along the representational axis Labour simply 
attempted to make tripartism work with no significant institutional 
changes, Le. the DEA did not itself incorporate the triparti te;:-agency 
into the state apparatus as that reuineci the function of the NEOO. In 
this Labour achieved considerable initial success with the Statement of 
Intent and the voluntary incomes policy of its first two years. However, 
once the government veered off course in the 1966 sterling crisis, its 
resul tant unilateral actions and the virtual alIandolUlent of triparti 1;8-: 
negotiations put severe strain on its relations with both industrial cap-
i tal and organized labour, the llatter in p&rticular bearing the brunt of 
the crisis aeasures. Labour lI&de no atteapt to alter the corporate bias 
of the tripartite institutions retained fro. the earlier Conservative 
govern.ent (the BOO and EOOs), and even its innovative agencies (the ImPI, 
the lEA, the IRC) u.de few concessions to trade union representation or 
outlook, pursuing instead the 8&IIe general objectives, i.e. productivity, 
increased profitability, wage control and the concentration of capital. 
'nle atte.pt to introduce aeasures of unmon refon over the heads of the 
TUC ushered in a new era of relations between the ~eand organized 
labour, one of dissension and conflict, that of course intensified under 
Heath in 1970-74. '!be resulting disruption and virtual revival of open 
class warfare UDseen since 1926 highlighted a crisis of representation 
which in effect began under Labour in 1966. 
In tems of the state's econollic function Labour proved .ore inter-
ventionist in ita approach than the Tories but equally constrained in the 
end by the It-its set by capital and labour to the prograruae of voluntar-
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istic corporatism. The aovement towards some form of central co-ordin-
ation of economic policy of course collapsed under the impact of the 
July crisis of 1966 leaving only ad hoc intervention along various 
lines. Where it breached the limits of acceptable policy as regards 
some sections of capital, e.g. the nationalization of steel and the IRC, 
such measures did not constitute a significant threat, and indeed the 
latter organization enjoyed considerable support by the time the Con-
servatives returned to power. The government of course never attempted 
to institute a progr&llJlle of directive state intervention, let alone any-
thing 811&cking of a transition to socialism, but restrained state actions 
to a strictly supportive role vis l vis private accumulation. Even those 
acts which received an unfavourable reception among the more hostile 
sections of industry and finance were fralled in terms of reinforcing not 
underainiDg the authority and competi ti veness of Bri tiBh capital. Inter-
vention on the side of labour was at the same time a much greater threat 
to the freedom and independence of working class organizations, and, as 
argued above, the move in the direction of statutory controls was a direct 
result of the failln"e of plannin8 andtpolitical dominance of national and 
international finance imbedded in the existing structure of the state and 
its external relations. However, here as well the negative strength of 
the union soveaent prevented any dramatic or perraanent move in this di-
rection, leaving the government politically bewildered and exhausted by 
the tiae of the 1970 election much as in 19)1 and 1951. 
The internal changes in the structure of the state administration I 
have exhaUstively described. above. Briefly, the "technocratic" apparatus 
was brought into the state sphere with the creation of the lEA. The a.ia 
here, as with the o~ institutional innovatiClls of labour, was in es-
sence to -tunctianalize" state expenditure and policy to the requi%eMnts 
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of private capital accumulation. Likewise, the refinement of public 
expenditure surveys with the institution of the Public Expenditure 
Survey COJUlittee (which will be described in detail in the next chapter) 
followed this fundamental logic. However, the unwillingness or inability 
of the government to establish the hegemony of the DEA over all aspects 
of policy formation, the demise of anything resembling a framework of 
national planning and the consequent recurring disruption of policy an~ 
expenditure prograues by the state of alJaost constant crisis undermined 
virtually complete ly all of these efforts. In the end Labour could not 
escape the fundaaenta1 fact that it had not disaantled the basic strac-
ture of power and the continued doainance of the traditional power block 
of financial capital. Throughout the course of the sixties each orieis 
reasserted the priorities of the City and redirected the governaent away 
from its electoral progr&lllle and down the path preferred by the dollinant 
agents of capital. 
'lbe labour governaents of 1964-70 failed to provide a progruae of 
iDdicative planning IlUch &8 the post-war IOverDJllenta had failed to iBsti-
tute "deaocratic planning." One need not dig too deep:::'for the reasons 
beneath the iIlpaS88 of Labouri8ll. The noru.l. exercise of state power in 
a capitalist society occurs within strict lWta. Pre-eainent aaong these 
are the legal re!ations which delineate the private ownership of productive 
capital. Even if one accepts the arguments about the "II8ll8g8rial revol-
ution," which I do not, the following comment of' the "mangerialist~"rBi-
ward Mason, seetRS apt. 
though private ownership may no longer carry with it control, 
it does guarantee corporate management against BloSt of the polit-
ical, ainisterial and legislative interference that COIIIlonly besets 
public UD8paent. Perhaps in a corporate society this is becoa-
ing one of' the prilulr,y contributions of private property (cited in 
Shonfie1d, 1965. p. 379). 
If the l8ga1 separation of the private sector has allowed the state 
rather aeagre instruaents for influencinc the BOurse of' the accwmlation 
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process, the international expansicm of capital, the development of 
new fo%'lls like the multinational corporation, have thrown the insuffi-
ciency of the national state as it presently exists into sharper relief. 
The power of internaticmal agencies has already been dealt with to the 
extent that their activities are a known quantity, '!be growth of multi-
national capital has brought into question, however, even the limited 
efficacy of aacroeconoaic aaasures as practiced in the political economy 
of post-war capitaliSll. 'lbrough transfer pricing, leads and. lags in 
internal payaents across national bounderies, these giants can play havoc 
vi th the nOrllal controls on the balance of payments, reserves, etc. '!bere 
already exists evidence that they ware becoming the central actors in the 
farce of speculation against the pound in the 196Os, asvell".&S other 
currencies. They are equally in a position to by-pass monetary policy 
through generating funds internally or utilizing international credit, 
as noted early on in the evidence to the Radcliffe Couittee (see also 
HollaDd, lW5. ch, 3). '!bese new giants were to have a greater part 
in the next decade's drama, one which unfortunately reinforced the trad-
i tional point of view and dominant position of British finance, as we 
shall see. 
In essence Labour failed to plan the economy because the leadership 
of the Party assUlled that it was possible to direct a capitalist econollY 
while relying on deaand ID&Da&ement, fiscal incentives, exhortation and 
the co-operative attitude of big capital and the unions. Without the 
instruments to plan there could be no effective planning systel1. By 
the end of the decade not only planning but the entire array of macro-
econoaic policies identified by the logo€;of Keynesiani8ll had come in-
creasingly into disrepute as the simultaneous pursuit of the goals of 
full emploYMnt, growth, price stability, auatained investllent and 
balance of pe.yaents equilibrium proved intractable. Clearly, this entire 
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mesh of policies had reached certain limits in the context of the 
decline of Brita1h's economic structure, the limits set precisely by 
the exercise of class power in a class society. To achieve any further 
advance of a planning 1Il8chanism would imply the enhancement of the state's 
degree of autonGIIlY from the dOllinant structure of power, It would neces-
sitate a direct confrontation with the traditional power block, presumably 
using the organizations of the labour .ovement as the shock troops of 
any new offensive. Whether the Labour Party could rise to that challenge 
in the 1970s is a utter into which we shall delve shortly, Cert&in1y, 
the record of the sixties did not bode well for any renewal of a planning 
initiative in the next decade, in which the eosts of failure would prove 
even greater fro. the stand point of both the legitimacy of the Labour 
Party and even parliuentary de.ocracyand the rights and conditions of 
the British working class. 
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CHAPIER EIGHT 
The City and Industry to the 1970s 
The Dynamic World of Finance 
Throughout the 1960s the position of sterling and the City altered 
radically, transforming in turn the context in which economic policy 
would be formulated in the 1970s. Put at the most general level the 
loss of sterling's protected position in the countries of the old Empire 
and its final eclipse by first the dollar and then other "strong" 
currencies in both its reserve and transaction roles finally registered 
in the consciousness of both the City and the Civil Service. At the same 
time the City regained its international prominence as a major, if not 
the major, financial @hleiepet. As strange argues, four developments 
were intertwined in this process of financial restructuring, all of 
which had a negative effect on the balance of paymentsl. In the first 
place there was substantial investment overseas, especially into the 
sterling area. As an international investor Britain was second only to 
the United States and far ahead of its nearest competitru;.. In the late 
fifties and early sixties, this investment amounted to a substantial 
burden on the external account , although by the end of the decade re-
patriated income was balancing capital outflow. Reflecting the gradual 
demise of merchant banking from the end of World War I and the rise of 
multinationals in the IX>st-World-War-II period, this investment was over-
whelmingly direct rather than portfolio, a point to which we will return 
shortly. In the 1970s once again direct investment rose considerably, 
this tim~reflecting the changing orientation of British capital, 
directed increasingly into Europe. 
1. 'Ibe following draws heavily on Strange, chapter 4. 
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Secondly, the disintegration of the remnants of the Empire had 
manifold repercussions. The gradual decay of sterling's reserve role 
among the sterling area countries could not be staved off any longer, 
and by the end of the 1960s the latter had diversified into other 
currencies. Particularly after devaluation in 1967 the pressure to 
drop sterling as a reserve currency became insurmountable. The 
realisation that it was possible to separate the reserve role of the 
pound from its transaction role in world trade or even jettison both 
no doubt reduced alarm and despondancy in financial circles as is clear 
in the following passage from The Banker (1967, p. 10)1): 
A decline of the reserve role of sterling need not be too 
damaging to its use as a wor14 trading currency. Bri tain remains 
a great trading country, and it will contine to be convenient 
to transact a great deal of world commerce in sterling. 
Similarly, the attractions of the City of London as a financial 
centre will survive the devaluation of sterling. Its remarkable 
success in Euro-currency business in recent years is evidence, 
if it still be needed, of its enterprise and adaptability •• 
The pound will still be used as a leading world currency for 
trade and finance. 
Similarly, a few years later the Govemor of the Bank of England 
noted that "we came to the conclusion some time ago that it was right 
that we should not seek to perpetuate the use of sterling as a reserve 
currency" (Bank of E~land Quaterly Bulletin, 1972, p. 8)). He continued 
to explain that 
A distinction must be made between the reserve role of sterling 
and its trading role, and a decline in the former does not 
necessarily lead to a decline in the latter. Even more 
important, the past decade has shown that the City can flourish 
and expand .intemationally even when sterling is weak, and 
the international use of sterling is being curtailed. (ibid. p. 85) 
Thirdly, the dissolution of the Empire was also expressed 
politically through increased government spending abroad for military 
and economic purposes. While this might seem paradoxical, the point is 
simply that the period of transition to "home rule" for the former 
colonies necessitated increased military and political involvement 
to secure regimes friendly to British and Western interests. '!he burden 
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of the state's overseas payments has been frequently cited in the past 
but what is less commonly recognised is the mutually reinforcing 
tendencies of foreign political involvement and the international role 
of the pound. 
The fourth development was the revival of London as the 
international financial centre of Europe, increasing the volitility of 
short-term capital flows and preparing the way for the eventual divorce 
of the fortunes of the City from those of the pound. London emerged in 
the sixties no longer an instrument for funneaing British capital abroad 
but primarily as an international financial entrejX)t. The City prospered 
as never before, but its international transactions were increasingly de-
nominated in currencies other than sterling. In fact the most spectacular 
growth area was in the Eurodollar and Eurobond markets, i. e. markets in 
short and long-term credit denominated in dollars and often held by 
foreigners. The breakthrough for Eurobond dealing came in 1962 
following the decision by the Bank of England to allow issues of securi';'·, 
ties denominated in foreign currencies in London. Subsequently, new 
issues of Eurobonds rose from ~l34m in 1963 to ~3,368m in 1968 with 
most of the secondary trading centred in London as well (Strange, 1971, 
p. 205). '!he Eurodollar market likewise became centred in London where 
perhaps half the transactions have taken place. While estimates of the 
volume of business are notoriously imprecise, the Eurocurrency market 
as a whole (including currency denominated in DM and others) grew from 
its inception in 1958 to something like ~20 billion in 1966, ~ billion 
in 1969, ~91 billion in 1972 and ~132 billion in 1973. In comparison 
the entire UK money supply in 1972 equalled about ~54 billion (Samuels 
et al, p. 270). Of course, London did not become the centre for these 
markets simply out of tradition but OWing to British policy, which 
unlike that of European governments, directly encouraged the inflow of 
Eurodollars and allowed the formation of a direct link between the 
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foreign and domestic credit markets. Eurodollars were drawn to London 
because of the high interest rates, where they could be switched into 
sterling and where holders of sterling could get state-supported 
insurance against a fall in the rate of exchange (Strange, 1971, p. 213). 
In more recent years the proportion of Eurocurrency business 
centred in London may have declined somewhat, due mainly to the increasing 
importance of non-dollar Eurocurrencies, to the decline of on-lending 
by US banks in London to their head offices owing to restrictions imposed 
by the Federal Reserve, to the easing of credit conditions in the US, 
and to the rise of foreign currency lending by British banks to British 
residents. One state-funded report which noted this changing situation 
went on to recommend the encouragement of multi-currency holding on the 
part of City institutions and suggested as possible counteractions 
"a revival of sterling as a trading and investment currency, and an 
initiative by British-based banks to develop a European Currency 
Unit market centred in London!' (IBRO. pp. 2-12). 
In the sixties the economic policies of successive governments 
were dominated by the same priorities that governed the entire pre-
war period, namely an "open door" for the City and support for sterling 
in every possible way. This does not imply that conflict did not occur 
over economic policy. As I have argued above this conflict did take 
place, although opposition forces, led by various economists but with 
significant backing from industrial capital, never succeeded in 
overturning the established structure of power. The divergent po si tions 
were expressed as the maintenance of sterling as against the need for 
growth, alternatives which were posed against each other for the 
remainder of the decade. While various governments, particularly 
Labour, a.pprecia.ted the dilemma. and hesitated in introducing 
deflationary policies, when the crunch came they invariably supported 
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sterling and clamped down on domestic demand 
also Ka1dor, 1971.) 
and investment. (See 
While the policies of governments of both parties ostensibly 
aimed at defending the international role of sterling and the existing 
exchange rate, they ultimately failed at both tasks. In fact in many 
ways they encouraged the substitution of the dollar as top currency 
in that American banks were allowed to open many branches in London 
and expand their business tremendously. Similarly, the lack of 
restrictions on capital flows encouraged the growth of the Euro-credit 
markets. !be growth of American multinational firms no doubt also facil-
itated the worldwide use of the dollar. At any rate by the beginning 
of the 1970s sterling was finished even as an international transactions 
currency, but the City was prospering despite the loss. 
While the growth of the Eurodollar and Eurobond markets was the 
key feature of the 1960s, it in turn was a prime factor behind various 
other changes in the structure of British financial institutions and 
theT competitive strategies, mainly by way of eroding the boundaries 
between and within national financial systems. First among the related 
features was the growth of the so-called secondary and parallel markets. 
Stimulated initially in the late 1950s by the return to convertibility 
which permitted the entry of short-term money into London and by the 
requirement that local authorities finance a greater share of their 
short-term borrowing from private sources, the parallel markets thrived 
in the 1960s as a means for avoiding the official restrictions of the 
discount market and, as far as lenders were concerned, for receiving 
higher interest rates. !be growth of issues of and secondary markets 
in certificates of deposit (eDs) illustrates the interaction of inter-
national and domestic financial systems in this process. First intro-
duced in the United states primarily for corporate users, New York 
banks began to issue CDs in London for their multinational clients. 
Following their success in City markets legislation was passed allowing 
the issue of sterling CDs in 1968, which subsequently grew to a total 
of some £5,100m by July 1974 (Channon, 1977, p. 14). While the 
growth of parallel markets both in dollars and sterling (and eventually 
other denominations) attracted a good deal of business to the City, 
it also brought certain disadvantages and dangers, chief of which were 
the lack of security on such loans and of a lender of last resort. 
The influence of the state authorities on such markets, which had 
emerged largely to avoid official control, was at best indirect, a 
feature symptomatic of a deeper crisis which we shall return to at the 
end of this section (ibid., ch. 1 and McRae and Cairncross, 1973, 
ch. 4). 
In the same period and for much the same reasons as the 
growth of the Eurocurrency and parallel markets the City experienced 
a massive invasion of foreign, especially American, banks. Securing 
a beachead in the early 1960s foreign financial institutions expanded 
their activities and assets at a phenomenal pace in the latter years 
of the decade and into the 1970s. By 1975, 244 foreign banks had 
established operations in London, more than half after 1967. Of these 
58 were American, 23 Japanese and a further 35 from the EEC countries. 
The assets in sterling and foreign currencies of these institutions 
totalled £69,800m in the same year, some 53% of the total banking 
sector (British and foreign) in the UK, while the assets of American 
banks alone (at £33,600m) exceeded those of the London clearing banks 
(Channon, lrn7, pp. 150-1 and The Banker, Nov. 1975). By 1979 
despite the squeeze on profitability through the high sterling rate 
and the feeling that the foreign presence might be near the point 
of saturation, the number of foreign banks had grown to 328 of which 
72 were American, 24 Japanese and 64 from the EEC. London's status as 
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a world financial centre was further confirmed by the fact that only 15 
of the top 100 banks in the world did not have a branch in the City. 
The total assets of these institutions had now reached £130,172m, up 
to 56% of the total assets for all banks operating in the UK. Their share 
of sterling advances, while growing steadily from 13% in 1975 to 16% in 
1979, indicated their continued concentration in the foreign currency 
markets, where they accounted for 77% of the advances by all banks 
(The Banker, Nov. 1979). The only serious rival to London as an 
international financial centre by this point remained New York with 
somewhat fewer foreign banks represented (2]4) but only 11 of the top 
100 not having direct branches. The spheres of influence of the two 
centres also differed somewhat, reflecting historical patterns; New 
York retained stronger representation from Latin America and London from 
the Middle East, Indian sub-continent and the socialist countries (The 
Banker, Feb. 1980). 
In this hot house environment the structure and strategies of 
British financial institutions were forced through rapid mutations. 
The intensely competitive context dovetailed with state policy in the 
late 1960s, as the PIS challenged the traditional embargo on mergers 
in the financial sector with the (then) surprising approval of the 
Treasury and the Bank of England. There followed a major merger boom 
(as with the rest of British capital), the first sine the 1930s, The 
most dramatic of these was the fusion of National Provincial and 
Westminster, fourth and fifth ranked of the big five, in January 
1968, which brought th~ resulting National Westminster into first 
position in terms of total deposits. However, the attempt to merge 
Barclays, Lloyds and Martins a month later was blocked by the 
Monopolies Commission, although Barclays was allowed to absorb Martins 
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as a sweetener. Within a few months the Big Five had become the Big 
Four (nearly the Big Two), and various other smaller banks had 
disappeared in the process, creating a new structure of clearing banks 
which has remained fairly stable since then (Channon, 1977, pp. 42-4, 
and Committee of London Clearing Banks (CLCB) , pp. 20-25). As a result 
Barclays and National Westminster ranked fourth and fifth in the world 
in total assets behind only the big American banks (Bank America, First 
National City and Chase Manhattan), while Midland and Lloyds were 
placed somewhat further down the table at 22nd and 32nd, respectively 
(The Banker, June 1971). By the end of the 1970s the strength of the 
Japanese and to a lesser extent the German and French currencies 
contributed to the banks from these countries displacing the British 
(even more so the American) banks in the top :fJ. Bar.clays had dropped 
to 19, National Westminster to 21, Midland to 41 and Lloyds to 47 in 
the world stakes (The Banker, June 1979). Yet, within a yea:r, again 
partly due to currency realignments, Barclays had returned to the top 
ten at ninth, National Westminster, 11th, Midland 26th, and Lloyds 37th. 
This rapid return to the front runners was not simply due to sterling's 
new found status as a petro-currency, however, since in terms of pre-
tax earnings all four British clearers ranked in the top ten with 
Barclays and National Westminster the world leaders C:), a point to 
which we will return in the next chapter (The Banker, June 1980). 
strategically as well the clearing banks had to innovate rapidly 
in order to match the services offered by their foreign, especially 
American. rivals as well as take advantage of the possibilities offered 
by the new wave of computer technology. On the one hand they diversified, 
];8rlicularly into services to the corporate sector including credit 
finance (through either investment in or total purchase of finance 
houses) , factoring. leasing. merchant banking (through purchase as 
in Midland's acquisition of Samuel Montague and the Dray ton Group or 
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through building up internal divisions), investment management, other 
non-banking services like travel and insurance, and finally multi-
national expansion, which we shall return to shortly. The adoption of 
merchant banking functions was reflected in the growth of contractual 
term lending to the corporate sector, particularly after the introduction 
of competition and credit control (see below, ch. 9) ended quantitative 
restrictions and allowed access to wholesale deposits in 1971. 
Contractual loans to non-personal borrowers increased from nearly 
27% to over 40% between 1973 and 1976. On the other hand the 
clearing banks increasingly shifted to a divisional structure, especially 
in correspondence with their multinational extension, decentralising 
bureaucratic management, reorganising each division, whether geographically 
or product-based as separate profit centres, replacing non-executive 
with executive and professional directors, in short, adopting the corpor-
ate structure of modern capitalist multinational enterprise 
(Channon, Im, pp. 44-61, and CLCB, chs. 2, 8, and 13, and Table 59). 
Under these circumstances the merchant banks could hardly cling 
to their status, and well-established traditions. While in the early 
post-war years they seemed destined to remain locked in the languor 
and slow decline that had set in during the inter-war decades, the 
revival of the City after 1958 spurred them as well into rapid growth. 
The return to convertibility, the relaxation of exchange controls, 
the emergence of the Eurocurrency and secondary markets, the development 
of corporate and export credit finance and the expansion of' fund 
management with the rise of institutional investors all of'f'ered scope 
for increasing the business and activity of the merchant banks. Several 
years before the clearers they had initiated a series of take-overs and 
fusions within their own ranks. '!hey likewise rode high in the merger 
wave that swept through the whole corporate world in the mid-to-late 
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1960s with the agressive but not exactly stately firm of Slater 
Walker setting a somewhat notorious style in this particular field. 
However, by the early 1970s the inherent limits of merchant banking, 
particularly their very narrow capital base, began to pose very practical 
questions about their future in the increasingly cut-throat world of 
international finance. IMarfed financially by the clearing banks and 
the foreign invaders they attempted to defend their position through 
diversification into the same services, i.e. those mentioned above, 
plus leasing and factoring, insurance, and, of course, property develop-
ment. However, these activities merely contributed to the blurring of 
traditional lines of demarcation in, as the Radcliffe Report once noted, 
the single market for credit, a process confirmed and encouraged by the 
introduction of CCC. While most of' the staid members of the Accepting 
Houses Committee managed to say clear of the eventual collapse of the 
property market in 1974, a few well-known names did go under, such as 
Keyset' Ullmann, Edward Bates, William Brandt and for somelllhat different reasons 
Slater Walker. As a result of these various pressures many of the 
merchant banks began to forge closer links with the clearers sometimes 
through absorption, as in the above-mentioned case of Midland, but 
more often through strategic financial holdings, while others pursued 
the same tack with either foreign financial or other industrial and 
commercial groups. Given the late adoption of diversification and 
divisional organisation and the overwhelming limits of size, independent 
merchant banking was very nearly in its death bed ~ the end of the 
decade (Channon, 1977, ch. 4 and C.J. Clay and Wheble, 1976). 
Taking a more global view British finance was better placed to 
meet the other major challenge of the late 1960s and 1970s. namely 
the development of multinational facilities and operations. '!he 
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merchant banks of course had their roots in the interstices of internation-
al trade, although from the inter-war period through the 1950s their 
emphasis had shifted to domestic activities. From the late 1950s they 
redeveloped an international posture, first through export finance, 
then through the Eurocurrency markets and finally for defensive reasons 
against encroaching competition through establishing direct operations, 
correspondent linkages and consortium associations abroad (Channon, 
1977, pp.137-141). Again, though, size and the aggressive move of the 
clearing and foreign banks into traditional activities of the merchant 
banks hampered the growth of the latter in the 1970s. While in 1970 
six merchant banks counted in The Banke~ top 300, by the end of the 
decade they had all dropped out (The Banker, June 1971, and June 1979). 
The remaining British overseas banks fared somewhat better. 
Following the merger which set up Standard. Chartered in 1970 the latter 
moved fr:omits base in Africa and-the Far and.Middle East into Euro-
market, European and American operations, consolidating the latter in 
1979 through the purchase of the California-based Union Bancorp, holding 
company for Union Bank, the 25th largest in the us. Falling somewhat 
in the middle years of the decade it managed to regain its rank of 59th 
by 1980, aided large ly by the recent acquisition. Grindlays likewise 
diversified its activities geographically and functionally, most 
notably through the purchase of' the merchant bank Wi1liam Brandt. The 
latter, however, was badly wounded in the secondary crash of 1973-4, 
and Ci ti bank (now Ci ticorp), the senior partner with Lloyds in the 
joint ownership of Grindlays, moved in to tighten its managerial hold 
on both Grindlays and its merchant subsidiary. Still, by the end of the 
decade Grindlays remained 174 in the world league, down from 121 in 
1970 (The Banker, June 1971 and June 1980, and Channon, 1977, pp. 104 
and 13.5-7). 
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The clearing banks likewise had an international dimension in 
the past, but as with much of British industry it had been traditionally 
located in the Commonwealth and other developing countries in historic 
spheres of British influence, whereas the growth markets of the post-
war years lay elsewhere. With the gathering intensity of foreign, 
especially American, competition they again, like their industrial 
counterparts, began to rapidly adopt multinational strategies by the 
late 1960s, although these varied depending on international presence 
and organisational structure. On one end of the spectrum Barclays, 
which had the strongest international base through Barclays reo, 
pursued the most committed indepeadent multinational strategy. starting 
from its existing branch network, which again was biased towards Africa 
and the Caribbean, it bought out the remaining shares in Barclays 000 
(renamed Barclays Bank International), expanded its American and European 
operations and shifted the emphasis of its business abroad from retail 
to wholesale and corporate banking. At the same time it did co-operate 
with other financial institutions to the extent of joining the ~pean 
banking "club", Associated Banks of Europe Corporation (ABECOR) and 
through it various consortium ventures. Midland at the other end followed 
a consortium approach, establishing correspondent relationships with 
other foreign, especially European, banks and participating in the 
founding of various consortium banks, starting in 1964 with Midland 
and International Banks, Ltd. (MAIBLE). Particularly through its par-
ticip:l.tion in the correspondent club, European Banks International 
Company (EBIC), it it gained large commercial and (with the colla.pse 
and majority buy out of Franklin National in 1974) retail operations 
in the United States, not to mention various other consortia in 
Europe and the Middle and Far East. By 1973 it too began to open 
representative offices in other financial centres and created a 
separate international division within its own organisational structure 
(Channon, Im, ch. 7 and cum, chs. 2 &: 12 and tables 48 and 49). 
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Lloyds and National Westminster chose intermediate paths lead.'ing 
increasingly towards the Barclays approach of establishing a direct 
overseas network. Eschewing consortium or club linkages Lloyds ran down 
its Latin American business, merged together and bought out minority 
interests in its overseas subsidiaries to form Lloyds Bank International 
in 1974, and like Barclays purchased a retail bank on the American 
West Coast in the same year, renamed Lloyds Bank California. National 
Westminster was originally handicapped by the lack of an international 
dimension but pursued an aggressive overseas strategy planting branches 
in the major financial centres of the US, Europe and the Middle and Far 
East and taking a 20% holding in a leading consortium bank, Orion (ibid.). 
In April 1979 it consolidated its international push by purchasing 
the National Bank of North America, a retail bank with 142 offices 
in New York City (Mergers and Acquisitions, Vol. 14, No. 3, p. 76). 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s it seemed as though the 
consortium and club linkages mentioned above offered a major arena for 
future development, not only in Britain but throughout the advanced 
capitalist world. However, they were largely defensive in inspiration, 
mainly against the American banks with their multinational structure 
and diversified services. The consortium banks lacked unified direction 
and financial control in the decentralised mode of the multinational 
corporation. In the financial panic of 1973-4 they suffered a particular-
ly severe liquidity squeeze, as depositors perceived their weaknesses, 
fearing particularly that parent or central banks might not support 
overseas subsidiaries if things got tough. While consortium banking 
survived that particular crisis, the trend since then has been away 
from loose groupings and towards streamlined organisations specialising 
in investment and merchant operations and particular product and 
geographic markets (Channon, 1977, ch. 9). By the mid-1970s the more 
significant trend was the movement of the clearing banks away from 
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short-term retail business and towards short and medium-term service 
for international corporate clients. Emulating the American "global 
financial conglomerates" like Citicorp they diversified geographically 
and shifted the core of their operations into the traditional provinces 
of the merchant banks, engendering severe problems for the latter 
(ibid., ch. 10). While somewhat late in adopting a multinational strategy 
and a universal banking structure, the clearing banks weathered the storms 
of the early 1970s and have since consolidated a new basis of strength, 
as the statistics and recent purchases enumerated above indicate. 
The approach towards and eventual entry into the EEC in 1973 
constituted an additional aspect of the changing political-economic 
environment in this period. As with the rest of British capital 
the City shifted towards a pro-European position in the middle of the 
1960s when the pattern of future market development became clear. 
The perceived interests of finance and-industry dovetailed in this 
particular case and corresponded, moreover, with the reassessment of 
British foreign policy that took place in the Foreign Office, the 
Treasury and the Bank of England at the same time, particularly after 
devaluation in 1967 (Jessop in R. Scase, 1980, pp. 70-4). 
The prospect of Britain joining the EEC in conjunction with the 
transformation of the international economic context described above 
prompted a re-evaluation of the traditional attitude of British finance 
towards among other things the exchange rate of the pound" An article 
by John Cooper in The Banker postulated that "whatever happens to the 
sterling exchange rate, the City of London expects to gain from the 
I 
I 
Common Market," and foresaw further deva.luation as a necessary condition 
of entry (The Banker, 1970, p. 1180). The same article noted the 
developments behind this reversal of attitude on the part of ~ 
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capital, namely "the almost complete divorce which has taken place in 
recent years of the fortunes of the City of London as an international 
financial centre from the fortunes of the pound sterling" (ibid.). 
In his explanation of the basis of this outstanding development he went 
on to note, 
The prosperity of the City's international business depends 
in large measure on the willingness of the various British 
authorities to treat the City as an 'off-shore' island outside 
the controls imposed on domestic financial institutions; the 
failure of other financial centres to compete effectively for 
the City's international busibess results at least in part 
from the unwillingness or inability of other national 
authorities to take such a flexible line. The City thus has 
a strong interest in seeing that whatever institutional and 
regulatory arrangements are developed within the Common Market, 
it preserves the independent, 'off-share- position vis-a-vis 
those arrangements that it cUrrently enjoys vis-a.-vis the domestic 
monetary arrangements in Britain (ibid., p. 1185). 
A speech given a year later by the Governor of the Bank of 
England on "The City and Europe" struck some similar themes. Effectively 
scotching the notion that with British integration into the EEC sterling 
might become "the reserve currency of Europe", he expected the City 
to prosper despite the reduction of sterling's reserve and transation 
roles. In particular the liberalisation of direct investment into the 
EEC and the expected rise of complimentary investment into Britain 
offered certain opportunities. He mentioned as well that, 
There is likely .~ '.J.. to be a notable increase in investment 
by other EEC countries in those parts of the world that have 
traditionally looked to London as their source of finance, 
principally the countries of the Commonwealth and of the 
sterling area, a mobilising of resources for that investment, 
there will be ample opportunities for the financial institutions 
of the eity to make use of their established connections 
(Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 1972, p. 85). 
Perhpas the most interesting document analysing the rapidly 
changing international context and setting out a European strategy 
for banking capital was the report of the Inter-Bank Research 
Organisation (IBRO), The Future of London as an International Financial 
Centre. Commissioned in 1973 by the Central Policy Review Staff (the 
governJllent "Think tank',), this set of papers offered a unique statement 
by those who saw themselves as City strategists. For that reason 
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we should investigate its proposals in some detail, although the report 
cannot be taken as the consensus view of banking capital but rather a 
programme promoted by the more articulate and farsighted spokesmen 
of the City. 
In the most general terms the IBRO report saw the future as one 
in which a number of international financial centres, primarily London, 
New York and Tokyo would emerge, each servicing a major region of the 
capitalist world. London, it was assumed, should develop its links 
with the European financial system, not attempting to centralise all 
financial business in London, but maintaining the City's advantages and 
therefore its lead, while not discouraging financial activity elsewhere 
in Europe. 
Thus a policy of encouraging unified financial markets in 
Europe, the free movement of trading and investment funds between 
Europe and the rest of the world, and a growing level of business 
in other European and world financial centres, will be the 
policy most likely to promote the long term commereial interests 
of London and the United Kingdom's ~inacia1 services as a whole. 
It will enable us to contribute our special skills and experience 
to the European eommuni ty while maintaining our traditional 
outward-looki~ political stance in international affairs 
(IBRO, pp. 1-3). 
It also foresaw the possibility of a hardening of these traditional 
groupings into regional discriminatory blocks, a possibility which 
has become more real in the present depression, but hoped to avoid 
this alternative since it would be "a serious blow to London's inter-
national position as a financial centre as well as to the United King-
dom's wider international interest~ (ibid.). 
The divorce of the activities of the City from the fate of the 
pound (and even the dollar) was also emphasised in the report as the 
basis for a needed re-orientation in the future planning of Eritish 
banking md the relevant state agencies. Noting the historical links 
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between London's role as an international financial centre, British 
trade and particularly the export of capital and the international use 
of sterling, it argued that the City could no longer rely on these as 
bases for its future operations • 
..•• insofar as the strength of an international financial centre 
may continue to depend on its country's role as an international 
trader and exporter of capital, London will have to look in the 
future to the whole of Europe as its hinter land. But , it will 
be equally important to promote London's role as an entrepSt 
financial centre [my italics], through which funds are channelled 
from one foreign country to another and whose services are used 
by foreign countries to facilitate their financial transactions 
with one another. Indeed, this may well be London's critically 
important future role (ibid., pp. 1-8). 
!BRa saw these developments as tightly interconnected with the 
need for the City to become a multi-currency centre. Given the instabil-
ity and likely decline of the dollar the danger lay in the possibility 
that the growing use of strong national currencies, e.g. the German 
mark and Swiss franc, could shift the international currency business 
towards other European financial centres. While remarking that 
British financial institutions had in any case picked up much business 
transacted in currencies other than sterling and the dollar, it none-
the less articulated the need for further state encouragement of this 
process. 
It may be desirable for the government to encourage a 
considerable expansion of business in Eurocurrencies other 
than dollars, the development of the forward foreign exchange 
market to handle longer term deals, a significant increase in 
the number of institutions operating in London that are 
permitted to undertake foreign exchange dealings, the intro-
duction of multi-currency clearing facilities, and the 
adoption of a common European currency unit for financing 
internal and external Community trade and investment. In 
other words, the government and the City should probably regard 
London's future role as being that of a multi-currency financial 
centre, rather than one whose activities are based primarily 
on sterling and the dollar (IBRO, pp. 1-20). 
In the same vein the report saw the commitment towards harmoni-
sation of financial institutions and policies within Europe as a 
potential danger which could be turned to the City's advantage if 
harmonisation led to the general liberalisation of financial controls 
-307-
and not equivalent retriction. This in turn posed the question of 
the need for co-ordination of City interests within the EEC and the 
British state, the adequacy of the Bank of England as the traditional 
agent of banking capital and so on. However, we will return to these 
considerations shortly. 
With regard to the changes in international business activity, 
IBRO emphasised the growth of multinational operations as the most 
significant trend, in particular because it was altering the demand for 
financial services in international trade. Compal'lies operating in 
several countries had to manage their cash flow on a multi-currency 
basis, taking account of different tax systems, exchange rates and other 
national differences requiring different financial services than the 
one-country firms of the past. 
This is one reason why international and multi-national banks 
are now beginning to emerge - to serve the growing dema,nd for 
international financial services. Another main reason is that 
sources of supp-ly funds (Le. the capital and money markets) 
are also becoming international •••• We have seen the creation 
during the last few years of international consortium banks 
and of international groupings (such as that in which Bancodi 
Roma, Commerzbank and Credit Lyonais are participating) which 
could well be the first steps towards the single, merged, 
multinational banks of the future. Similar developments are 
taking place in insurance. The chairmen of various European 
stock exchanges have said that they envisage the steady 
development of closer links between London and other stock 
exchanges (IBRO, pp. 1-17). 
It went on to note that the location of headquarters of these future 
multi-national institutions would strongly influence what city would 
emerge as Europe's financial centre. While the significance of these 
b!.nking consortia was understandably overst& ted at the time, for the 
rest· the repbrt accurately forecasted the development of London over 
the rest of the decade. As noted above the continued success of the 
Ci ty in sharp contrast to British industry by the early 19&Js hinged 
largely on its capacity to adopt many of the proposals recommended in 
the report, not that the latter was anything more than an impressive 
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witness to this process. 
The final feature of the changing political-economic context 
which in turn had a dramatic effect on the formulation of British econ-
omic policy in this period was the collapse of the world monetary order 
that had existed since the Bretton Woods Conference at the 
end of World War II. In truth the multilateral world system had been 
in trouble ever since its crowning moment, the retu~ to British and 
European convertibility in 1958. The growing deficit on the United 
States balance of payments through military and government expenditure 
(especially as the Vietnam conflict hotted up), the renewal of US 
foreign direct investment and eventually the deterioration of the 
balance of trade began to take a growing to11'.on US gold reserves, as 
the dollars pumped into the world economy were converted back into a 
more secure asset. In short the very process that more than anything 
spurred the revival of the City from the late 1950s was at the same time 
undermining the world monetary system as the inflated dollar became 
an' increasingly unstable reserve and transaction medium. When the 
devaluation of the pound in 1967 unleashed an expected wave of 
speculation against the dollar and a rapid drain of US gold reserves, 
the American government responded with a unilateral and increasingly 
beligerent economic measures against the other main capitalist 
powers. Starting with capital controls in January, 1968, the Johnson 
administration within a few months dissolved the gold pool (the agency 
for stabilising the dollar-gold exchange rate in London) and consequently 
introduced a two-tiered market for gold, retaining the ~J5 per ounce 
exchange rate only for the official market. At the same time various 
advisors within the administration began to formulate plans for a tariff 
surcharge on imports and for the use of political and economic 
muscle' to force countries with balance of payments surpluses to 
absorb the full brunt of the inevitable exchange rate adjustments 
(F. Block, ebs. 5-8, esp. pp. 193-202 and M. Hudson, chs. 10 and 11). 
By August 1971, the Nixon administration effectively encapsulated 
this new "passive" strategy towards the balance of payments, 
announcing the "end of US hegemony" with its New Economic Policy 
(Sweezy and Magdoff, 1972, pp. 197-212). This quite simply knocked 
down the twin pillars of the multilateral world regime; it broke the 
link between the dollar and gold by closing the official gold window, 
and it imposed the l0}6 import surcharge muted a few years earlier. 
Following the British example ("we are all Keynsians now") Nixon like-
wise imposed wage and price controls to demonstrate his resolve to 
fight domestic inflation and thus support the existing dollar excha~ 
rate. After three months of diplomatic wrangling in the wake of this 
shattering announcement a Group of Ten meeting at the Smithsonian 
Institute in Washington in December 1971, agreed a new package which 
involved mainly concessions to the Americans. A slight devaluation 
of the dollar against gold and the removal of the import surcharge 
were more than matched by further revaluations of the Deutsche Mark 
and the Japanese Yen. However, despite Nixon's proclamation of the 
meeting as "the most significant monetary acheivement in the history 
of the world It; this new system of 'bentral' fixed exchanges with wider 
bands for minor fluctuations lasted only a few months before first 
the dollar and then the pound came under renewed attack. By mid-June 
1972, the pressure on sterling could not be contained, and from 2) June 
the pound was floated, falling to a (then) record low of $2.)2 by 
october. In early 1973 pressure shifted back to the dollar, and the 
US government had to negotiate another currency realignment that 
included a l~ devaluation of the dollar. As this failed to stop the 
speculation, the Germans, who had received the brunt of the 
run from the dollar agreed to a joint float of EEC currencies against 
the latter, the final nail in the coffin mf the Bretton Woods regime 
of fixed exChange rates (Block, Ope cit., Ba1ogh, 1973, pp. 26-45 
and Strange in A. Shonfield, 1976, pp. 320-,54). 
-)10-
The Emerging Crisis of British Industry 
While British banking overcame its moment of crisis in the early 
1970s and raestablished itself at the forefront of international finance, 
the progress of industrial capital was not so auspicious. This~ not 
to say that the.'post-war period was one of stasis for British industry, 
far from it. The industrial sector as much as the financial experienced 
strategic and structural transformation and for much the same reasons. 
Again the impetus for change originated in the erosion of traditional 
markets at home and abroad, the intensification of international competition 
that accompanied the establiShment of a multilateral world trading 
regime and the invasion of first American, then European and Japanese 
multinationals. British entry into the EEC both confirmed and gave 
further encouragement to this process. However, the capacity of British 
industry to reverse its historic decline seemed increasingly remote 
by the late 1970s. Despite (or partly because of) government efforts 
in the past two decades the United Kingdom's share of world trade in 
manufactures continued to fall from 12.7% in 1960 to 8.6% in 1970 
and 7.0% in 1978, reflecting rates of growth, productivity and invest-
ment that continued to lag behind her main competitors. The ratio"of 
manufactured imports to GNP grew from 4.6% to 14.2% over the same period. 
(cambridge Economic policy Reyiew, April 1979, p. )). 
In this increasingly competitive environment British industry 
had to adapt rapidly simply to stand a reasonable chance of survival. 
Whereas the slump of the inter-war years had encouraged inter-firm 
collusion through cartels and the erection of political barriers by 
way of Imperial Prefernce, both of these forms of restricting competition 
expired slowly but inexorably in the post-war decades. Multilateral 
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trade agreements such as GATT, changing patterns of trade and the 
overseas expansion of American and other multinationals gradually 
eroded the protected markets of the sterling block, which in any case 
were relatively stagnant, a process which culminated with Britain 
joining the EEC. The share of visible exports destined for the Overseas 
Sterling Area (OSA) countries declined from )4.6% in 1963 to 19.5,% 
in 1973, while the EEC proportion of the total grew from 21.1% to 
31.% in the same period. By 1978 the EEC was absorbing 38.6% of 
British visible exports, partly reflecting the inclusion of new members 
to the Community but significant none the less. Similarly, the 
developed countries of the world together received over two thirds of 
British exports by the latter date, and the British share of OSA imports 
suffered a corresponding decline (CSO, 1974, p. 11 and 1979, p. 20). 
At the same time most cartels simply disintegrated in the 1950s under 
the twin pressures of post-war expansion and the anti-restrictive 
practices legislation of successive governments, although some 
(like GEC - AEI - EE) hung on into the 1960s (when the three fims 
merged together with the support of the Labour government) ( Hannah, 
19'76, ch. 9, and Jones and Marriot). Concentration of capital 
and diversification mainly into related product and geographic markets 
now replaced e&rtelisation and tariffs as the prime means of controlling 
competition with most of the top manufacturing firms adopting multi-
national and multidivisional forms of orgarisation by the early 1970s. 
'Concentration proceeded rapidl~ particularly in the merger boom 
of the late 1960s. '!he share of the largest 100 firms in manufacturing 
net output leaped from 2~ to something over 40% between 1948 and 1970. 
However, this trend did not arise primarily out of technical economies 
of scale reflected in a ];aralle 1 increas~ in plant size. '!he share 
of the 100 largest establishments (factories) in manufacturing net 
output remained virtually constant at around l~ from 1930 onwards. 
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While there was a tendency for the size of the "typical" plant to 
grow, it was not of the same magnitude as the growth rate of the largest 
firms, and, moreover, was accompanied by a spreading of the "central 
range" of sizes which account for half of manufacturing employment. 
To put it simply the trend in plant size had been far too diffuse 
and ambiguous to account for more than a small fraction of the pattern 
of concentration in manufacturing enterprises. (Prais, 1976, chs. 1 
and 3, and Hannah, 1976, ch. 7). Financial factors appear to have been 
of far greater significance in the rapid growth of the major industrial 
firms. These financial pressures included the growing proportion of 
industrial shares held by institutional investors and the rising 
gearing ratio (ratio of long term loans to equity capital) of industrial 
firms (both of which we shall look at more closely below) as well as 
the need to spread risks and diversify operations in the face of foreign 
and domestic competition and the greater vulnerability to take~overs as a result 
of the dilution of equity held. by owner-directors (Pr~is, 1976, ch. 5). 
The impression that financial aspects were largely responsible for 
rapid concentration in the industrial sector is reinforced by the close 
correspondence between the latter and merger activity in the 1950s 
and especially the 1960s (not to mention the 1920s) (Hannah, 1976, 
ch. 10). The combination of these factors meant that by 1970 the 
typical large industrial concern had pursued a pattern of growth less 
by means of internal expansion than through acquisition of or merger 
with other firms and was thus comprised of a multiplicity of plants 
and formerly autonomous enterprises of varying sizes. 
The strategies and structures of these dominant manufacturing 
corporations followed a corresponding evolution. Starting in the 
electrical, chemical and engineering industries in the early post-war 
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years diversification into new product and geographic markets spread 
throughout the industrial sector by the late 1960s. In 1970, 94 of 
the top 100 manufacturing firms had diversified to some extent from 
their original product lines, 72 had adopted a multidivisional structure 
in some sense and some 50 were operating in six or more countries 
(Channon, 1973, ch. 3). Yet, diversification was essentially a defensive 
response to foreign competition and a simple consequence of the merger 
activity and growth through acquisition described above. More often 
than not it was not part of a consciously planned strategy "but more a 
sequence of ad hoc opportunistic moves almost in desperation to gobble 
up potential sources of entry into related product markets" (ibid., 
p. 240). Moreover, diversification and merger were accompanied at best 
initially by extreme decentralisation as represented in a holding company 
structure where the head office operated virtually as a banker to the 
various divisions, leaving all non-financial decisions to local (often 
formerly independent) management. In 1960 for example Channon estimates 
that some 40 firms in the above population had. adopted a holding 
comJ8llY structure (ibid., ch. 3). While this proportion undoubtedly 
declined over the next decade, it seeIllS likely that the formal and 
rather simplistic classification system employed by Channon among 
others has overestimated the trend towards centralisation and 
di visional structure in the American mold. Much of British industry 
in other words has retained the decentralised mode of operation char-
acteristic of the holding or "federal" company despite the rapid 
concentration of capital in the past thirty years, a structure which 
has proved remarkably resilient in the face of Chronic difficulties 
(Child and Francis, 1977). 
The underlying logic of this particular path of structural 
evolution has been illustrated in an examination of several motor 
components suppliers in Midlands engineering industry, a study which 
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almost certainly has wider implications. On the one hand financial 
concentration overcame the limits imposed by the traditional practice 
of self-financed investment as corporate finance departments utilised 
the greater assets of the merged firms to obtain easier access to both 
the increasingly active debenture markets and state subsidies while 
at the same time preserving existing trading alliances with motor 
manufacturers and thus securing market outlets. On the other the re-
tention of decentralised control in such areas as manpower management, 
labour relations and production supervision served the dual purpose 
of satisfying the aspirations of (formerly independent) "enterprise" 
management by retaining traditional lines of authority and promotion 
as well as recognising the long-established but localised power of 
workplace and shop steward organisations. In pursuing such a strategy 
(if it can be called such as it was really a sequence of ad hoc responses 
to mutually reinforcing pressures from various sources) management 
could minimise and contain conflicts which otherwise might disrupt 
production runs, marketing deadlines, etc. (Loveridge, 1979). However, 
the perpetuation of this fragmented control structure also precluded 
the introduction of planning procedures and this correspondingly 
prolonged the short-term profit; production and market orientation 
which at least some authors have associated with the long-term decline 
of profitability in British industry. Similarly, changes in productivity 
by way of "rationalisation" of the components industry in the 1960s 
occurred mainly through "the elimination of many small establishments 
that did not come under the 'umbrella' offered by the federal company" 
with the remaining firms registering only small increases (ibid., 
p. 21). 
The structural transformation of industrial capital in the 1960s 
thus did not resolve the cumulative problems associated with its 
relative decline vis-a.-vis its main foreign rivals. Briefly stated 
financially inspired concentration could not in and of itself overcome 
-315-
the barriers to greater competitiveness. the latter consisting primarily 
of financial dominance in state economic policy formation, the historic 
separation of the financial and industrial sectors and the defensive 
capacity of working class organisations particularly at the point of 
production. While I shall return to the questions of the relations 
between finance and industry and economic policy in the next sections, 
it is the issue of the effects of worker organisation that I wish to 
consider briefly at this point. For the historic weakness of British 
industry became the focal point of economic and political controversy 
in the 1970s as stagnation in the level and rates of growth of prod-
uctivity, investment and GNP combined with the related problems of 
import penetration and a deteriorating balance of payments to produce 
a situation of virtually permanent crisis. First noted by two neo-
Marxist economists the decline in pre-tax rates of return mf British 
industrial and commercial companies was disguised until the early 
1970s by the use of accounting techniques which had not adapted to a 
period of high inflation (G1yn and Sutcliffe. 1972. ch. 3). Briefly 
stated. rates of return must be measured net of stock appreciation 
and capital consumption at current rather than historic costs if one 
wants to take account of their "real" rather than inflated values. 
i.e. the surplus available for investment or diBtr~bution to share 
holders. . ' While these 1Bsues were hotly debated in recent years, at 
present at least a broad consensus exists on the predominant trends 
(King, 19'75. Panic and Close, 1973. G1yn, 19'75. Burgess and Webb, 
1974). On the basis of the most recent estimates pre-tax real rates 
of return on trading assets showed a long term secular decline 
from around 12!C in the early 1960s, to about ~ in the early 1970s. 
They fell Sharply to ~ in 1974-76 as accelerating inflation and 
economic slump prompted a liquidity crisis. from which point they 
revived slightly in the recovery of 1977-78. However. by 1979 
rising costs (especially of raw materials) and the appreciation of 
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sterling had eroded British competitiveness to such an extent that 
the rate fell to ~, the lowest ever recorded. The share of pre-tax 
profits in domestic net income has demonstrated a parallel trend, 
although the decline by this measure was less sharp, reaching a% by 
1979 (Bank of England ~terly Bulletin, June 1980). 
Whether measured as a rate of return on trading assets or as 
a share of domestic income the long term decline in pre-tax profitability 
undoubtedly had a severe affect on investment (ibid., Dec. 1978). 
The valuation ratio ('q'), which is a summary measure of the relationship 
between the real rate of return and· the cost of capital, likewise 
declined slowly in the 1960s and early 1970s as the cost of capital 
rose while the rate of return dropped in 1974. Since that date this 
ratio has remained below unity, indicating a low incentive to invest 
(ibid., June 1977, and June 1980). '!he average post-tax rate of return 
did not, however, register the same collapse as the other measures 
of profitability in the 1970s. Reflecting the reduction of the burden 
of company taxation following the extension of 100% allowances on plant, 
machinery, ships and aircraft across the country and the introduction 
of retrospective stock relief in 1974, post-tax rates fluctuated between 4 
and ~ from 1965 onwards, down somewhat from the early 19608 but more 
or less stable. Stock relief proved particularly important in this 
regard as without it the post-tax rate of return would have been close 
to zero in the years after 1974 (ibid.). Indeed, this measure so 
completely mitigated the burden of "mainstream" corporation tax 
that by 1977 
the situation had been reached where for the 'average' 
industrial company corporation tax [had] effectively been 
abolished. Many of them [had] negative taxable profits 
while still being in a position to pay dividends, and [were] 
building up unrelieved tax losses which they will carry 
forward to offset future years' tax (Kay and King, 1978, 
p. 198). 
The question remains what relationship did this (by now) wel1-
documented decline in profitability before tax have with trade union 
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organisation and the growing militancy of workers from the late 1960s. 
Glyn and Sutcliffe in their original analysis offered a fairly 
unambiguous view on the causal links between the two. They argued 
that increases in money wages cut into profits from the mid-l960s as 
firms were unable to pass on the subsequent rise in costs as higher 
prices because of the similtaneous intensification of international 
competition (Glyn and Sutcliffe, 1972, pp. 59-65). The main problem 
with this suggestive but rather simplistic argument is that real 
wages after tax were more or le66 stagnant in the 19606, even declining 
between 1965 and 1969 when Labour pursued a fairly effective policy of 
income restraint (Cambridge Economic Policy Review, No. 2, p. 26). 
During the same period productivity was rising on average J' per 
annum, so the direct relationship postulated by Glyn and Sutcliffe 
between workers' income and the decline in profitability seems 
implausible. 'nle intervening variable here is the growth of state 
receipts, particularly in the form of taxes on income from work as 
the combination of a progressive income tax structure and inflation 
drew more manual workers into (higher) taxable brackets. Planned 
state expenditure, especially on investment, did not increase to the 
same extent as tax receipts, as governments of both parties chose 
neither to raise the former nor to cut the latter to fully even out 
the discrepency. Put slightly differently employers' costs were set 
by the growth of grOSS money wages, while demand for their products 
was determined by the smaller rise ',in net wages. These conditions 
would ce-terhr paribus produce excess capacity, and employers could 
only either raise prices to meet costs and thus lower real demand, 
or not raise prices the full extent and accept lower profit margins. 
'Ibe latter course seems to have been the one followed, partly no 
doubt due to the extent of international competition noted by Glyn 
and Sutcllffe, and partly because the true extent of the drop was dis-
gUised by current aa:ounting practices. This in turn contributed 
to rising unemployment by the early 1970s, as it inevitably hit planned 
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output growth and future investment (Jackson et aI, 1978, ch. 3, 
especially pp. 101-), and Panitch, 1977). 
Thus the relationship between real wages and real profit rates 
was not direct but mediated by state management of the economy, namely 
the effects of orthodox Treasury policy of treating inflation (also 
closely related to the effects of taxation and real earnings) as a 
problem of excess demand (or lately monetary growth) (ibid.). 
In 1971-72, 1974-76 and probably 1979-80, the wage explosions that 
followed periods of severe restraint did result in post-tax wage rates 
at settlement rising above the overall trend rate of 0.7~ per annum 
and in that sense probably contributed to the acute profitability 
and liquidity crisis in the middle·years of the decade (as well as 
the one predicted for the near future). For the most part, however, 
the trend rate in real wage growth has remained below or roughly 
equal to that of production per head, and the decline in profitability 
is more readily explained by the depressed demand forcing firms to 
operate below normal capacity, thus incurring higher unit costs 
(Cambridge Economic Policy Review, No. 5, Ch. 3). The main point of 
the argument still holds; that worker demands for higher wages in and 
of themselves cannot explain the decline in the rate of profit; actions 
taken by state agencies are critical in determining the distribution 
of income to various factors and the overall level of demand, both 
of which impinge directly on profitability. 
A weaker ~ersion of this argument seems more plausible, namely, 
that the defensive power of labour organisations not only impeded the 
structural adaptation of British firms, as described above, but 
precluded the resolution of the CFisis of the 1970s through a reduction 
in real wages. The ability of workers to defend their living standards 
as represented by the above trend rate of real wage growth despite 
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growing unemployment and successive governments' attempts at ''voluntary'' 
or statutory wage policies, meant that unions and local organisations 
constituted at the very least a barrier to certain kinds of "solutions" 
to the growing problems of profitability, inflation and competitiveness. 
Similarly, the historic pattern of industrial 
relations and the widely diffused tradition of worker influence (if 
not control) at the point of production almost certainly contributed 
to the relatively slow diffusion of new techniques and low growth of 
productivity that has characterised the manufacturing sector for some 
decades (Kilpatrick and Lawson, 1980). In any case the perceived power 
of labour organisations combined with the severe problems of the 
manufacturing sector no doubt contributed strongly to the hardening 
of industrial attitudes in the 1970s •. Increasingly the post-war settle-
ment and the politics of a "producers' alliance" became untenable as 
industrialists saw lower inflation and wage reductions (even at the 
cost of higher unemployment) as their only salvation from the profits 
squeeze, and worker aspirations for even a moderate rise in real 
incomes proved "unrealistic" in the face of virtually stagnant output. 
These, then, were the tensions between industry and labour which 
underlay the political conflicts of a rather dismal decade. 
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The Changing Relationship of Industry and Finance 
Various authors have maintained that the historic separation 
of industry and finance outlined in earlier chapters has broken down 
in the post-war era as personal and financial ties proliferated between 
the two sectors. My prime concern is the political relationship between 
banking and industrial capital, but, since I have argued that their 
distinct political priorities have had in some sense an economic 
foundation, the proposition that the two sectors have joined at the 
economic level ought to have important implications regarding their 
political conflicts (or lack of them). Traditionally Marxists have 
followed Hilferding and Lenin in arguing that especially for 
imperial powers advanced capitalism is ,characterised by a fusion between 
these two fractions, as indicated by the term finance capital 
( Hilferding, 1968, and Lenin). From 'this perspecti-we large capital 
is not divided ''horizontally'' between sectors o;r: circuits but "vertically" ! 
between weakly competing (or' co-operating) interestcblocks, each of 
which are composed of a closely knit group of industrial, financial 
and commercial firms. Evidence for this view is typically drawn from 
a few main sources, interlocking directorships, shareholdings by 
financial institutions and to a lesser extent kinship connections and 
"social networks" as described by school and university attendence 
and club affiliation. In general this evidence is marshalled to show 
the fundamental unity of the dominant elite underlying the fairly 
superficial divisions into interest groups, and the strategic position 
of finance in this web of interconnections. 
In the British case several stUdies have demonstrated the extent 
of interlocking directorships in the post-war period "as the spheres 
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of finance and credit have become increasingly integrated with the spheres 
of production and trade" (Aaronovitch, 1961, p. 37). Interlocks are 
particularly characteristic of large corporations which are not 
family controlled. More significantly financial institutions are more 
closely integrated, and the interconnectedness of major industrial 
firms increases significantly when their common links with the former 
are taken into account (ibid., ch. 3, Barrett Brown, ,1968, and 
Whitley, 1<714). Thus, from an interest group perspective financial 
institutions, especially the merchant banks, play a crucial role 
integrating disparate industries and coordinating their broad financial 
strategies. This view is reinforced by the fact that many of the links 
are of recent origin and associated with the involvement of the 
City in the frenetic merger activity of the late 1960s (Spi~lberg, 
chs. 2 and 3). Kinship connections and social networks suggest sub-
stantially the same picture as again there exist some significant 
differences between the two sectors. Directors of large &a.ncial 
institutions, especially merchant banks, are more tightly connected 
on kinship lines drawn from the traditional aristocracy and more 
exclusively recruited as demonstrated by educational background and club 
memberships , although as regards kinship industrial and financial 
directors together show about the same degree of integration as the 
City taken on its own (Whitley, 1974, and Stanworth and Giddens, 1974). 
Looking at share ownership the growing importance of financial 
institutions, especially insurance companies, investment and unit 
trusts and pension funds has been frequently noted. Between 1963 and 
1975 personal holdings in British companies fell from 54 to 37.'" 
of market value, while those of financial institutions rose from 
30.",c to 4&', and pension funds alone grew from ~ to 17%. According 
to one estimate by the end of the present century institutional 
investors might hold as much as 70 to 8SC of the u.rket value of 
UK equities (Wi1son Cow ttee, Progress Report, 1977, pp. 20-1). 
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Marxist theorists have generally concluded from this sort of 
evidence and parallel research with regard to other Western countries 
that banking and industrial capital are increasingly "fused" and that 
the former exercises strategic control over the latter in the resulting 
interest group formations. This rather simplistic perspective has, 
however, been effectively criticised for failing to take account 
of the rather distinct national paths of capitalist development and 
for conflating the process of centralisation of capital with the forma-
tion of a "personnel union" in which financial directors sit on 
the boards of various corporations. '!he total picture is thus one of 
necessary evolution towards the active direction of the economy by an 
evef smaller circle of financiers and industrialists with the former 
presiding. 
Sweezy has argued that this predominance of finance capital 
in the sense of detailed and direct control over financial controls 
might be true of certain periods of capitalism, namely those 
charcterised by extensive combination of capitals which typify in his 
terms the transition from competitive to monopoly stages. After the 
period of transition the function of issuing new securities, the source 
in his view of the banks' strategic position in the control of capital, 
declines in significance while self-financing becomes the major means 
for raising investment funds. Thus, with these internal sources of 
additional capital at their disposal co~rate managements are to a 
greater or lesser degree freed from their dependence on the market 
for new securities as a source of capital, and by the same token they 
are freed from their dependence on bankers (Sweezy, 1968, p. 267). 
This treatment of the problem of periodisation is as inadequate 
as that of Hilferding and other Marxists, however, on at least two 
groundS. As is clear from the above statement Sweez;y, believes that 
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once capitalism has matured concentration will take place only through 
the process of accumulation and not through the centralisation of 
capitals. Empirically, the post-war period and especially the 
merger boom which began in the 1960s have made nonsense of this claim. 
although it is largely true that self-financing is still the major 
source of capital for industrial corporations in the UK and the US. 
On the Continent, however, internal sources have not assumed the 
significance that they did in the latter two countries, as we shall 
document below. His inability to see the possibility of variation 
reflects as well the theoretical inadequacy of his presentation, the 
transi tion to "monoploy capitalism" as a unilinear, evolutionary 
development from childhood to maturity. Sweezy's generalisations about 
"monopoly capitalism" are as coloured by national experience as 
Hilferding's treatment of "finance capital". Neither offers a theory 
of periodisation capable of coping with the variations that have 
actually characterised capitalist development at different times and 
in distinct national contexts. 
Scott has offered a more sophisticated and in my view preferable 
version of the "finance capital" thesis. In his view the above 
evidence indicates the existence of several complementary trends. In 
Britain as elsewhere in the advanced capitalist world strategic control 
is passing from personal to impersonal forms as indicated by the shift 
from direct family majority ownership to minority but controlling 
ownership by "constellations of interests". Financial intermediaries 
play a pivotal role in this transition through the growing proportion 
of company shares they hold as well as their central position in the 
"communications network" of interlocking directorships. The influence 
of financial institutions thus occurs not by way of direct management 
of industrial and commercial companies nor as a conscious strategy, 
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but rather as the unintended consequence of a particular set of rela-
tions and informal practices (Scott, 1979, especially chs. 3 and 4). 
Scottts argument here draws from that of Hussain and Thompson, who 
reach parallel conclusions from a rather different point of departure 
(Hussain, 1976, and Th9mpson, 1977). For these authors the term 
finance capital defines a particular articulation between banking and 
industrial and commercial capital in which the former is dominant. 
This set of relationships requires certain precondition~ including 
primarily 1. the existence of a markot for financial assets, 2. the 
centralisation of finance capital and the development of specialised 
financial institutions, and ). the development of fiduciary and 
credi t money, which together serve to extend the sphere of credit in 
terms of volume, time period and coverage of other sectors of the 
economy. As such finance capital can be institutionalised in 
different ways, whether through the mechanism of long-term loans and 
close organisational tits between banks and industry as in many 
Continental countries or the medium of an extensive stock market 
and organisational separation characteristic of Britain and to a lesser 
degree the US. In either case 
the dominance of finance capital rests on the existence of 
a wide spectrum of credit forms and an extensive credit network 
which affects the distribution of means of production in all 
branches of production (Hussain, 1976, p. 15). 
'1ha.t is, it is the lending and bOXTowing -practices of the financial 
sector that constitute their particular mode of economic control or 
effective possession. These practices determine where accumulation 
can take place (internationally as well as nationally), whether 
investment funds are raised internally or externally, and whether 
external funds come as shares, loan capital (bonds and debentures) 
or short term bank loans. Even firms raising a large proportion of 
investable funds from retained earnings are subject to at least an 
indirect constraint in that the informal practices of finance capital 
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determine what counts as a prudent or acceptable performance, and hence 
a firm's financial viability as measured on the stock exchange. As 
Thompson points out, "'Reasonable' profit margins must continually be 
returned otherwise a run on the company's shares can ensue in which 
takeovers loom" (Thompson, 1977, p. 268). 
The latter versions of the finance capital thesis are a vast 
improvement over the more orthodox varieties and offer a useful frame-
work for investigating the relationship between the financial and in-
dustrial sectors in Britain, despite certain promina~t-weaknesses. 
In Scott's formulation the question still remains to what extent does 
the growth of interest constellations, impersonal control and a network 
of interlocking directorships actually affect the performance of modern 
large corporations. As I argued above financial factors obviously 
influenced the pattern of concentration in British industry. However, 
the mode of "operational control" of "effective possession" at the 
point of production cannot be adequately explained without reference 
to other factors, like the customs and strategies of enterprise 
management and worker organisations. Moreover, as I argued above, 
these patterns at the local level have functioned as a constraint and 
significant influence upon the mode of strategic control exercised 
by central office management. Secondly, in putting the case for a 
generalised mode of financial control Scott as well as Hussain down-
play national differences in the way in which the relationship between 
finance a.nd industry has been institutionalised. 'Ibe same is true of 
at least the theoretical argument proferred by Thompson, although the 
bulk of his evidence points precisely to the significances of the 
form of institutionalisation and the related practices of financial 
insti tutions as regards the performance of industrial and commercial 
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t . 1 corpora ~ons • In what follows I will argue that the institutional 
separation and the structure of relations between finance and 
industry in Britain have continued despite the existence of the 
various trends noted above. The frequently announced "fusion" of the 
two sectors has been premature, although certain changes may herald 
a more closely knit relationship in the near future. Finally, the 
institutional separation of the two, the form of economic relationships 
and consequent practices has had real effects On industrial 
performance and posed a significant barrier to the regeneration of 
British capitalism. 
One can best perceive the effects of the institutional se para-
tion of finance and industry by looking at the mode of financing 
investment. In the first place British investment in domestic 
manufacturing industry is low by comparison to the other main capitalist 
nations. Over the period 1966-71 gross domestic fixed capital formation 
in the UK was approximately 5~ of that of Germany and ~ of France. 
In 1972 investment levels per capita were £28,200 for the FRG, £20,400 
for France and £12,000 for the UK (Samuels et al, p. 2). As an average 
over the years 1960-72 the percentage of GDP devoted to manufacturing 
investment was for the UX-).8..', FRG - 4.~, France - 6.9,C (not 
including 1972), the US - ).1%, Japan - 8.9,C. Italy - 6.4%, Belgium -
5.j% and the Netherlands - 8.~. In other words the only major 
capitalist country with a lower percentage was the United States, and, 
as that figure e»udes public investment it should be discounted 
(NEDO, 1975, p. 11). Investment is of course not the only factor in 
1. A more recent elaboration of the Thompson/Hussain argument resolves 
this particular contradiction, and much of what I have to say below 
is in broad agreement with their conclusions, even if it does not share 
their epistemological framework (See Cutler et al t Vol. 11 t 1978). 
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in expanded accumulation, growth or national competitiveness. In 
particular I argued above that productivity constitutes another 
important aspect and that traditional shop floor practices. union 
organisation and defensive power, etc. could be taken as a sufficient 
constraint on productivity growth. However, the level of investment 
is bound up with productivity in a way which makes it difficult if not 
impossible to isolate one variable from the other. One can at least 
claim that a low level of investment, ceteris paribus, will place a 
limit on growth and productivity. As one study of finance and invest-
ment put it from a somewhat different perspective, 
••• it should be appreciated that even if the British worker 
or trade uniorist is not as co-operative as those in some other 
countries, if he only has half the amount of equipment and 
machinery to work with as his Europea.n counterpart, he and the 
country are already at a disadvantage before one takes into 
account anything else at all, let alone nebulous notions like 
national character (Samuels et aI, p. 13). 
Not only has British investment, especially in manufacturing, 
been low both in absolute and percen~ terms by comparison with 
her main competitors, but it has followed the same secular decline -
as the trend in profi tabili ty in recent years. Gross and fixed capital 
formation for industrial and commercial firms fell from around 
9 - l~ to under 7% of their fixed capital stock in the period 
between 1960 and 1976 (Bank of England 9Harterly Bulletin, June 1977, 
p. 1,57). 'Ibe general trend and cyclical pattern of investment appears 
to be closely related to the real rate of re~n and the valuation 
ratio as described above (Wilson Committee, Vol. 11, p. 7). The 
decline in profitability, particularly when coupled with the recent 
rise in the' cost of capital, seems to have had a parallel effect on 
industrial investment. 'Ibis relationship is pn-ticularly marked given 
the traditional importance of retained earnings as a source of 
investment finance. According to one estimate externa.1 funds 
account for some 15.' of total lilysical investment over the period 
-328-
1964-73. while comparable figures for the US and Japan were 31.3% 
and 31.6%. respectively. with France and Gemany falling in between 
(NEDO. 1975, p. 53). While internal sources decreased as a percentage 
of total funds from approximately 90% in the early 1950s to 8Q% by 
the early 1970s, this trend essentially reflected the decline in 
profitability and fluctuations in the business cycle (ibid., p. 57, 
and W.A. Thomas, 1978, p. 218). Greater reliance on the banks and 
capital markets in recent years did not make up for the fall of internal 
income as the trend in gross investment indicates. More significantly 
both in the period up to the mid-1960s and the early 1970s the company 
sector as a whole was a net lender to the rest of the economy, despite 
heavy bank borrowing in the later years. This pattern was reversed 
in West Germany, Japan, France and the US, where the financial 
surplus of other areas of the economy was furmelled into company finance 
( HU, p. 46 and Thompson, p. 274). Thus, the overall po si tion of the 
flow of funds between sectors reinforces the significance of internal 
funds as the primary source of investable income;, ,lICence, the over-
whelming concern among industrialists about the level of profits in 
the crisis years of the 1970s. 
While some authors have taken high self-financing ratios as 
indicative of managerial independence from financial constraints, 
they are more properly viewed as a result of the practices of the 
financial system and in relations with industry, i.e. reflections of 
the conditions which govern lending and borrowing. The conservatism 
of British banking capital as a provider of external finance has been 
documented in various sources. Of the three main types of external 
finance, shares, marketable debt (bonds and debentures) and bank 
loans, the first two are provided through the securities markets. 
Remarkable as it may seem, the London Stock Exchange, although easily 
the largest and most sophisticated in Europe with by far the highest 
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number of quoted companies and the largest turnover, raises fewer 
new issues in absolute terms for industrial and commercial 
companies than the French or West German bourses .(Samuels et al, p. 82). 
Between 1963 and 1973 the issue of shares on the domestic market averaged 
0.49% of GNP in the UK, while comparable figures for other countries 
were US - 0.65,%, Japan - 1.50%, West Germany - 0.52.% and France -
0.87%. The new issue market for equities has also demonstrated 
considerably greater volatility than those of the other major capitalist 
countries apart from the US. This volatility reflected bo~the stop-go 
policies of various governments and the business cycle but also more 
significantly the activities of institutional investors (Hu, pp. 30-
35). The London Stock Exchange operates primarily as a secondary market 
for existing shares rather than a market for new securities as indicated 
by the very high turnover rates in which institutional investment 
figures prominently. Over two-thirds of its business is in government 
securities and its role in external finance for industry tends to be 
limited to a relativelY small group of "blue chip" companies (Thompson, 
p. 263)· 
If one includes new issues of bonds, debentures and preference 
shares. the proportion raised through the securities markets rises 
considerably over'the period 1964-73, but as mentioned above net 
external finance still remains significantly lower on average for the 
period than that of other major capitalist countries. Moreover, from 
1973 the fluctuation in inflation rates increased the risks of fixed-
term borrowing., and the market in new issues of debentures and loan 
stock virtually dried up (Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, June 
1980, pp. 193-5). In recent years the leasing of capital assets 
from financial institutions has become an increasingly important 
source of finance for industrial and commercial firms, large ly because 
of the tax advantages afforded by initial capital allowances. 
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The Equipment Leasings Associations, which represents about 8Q% of 
the business, has estimated a growth in the annual acquisition of 
assets for leasing from £0.1 to £1.8 billion between 1972 and 1979. 
By comparison new share issues averaged £9.8 billion in the years 
1976-79 (ibid.). 
In addition those countries, primarily Britain and the United 
states, which have relatively high self-financing ratios also tend 
to depend more upon the securities markets as sources of external 
finance. This means that their investment decisions are constrained 
by the short-term orientation imposed by the "free-market approach" 
to capital funding, particularly given the growing role of the fund 
managers in company securities. 'Ibis pOint was best expressed by 
the Deputy Director General of the CBI at a seminar on "What Industry 
Expects from the Banks" in November, 19'74: 
Few companies can operate effioiently if thelll.8Jlagement is 
conoemed to see that the actual profit de olaredeach yea:r 
should show at least a modest improvement on the previous 
year. Ideally companies should be in apesi tion to opt -
if necessary - for short-term downturns in profitability 
or cash flow if this is due to ma.jor investment or restruotur-
ing designed to acce~te growth and profits in the medium 
and long term. And yet managements -because- of the markets' 
preoccupation with the short term - can be inhibited by the 
share valuations. The market does not readily aoce:pt 
deliberate short term polioies to utilise cash flow for 
longer term benefits •••• This has aooentuated the 
constraint plaoed on company managers to achieve a steady 
but as a result slowly growing profitability (cited in 
Hu, p. 60). 
Looking at the'lending praotioes of oommeroial banks, again 
oertain distinot aspeots of British olearing banks seem prominent. 
British bank loans have traditionally been predominantly short-term, 
usually in the form of overdrafts. Although in praotioe overdrafts 
are often "rolled over" to finance investment as well as ourrent 
oosts, this form of lending likewise imposses certain oonstraints 
in that banks usually demand seourity as represented by a firm's 
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liquid assets and debt profiles. Longer term loans offered by banking 
systems in other countries, notably Germany and J~Jan, have 
encouraged a longer view on company performance. Similarly, as over-
draft facilities are open-ended while longer-term loans are usually 
designated for specific projects, the latter have been associated with 
closer relationships between industry and finance in countries where 
these practices are more common (Thompson, pp. 26)-4, and Hu, ch. 4). 
This form of finance has become increasingly important in the 1970s 
as bank advances rose from just over 40% of the net debt of industrial 
and commercial firms in 1970 to 7'" in 1979. The danger of this form 
of finance is best illustrated by the liquidity crisis of 1974 when 
interest payments (primarily composed of variable rate short-term 
bank loans) absorbed as much as 4Q% of gross company income (Bank of 
England ~terly Bulletin, June 1980). However, one should note that 
in recent years British clearing banks have increased the proportion 
of medium-tem lending 'as they moved into corporate finance following 
their American competitors and the introduction of Competition and 
Credit Control. One recent review of these figures, admitedly very 
approximate, estimated that some 1j% of clearing bank~s lending 
to British industry took the form of term loans, whereas medium 
and long-term loans accounted for over half the bank lending to 
industrial companies in Germany, France,' the United States and Japan 
(Hu, pp. 28-29). On the other hand the clearing banks themselves 
have claimed that contractual term lending accounted for as much as 
~ of total sterling and foreign currency lending to UK non-personal 
borrowers (a wider sector) in 1976 (CLCB, pp. 101 and 276). If the 
internationalisation of finance capital has thus affected the practices 
of British banking, it is nonetheless true that siPlificant nationaL 
differences still rema.in. Whether through the banks as in the US, 
Germany and Japan, holding companies as in Italy and Belgium, or 
insti tutions like the Banques d t Affa1res and Ciaisse des D8pots in 
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France, foreign banking capital tends still to be more directly involved 
in industry than is the case in Britain (Re'adman and HU). Moreover, 
the clearing banks face the continual problem of matching medium term 
loans with equivalent deposits. The absence of a central rediscounting 
facility as available in some other countries places a limit on the 
extent to which British banks can safely increase their term lending. 
The financial practices of the banks also affect corporate finance 
through the criterion by which loans are offered. Appraisal of borrowers 
is usually approached through backward-looking analyses of profit records 
and balance sheet ratios. Financiers and industrialists both take the 
capital gearing ratio as the single most important criterion of credit 
worthiness, Le. the ratio of debt to equity finance. Average gearing 
ratios vary widely country to country, reflecting the greater reliance 
on fixed interest debt elsewhere mentioned above. The following table 
indicates an estimate for these ratios for 1972: 
Japan - 2.96 
Italy - 1.58 
France - 0.92 
Belgium - 0.75 
w. Germany - 0.74 
USA - 0.66 
Netherlands - 0.59 
UK - 0.55 
(source, HEro, 1975, p. 32.) Short-term plus long-term loans 
over shareholders' interest. 
Moreover, capital gearing for industrial and commercial companies has 
fallen in recent years as inflation affected the nominal valuation of 
capi tal employed. By lrn9 net debt as a percen~e of trading assets 
had fallen to something like half the level of 1970 (Bank of England 
Qparterly Bulletin, June 1980, pp. 193-4). 
Gearing is significant in two respects. On the one hand greater 
reliance on debt finance can cheapen the cost of capital through tax 
benefits and the •. ffects of inflation on fixed interest loans. On 
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the other hand gearing has a disproportionate effect on shareholders' 
returns. Greater reliance on fixed interest debt augments the return 
to shareholders if profits are high but has the opposite effect if 
profits decline since the interest on loans constitutes a fixed charge 
deducted from company income. Similarly, inflation raises the 
uncertainty with regard to fixed interest borrowing, since loans 
contracted at high nominal rates become increasingly burdensome if 
inflation decreases. Higher gearing thus represents a riskier but 
cheaper and possibly more lucrative mode of investment finance. 
Japanese industry is able to maintain a significantly higher average 
gearing ratio because the banks are supported by the central authorities 
when their lending policies lead to short-term liquidity problems 
(Thompson,l9'77 ,p. 268). High gearing offers certain advantages to the 
corporate sector since it allows a higher rate of capital formation 
than can be financed solely out of :retained earnings, but at the same 
time it requires that "Government must be recognised to commit~ itself 
to supporting the industrial sector even in tight money or deflationary 
fiscal periods" (NEOO, 1975, p. 33). 
In this sense then the practices of the financial sector along 
with those of the Bank of England have created a do.~ward snowball 
effect, as companies' investment programmes have been constrained by 
their past profit records and their capacity to raise new equity finance. 
Loan finance as well as other forms reinforces the short-term orientation 
of firms and precludes the closer a.ssocia.tion and financial monitoring 
that banks would have to undertake if greater reliance waB';placed on 
term lending (Samuels et al, ch. 13). At the same time one should note 
that the rather cautious approach of the financial system in Britain 
is not unrealistic given the recent performance of the industrial 
sector and the overall trend of profi tabili ty • In this sense the 
hl::;ber gearing ratios of other countries may simply refelct the extension 
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of credit in conditions o~ relative economic boom, i.e. the macro-
economic environment and government policies. The financial and 
industrial sectors in Britain have simply adopted practices on the 
basis of fairly accurate expectations about the rate of growth and 
trends and variations in profitability and liquidity characteristic 
of the national economy. At the same time as part of the general low-
growth syndrome the "rentier practices" of banking capital do seem 
to have penetrated and dominated the approach of industrial capital 
towards investment finance in Britain (Thompson, pp. 270-71). In that 
sense they have presented an obstacle to industrial revitalisation 
which became a topic of political controversy in the 19'70s. 
The NEOO report, Finance for Investment, is instructive in this 
respect. A survey of attitudes of industrial and commercial companies 
concluded that "few companies seemed to feel dependent on the City 
financing mechanisms and related institutions" and that "most of the 
smaller companies ••• preferred to limit their growth investment to 
the availability of internal funds" even when the option of stock 
issues was a possibility (NEIO, p. 75). However, the report qualified 
this in two respectsl first, "companies in • recoverY , situations, 
which needed risk capital for fundamental rationa~sation and sub-
sequent expansion, had difficulty in obtaining finance (and have had 
very much more difficulty since 19'72)", and second, "conservative 
financing attitudes, sometimes connected with a desire to avoid 
dilution of ownership or managerial control, must have inhibited the 
development of more positive growth strategies" (ibid., p. 76). Thus 
the evidence does not support the picture painted by some left-wing 
critics of British industry begging the City for capital, but rather 
one of industrialists pursuing conservative investm~nt programmes 
congruent with the prudent practices of the financial sector. The 
political problem posed by :the relations between industry and finance 
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in the 1970s was sharpened by the fact that internally generated 
funds were increasingly inadequate for maintaining existing investment 
levels, let alone financing a programme of industrial regeneration. 
To cite the NEOO report once aga~, 
if investment in the UK were to be increased to levels 
corresponding to those in other countries, either profits 
would need to increase substantially or greater reliance 
would need to be placed on external sources of finance. 
Almost certainly greater reliance would have to be placed 
on external finance until cash flows were built up (NEID, p. 20). 
This statement succinctly describes the poles of the political debate 
on ca pi tal function in the 1970s. From the point of view of British 
industry the attempt to revive investment through greater profitability 
and productivity (not to mention wage restraint) placed it in a position 
of potential (and actual) conflict with organised labour. On the other 
hand the alternative or complementary course of developing new means 
for funnelling savings into industrial investment was bound to cause 
an open break with financial institutions , although it cOJlllJlEi.Dd.ed 
widespread support among the unions and the labour Party. '!his 
division underlies much of the conflict on domestic economic policies 
over the next decade. 
-336-;. 
CHAPI'ER NINE 
The post-War Settlement Unravels. 197°-74 
The surprise victory of the Conservatives in June 1970, augured 
a sharp break with the ad hoc interventionism in industrial incomes 
and labour policy or alternatively the emerging system of voluntaristic 
corporatism which characterised governments of both parties in the 1960s. 
For in opposition the Tories had shifted ideologically back towards 
the neo-liberal position of the 19.50s. At this point, however, the 
renewed rehetoric of reviving market forces, restricting the role of 
the state and coming to grips with union power had a much harder edge 
than before, reflecting the growing realisation on at least one side 
of the class divide that the consensus politics of two decades were 
failing to deliver the goods. While in at least one important respect, 
namely the reform of industrial relations, the Conservatives did appear 
to be following through with a corPoratist impuls&, namely the 
initiative put forward in In Place of Strife, for the rest the "Selsdon" 
approach did appear initially as a radical departure. Even in industrial 
relations the willingness to press ahead with legal reform despite 
the total hostility of the unions bespoke a new stridency in the 
neo-liberal programme, which was pursued even at the cost of regenerating 
a degree of open class conflict unseen since the 1930s. 
By the end of course the Heath government had changed directions in 
virtually every aspect of its initial approach, so completely thrown 
off its track that it more or less collapsed in the winter of 1974 
amidst the second miners' strike in two years. the three-day week, the 
almost unbelievable politicisation of industrial conflict and the worst 
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economic crisis since 1931. The virtual abandonment of the Industrial 
Relations Act was only one of several u-turns, as measures in every 
area of economic policy came up against the structural resistance of 
the British political economy. At the same time certain aspects of the 
free market approach in the fields of monetary and exchange policy, 
especially the floating of the pound from June 1972, and the 
introduction of Competition and Credit Control, survived the government's 
reversals on other issues (cce admitedly only with important modifica-
tions). The floating of the pound seems particularly important given 
the previous analysis of the politics of devaluation in the 1960s. 
For the Conservatives were hardly the party to act against the City. 
Indeed, as the 'baricature of "Selsdon men" indicated, they seemed 
permea ted by a harsh new breed of financiers. Yet devaluation or 
floating exchanges were measures never before enacted by a Tory 
government. As pointed out above, changed attitudes towards sterling 
reflected the altered context of national and international finance, 
and in that sense hardly conflicted with City interests, perceived or 
imputed, a point which I shall discuss more fully be low. First, 
however, I shall look at the one area where it may be said that the 
planning initiative of the 1960s survived in some form. 
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Administrative Planning and the Control of Public Expenditure 
The Heath government may have favoured unleashing market forces 
on the British economy, but planning still remained at least the 
rationale for its approach to controlling the state machinery. 
Regarding administrative organisation and procedure it took its cue 
from corporate management and planning. That is, its embrace of the 
opposing principles of market and plan was not quite so contradictory 
as might seem at first glance, since it effectively mirrored the 
practice of advanced capitalist firms, which plan production internally 
in so far as possible despite the external constraints of market 
forces. While it is not my intention to investigate administrative 
"rationalisation" in a:ny detail, I will briefly review developments 
in this field as 1. it was the only area in which the planning initiative 
survi ved, and 2. the issues surrounding public expenditure control 
become increasingly important matters of economic policy in the 1980s. 
For the Tories the managerialist ethos and technocratic impulse 
of the early 1960s was perpetuated through the period of opposition 
largely through the work of the Conservative Party Public Sector Re-
search Unit (PSRU) under Lord HarpIes. Between 1967 and 1970 this 
group confered with various business interests on plans for the 
reorganisation of the state machinery which focused on several themes: 
1. The need for a close. more ouput-oriented definition 
of the function of central government. and a consequent re-
patteming of departments according to this 'functional 
principle' • 
2. The advantage of a • central capabili iy' ... to assist in 
strategy formulation, and raise eyes beyond the inevitable 
pressures of short-term business. 
3. The need for a system of formal programme analysis, 
possibly run by the 'central capability'. 
4. The shedding, or 'hiving off' to & distance, of non-policy 
exeouti ve tasks said to be encumbering ministerial departments. 
(Poll it , 1980, p. 86.) . 
Two other groups also fed into the Tories' rethinking of administrative 
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rationalisation in this period. The Party Advisory Committee on Policy 
under Heath and Edward Boyle decided to continue the process of 
amalgama. ting government departments began under Labour. The 
''Businessmen's Team'~, composed of various corporate executives, who 
remained on secondment from their respective firms throughout the life 
of the government, devoted its efforts to a series of special projects, 
some of which covered the same issues as the other groups (ibid., 
pp. 85-7). 
These concerns were reflected in the government white paper, 
'nle Reorganisation of Central Government, published in october 1970. 
This avowed the aims of efficiency and effectiveness and reiterated 
the "functional principle" of administrative organisation first 
announced in the Plowden Report in order to achieve "economies of 
scale", avoid "the diffusion of expert knowledge and the difficulty 
of co-ordination", save duplication and clarify "lines of demarca-
tion between responsibilities" of different departments (p. 4). Such 
rationalisation was likewise supposed to aid in the formation of 
strategic policy and provide organisational stability as a background 
to the introduction of new techniques of policy evaluation and the 
refinement of older ones. The white paper proposed essentially three 
means of institutionalising or strengthening such a functional 
or technocratic mode of procedure, 1. the further centralisation of 
administrative functions through the amalgamation of departments, 
2. the creation of a "central capability" oriented towards strategic 
objectives through the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS), and J. re-
inforcement of the Public Expenditure Survey Committee (PESC) by way 
of the introduction of ~ogram.me Analysis and Review (PAR1. 
As regards the first point the government created in particular 
two giant de:pe.rtments. 'nle Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
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took over most of the responsibilities of Minteah and the Board 
of Trade as well as that for monopolies, mergers, and the restraint 
of trade, from the Department of Employment and Productivity (DEP). 
The aerospace function of Mintech".was, however, hived off into a 
temporarily demarcated Ministry of Aviation Supply. The Department 
of the Environment (DoE) absorbed the old ministries of Housing and 
Local Government, Public Buildings and Works and Transport. Having 
lost its responsibilities of dealing with prices, productivity and 
incomes the IEP became simply the Department of Employment. While 
this reorganisation looked rather thorough at the time, it should be 
pointed out that this process was really a continuation of that started 
under Labour and that in any case "'!he initiative here came as much 
from the Civil Service as from the ministers" (Pollit, 1980, p. 88). 
In particular one proposals of the PSRU for splitting the Treasury 
with a separate ministry in Charge of the Public Expenditure Survey and 
Civil Service Division was effectively blocked at least in part owing 
to Whitehall opposition (ibid.) •. Wha~ever the logic of this aspect 
of administrative rationalisation the changes in organisational 
structure were too short-lived to have any significant impact on the 
mode of procedure of government policy formation. For, whether for admin-
istrati ve Oll' pOlitical reasons, Labour promptly dismantled the IJI'I 
and at least partly dismembered the DoE. 
wrd Rothchild' s "think tank", the CPRS, fared little better 
as an attempt to insert strategio, cross-departmental oonsiderations 
into government polioy making. Com~sed of roughly half career oivil 
servants and half from business, academio and international organisa-
tion~ this aspect of Heath's "managerial revolution" was from the start 
a compromised version of the PSRU's notion of a central "analytic 
capability" serving the Prime Minister. .Treasury fears of an organ-
isation largely duplicating its prescribed role and Cabinet opposition 
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to the idea of a "presidential" department serving the Prime Minister 
precluded any ambitious departure, and no doubt contributed to the 
insecurity of the position of the CPRS in the traditional Whitehall-
Cabinet nexus (Heclo and Wildavsky, ch. 7). Its tasks largely 
concentrated in three areas, 1. special reports on a variety of politi-
cally controversial issues, 2. twice yearly briefings at Chequers on 
the general progress of the government·s programmes, and 3. analysis 
of the compatability of the various papers put forward by ministers 
to the Cabinet. Given the confidential nature of much of this work 
it is very difficult to evaluate its detailed effects on government 
procedure (pollitt, 1974 and 1980). However, there is certainly 
considerable evidence for taking a fairly negative view at least 
as regards the capacity of the CPRS to either offer alternatives to 
Civil Service policies or introduce a more strategic outlook. With 
respect to the former the CPRS was both very small, dependent on 
information supplied by Whitehall departments, and unlikely to differ 
radically from Treasury orthodoxy in any case given its composition 
and general ethos (ibid.). On the latter point, as I will argue below, 
virtually all major decisions in the central areas of policy, 
can be adequately characterised as immediate responses to short-term 
contingencies. 'Ibe infamous u-turns taken by Heath in 1972-3 
hardly testify to the predominance of a long-term programme. Moreover, 
as the government received successive batterings in these years, 
Heath apparently increasingly distrusted the advice of Lord Rothschild 
and withdrew into a "bunker" of alternative advisors, primarily Sir 
William Armstrong (head of the Civil Service), n>uglas A11en (head 
of the Treasury), Robert Armstrong (principal private secretary to the 
PM) and Burke Trend (Cabinet Secretary) (Fay and Young, 1976). 
'Ibe one area in which a more output-oriented, technocratic mode 
of procedure was at least systematically attempted, namely the 
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control and planning of public expenditure, offers additional 
negative evidence. PESC, and interdepartmental committee chaired by 
an under-secretary from the Public Sector group of the Treasury, was 
itself a product of the Plowden proposals of the early 1960s. The 
first five year projection of public expenditure appeared in 196), 
and these became regularised on an annual basis after 1968. The 
Conservatives' sole innovation in this aspect of administrative planning 
was to introduce a form of programme budgeting and systems analysis 
through PAR. This essentially represented Ita way of applying the 
principles of corporate planning to running the Stat~ (Leruez, p. 2)7). 
'!he business team had been particularly influential in drawing up this 
set of proposals, but their notion of a general exercise under the 
control of the CPRS was quickly scotched (Reclo and Wildavsky, ch. 6). 
Indeed, since the Treasury in any case retained charge of the whole op-
eratio~seeing it as an extension of its traditional mode of control, 
it is difficult to see how PAR constituted mUch of a break with past 
practices. In any case the secrecy of the PAlf reports precludes 
more explicit discussion. All that one can claim is that their 
coverage remained selective and their integration with the PESC system 
limited (Pollitt, 1980). 
More significantly FESC itself began to come undone by the end 
of the Tory term of office. The reason for this was simply that it 
appeared that public expenditure was shooting rapidly o~t of control 
and that PESC almost certainly bore part of the blame. The 
deficiencies in the Public Expenditure Surveys, which forecast future 
spending in volume terms, became increasingly apparent as inflation 
and particularly the so-called relative price effect of .public sector 
costs rising faster than those of the private sector affected 
the actual outturn. The latter featured particularly strongly in 
the discrepancy between the 1974-75 outturn and that projected in 
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1971 for the same year which became a political hot potato under 
Labour as the issue of "the missing billions" (Wright, p. 148). 
Similarly, looking back somewhat further to the use of PESC under 
Labour, the fact that projections for public expenditure were made 
in reference to the "unrealistic" forecasts of economic growth made 
in the National Plan almost certainly contributed to the rapid rise 
of the former as a percentage of GDP in the middle years of that decade 
(ibid., p. 1]4, and Sandford, 1979, pp. 4-6). Thus, at least in some 
respects the refinement of public expenditure planning teChniques 
associated with the purposive/rational mode of procedure actually 
contributed to the "breakdown of control" which erupted in the 
mid-l970s. At the same time, however, one must i1'lject at least one 
note of scepticism on the extent to which planned public expenditure was 
spiralling out of control in these years. For by far the greater part 
of the actual growth of state spending was accounted for in the provision 
of transfer payments, and these in tu.r? .l!.e.~ largely explained by 
demographic factors, the growth in regional aid and the increase in 
interest charges on the national debt during inflationary periods 
(Wright, p. 146). 
At the same time PESC made little headway in the other of its 
chief aims, stabilising the variations in public expenditure, 
particularly on the capital account. Labour's recourse to public ex-
penditure cuts as a response to immediate economic and political 
pressures, e.g. runs on sterling, as already described. The view of 
the new government as expressed by the Chancellor on October 1970, 
was that the trend of public expenditure towards accounting for !j(:$ 
of GDP was "unacceptable" and that consequently public services 
"must be subject to finn control to secure economy and efficiency" 
(Hansard, 1970-1, vol. 80S, col. 37). However, by the summer of 1971 
under the pressure of rising unemployment the government had reverted 
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to using "the level of public spending and the programmes to which 
it is applied to meet urgent and immediate needs as an instrument of 
po li cy" (Mauri ce Macmi llan, cited in Blackaby, p. n8). The use of 
public expenditure as a short-term expedient for reflation between 
June 1971 and May 1972, was followed by the use of cuts as a means 
of deflation in late 1973, in particular the savage cuts in capital 
programmes in December as tne government's crisis deepened • Neither 
the Tories under Heath nor Labour before or after were able to refrain 
from short-term and often substantial variations in public spending 
as an instrument of policy. As a result some four of the £5.8 billion 
increase in outturn over forecast expenditure for 1974-5 was due to 
policy changes of both governments (Wright, p. 149). PESC may have 
had problems of its own, but the main problem was simply the inability 
of governments to maintain any stable programme over the medium term. 
Politics retained its primacy over policy despite the intentions 
of the corporate planners and Civil Service technocrats. 
Economic Policy and the Crisis 
Given the ideological commitment of the Conservatives to state 
withdrawal from economic and industrial intervention and greater 
reliance on market forces, as articulated at the Selsdon Park 
conference in January 1970, planning was a dead letter. The problem 
for the Heath government was how to articulate the rediscovered market 
philosophy in a framework where state policies inevitably strongly 
affected the performance of the economy, particularly in a period of 
emerging crisis. In the event the Tories simply reaffirmed short-term 
demand management with a new vengence even more destaHlising than in 
the past. Caught between the same but more intense cross winds that 
had bedevilled previous governments, they succumbed to the buffeting 
and shifted their policies 'erratically in a vain attempt to cope 
with rising inflation and unemployment, speculation against sterling 
and eventually a massive liquidity crisis. The much heralded vi thdrawal 
from state intervention and end to consensus politics proved short-
lived, as within two years the Heath government reverted to more or 
less the same ad hoc mix of economic and industrial programmes that 
had characterised Wilson's last years. 
The bud4!;etary policies of the Tories typified this circuitous 
route. The new government had inherited a substantial surplus on 
the balance of payments current account, but incomes policies and de-
flation over the previous three years had also bequeathed a slow 
growth rate, excess capacity, rising unemployment, and an explosion 
of money wage rates and strike activity. The budgets of October 1970, 
and March 1971 , were cautious in design and more or less. neutral in 
terms of their effects on demand, although the second allowed for a 
sli8ht rise of the ~cbwthrate of GDP up to ~ for 1971. The more 
controversial aspects of the initial budgetary stance concerned distri-
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butional effects and industrial policy, as the Conservatives replaced 
investment grants with tax allowances, phased out the regional employ-
ment premium and eliminated various social subsidies like museums, 
school meals and free milk, dental treatment, etc. If at the beginning 
the emphasis of economic policy had been towards controlling inflation, 
by the early spring of 1972 it had shifted towards combatting unemploy-
ment. The latter had risen particularly fast over the course of 1971, 
approaching the one million mark (an important "psychological barrier" 
at that time) by early 1972. While the Chancellor, Anthony Barber, 
had taken some steps to stimulate consumption in July 1971, various 
monetary measures discussed below and a rapid rise in public expenditure 
added more fuel to the reflationary fires by the turn of the year. 
'Ibe final step was the massive tax-cutting budget of March 1972, 
intended to stimulate the growth rate to a ~ level and bring 
unemployment down to 500,000 by the end of 1973. Even this unprecedented 
injection was not enough to push the growth rate over 3 1/4f1" and 
the price of the consumption-led"""Barber boom" was a rapid rise in 
both inflation and imports, as stop-go polieies reaped the usual 
harvest. By the time of the March 1973 budget the external current 
account had moved back into deficit but the Chancellor stuck to a 
neutral course followed by slight restriction hoping to reach the 
projected growth rate. This was followed by minor restrictions in May 
as the Chancellor announced cuts in projected public expenditure 
over the next two years of some £600 million. As a result by the end 
of the year the current balance had deteriorated to its (thert) worst 
ever deficit, although the latter was at least in part due to the 
exceptional rise in import prices owing to the burst in the world growth 
rate. However, inflation had. crept up to l~ by october, even before 
the oil price rises floowing the Yom ICippur War (Stewarl. 1977. pp. 119-
173. and Blackaby, chs. 2 and J). 
Monetary policy likewise fed into the inflationary spiral of 
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the Heath years. One result of the growth of secondary banking, 
described in the previous chapter, was that the Bank of England 
gradually found itself loosing control over the money markets and 
hence- its leverage on monetary policy. Partly to re-establish that 
control and partly to put all banks on an equal competitive footing, 
, 
it introduced the new policy of comp~ition and Credit Control (CCC) 
in 1971 (Bank of England Quarterly ~u\etin, June 1971). While the 
new system resembled the old in that it was based partly on a 
specified ratio of liquid deposits and partly on special deposits 
placed with the Bank of England, it differed in several respects. 
Under the previous system competition among the clearing banks had 
been limited by the requirement that they hold a% of their deposits 
in cash and non-interest bearing accounts at the Bank and a further 
2Q% in liquid assets which together counted as the liquidity ratio, 
Le. 2a%. Following the introduction of CCC the new "reserve" ratio 
specified that only 12.~ of total deposits had to be held in 
approved assets and the definition of the latter was widened to 
include short-term gil ts. The reserve ratios applied not only to the 
clearers but all banks. lending ceilings and the interest-rate cartel 
of the clearing banks were discontinued, and therefore there was no 
longer an automatic link between their lending rates and the minimum 
lending rate (previously called Bank Rate) (Blackaby, pp. 238-48). 
As much as the new system was simply a response to changes in the finan-
cial system, they also dovetailed with the neo-liberal ideology of the 
Conservatives, as the clearing banks were henceforth free to compete 
more actively for deposits among themselves and with other banks. 
CCC, however, perpetuated and in someways accentuated some of 
the defects of the old system, particularly as regards control of bank 
lending and the money supply. For one the reserve ratio was lower. 
equivalent to l5-2Q% of deposits in the; .terms of the previous 
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liquidity ratio, which allowed the banks greater latitude in 
expanding their lending (Stewart, 1977, pp. 139-40). Secondly, as 
the clearing banks now directly entered. the secondary markets, 
trading in the inter-bank and Certificates of Deposit (CDs) markets 
grew rapidly. Without lending ceilings the banks needed only to 
include net borrowings in these markets as their eligible liabilities 
in the reserve ratios. As a significant proportion of those reserve 
assets were in fact loans to the discount market secured against CDs 
issued by the banks themselves, the reserve ratio offered even less 
of a limit on the expansion of lending in the secondary markets 
than implied by the gross percentage of liquid assets to deposits. 
Moreover, the expansive growth in the use of CDs as security in 
the discount market together with the lack of knowledge of the 
ultimate source of funds meant that this "financial chain letter" 
posed a severe security and liquidity ris~ in the event of any future 
monetary squeeze (Channon, 1977,. pp. 14-15, and 91-3). Thirdly, 
budgetary policy still impinged on the ability of the Bank of England 
to exert monetary control. If the Bank neede to raise finance by 
issuing Treasury bills this would add to the reserve ratios creating 
the basis for further lending. In practice the combination of a large 
government deficit to bring down unemployment, rapidly rising 
inflation and political pressure to keep down interest rates prevented 
the authorities from restraining the vast expansion of credit in the 
early 1970s (MoRae and Cairncross, 1974, pp. 209-11). 
As a result the money supply expanded in the wake of the new 
regulations, although the two standard measures diverged rather 
sharply from mid-1972, Ml' increasing at an annual rate of l4.~ 
and M) at 28.}% (Blackaby, p. 250). In the first nine months after 
the introduction of CCC bank advances increased ~, and by mid-1973 
they had doubled. Activity in the secondary markets was particularly 
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intense despite slightly higher interest rates, as over the same period 
borrowing on the sterling inter-bank market rose nearly 300%. Since 
such a rapid growth in the money supply (particularly apparent in the 
wholesale markets) ~ould not be translated into industrial growth, it 
financed the boom in consumer goods and property instead. From 1971 
to 1973 bank lending to the property sector rose four times, so that 
by the end of 1973, if one includes loans for construction, it exceeded 
the lending of the clearing banks to the whole of the manufacturing 
sector. The fringe banks prospered particularly in the property 
development boom often taking equity stakes and thus increasing their 
assets as well as their profits from the rapid rise in property values. 
The expansion of credit following ece and the rather slack attitude 
of the monetary authorities towards constraining that growth thus 
fuelled a major speculative boom which needed only a small shove to 
bring it crashing down (Charmon, 19(7, pp. 93-5, Stewart, 1977 t 
pp. 139-40, ahd. Gowland, chs.4and-'5)-. 
The reaction of the Bank of England to the money and property 
boom was as sluggish as that of the government to the rapid rise in 
output and imports. From August 1972, the Bank reverted to "qualitative" 
lending priorities, requesting that banks limit their operations on 
the property and stock markets. This, however, did little or nothing 
to control the boom. Moreover, the substitution of minimum lending 
rate for Bank Rate two months later cut the other way since the new 
instrument was supposed to be "automatically" determined on a weekly 
basis at 1/2 per,oemt above the average rate for Treasury bills. 
In other words, the bank in accordance with the neo-liberal approach 
announced that it would henceforth be f~llowing rather than attempting 
to lead market rates for government stock, although it returned to the 
previous practice a year later. The Bank only began actively to 
restrain monetary growth in July 1973, once again in response to the 
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deterioration of the sterling exchange rate and the disparity in short-
term rates between London and financial centres abroad. In the usual 
panic MLR rose from 7 1/2 to 11 l/~ within a week, an unprecedented 
jump, as the Bank called in further Special Deposits (Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin, 1973, p. 476). Over the next few months restrictions 
were tightened. The earlier request on lending priorities was repeated, 
an official ceiling on bank deposits under £10,000 was reimposed, hire 
purchase controls were renewed and a Supplementary Deposits scheme 
introduced. By November the Bank had reverted to its earlier policy 
of announcing a change in the official rate when it raised MLR to 13% 
in response to another run on sterling occasioned by the trade deficit, 
oil crisis and inflation (Blackaby, 1978, pp. 245-57). 
In the meantime the government had initiated at least a minor 
revolution in exchange rate policy as in June 1972 sterling was 
floated. Initially conceived as a temporary measure to thwart 
speculation and justified as necessary to preserve the expansion of 
domestic demand, external pressures actually featured most strongly 
in the decision. As mentioned above the growth of financial business 
denominated in foreign currencies and the.similtaneous initiative to 
join the EEC had already precipitated a re-evaluation in financial 
circles towards exchange rate policy. More significantly the Bretton 
Woods system had been effectively jettisoned the previous December 
and Britain was already participating in a joint float with EEC 
currencies from May. 'Ibe new regime of quasi-floating rates had already 
suffered some disturbance, and at this point it was simply sterling's 
turn in the line of speculative fire. A combination of a sharp drop 
in the balance of payments situation and the threat of a massive 
industrial dispute over the Industrial Relations Act and the imprison-
ment of several dockers, set off a flight of short-term capital. 
Once again devaluation (or in this case floating) was less the result 
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of a conscious policy decision, than the forced consequence of 
internal and primarily external pressures (Stewart, 1977, pp. 150-53). 
More ominously for the future the combined effect of eee and the 
floating exchange rates was actually to increase the power of the 
financial markets to dictate government economic policy. As the new 
monetary creed swept through financial circles in the next few years, 
the incoming Labour government found itself even more constrained than 
in the past (Keegan and Pennant-Rae, pp. 134-5). 
The squeeze of the second half of 1973 first took effect in 
the housing and wholesale markets as building society advances dried 
up and wholesale rates soared. By December a massive liquidity crisis 
hit the overextended secondary banks, as the fall in property values 
and rise in interest rates exposed their insecure position. London 
and County Securities shut down first, followed by the collaps~ of 
Moorgate Mercantile and Cornhill Consolidated and runs on virtually 
every other secondary bank. On 21 December the Bank of England launched 
the "Lifeboat" operation together with the London and Scottish 
clearing banks and by January an estimated £700 million had been 
"recycled" in support of the fringe banks. The financial panic abated 
somewhat by the end of January, but in the meantime shareprioes had 
crashed with the property sector particularly hard hit with the liquidity 
crisis and collapse of confidence spreading from the financial to the 
industrial sector (Channon, 1977, pp. 96-100). In a.s much as the 
financial crisis was an international phenomenon, illustrated by the 
crash of the San Diego Bank, the Sindona empire, Franklin National, 
and I.DA Herstatt, it can hardly be blamed entirely on the monetary 
policies of the Bank of England. There is little doubt, however, that 
the latter contributed to the credit bubble in the United Kingdom and 
this constituted part of the reason for the particular severity of the 
crisis in this country (ibid., pp. 119-21). To understand how the 
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liquidity and security problems of the fringe sector of British banking 
triggered off an economic and political crisis affecting the entire 
British economy, we must first look at another aspect of Tory policy, 
namely that concerning union reform and prices and income policy. 
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Industrial Relations Reform and Incomes Policy 
Neo-liberal ideology likewise guided the financing of the 
Conservative programme for industrial relations reform. However, the 
Industrial Relations Act of 1971 paradoxically represented more of a 
shift towards state corporatism as a substitute for statutory incomes 
policy than anything else (Crouch, 1977, pp. 166-79 and 23}-40). 
While justified in terms of the usual obeisance to market forces and 
withdrawal of the state from active intervention in industrial disputes, 
both the concrete measures proposed and the effect of attempting to 
implement them pushed well beyond the framework of voluntaristic 
corporatism that had emerged in the 1960s. Through such provisions 
as the registration of unions, restrictions on strike activity and 
the responsibility of union officials for respecting these restrictions 
(especially in the case of legally binding agreements), and a new legal 
offense of unfair industrial practices, the_Act in effect proposed 
to both reduce the autonomy of the unions and convert them at least 
partially to agencies licensed by the state. It likewise extended 
the sphere of state intervention in industrial relations through 
those pressures and the establishment of the National Industrial 
Relations Court and the Code of Industrial Relations Practice, the 
retention of the Commission on Industrial Relations on a statutory 
basis and the introduction of clauses allowing for compulsory ballots 
and cooling-off periods • Although voluntary aspects were retained 
in respect to legally binding B8Z'eements and registration, and the 
extension of the government's role was limited through hiving off 
much of the responsibility for enforcement on to quasi-state agencies, 
:there is no doubt that the Act involved both greater coercion and a 
shift towards statutory corporatism. (ibid., and Thompson and Erlgleman). 
Had it survived one would certainly foresee an attempt to consolidate 
that trend through further sanctions against unregistered unions 
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and/or an extension of the range of legally binding agreements. 
In the event the bill did not outlive the Heath government, 
and even the latter more or less abandoned the attempt to enforce it 
by the end of 1972. In the short period of its operation, however, 
the Industrial Relations Act managed, along with Tory policy on wage 
control, to completely erode another pillar of the post-war settlement, 
the institutional separation of industrial and political issues. 
Initially, Tory policy on wages followed the same over-all 
market approach, as they wound up the NBPI and left it to employers' 
to resist as best they could the wage explosion of the early 1970s. 
By July 1971, they had reverted towards, partially at least, an 
informal agreement on prices, following up an initiative by the CBI 
to hold price increases below " for the coming year, a move which 
received widespread support among the largest firms. The problem with 
this line appeared first in the: public sector, where the government as 
employer could hardly avoid taking as tough a stance as it had agreed 
with industrialists. Its initial stance was to both indirectly discipline 
the nationalised industries by refusing to allow price increases in 
line with high wage settlements and directly resist, . public sector 
wage claims above an informal norm. This proved relatively successful 
over the first winter, although the cost was several drawn out disputes 
with the dustmen, electricity supply workers and postal workers. 
However, the growth of public sector wages continued unabated, and 
the imposition of price restraint on the public sector resulted in the 
nationalised industries accumulating accelerating deficits (Blackaby, 
pp. 60··and 511). By the next winter the Tory plan of hitting the 
public sector had stalled on the first national miners' strike since 
1926. The strike began in January 1972, and lasted until 25 February, 
resulting in power cuts, a state of emergency, and a three-day week 
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for much of British industry. It also introduced a new term into 
British industrial relations, the "flying picket", as the miners took 
their dispute from the pit-head to coal depots, ports and power stations 
in a display of militancy not seen in the post-war :period. Ostensibly 
an industrial dispute, the miners' strike was certainly :perceived at 
the time as directed against the government. The "hands off" policy 
had in fact encouraged the rampant politicisation of wage issues, owing 
to the disparity of treatment accorded the private and public sectors. 
This process was further enhanced by the :passage of the Industrial 
Relations Act, as the militant faction within the 'rue pushed through 
a policy of non-co-operation and overt political strikes. Two 
official one-day stoppages and demonstrations drew out 1 1/2 million 
workers in March 19'71. 
By mid-winter, 19'72, the Tory inflation strategy was in tatters. 
Rising unemployment had failed to have-any significant impact on wage 
bargaining, as the relationShip ·postulated. by the Phillips curve 
so dear to the Treasury no longer apPeared to be valid. Even the 
Bank of England had abandoned its traditional approach to controlling 
inflation. As pointed out by the Deputy, Governor of the Bank of 
England in a speech on 25 April 1972: 
We have the unwelcome and unusual sight of rising unemployment 
and declining capital utilisation coupled with rising prices -
circumstances which call into question the possibility of 
controlling inflation through measures of orthodox demand 
management. (Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 1972, Po_ 228.) 
'Ibe growth of unemployment by this point seemed so serious that, as 
mentioned above, the government massively reflated the economy in the 
next budget. The policy of steadily reducing settlements in the public 
sector had likewise foundered on the miners' strike, leaving both 
instruments of wage control effectively useless. 
In the event the Heath government had little choice t and began 
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to return to the alternative programme of negotiating some form of 
incomes policy with the unions. Initial discussions with the TUC in 
March got nowhere, as by then the Industrial Relations Act was reaping 
a harvest of growing industrial chaos. The attempt to use strike 
ballots and a cooling-off period in the railway dispute in April 
proved futile, as the railwaymen voted massively in favour of the action 
and won a substantial pay increase. At the same time union policy of 
refusing to recognise the authority of the NIRC resulted in huge fines 
for the TGWU and the AUEW, further poisoning the industrial atmosphere. 
legal wrangling over who was responsible in cases of "unfair industrial 
practices", the union which could only be fined or the individual strikers 
who could be imprisoned, now produced the Act's biggest and most 
embarrassing headache. Successive reversals in the courts over this 
particular aspect led first to the near imprisonment of three dockers 
on 16 June and a massive walkout that threatened to spread to other 
industries. In this case the government was re]Bved by the actions of 
the now famous Official So11ci ter, who appeared out of nowhere and 
successfully applied to the Appeal Court to rescind that particular 
judgement by the HIRC. However, in a separate local dispute 
another NIRC injunction actually did end up with the imprisonment of 
five more dockers a few weeks later, precipitating a national port 
closure, widespread sympathetic strikes and a call by the TUC for a 
one-day general strike on 26 July. Fortunately. for the Tories the 
House of lordS ruled on the same day regarding a previous case that 
the union!!! responsible for the unofficial actions of its mem~. 
'!he dockers were re leased, the TGWU fined Once again and the industrial 
bombshell defused at least for the moment. 
As noted above the industrial conflicts at this time reacted 
with the underlying decline in the balance of payments position and 
-357-
the almost continuous international monetary crisis to produce a run 
on sterling and the subsequent decision to float the pound. Having 
lost this additional constraint on domestic inflation the Heath 
government noew began to court the unions in an .earm:es'tJfvain attempt 
to secure agreement on wage restraint. It dusted the mothballs off the 
NEOC, as the latter constituted the only "neutral" forum where 
discussions could take place. Negotiations at the NEOO, Chequers and 
Downing street dragged on into the autUmn. While this intensive 
soliciting of union opinion by a Tory (or even Labour)_government 
was unheard of previously, and while Heath made substantial concessions 
to the views of the TUC, the talks foundered on the demand of the latter 
for a wholesale change in government policy, including repeal of the 
Industrial Relations Act. Consequently, when it finally became clear 
that voluntary agreement on wage restraint was out of the question 
on 6 November, Heath resorted to the only deflatio~ option left 
.-
despite the Tory manifesto commitments, Le. a s~tutory incomes policy. 
Under Stage I of the incomes policy the government imposed a 
three-month freeze on all wages and most prices, although fresh foods 
were excluded, and some manufacturers of food products were allowed to 
increase prices in line with the growth of input costs. In consequence 
average earnings rose by less than one per cent over the period, 
while the retail price index went up by some 2.~, most of this due 
to the rising cost of food (Blackaby, p. 379). stage II, whiCh followed 
directly on from the freeze, allowed for average pay increases of ~ 
over 12 months plus £1 per week. Having abolished the NBPI, the 
Conservatives now had to revive it, although this time it was split 
into two agencies, the Pay Board and the Price Commission. These two 
bodies also had somewhat different terms of reference from their 
equivalent under the previous government. Price increases had to 
refer either to increases in "allowable costs per unit" and/ora ma.ximum 
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limit on net profit margins. Wage coverage was universal rather than 
requiring the government to refer cases individually, was based on 
average earnings rather than national pay agreements, made no allowance 
for productivity settlements and leaned more on large firms. As 
Crouch has argued the thrust of the policy was primarily towards 
"fairness" in the sense of per serving the existing structure of pay 
relativi ties and "consensus" in securing an agreed framework for wage 
growth (Crouch, 1977, ch. 7). However futile the ultimate aims of the 
programme, it did succeed in at least a limited sense. The unions 
acquiesced for at least a time to the very active attempts to include 
them in the statutory structure. It a.1m.08t certainly as well had some 
effect on overall wage rates, although unions and employers managed 
to exploit the exclusion clauses regarding payment by results, equal 
pay, overtime and postponed settlements. By October 1973 average 
hourly earnings had risen 13 1/2.% over the previous year (roughly 
the same as the previous two years). However, food prices in the last 
quarter of 1973 were up 20% on the- year 'before fuellng union resentment, 
and real post-tax wages had actually fallen for the first time since 
1968-69 (CEm, no. 2, ch. 3; Blackaby, pp. 378-401, and Stewart. 
pp. 178-85)· 
It was Stage Ill, from November 1973, however that really ran 
into trouble. The revised price code made few changes with no attempt 
to bring food within i ts ambit. On the wages side the attempt to 
institute a more flexible policy created the basis for potential 
breaches of the general norm of ?% or £2.2.5 per week. At TUC 
insistence after prolonged negotiations the government introduced various 
escape clauses for reasons of efficiency, relativities and equal pay. 
More significantly, the new package included·~threshold payments if 
inflation rose beyond a projected percentage and special rates for 
, '\ "-
"unsocial hours" in an attempt to ward off an 1JPJllaNmt battle 
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with the miners. Given that the terms of trade and balance of payments 
had alreadY shown a marked deterioration because of the international 
commodity boom and the rapid expansion of domestic consumption, the 
October Treasury forecast of 7% inflation beyond which threshold pay-
ments would commence was wildly inaccurate. When coupled with the 
trebling of oil prices that followed on the heels of that projection, 
Stage III laid the basis for another wage-price explosion (ibid.). 
In any case the new policy was rapidly overtaken by the oil 
crisis and the disp,lte with the miners. A secret meeting in July 
between Heath, Joe Gormley, the miners' leader, and Sir William 
Armstrong, head of the Civil Service and Heath's closest advisor, had 
evidently led to an understanding that such measures would be enough 
to buy off the miners as a special case. The open publication of 
those escape clauses in the discussion Green Paper in October", 
especially for "unsocial hours", seemed to preclude such a deal, since" 
they were now available to any union. More importantly two years 
" " 
of militancy and the hardening of the government's attitude left a 
highly delicate situation in which misunderstandings were likely and 
neither side particularly open to an easy compromise. From 1 November 
the electrical power workers were in dispute, and on 12 November the 
miners called an overtime ban • Heath responded the next day with a 
state of emergency banning Christmas lighting, followed up in 
December with a !JJ mile speed limit and the announcement of the three-
day week starting on New Year's Day. Subsequent attempts at mediation 
resulted only in further polarisation. Another secret meeting in mid-
December between Gormley and William Whitelaw, the new Secretary of 
state for Employment, produced only another misunderstanding and 
hardened opinions. By 16 January even an offer by the TUC at an NEOO 
meeting not to use a special settlement as an excuse to exploit the 
pay code was publically brushed aside b,pthe Chancellor (Fay and Young, 
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1976). The Mining executive balloted the membership with a massive 
result reported on 4 February in favour of a strike from the lOth. 
Three days later Heath announced a general election for 28 February. 
Thus, by the end of its brief term of office the Conservative 
government had come full circle regarding industrial relations and 
incomes policy. The neo-liberal incomes approach grafted onto an 
€tatist corporatist programme of union reform failed quickly and 
completely. In the process the post-war settlement on industrial 
relations, already badly shredded under Labour, simply fell apart. 
Not only had the Tories precipitated-overt.. pollticalstrikes for the 
first time· in the century (if one excludes the General Strike), but 
even straightforward industrial disputes now took on an unavoidable 
political dimension. Whatever the views of the majority of participants, 
the miners' disputes of 1972 and 1974 were seen at the- time as strikes 
against the government • Given the attem~ _ to hold on to some form 
of wage restraint in both years, whether official or unofficial, they 
could hardly acheive their industrial objectives without assuming a 
po li tical aim. Another pillar of the post-war system, the institutional 
separation of industrial and political issues, had crumbled. 
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Industrial Policy 
The hands off policy regarding state relations with industry 
fared no better. In this arena as well the Conservatives had announced 
their intention to back off from detailed intervention of even the ad 
hoc variety practised under Labour. They promised at the outset to 
hive off some parts of nationalised industries, wind up the IRC, 
revert from developnent grants to tax allowances, refrain from supporting 
troubled companies and reinforce anti-restrictive policies. In the first 
year of office they successfully pursued the new line, but by the end 
only the policy on competition remained intact. The Fair Trading Act 
of 1973 buttressed the Monopolies Commission and established a new 
quango, the Office of Fair Trading under a Director General more or less 
independent of the government. However, the Director General still 
lacked the power to initiate a merger investigation, and the first 
appointment to the post only occurred a few months before the government 
expired, leaving little chance to assess the new policy in practice 
(Blackaby, pp. 428-31). 
The "nO lame ducks" policy was the first to run aground in 
infamous circumstances. Ironically, perhaps, the two industries which 
marked the first of many Tory u-turns had both been reorganised and 
received substantial state aid under Labour in the pro-merger period, 
which may have contributed to undermining their commercial position. 
Three firms in particular ran :ilto serious financial trouble in 1970, 
Upper Clyde Shipbuilders, Cammel1 Laird and Harland and Wolff. UCS 
in particular had emerged as a direct result of an amalgamation sponsor-
ed by the Shipblilding Industry Board in 1967 and 1968. The latter 
had already injected some £21 million in that firm in grants, loans 
and share purchases while the IRC had made loans and bought shares 
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totalling £5 million in the Laird Group (the hived off shipbuilding 
section of Cammell Laird) by the time of the Conservative electoral 
victory. By August 1971, the government had alreadY raised the credit 
limit for home shipbuilding to £l,OOOm and extended the life of the 
SIB to the end of 1971 from when it was allowed to lapse. Harland 
and Wolff was more or less taken over by the government of Northern 
Ireland in December 1970, following its collapse. In June 1971, the 
government rejected a request for immediate aid from UCS and called 
in a liquidation committee who recommended closing two of the four 
yards. This sparked off the famous sit-in which lasted months and 
provided the prototype of another form of industrial action that soon 
spread to other firms threatened with closure and even to straight-
forward industrial disputes. Fortunately, between February and April 
1972, the Tories compromised their tough stance, finding and subsidising 
a buyer for one of the yards and ~?~orb.ing the other into the. renamed 
Govan Shipbuilding which received an additional aid package of 
£35 million. Cammell Laird likewise J:'8ceivedanother £20 million in 
lo,ans between August 19'71 and Septf!mber 19'72, and further aid was 
extended to other firms under the terms of the Industry Act of 1972, 
including £33.5 million for Harland and Wolff. As a result the ship-
building industry had received some £153 million in 1970 prices in 
government aid between 1964/5 and 1973{4 of which approximately 
£100 million had been extended under the Tories. Similar ly, despite 
their ideological intentions the state now owned Govan Shipbuilders, 
half of Cammell Laird and 47.£11, of Harland and Wolff (Blackaby, 
pp. 461-71 and 478). 
State sponsored recrganisation had likewise largely determined 
the structure of the aerospace industry , although in this case the 
basic mergers had occurred under the Conservatives in 1959-60 
leaving three main producers of air frames and two ot engines. 
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A further amalgamation under Labour had. reduced. aero-engine manufacture 
to a single firm, Rolls Royce, while some of the smaller air frame pro-
ducers were allowed to go into liquidation. The rising time span and 
costs of development projects, especially Concorde and the RB 211 engine 
began to cause financial trouble for Rolls Royce by the late 1960s, 
despite extensive government aid totalling some £1)0 million for those 
two projects alone by 1969/70 (ibid., p. 458). Although the Heath 
government had exempted the aircraft industry from the "no lame ducks" 
regime, there can be no doubt that they did not really bargain for the 
amount and form of state aid eventually required to save it from bank-
ruptcy. Despite another mixed. public and private aid package of 
. £60 million for the RB 211 project in November 1970, by the following 
February Rolls Royce had called in the receiver and state ownership 
was extended to the company's aircraft divisions. Subsequent renegotia-
tions on the engine contract with Lockheed resulted in a further subsidy 
of an estimated £190 - 195 million, and the Concorde project likewise 
received annual extensions on development, costs, none of which the 
government was likely to recover. In the end the aerospace industry 
as a whole had received some £758 million in 1970 prices of state 
. expenditure in various forms between 1960/61 and 1973/4 of which nearly 
half had been advanced. in the last four financial years, mainly for the 
two troubled and costly projects (ibid., and pp. 450-61). 
The collapse of Rolls Royce in February 1971 may be taken as 
the starting point for the re-evaluation of Conservative industrial 
policy. The Expenditure Committee's Sub-Committee on Trading and 
Industry appointed at the same tue held a series of meetings from 
the next month that lasted a year. These delved into the general 
question of "the objectives and effectiveness o.f financial aid 
provided by the Government to the private sector of industry", and 
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led to the publication of the report, Public Money in the Private 
Sector in July 1972 (Expenditure Committee, Sixth Report, Session 
1971- 2 , Vol. 1, p. 5). These sittings took evidence from a cross-section 
of major industrialists, primarily those previously or presently 
involved in para-state agencies or whose firms had received substantial 
aid, as well as top civil servants from the Treasury arid the Department 
of Trade and Industry. While not representative of the total range of 
opinion in manufacturing, it did give an effective platform to those 
"progressive industrialists" (and even one mer,chant banker) who favoured 
a Blore "flexible" policy regarding state relations with the private 
sector. It also took evidence ~1Il_ ~e ($1. which backed this group' s 
general perspectives to a somewhat surprising extent, and this deserves 
careful scrutiny. 
In the main the consensus theme of this testimony supported the 
ad hoc intervention that characteri~~ _~e Labour (and. eventually) the 
Tory governments. Those industrialists and bureaucrats who appeared 
before the Sub-Commi ttee were genemlly loathe to stipulate any con-
sistent principles for guiding state aid to intervention in the 
private sector. For example, Sir Frank Figgures, then Director 
General of the NEIO, stated with regard to this issue that "I would 
doubt whether it is possible to find general criteria which enable 
one to judge". At the same time he felt that such intervention should 
be placed in the context of "strategic judgements" regarding structural 
policy (ibid., Vol. Ill, p. ,520). Sir Arnold Weinstock voiced a similar 
opinion: 
The sophistication of technology is now sueD that in some 
fields there will be no industrial survival without Government 
participation, and one can name some thing$, nuclear power 
generation is one, the aircraft industry isa second, the 
aircraft engine industry is a third ••• '!here are other industries 
which from time to time will need special protection if they 
are to survive. (ibid., Vol. 11, p. 275.) 
This contradiction between principle and the practicality of state aid 
was best expressed by Sir Kenneth Keith: 
I think it is terrible difficult to be dogmatic •••. As a general 
principle I am 'agin'. I am a strong supporter of free enterprise 
and I am a strong supporter of industry pulling itself up by 
its own bootstraps. If it is not viable long term it is going 
to go to the wall. But there are cases like Rolls Royce. 
There are cases, I think, like ICL where the national interest 
is involved .•. It is necessary in the aircraft industry and 
these may be expensive, very technologically based companies 
for Government money to be put in. I think each case needs 
looking at on its own merits. (ibid., Vol. Ill, p. 463.) 
As one might expect representatives from the shipbuilding and aircraft 
industries and their corresponding government departments reiterated the 
"special casEI' criteria which qualified them for exceptional aid 
despite their objections to state funded .capital formation. '!bese 
criteria typically included economic and social importance, e.g. for 
reasons of defense and employment, SUbsidies offered by other governments, 
the inability to raise private finance for long-term and costly develop-
ment projects, "short term" cash flow problems as a result of the same, 
uncertain markets, spin-off efefcts,._etc .• (ibid .. , pp. lOl~l05, 124-
125, 146-153, and 171-176). 
The evidence of the CBI to a certain extent cut against the 
grain of this sort of tendency. In its written memorandum the CBI 
actually did attempt to articulate general principles of state aid to 
industry which largely supported a neo-liberal strategy. This submission 
gave full marks to the efficiency of the market and competition in the 
allocation of national resources. '!he function of the state was simply 
"to create a climate within which industry is allowed to get on with 
the job of creating the wealth of the country". Apart from the 
provision of an economic and social infrastructure, the CBI presented 
the government's role largely in negative terms, i.e •. relDDvlng the 
obstacles to market forces, ending discrimination between industries 
on any grounds other than profi tabil1 ty, and removing aid other than 
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tax incentives (ibid., Vol. 11, pp. »2-4, and CBI, 1972). It likewise supported 
the removal of the Regional Employment Premium and the switch from in-
vestment grants to tax allowances (ibid., pp. 305-6). However, the CBI 
modified tHe tough ideological stance in several respects. It noted 
several exceptions to the rule of market forces, namely environmental 
questions of social costs and industries whose foreign rivals received 
state subsidies. It conceded as well the case for regional policy, 
although here it argued for greater consistency and less discrimination 
to take account of "the long term nature of industrial planning" (ibid., 
p. 305). On the question of state support for R cl: D it admitted that 
there was "11 ttle scope for increasing the proportion of the cost of 
government research laboratories paid directly by industry" as "at 
.present industrial research and development budgets are under heavy 
pressure" (ibid., p. 307). Similarly, it allowed for state funding of 
private R &: D expenditure but argued so_what bizarrely that this did 
not count as a subsidy. In this case it supported the introduction 
of rather vague colllllercial criteria, i.e. eva.luating the costs of R & D 
projects in teras of the cow tment of national~sources and a more 
careful financial review of their firiancial. prospects. It also called 
for five-year forecasts of government R & D'expenditure (ibid., pp. 306-
:310) • 
The oral evidence from CBI members further eroded the hard line 
of the written submission. Sir Arthur Norman, the Vice President, 
conceded that specific industries required state aid and could only 
criticise "intelligent ad hocery" by calling for "more consistent and 
longer-term policies" (ibid., pp. 314-:315). Michael Shanks attempted to 
insert a degree of consistency by offering four criteria of exceptions 
to the general rule of market forcesl short-term cyclical problems, 
industries competing with foreign subsidised firms, industries with 
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cash flow problems but long term financial viability and those sectors 
"where the contribution to the economy is always likely to be greater 
than the actual reflected accounted profits .. (pp. 315-16). '!hus, 
when questionned closely by the Sub-Committee, the CBI members had to 
drop the strict neo-liberal ideology expressed in the written statement. 
In effect they too offered critical support for the system that had 
emerged in the 1960s although they were loathe to admit it. 
Of greater interest than the attempts by industrialists to 
reconcile the principles of free market capitalism with ad hoc state 
support for troubled firms were the discussions of the role of the IRC 
and the issues of state financed capital formation. Not surprisingly, 
perhaps, these major industrialists generally favoured the idea of an 
agency performing that sort of function. Lord Stokes, of course 
not exactly disinterested as a former member of that body, nevertheless 
argued that 
the !RC did a magnificent job-in helping to stimulate mergers 
in some companies which had got a little sluggish •••• it was 
done very admirably by the IRC because it was slightly at axms 
length from government and whereas there was a certain 
suspicion of IRC in the early days it was remarkable the 
number of industrialists who came to consult us with the 
feeling that they were talking to fellow industrialists 
themselves, particularly men they found out we had not any 
personal aims or ambitions, that we were only trying to help 
them. (ibid., p. 200) 
Virtually every other industrialist gave similar testimony, including 
those who had not directly served on the IRC board. Even Sir 
Arthur Norman and Michael Shanks of the CBI noted that while "on the 
whole, the CBI membership was not disappointed to see it go", they 
personally were "not glad" and "BOrry" (ibid., pp. 316-17). 
The problem with regard to capital formation was simply another 
aspect of the contradiction between ideological prediliction and 
practical need. Virtually every industrialist agreed with Norman' s 
\ 
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view that he "would have preferred to see the money coming from the 
institutions of the City of Iondon". The difficulty here was that 
industrialists perceived the necessity for "a lender of last resort 
in a position to respond rather than dictate, that is, fill gaps which 
the normal capital market will not fill because, in fact, the profit-
ability and return are somewhat further away than the capital market 
is looking for" (ibid.). Sir Frederick Catherwood likewise saw the 
use of an agency that would bridge the gap between the interests of 
shareholders and boards of directors: "The City, in my mind, should 
do this but there is a vacuum here and you can fill it with the IRC 
or from the City" (ibid., p. 2)4). Sir Kenneth Keith of Hill Samuel 
likewise thought it "a pity" that the IRC was abolished and could only 
respond negatively when asked directly whether the City and in particular 
its brainchild, Finance Capital for Industry (FOI), would fill the 
hole left by the former's demise (ibid., Vol.· Ill, pp. 462-)). The 
somewhat concealed agenda of these disCUBsions is perhaps best revealed 
in the following exchange between Mark Hughes, MP, and Aubrey Jones, 
the former head. of the PIB and Tory MPI 
Mr. Hughes - You have said that [ the. capital market] will not 
work because its calculus .is too narrow. The alternative that 
you pose is that the assistance of a para-governmental body 
should be given to prop up private capitalism? 
'Mr. Jones - To give private capitalism a wider outlook, to 
put the whole thing in reverse. (ibid., Vol. II, p. 241.) 
In general the industrialists favoured the notion of an agency 
performing the roles of the IRC, although less as a catalyst when 
appropriate for merger and rationalisation than as a bridge between 
management and shareholders, and a lender of last resort to firms with 
large capital needs but short-term cash flow problems. The "proprietor-
ial gap" figured much more strongly than the need for centralisation 
because, as Sir Joselil Lockwood put it, "the shareholders do not have 
enough control over the manageDlent" (ibid.., Vol. Ill, p. 430). 
Ironically, this growing concern had partly arisen from the IRC policy 
of "restructuring", which was in the words of Ronald Grierson "a modern 
idiom for the old word rationalisation or the even older one 
ca.rtelisatlon" (vol. Il, p. 263). '!bat is, the pro-merger programme 
of the IRC together with the amalgamation boom had produced a situation 
in which competitive forces might not act as a sufficient diSciplining 
force on the large and rather unwieldy firms whose owners were 
increasingly remote from day to day management. Somewhat greater 
division existed on the exact nature of such an agency, but most 
concurred with the view expressed by the CBI spokesmen that it should 
fuse the roles of the IRC and the City's FeI. Any new organisation 
might even take an equity stake in its industrial clients, but it should 
be a mixed public-private venture to secure industrial confidence 
against the fears of back door nationalisation (ibid., pp. 324-5). 
Or as argued by (now Sir) Charles Villiers, given that the public sector 
supplied roughly half the investDl~nt_1n_.the jtQ9nomy, there was a need 
to get the unavoidable relationship between the state and industry 
"on to the proved commercial lines" (ibid., Vol. Ill, p. 427). 
If the IRC had largely fulfilled its "restructuring" role in the 1960s, 
he still foresaw the usefulness of some kind of quasi-public 
"industrial development bank" supplying entrepreneurial investment 
funds. Unfortunately FOI could not fill that entrepreneurial gap 
of providing large scale risk capital as its "hands were 
considerably tied, both by shareholders and by the banks who supplied 
it with funds" (ibid., p. 431). SUch concerns were reinforced by 
the view expressed by CBI representatives that industrial regeneration 
required raising capital investment from 11 to 17 or 18% of GNP, and 
that such a project was sillply beyond the resources of a City-based 
instit.ution like FCI (ibid., Vol. 11, pp. 322-5). 
The TUC's evidence to the SUb-Committee in some ways supported 
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but in other respects went well beyond the tentative suggestions of 
industrial spokesmen. It differed substantially particularly from the 
CBI written memorandum by advocating "a much greater degree of discrim-
ination and selectivity in the administration of financial aid to the 
private sector of industry. tt Thus, they came out strongly in favour 
of investment grants rather than tax incentives, a }:8rallel but expanded 
system for the Development Areas as well as the prolongation of the 
REP (ibid., pp. )4)-47). Likewise, the thrust of their support for 
public aid to the private sector had a distinct emphasis of a corporatist 
character, downplaying commercial criteria. Instead they offered three 
main justifications -
1. to retain and strengthen Britain's growth potential and 
international competitiveness ••• 
2. to help ensure the fulfillrnent of the social responsibilities 
of industry ••• [and] 
). to facilitate the integration of private corporate objectives 
into national economic and social objectives (ibid., p. )4)). 
As such it rightly castigated the ad hoc provision of aid as less 
directed to those objectives than "a response to the immediate problems 
of survival" (p. )47). Following this line of argument the TUC was 
more forthright than industrialists in reaching a similar but more 
explicit conclusion. 
The divorce between the financial and industrial sectors still 
has damaging consequences. '!bere is indeed often a direct con-
flict between the interests of the City and the owners of capital 
on the one hand and those of productive industry on the other: 
the former benefit from high interest rates, and the latter 
from cheap money. For the financial sector the need for a 
quick return in terms of &ccounting profit is paramount whilst 
industry needs a long period of consolidated investment and 
growth. Moreover, although the financial sector claims the 
right to steer funds into particular industries by reference 
to market sentiment, this is often exclusively based on short 
term movements on the stock Exchange rather than to [sicQ long 
term growth potential. (ibid., pp. 348-9) 
On these grounds the memorandum a,;ain pointed out the divergent 
practices of foreicn countries t especially Italy, and called for direct 
state intervention in the capital market through the establishment of 
a public agency able both to provide loan cap~tal and take controlling 
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or minority equity stakes to achieve the desired investment patterns 
(ibid.). 
While some of the industrialists offered specific criticisms 
of the IRe role, a more straightforward rejection of the case for 
para-state agency came from representatives of City institutions and 
the re levant government departments. Im:d Sherfield of ICFC thought 
that such a special body was unnecessary, that the money markets were 
generally sufficient for the needs of industry and that any funnelling 
of public funds was best left to existing departments (Vol.Ill, pp. 
401-2). The representatives of FeI were less direct but their testimony 
did serve the function of excluding the proposal that that institution 
form the nucleus of any future mixed development bank. First, their 
borrowing capacity was still limited to £100 million that had been 
set when they were initially set up in 1945 by the Bank of England 
and various City institutions (p. -388}.-- Moreover-, they thought that 
their principU shareholders "would be reluctant to see our borrowing 
limits very much increased in so far as it must increase the risk that 
their uncalled liability would be called up" (p. 395). Secondly they. 
remarked that such high risk high technology pro jects as the RB 211 
and especially Concorde were beyond the scope of any City institution 
because of the inability t~:·~ee "(a) the end of its commitment or (b) 
the ultimate profitability or return on its money" (p. 390~. They. 
raised the problem of public accountability if state funds were 
channelled through an essentially private corporation (p. 389). Lastly, 
it pointed out that while it had financed at least one merger, it could 
not imitate the IRC's initiating role without SUbstantial reorganisation 
(p. 394). 
Representatives of the Treasury and the Dl'I echoed this view 
that City markets were effective in providing risk capital and that 
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no special agency was needed. In the words of Sir Samuel Goldman 
I think the triangular relationship between the Departments 
and Government generally, the firm or company involved, and 
the City is such, or could be such that the capital requirements 
one would look for from the City, could be mobilised perfectly 
adequately without the intermediary of a separate institution ••• 
(p • .583·) 
Moreover, he stressed the point that 
it is important if para-governmental institutions are set up 
that their working does not impair the working of the private 
capital system which is to be found in the City (ibid.). 
In addition he asserted with regard to such organisations that 
the Treasury would regard it as an important part of its function 
in assessing the desirability of a project of this kind to 
attempt some sort of evaluation of the cost of this and the 
relations between this additional cost and the other things on 
which the Government might wish to spend money (ibid.). 
That is, he wanted to ensure the extension of ''Treasury control" to 
cover the activities of any such agency. The Ul'I spkesman, Sir Anthony 
part echoed Goldman's case against a para-state institution, although 
he framed his objections more in terms of the greater Parliamentary 
scrutiny afforded by departmental control (pp. 578 and ,581-2). 
The Committee's inquiries on these issues took an interesting 
turn. Following up the suggestion made by the TUC as well as at least 
one of the ildustrialists (viz. Sir Joeexn !ockwood",·,ibid., p. 430) 
-that foreign practices regarding industrial finance might have something 
to offer, it commissioned a special report on European para-government 
agencies by a Mr. stuart Holland. This memorandum investigated 
industrial development banks and state holding companies in various 
countries, paying special attention to the Italian Industrial 
Reconstruction Institute (IRI). The report plumped heavily for the 
state holding company model partly because of its potential as 
an instrument for counter~cyclical investment in the context of national 
planning, but mainly owing to the inherent weaknesses of ~ lending 
agencies. '!bat is. it pointed out,the basic contradiction in the 
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solution preferred by industrial spokesmen, firms most in need of 
financial assistance were inevitably those which would not qualify 
for commercial loans (ibid., pp. 740-53). This report led to a 
fact-finding trip by the Sub-Committee to investigate the Italian 
para-state organisations in April 1972. Discussions with various offi-
cials and industrialists emphasised the ultility of a state holding 
company in terms of both regional planning and as a provider of entre-
preneurial capital for industr,y (ibid., pp. 753-73). 
'nle Sub-Committeets fi.na.l report mainly summarised the evidence 
given by the various witnesses. In so far as it reaChed substantive 
conclusions, these were primarily in two areas. First, on the general 
question of the criteria for public aid it essentially supported the 
rule that private industry should stand on its own feet, but noted the 
numerous exceptions justifying public intervention, 1. e. international 
competition, defense requirements,.balance. of._payments _considerations, 
essential industries, advanced ·technology, and social needs. (ibid., 
Vol. I, pp. 11-18). looking in detail at the major cases of public 
assistance in shipbuilding and aerospace, as well as other industries, 
it mainly called for greater clarity on the criteria for assistance 
and more Parliamentary accountability (cbe. 3-5, especially pp. 33 
and 43-4). Regarding regional policy the same points were made with the 
additional caveat that the lack of hard information regarding especially 
the effects of regional incentives and IDCs made evaluation particularly 
difficult (ch. 6, especially pp. !P-?). More interesting for our 
purposes were the conclusions regarding the form and scope of the 
proposed para-state agency for industrial investment. While the Sub-
committee did not make any firm recommendations On such a hot political 
potato, it did offer critical comment on some of the suggestions. 
R88&rding the schemes ot industrial spokesmen it noted the difficulty 
of the necessary separation in accounting, handling and spending 
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public and private money in any mixed. venture. It likewise rejected 
the choice of either FCI or ICFC as a model or nucleus of any para-
state finance institute, except in so far as they might serve in an 
advisory capacity. Remarking on the benefits of such an agency 
offering equity as well as loan capital, it gave a very favourable view 
of the advantages of the !RI model (ibid., pp. 68-77). Lastly it t:ro.d 
. 
the rather delicate path between the request from industry that any 
such body should be fairly independent from political control and "the 
important criticism made by Government witnesses that accountability 
to Parliament is necessarily less if assistance is handled through an 
agency than if it is channelled directly through a Government de~ent" 
(p. (7). In sum 'irhile the report refrained from a specific outline, 
it did rather come down on the side of the state holding company model. 
In the period during which the Sub-Committee took evidence, 
the Conservative government completed its u-turn on industrial policy. 
. .. .' ~ 
It did not in the end. complete the brief outlined above, tba. t is, no 
attempt was made to institute a state holding company, industrial bank 
or similar institution. It was left once again to labour to pick up 
and attempt to run with that particular football. Rather, as documented 
in the White Paper, Industrial and Regiona.l Developnent, published in 
March 1972, the Tories chose to stay within the bounds dictated by 
Civil Service and City opinion. '!bey opted instead for an "Industrial 
Development Executive" within the MI, which would recruit ex-officio 
members from industry and the City, and fuli"ill a JUrely advitsery. 
function (paras. 41-42). Secondly, through the Industry Bill 1972 
they passed enabling legislation which would allow the extension of 
financial assistance to the private sector at the discretion of the 
government and the relevant departments. The infamous Clause Seven 
of the Bill provided the Secretary of State for Industry with the power 
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to offer selective assistance on virtually unlimited criteria including 
"investment by acquisition of loan or share capital in any company", 
purchase of an undertaking, granting secured or unsecured loans with 
or without interest or any form of insurance or guarantee. The only 
constraints placed on the Secretary of State were an upper financial 
limit of £250 million with additional drawing power of £300 million 
given consent of the Treasury and the provision that share acquisitions 
could only be made with consent of the company concerned and had to be 
disposed of as soon as possible (Clause Eight). The Conservatives 
thus were forced to return most of the way to the pattern of voluntarist 
corporatism in industrial matters established in the 1960s, although 
&s usual they were far less willing to Challenge the views of the dom-
inant power bloc. By the end of their term of office it is almost 
certain that they had diverted at least as much and most likely more 
public money into private industry &s had the previous government. 
Looking & t aerospace, shipbuilding, textiles and the IRC alone, state 
.. --..,. ....... --. -- -... _. - .. ---.... - : . 
expenditure in constant 1970 prices on industrial intervention in the 
years 1970/1 to 1973/4 totalled some £S04 million, while the equivalent 
under labour equalled £485 million (Blackaby, p. 418).' More significantly, 
if one places the industrial legislation in the context of other ex-
tentions of state intervention in industrial relations,:incomes policy, 
and housing finance, they had inadvertently constructed, in the words 
of one not exactly unsympathetic critic, "The most comprehensive armoury 
of Government control that has ever been assembled for use over private 
industry, far exceeding &11 the powers thought to be necessary by the 
last labour Govemment" (T. Benn, 19'73). The same person was more than 
ready to make use of such powers when the next Labour government returned 
to the helm. 
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Capital Formation ~ The Emerging Critigue and the City's Response 
As the testimony to the Expenditure Committee analysed above 
indicates, yet another plank of the post-war settlement was rotting 
away during the Heath government, namely the depoliticisation of capital 
formation. By the time of Labour's return to power the issues 
surrounding investment, profitability, and the City's role in respect 
to industry had become the focus of a major political dispute. The 
main forum in the emerging controversy was, of course, the Labour Party, 
in particular its National Executive. Discussion here began with the 
post mortum of labour' s period in office. Essentially the failure 
of the programme of voluntaristic corporatism and the general morass! 
that engulfed every aspect of the economic and industrial policies 
of the Wilson government prompted a re-evaluation of planning, incomes 
policies, and relations with the unions, not to mention social issues, 
industrial democracy and inequaU ty • 'lb18 ~ ~consci-ence 
particularly affected those associated with the planning movement who 
perceived its collapse as due to several factors: 1. the lack of effective 
instruments of control, 2. the vacilation on institutional reform, 
especially regarding the power of the Treasury and the Bank of England 
and their links with the City, and :3. the absence of a wider· framework 
of social justice which could persuade the unions to accept wage re-
straint voluntarily. 
As early as October 19'70, for example. Wilson's close advisor 
'.l'hmUS (now Lord) Balogh published a Fabian pamx;hlet a.ttacking the 
Labour leader's record in all these areas (Balogh, 1970). While 
critical of the unions as the source of wage inflation he predicted 
that future incomes policies would only work in the context of a 
radical social and economic programme. ThUB he pinpointed the social 
democratic dileDllDaI only accelerated growth and higher real incomes 
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could establish the basis for the successful pursuit of·cthese policies, 
but growth in turn depended on higher productivity and improving not 
only the quality but the volume of investment. Relying on higher 
profits would not ensure the latter and would likewise decrease the 
possibility of a deal with the unions. Consequently, an extension of 
public ownership seemed to be the key, not only for raising investment 
levels, but to ensure greater public accountability and a more equitable 
distribution of income. While overly blithe about the real effects 
of "restructuring of industry" under labour, Balogh saw that expanding 
the powers and the financial base of the IRC and the introduction of 
worker particiJBtion would be crucia.l. aspects of a new "contrat: social". 
'Dle programme was simple, "a double pronged attack" raising investment 
and productivity on the one hand and holding down wages on the other 
(ibid., p. 40). The problem with it was likewise two-fold, defining 
the exact content of the package and finding the ground for consensus 
when even the existing low growth rate proye~ "ext~vagant". 
In the event these themes were picked up by two "young turk" 
advisors to the Wilson government, Richa.rci Pry~e and stuart Holland. 
~e had resigned his post at the Cabinet Office because of the crisis 
lIeaBUreS of July 1966 and written a critical book advocating both a 
competitive strategy for public enterprise and a state holding company 
on the IRI model to promote new enterprise and regional development 
(Pryke, 1967, especially ch. 4). 
Holland had left his position at Number 10 in 1968, pursued a 
research project on the !RI and began to develop the same ideas into a 
fairly coherent programme. Briefly, Holland's basic notion was a kind 
of advanced Keynesianism. Keynes1an demand management policies had 
proved insufficient in resolving the structural aspects of the growth 
process which the market alone could not overcome, especially structural 
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and regional unemployment and sectoral under;'investme.mt. These problems 
were further exacerbated through the internationalisation of capital, 
as multinational firms increasingly both encouraged regional disparity 
and thwarted standard fiscal and monetary instruments. In these 
circumstances the state had to step in and assume the role of entre-
preneur. Through direct intervention and planning the state would 
not so much substitute itself for the market as ensure the large-scale 
investment providing the conditions which would make the market work. 
The institution of a state holding company would both strengthen the 
government's hand against multinationals and give it the necessary 
leverage to make planning and intervention eff4i:tctive (Holland, 1971, 
and 1972). Through the acquisition of even minority Share holdings 
such an institution could build up a competitive public sector which 
would give an adequate basis for the new industrial strategy: 
In other words, state firms purposively used. can influence private 
firms within a sector without actuallycontrolllng them, and can do 
so at various levels including the scale, rate and location of 
investment, and price competition between products (Holland, 
1972, p. 3). 
These ideas surfaced organisationally at a special conference 
called by the NEe's industrial policy sub-committee in February 1972. 
AB developed here and at subsequent meetings of the sub-committee's 
working groups on the public sector and economic planning, Holland.·s 
scheme soon included various other proposals to win support of trade 
unionists and the Party left (Ha.rtley-Brewer, 1975). Essentially, 
these were 1. the so called progr&mme contracts or compUlsory planning 
agreements between the envisioned NEB and leading firms, 2. the 
disclosure of relevant information on medium term corporate plana to 
make the planning ~eements possible, 3. provisions for industrial 
deaocra.cy, and 4. the nationalieation of twenty top MllNlfacturing firms, 
one of the big three clearing banks and two or three insurance 
companies. The increasingly radical nature of these proposals, 
especially the industrial democracy plank, proportedly won the support 
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of Tony Benn, who took over the chair of the sub-committee in December 
(ibid.). The publication of the public sector working group's draft 
plan for the NEB as an Opposition Green Paper in March 1973, grafted 
these aspects onto the original trunk including the "25 companies" 
proposal (Labour Party - NEC, 1973). This report was incorporated more 
or less in toto in the National Executive's document, Labour's Programme 
.!2Z2., presented to the Annual Conference in the same year (Labour Party, 
1973) . 
At Conference the draft plan received its first watering down, 
partly owing to a skillful speech by (now Sir) Harold Wilson in the 
debate on the public sector. After a ritualistic attack on the 
"remote boardrooms" of the multinationals and the "irresponsible seats 
of power within the City of London", Wilson announced the intention 
of a future labour government to nationalise the docks, development 
land, shipbuilding and aircraft as ",eJJ..,~·~~pecified. ~~ction~ of the 
Iharmaceutical, machine tool, construction and road. haulage industries 
(labour Party Report, 1973, pp. 160-70). He likewise confirmed the 
introduction of the planning agreements system, industrial democracy, 
a new industry act and the NEe. However, Wilson left little doubt as 
to the fate of the "25 companies" proposa.la 
I am against it. The Parliamentary Commi tt-ee is against it. 
I will leave it with these words, that the Parliamentary 
Committee charged by the Constitution with the duty of sitting 
down with the Executive to select, from the Programme adopted. 
by the Conference the items for including in the election 
manifesto, entirely reserves its full constitutional rights 
on this matter, and there could be nothing more comradely than 
that (ibid., p. 167). 
The voting on this section of the programme confirmed his !ree hand. 
A motion to extend the shopping list to "2.50 major monopolies" was 
overwhelmingly defeated. Instead, Conference unanimously approwd,-a 
vague motion supporting the programme of the National Executive "for 
early nationalisation of important parts of the British economy". 
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However, a third. resolution in at least ~ contradiction with the 
previous one, in that it rejected "The concept of shopping lists of 
industries and companies for social ownership" likewise passed , albeit 
by a small margin of ),839,000 to 2,217,000, despite the support of 
Tony Benn and the NEC (ibid., pp. 170-88). Given this ambiguous compromise 
the shopping list proposal did not appear on the 1974 election manifesto. 
In the meantime critical comment on the relationship between 
industry and finance, initiated by the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee, 
began to filter through to the financial press. An article. in The Banker 
in February 1972, had contrasted the ci.ty·s "extraord.iriS.ry recovery" 
in the 1960s with the comparatively low levels of domestic industrial 
investment. It claimed that the view was widespread that both Eri tain 
and the US, the two countries with the most developed systems of stock 
exchange finance, were moving towards the German and Japanese systems 
of bank finance. At the same time it reiterated the traditional 
objections to banks involving more than a fraction of their assets 
in venture capital but remarked, 
. 
Some bankers use this argument to just4fy the City' s non-
intervention in industrial affairs. But one does not need 
to argue that the banks themselves should invest more of their 
own resources in industry if all one wants is more City 
involvement in management (The Banker, 19'72, p. 145). 
A subsequent article reported that "The Bank of England had been 
talking for some time with leading commercial bankers and investors 
about ways of collaborating with industrial companies in securing 
increased efficiency where that seemed to be needed" (ibid., p. 4.53). 
It likewise called for more industrial expertise in the banks, but 
little else. '!his activity led to the request of Sir Laslie O'Brien, 
the Governor of the Bank, for the setting up of a City Working Party 
on increasing efficiency, rut even that limited enterprise failed to 
get the backing of the merchant or clearing banks or the issuing houses. 
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He best expressed his attitude on the subject of industry-finance 
relations in a speech to the Institute of Bankers in January 1973: 
Perhaps the most likely development will be the arrival of 
the all-purpose bank in the United Kingdom. This will not be 
unwelcome provided it does not lead to the submerging of the 
special talents and expertise of the merchant banker. Less 
likely and less welcome, in my opinion, will be a change in 
the relationship between the main deposit banks and industry 
in imitation of some continental models. Many have yearned for 
such a cnange ever since the Macmillan Report of 1931 and 
probably for longer, and certainly one can sympathise with 
the desire to see pressure through the medium of the banking 
system being brought to bear on industry to improve its 
efficiency. This is a vi tally important 0 bjecti ve which has 
got to be achieved somehow, and, as you know, I have so far 
had only moderate success in persuading the institutional 
investor to take on this task. I shall persevere but I 
would not think it right to seek -to persuade the banks to 
become large-scale equity investors in industry so that they 
may do the job. I prefer banks to run their businesses 
primarily with the accent on liquidity and with the safety of 
their depositors in mind t as our banks have always done. 
~, 19'73, pp. 57-8.) 
The negative response of financial institutions to even the 
extremely mild call by the Governor for collaboration with industry 
increasingly alarmed the editors of The -Banker: 
. -
The reasons advanced by the dissenting groups for standing aside 
are familiar and respectable even tho¥gh they contain an element 
of short-sightedness. The clearing banks have kept up the 
pretence that they lend only short-term funds to industries 
and are therefore not involved in managerial success or failure. 
This view is quite unrealistic as a large and growing portion 
of bank credit is t in fact, used by the borrowers as capital 
('hle ,Banker t~J 19?3 t _ p. 9) .. 
Encouragement of industrial expertise was necessary to secure the 
position of British banks in the EEC and to stave off the likely 
state intervention if self-regulation did not produce some results. 
''The next step forward," the article warned, ''will probably be associated 
with some cause celebre that will force the City to sit up and take 
notice" (ibid., p. 10). However, another article a few months later 
voiced the opinion that little had come of the promotional efforts of 
the Governor of the Bank of England and the City Working Party to involve 
the banks in industry, 
The banks insist on concentrating on the financial aspects of 
industry; but the government has been able to point out that 
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this has not been very effective in preventing disasters like 
Rolls Royce, Mersey Harbour Board, or Upper Clyde Shipbuilders 
(ibid., p. 457). 
In this context, then, the IBRO report commissioned by the CPRS 
intervened offering both short-term predictions and advice on the future 
relationship of the banks with industrial capital. After noting the 
existence of two opposing views on this relationship, what they termed 
integrationist versus the separatist, they also brought out the distinction 
between the private organisation of the German and Japanese integrated 
systems as against the state dominated systems of France and Italy. 
'!be rise of institutional investors was depicted as the key to the 
. British case, raising the prospect of moving towards the German! Japanese 
approach. Expressing the fear that disputes between the protagonists 
of the various alternatives could "unsettle London's future developnent 
as an international financial centre," given Labour's commitment to a 
state holding company, it argued that, in any case "the United Kingdom 
does not have an open, market-oriented 'financial system," that is, that. 
-
the traditional separatism of City institutions was being eroded· in 
fact even if this had not been recognised (IBRO, pp. 1-)6-7). Moreover, 
it was 
.••• realistic to expect that in fact, as monetary integration 
and financial harmonisation proceed in Europe, there will 
evolve a structure of European financial institutions that 
incorporates features from the British, the German, and the 
French/Italian systems, j;he precise balance being determined 
piecemeal as matters develop. London's prospects as an 
international financial centre will thus probably be enhanced 
both by allowing the British banking system to move rather 
further in the German direction, and by preparing British 
public sector financial institutions to compete effectively 
against their European counterparts. As a senior official from 
one of the Big Four clearing banks emphasised in conversation 
with us, it will be important for London to become the leading 
centre not only for Europe's commercial banking system but also 
for Europe's giro, savings bank, and building society 
movements too (!BRO, pp. 1-35}. 
Directly related to the above, IBRO recollected the impression 
of the Radcliffe Committee as far back as 1959 that "the market for 
credit is a single market", and reported that since then the trend 
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towards ~at direction ha.d continued apace including the markets for 
cash flow management and a.dvisory services= 
London's position as a lea.ding financial centre has been based 
on the multiplicity and specialisation of the financial inter-
mediaries operating there, but structural and technological 
changes in the financial services industry are pointing firmly 
towards the concentration of financial business in a smaller 
number of larger multi-purpose financial institutions (IBRO, 
pp. 1-27). 
It recommended state encouragement of these tendencies in the direction 
of German "universal banks". 
The IBRO report, was of course, never officially adopted as 
government policy under Heath or Labour and can be taken as representative 
of only the most "progressive" sections of City opinion. In general, 
banking capital responded very defensively to the political crisis 
which erupted in 1974 with the increased volitility of class struggle, 
the consequent fall of the Tory govemment, the serious squeeze on 
. profits and coporate liquidity and the.La.bour Party·s. proposals for an 
extension of the public sector, particularly into finance. '!'he only 
institutional change was the setting up of Finance for Industry by 
merging the Finance Corporation for Industry with the Industrial and 
Commercial Finance Corporation in late 1973, relics themselves of bank-
ing capitaPs minimal and delayed response to -the criticisms of the 
Macmillan Committee and founded under the Attlee government. 
This merger was fairly blatantly a sop to the City's critics, 
given that no changes in banking practices were contemplated. One 
need only consult the first annual report of FFI for evidence of the 
continued domination of "sound financial practices"; 
The primary function of the Group will continue to be the 
provision of medium and long term finance for the development 
of British industry, rut the priority given to profitable 
investments in the United Xingdom will not preclude similar 
investments overs~s (my emlhasis) (WI, Annual Report. It p. 4). 
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At the same time articles in 1b! Banker reflected a hardening 
of attitudes and lack of willingness to discuss any changes in the 
financial system. An editorial in February 1974, denounced all critics 
under the heading, "The City must counter attack", even the "mild, 
sweet-tempered people" who drafted the IBRO report, and called for 
resistance to all attempts to extend political control, whatever the 
intentions (The Banker, 1974, pp. 151-3). Similarly, Kenneth Fleet, 
the City Editor of the Daily Telegraph, opposed the move towards uni-
versal banks of the German type, although he also wanted to "re-establish 
the City as a provider of capital for industry (sic)" (ibid., p. 183). 
A Hr. YasSOkDvich, Managing Director of the European Banking 
Corporation, advocated.a "better PR eff~". to restore the City's 
deteriorating national image (ibid., p. 1.53). And another article 
proposed a refurbishing of the City Liason Committee set up initially 
in 1965 to lead such an effort in the combat against labour's proposals, 
given that "the quiet chat at the club" or-·,....& ·s·6rlobled note to the 
head of the civil service" was no longer suffioient (ibid., p. 859). 
Perhaps the most novel proposal in this period of obvious 
retrenchment was that of a former senior civil servant Neville 
Abraham in response to wrd O'Brien's suggestion of some sort of "ginger 
group" of institutional shareholders to vet management performance. 
Abraham favoured fulfilling this aim through a mixed-enterprise agency, 
independent of control of central government. Sv.ch a "Shareholders 
Management Corporation" would buy minimal shares in all major industries 
and "thus beoome the means to link the !nsti tutional investors of the 
City with the Government shareholder" (ibid., p. 874). The SMC 
would. be in other words a version of the IRC more under the direct oon-
trol of banking capital, avoiding the direct risk of major investment, 
but ptoviding advice "with the orthoddot a.im of improving efficiency, 
not as with the REB to save jobs" (ibid., p. 876). Abraham in effect 
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picked up some of the suggestions by leading industrialists to the 
Trade and Industry Sub-Committee, and as elaborated in his book published 
the same year, went 50 far as to recommend some form of worker 
participation and "a concordat between main political parties and 
other centres of influence" on key issues of economic relations (Abraham, 
1974, p. 7). Abraham's ''Bankers' corporation" never got anywhere, 
although it is at least of interest to note his similarity in both 
style and content with a. slightly earlier pUblication by the "cybernetic" 
Tony Benn eT. Benn, 1970). More typical was the increasingly shrill 
. attack on even mild criticism, which grew to panic proportions a.:f'ter 
Labour's return a.s a minority government in March 1974. 
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Conclusion 
By the beginning of 1974 the Conservative government was in 
disarray on virtually every front. The neo-liberal campaign had. been 
rolled back in industrial relations, income, monetary and fiscal policy, 
public expenditure control and state intervention (or the lack of it) 
in industry. Indeed, the Tories found themselves engulfed by a crisis 
of unparalleled severity for the post-war period, as not entirely un-
related aspects of liquidity strain, financial panic and industrial 
conflict combined in the winter of 1973-74 to send stock prices in a 
downward spiral. While the miners' strike stole the newspaper headlines, 
the financial crisis was at least as important an element in the loss 
of business confidence in the government. Claims made at the time and 
subsequently that the NUM 'brought down" the government are certainly 
overblown, although the strike against a statutory incomes policy 
certainly played a major :part in undemnrD.g . Rea. th • s credi bill ty • 
Mora accurately the Conservatives had appeared rather frantic for some 
time in their grasp~ng at new policy measures to cope with the accelerat-
ing crisis. By the end the government's authority had simply collapsed. 
'!he loss of support even in business circles was symbolically expressed 
by the head of the CBI, Sir Campbell Adamson, who declared during the 
election ~pa.ign that the Industrial Relations Act had been "a mistake". 
In reference to the general model of the state propounded earlier 
conservative strategy was characterised by a general failure to break 
out of the mould of voluntaristic corporatism along any of the dimensions 
of input, output or mode of procedure. In terms of representation the 
attempt to stand back from tripartite consultations foundered when the 
government sought to reintroduce incomes policy as a substantial plank 
in its economic policy. Ultimately the lack of progress in the effort 
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to secure TUC co-operation on voluntary restraint led to the introduction 
of statutory measures, but these too proved unworkable in a very short 
space of time. By the end the government seemed to have backed into 
an impossible position, unable to function effectively with or without 
the involvement of the unions, owing to the hostility provoked by the 
Industrial Relations Act. Had the latter survived it would have con-
siderably modified the voluntaristic framework of labour relations 
and union representation through its general assertion of the authority 
of the state over these nominally independent organisations. As 
pointed out earlier industrial relations legislation more than any 
other aspect of Tory policy contained the seed of a more statutory 
version of corporatism, even if in the end it did not come to fruition. 
As regards output the non-interventionist plank of the Tory 
programme of course collapsed with the decision to bailout Rolls Royce 
and UCS. Here the government simply reverted to the previous mode of 
ad hoc intervention and support, although there was no attempt to 
systematise state aid through the introduction of an IRC - type 
agency, despite considerable support for the idea from industrial 
capital. '!his simply reflected the lack of any coherent Tory policy 
on the issue of state intervention apart from a pUrely negative 
attitude. Drawn into financial support of various firms and sectors 
against its ideological commitments, it could hardly work such 
measures into a general economic programme. Similarly, the introduction 
of wage and price controls could only be justified as short-term ex-
pedient rather than as a central element in Tory economic philosophy. 
In the end Heath had in some respects gone further than Wilson in 
extending the pattern of" state controls on the private sector. 
When labour returned to office it had at its disposal a range of 
instruments written into the statute books through enabling legislation 
which could be used as a basis for a more comprehe . of nsl. ve programme 
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state regulation. 
Only along the axis of mode of procedure had the Conservatives 
maintained the previous "technocratic" line more or less intact. '!he 
output-oriented, functionalist mode of administrative organisation 
and controlling state expenditure fitted more easily into the business 
ethos of the Heath government. However, in this area as well the 
limi ts of administrative planning became increasingly apparent. 'lbrough 
both the dysfunctional consequences of projecting state expenditure 
in volume terms on the basis of unrealistic growth expectations and 
the ultimate fact that expenditure could not be isolated from 
poll tical control. When the crunch came policy in this area as in 
every other followed the dictates of short-term political considerations 
in response to economic and social forces. 
More significantly over the course of-the Heath term of office 
two pillars of the post-war settlement" bad" been seriously d&maged. 
'!he traditional separation of economic and political demands in the 
Labour movement had at least partially dissolved as the unions under-
took political action ouiaide Parliament, and even industrial 
disputes took on a political colouring in the context of a statutory 
incomes policy. This process culminated with the the miners I "strike 
against the government" in the winter of 19'74, not the only reason but 
certainly a major factor behind the call for an election and the 
Tories' defeat at the polls. Secondly, in a similar manner the process 
of capital formation had become politicised, an issue which had laid 
more or less dormant since the Attlee government. The raising and 
allocation of investment finance through the market mechanisms of the 
City were now openly questioned and not just by the left wing of the 
Labour Party and the unions. The new government thus had not only the 
immediate and severe problems of a multi-faceted economic and political 
crisis to face but the potentially more serious difficulty of a longer 
term but accelarating erosion of key aspects of the post-war compromise. 
This conjuncture wo~ soon be further compounded by the virtual elim-
ination of any prospect for short term economic growth. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
Labour and the Crisis of British Capitalism, 1974-79 
In February 1974 a minority Labour government returned to office 
following a snap election called by the previous Conservative Prime 
Minister, Edward Heath. Labour took power in the context of an econ-
omic and poll tical crisis of major proportions. While I have examined 
the underlying factors accounting for this crisis in the two previous 
chapters, for the present discussion I will designate the bare bones 
of this conjuncture as follows. First, the election had been called 
-in the midst of the most severe period of industrial conflict since 
~he General Strike of 1926. The precipitating cause of the premature 
election had been an overtime ban and eventual strike call by the Nation-
al Union of Mineworkers (NUM) against the Conservative statutory pay 
policy. While ostensibly an industrial dispute the faet that it was 
directed against govemment policy, that it constituted the second 
national mining strike in two years (the 1972 strike being the first 
such official dispute since 1926), that the NUM employed notably mili-
tant tactics (especially flying and mass pickets) and that Communist 
and other left-wing unionists assumed leading roles in the conflict 
all combined to gi~e the impression of political strike against the 
government. The election was thus dubbed with the slogan, "who rules 
the country" (the government or the unions). 
Second, at leut partly as a result of the excessive growth and 
then sudden contraction of the money supply under the Conservatives, 
a speculative bubble burst in the commercial property markets plunging 
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the financial sector into a panic of classic proportions. In December 
1973 London and County Secu~tties~ a major property company, closed its 
doors setting off a run on deposits and a string of failures that spread 
throughout the secondary banking sector that had mushroomed in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. The financial crisis continued unevenly over 
the next year at times even threatening the rather staid world of the 
City of London establishment and was only contained by the rescue 
"Lifeboat" operation conducted by the Bank of England and the major 
clearing banks. At its height in December 1974 something over £1,285m 
of support had bean recycled to troubled institutions at a cost of at 
least £20Om to the Treasury in its foregone share of profits from the 
rescue operations of the Bank of England. Despite this massive rescue 
operation a number of financial institutions went into receivership 
in the next two years including eight which had been supported by the 
Lifeboat Control Committee (~. J\me 1978, p. 237, Gowland, pp. 95-6 
and Channon. 1977. ch. 5). 
Third, on the heels of the financial panic a liquidity squeeze 
penetrated the industrial and commercial sector. This lDOI'e general 
if less spectacular crisis was not unrelated to the above-mentioned 
factors. On the one hand the financial troUbles of the City massively 
undermined business confidence and precipated a further drop in already 
depressed share prices. On the other industrial militancy had led to 
rapidly escalating wage costs, as workers sought to regain and then 
surpass real income levels lost during the period of statutory restraint. 
Industrial firms likewise faced further complications generated by 
Conservative and Labour anti-inflation policies. Threshold agreements 
tied to "the Retail Price Index triggered massive rises in unit costs 
as the inflationary spiral accelerated in 1971f.. At the same time firms 
were effectively constrained from meeting those costs through equiva-
lent price increases because of the statutory controls on the latter 
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introduced by Heath and carried over the Labour. In any case the 
immediate problems of liquidity caused by government policy only exacer-
bated two longer-term features of the "profits squeeze". Inflation 
appeared to increase at least the potential burden of company taxation 
primarily because of accounting practices which failed to discount the 
inflated values of stocks. These same practices had also concealed 
a long-term secular decline in pre-tax profitability for industrial 
and commercial firms. both points which I shall return to in the second 
section. 
This then was the position that confronted Labour on its return 
to office after four years in opposition, industrial mi1itancy and 
financial chaos, to put the matter none too bluntly. 'Ibe economic 
context was further complicated by two essentially political factors. 
First. the new government of Harold Wilson did not have an overall 
majority in Parliament. While the Conservative opposition was at first 
too demoralized to take much advantage· of Labour's minority position, 
the government's ability to manoeuvre was considerably hamstrung by 
its dependence on abstentions by some of the small pal'ties. essentially 
the Liberals and the motley group of MPs from Northern Ireland. This 
relationship was formalised a few years later in the so-calied Lib-Lab 
pact. However. initially at least it· lent some credence to fears 
expressed in the press and elsewhere concerning the 'ungovernability' 
of the country. Second, over the period of opposition both the unions 
and the Labour Party organization had shifted considerably to the Left. 
The intricacies and impact of this development necessitate some detailed 
discussion. Following this I shall conclude this section with a brief 
look at the political aims of business as it had evolved over the same 
period. 
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I The Political Forces shaping Labour Policies 
The resurgence of the Left had not led to a complete takeover 
of the Party apparatus. While the Parliamentary Left, mainly organized 
around the Tribune Group, received a considerable boost with the 
election of a number of radical MPs in 1974, the basic strength of the 
Left lay in the local constituency parties and in certain trade unions. 
From these bastions the radical wing of Labour had made certain inroads 
into the policy-making organs of the Party. In particular the Left 
had a position of dominance in the National Executive Committee (NEC) 
which drew up the Party programme and co-wrote the electoral manifesto 
with the Leader in Parliament (then Harold Wilson). It could also 
count on a narrow and rather uncertain majority at the annual 
Conference for at least some of its economic and industrial proposals 
through the secure support of the constituencies and the rather more 
important but at the same time ficlcle block votes of some major tmions. .. 1 
Thus the Left coUld muster the votes and the organizational muscle to 
exercise considerable influence over Labour's wirtten programmes and 
manifestos. However, this did not extend to the day-to-day activities 
of the Parliamentary Party or the government which remained in the 
bands of the Centre and Right. a situation reinforced by the minority 
status of the incoming government. 
As embodied in the NEC document adopted. at the Annual Conference 
of 1973, Labour's Programme for Britain, 1973, a comprehensive left-
wing blueprint offered detailed policy commitments for the future 
government. The most important planks for the purposes of the present 
analysis included the following. First, it called for new public 
enterprise in particular the nationalization of North Sea oil, natural 
mineral rights. the docks. aircraft and shipbuilding as well as the 
creation of a National Enterprise Board (HEa) around the base of exist-
ing public holdings in BP tRolls Royce and Short Brothers. The NEB 
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was designed as a state holding company to facilitate national and 
regional planning (especially of investment) in part through the 
acquisitioo of controlling shares in "some twenty-five of our l.argest 
manufacturers (p. 3~}." 'lbe second instrument for influencing 
corporate strategy was to be the introduction of a planning agreements 
system between the NEB and at least the 100 largest manufacturing 
firms. By way of a new industry act the government would secure the 
right to obtain information about medium-term company plans as well 
as to seek agreement with, issue instructions to, invest in or purchase 
outtoight or remove the directors of any firm encompassed by the 
planning agreements system (pp. 17-19). Third, the Programme called 
for the retention of the Price Commission and "the full weaponry of 
price controls" on the private sector with particular reference to the 
top 100 companies (p. 23). Fourth, it included proposals for 
strengthenina workers' rights, not only for l.Ulion recognition and 
membership, safety representatives and facilities for union officials 
but for some form of "industrial democracy" including the disclosure 
of company information as well as joint control through direct 
representation on a "supervisory board" at company level and "joint 
control cCIIDittees" of managers and workers at "that and lower levels 
(pp. 25-28). Fifth, the Programme announced the intention of reducing 
inequality through a progressive life-time wealth tax on the 
"descendents of this country's traditional 'ruling classes''', as well 
as a restructuring of income tax and the closure of loopholes to hit 
the better off and the return to a system of corporate taxation Which 
would favour "the retention of company profits for reinvestment in 
plant and machinery, and not their distribution into the pockets of 
shareholders (pp. 36-39)." Finally, it proposed a wide range of 
measures in social and economic policy to both support the goala of 
~ater equality and riainl living standards and secure the mainten-
ance of full employment. Underlying all of theae specific coaaitments 
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was the more fundamental socialist theme, "to bring about a fundamental 
and irreversible shift in the balance of power and wealth in favour 
of working people and their families (p. 7)." 
Whi le the proposals of the NEC document were formally adopted 
at the Party Conference in 1973, the fate of some of them, in particu-
lar the "25 companies" shopping list was sealed at the same time by 
the vociferous objections of Harold Wilson. 2 Yet, the Manifesto for 
the election of February, 197~, included many specific promises drawn 
from the 1973 Programme including income and wealth tax reform, 
naticoallzation of all of the specific industries previously men1:ioned, 
the purchase of shares in pharmaceuticals, road haulage, construction 
ad machine tools as well as the creation of the NEB. At the same time 
the "25 companies" proposal was dropped and the planning agreements 
system included with no mention of compulsory powers. More generally 
the Manifesto featured an agreement with the unions on a voluntary pay 
policy in return for the measures ahova as· well as other planJcs in the 
areu of industrial relaticns reform and social policy. Christened 
the "social contract" this bargain with the Trades Union Congress (TUC) 
reflected the opinion widespread in the Party that any future incomes 
policy could Cftly be maintained in the context of serious and deep 
reaching social and economic reform, a view more representative of the 
majority of MPs than the more radical proposals in the 1973 Programme. 3 
For present purposes the importance of this intra-party debate 
11es less in the watering down of the left-wing Programme, which was 
to be expected, than in the specific commitments extracted from the 
Prime Minister before the election. These, especially the Social. con-
trect, did operate as a political constraint on the government, particu-
larly during its first two years in power. The existence of a fairly 
tntecrated alternative strategy also offers a litmus test of the strength 
of tlae Left ad the TUC, both of which remained broadly committed to 
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the Programme throughout the period of the government. 'The fate of 
the N£B and the planning agreements system, both of which received a 
(rather ambiguous) endorsement in the Manifesto, were particularly 
indicati ve of the trajectory of the government. As these became 
identified with the Cabinet position of the leading left-wing MP, 
Tony Benn. his personal career from his appointment as Secretary of 
State for Industry assumes a wider significance. 
On the other side of the socio-economic fence Labour was on the 
receiving end of a set of political forces pushing in a rather differ-
ent direction. Aa pointed out in Chaptem 9 and 9 relations between 
the indU8trial and financial sectors were decidedly tetchy as a result 
of the activities in financial and property markets over the previous 
few years. 111e interplay of the perspectives and interests of the 
two main fractions of British business added another level of 
complexity to the influences on the government. While both industrial 
and banking capital were united in their total opposi tiDn to the economic 
propoeals of the 1973 Programme. many industrialists expressed criticism 
of the City's role in investment finanee and more generally the "distant 
attitude" of the City regarding industrial needs, partieul.arly in the 
wake of the boom and buat in the property and secondary "banking markets 
in the early 1970s. ~ge industry certainly did not want a massive 
extensico of publie ownership or statutory controls. but important 
sections of it did call for a reorientation of the capital uerkets towards 
inclU8trial needs for raticnalisation and restrueturing. 
Industry's peak a •• ociation. the CBI, roundly eondemned the industrial 
proposals of the 1973 Programme. "Complaining that British industry was 
"already .ubjeet to .eveN legal and administrative eonstI'aints." it argued 
that aU cOlll*'ie. ne.ded "maximum freedom to make full use of their i1lllllense 
practical experienee of market conditions (CBI, 197~b)." It 1ilcewise 
supported the 'IOluntary framework of government-industry ccosultation the 
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tripartite National Eeonomie Development Couneil (NEDC), the Eeonomie 
Development Committees (EDCs) and the Regional Eeonomie Planning Councils 
established in the 1960s. Consequently in the CBI view the 1973 
Progruae would overturn the mixed eeonomy and "should be resisted". 
More particularly it noted with approval the French system in Which 
fi~ might agree with the govemment on plans for investment, production, 
employment or the location of plant in return for financial assistance. 
However, 
there (1IU) no basis in recent British experience for a 
rigid "planning agreements" system on the line of the 
proposals in Labour's Programme 1973, with the whole range 
of individual eompanies' aetivities subjeeted to state 
eontrol, backed by legal sanctions (CBI, 1974a, p. 38). 
Thus, while aeeepting that private capitalism was eompatib1e with nationa-
Uzed industry, so long as the latter was "free to respond to market 
'aipals' ". the CBI resolutely opposed any significant extension or public 
ownership or the assumption by the state of any statutory eontrols over 
the private seetor. 
Lest it be thought that industrial eapital struck a wholly negative 
stance with regard to state intervention in the private seetor and the need 
for ebaIlle in the methoda of investment finance, one should recall the 
testimony of various industrialists to the House of C01llllans Expenditure 
Committee Sub-Committee an Trade and Industry a few years' earlier 
(Expenditure C~ttee, Sixth Report, SessiCXl 1971-72, and Chapter 9). 
Those hearings bad indicated eonsiderable support espeeially aJDCIlget large 
industrialists for a flexible approach to industrial policy, including ad 
hoc intervention when necessary and some form' of state- or mixed-funded 
-
boldins company to fill the gaps in the capital market and, most probably, 
pl'04 the City into a more effective orientaticm towards industrial needs. 
Tb. CBI .. well .. the TUC had called for a massive increase in the 
proportion of tbe natiClllal product going to investment. Its difference 
from the unions was that industry wanted funds made available primarily 
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~ugh more traditional government measures, namely relief provisions on 
corporation tax for stock appreciation and the relaxation of the price code, 
and not through directed investment funnelled through a state-controlled 
institutiClll. More generally the CBI wanted stability in government policies 
and "agreement" on "the basic long-term objectives for Industry (CBI, 1974-b)." 
At the same time it was equally eoncerned to defend the role of large firms 
and espeeially multinationals in the British eeonomy and prese~ existing 
cross-national freedom of movement of capital and goods (CBI t 1.974-a, pp. 
16 -17) • At the point of Labour t s return to power therefore the CB I and 
major industrialists shOlMd a willingness to work within the existing 
framework of voluntaristie eorporatism and ad hoe intervention. What they 
would not aecept were propoaala from the Left that woul.d bend 'that framework 
into a radically different shape. Various poliey objeetives. eg: improving 
inftsu.nt. productivity and profi tabili ty, assumed an equal. importance 
with reducing the rate of inflation. More surprisingly the CBI did not 
initially oppose the ending of statutory wage restraint despite the eontinu-
ation of price eontrols. In the words of its Economie Direetor at the time 
this was explained by the faet that in the wake of the miners' strike and 
the three-day week: 
. , 
cmfrontatim policies -- which s.emed to inelude ineomes poUcy 
were for the time at least unpopular. Furthe!'llOl"e many employers 
sought an opportunity to restore pay differentials and remove pay 
anomaliss which had arisen under ineomes poliey (Glynn. 1978. p. 32). 
Howeftr, CBI leadership was already under SCllDe pressure from harder-line 
.-beN as a result of the Director-General t s eritical remarks about the 
Conservatift Industrial "lations Act on the eve of the election (Gl<N 
suspended its membership fC1t' a time) (V. l<eegan in The Guardian. 1.6 May. 
1974). Over the next few years such pressures from the "New Right" within 
industry shifted the CBI towards an inereasingly intransigent stance over 
a wide 1"8DP of eCCllomic and industrial issues (Grant, 1981). 
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The response of the mainstream of banking capital to even the 
rather restrained criticism of major industrialists was predictably 
negative. Over the first two years of the Labour government the City 
essentially dug in and held a defensive position. An attempt by the 
Governor of the Bank of England to ward off such criticism of the City's 
distance from industry through the establishment of a working party on 
industrial efficiency fell on stony ground. This working group later 
took form as the Institutional Shareholders' Committee, but the whole 
project was eventually scuttled by the refusal of the Committee of London 
Clearing Banks or the Accepting Houses Committee to take part (BEQB, 1972, 
pp. 178-179 & 515, Wilson Committee, First Stage Evidence, Vol. 5, 
pp. 224-6 & 258 and Maran, 1981, pp. 391-2). A second effort on the 
part of the new Govemol', Gol'don Richardson, proved slightly ..aI'e 
fruitful. This involved the refurbishing of the City Liaison Committee, 
originally established in 1965 to advise the City's representative on 
the NEDC. Aa announced in Play, 1974, the Bank would sponsor and service 
a number of new specialist committees co-ordinated by the CLC under 
the direction of the Govemol' (The Times, 30 May, 1974, p. 19). These 
included a wol'king party on public relations under Eric Fa~er, 
Chairman of Lloyds Bank, a City /EEC Liaison Group under W. P. Cook, 
Advisor to the Bank of England, a City Taxation Committee under PhUip 
Shelbourne, ChaiI'lllan of Samuel Montagu, a Capital Markets Committee 
under I. J. FI'aser, Deputy Chairman of Lazards, a Company Law Committee 
under Sir Henry Fisher, Directol' of Shrodel' Wag, and a C~ty T~lec01llD\D'1i­
cations eo-ittee UDder William Clarke, Director of the Committee on 
Invisible Exports (Investors ChI'onicle, 31 May, 1974, pp. 1026-7 and 
Tbe Banker, August, 1974, pp. 858-9). The impetus for the greater 
foNalieatica of the City'. links with govemment .ca.. part~ fl'aI entry 
into the EEC, hut other considerations included the falling out with 
the Heath pwn_nt, the need to respond to industrial critici_ and 
Labour party proposals for the City, refOl'lD of the securities ~ket 
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and changes in company law (ibid.). More generally in the wake of the 
financial crisis there was a call for a better public relations effort 
and a concerted campaign to defend financial interests, especially given 
the view expressed in The Banker that: 
The City's time-honoured ways of dealing with Government are 
no longer in themselves enough: the quiet chat at the club, 
the scribbled note to the Head of the Civil Service or to 
the Prime Minister, the word with the Gov'nor for onward 
delivery - these were the ways of gentlemen and so they 
remain. The real business will probably continue to be 
done on that basis - and it makes little difference whether 
there is a Labour or Conservative government in power. But 
now the City, and particularly the Bank of England, feel 
that they should be seen to be doing more: public relations 
unfortunately _tter (ibid.). 
The appeal for a unified "Voice for the City" received consider-
able support in the financial press over the next year or so, as well 
as from its MP (ibid. and Investors Chronicle, 29 November, 1974, edit-
orial, 6 December, 1974, p. 920, and May 30, 1971f.). Yet, the City 
Liaison CoaDittee retained a fairly low profi~ o~r the succeeding 
years, not even submitting evidence to the WilsOD Committee (see below). 
The answer to this puzzle appears to be in part the resistance amongst 
the different branches of finance to any powerful central COIIimittee 
(Moran, 1981). Thus, in the words of Richard Lloyd, Chief Executive 
of William and Glyn's Bank, "What we need are good, well-staffed trade 
associations, not an overall City body (except for invisibles and for 
general Uaison with the NEDC on which I am now a City representative) 
(The Banker, Jan., 1974, p. 24)." Similarly, Michael Verey, Chairman 
of Schroders, expressed scepticism whether even the Governor could 
effecti.,.ly represent the diversity encompassed by the Square Mile and 
couaequently doubted strongly if it was "either practical or wise to 
try ~ find this Anpl Gabriel (The Bankers M!saziH, Oct., 1975, p. 10)." 
Rather, tteach group should have spokesmen _llquaUfied to fight their 
own comer and to speak authoritatively botb,to the public and to govern-
Mnt NprdiDa their particular area of busmen ad of course, when 
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suitable, join together with others on common problems" (ibid.). 
Several other considerations evidently played a part in this 
reluctance to formalise a peak association for the financia1 sector. 
First, the City wanted to avoid incorporation into the CBI, an aim which 
the latter had held to no effect since the publication of the Devlin 
Report on industrial and commercial representation of 1972 (esp. Pt. I). 
Second, various financiers voiced scepticism as to Whether a better 
PR effort would make much difference in any case (The Bankers Magazine, 
Oct. 1975, pp. 8-10). Finally, while some might not have agreed totally 
with Rooald Grierson. Director of Panmure Gordon. in his ratiler blunt 
characterisat ion of the City's approach, "Cet animal est ~s _chant, 
quand OD l' attaque il se dttfend" (ibid., p. 10), "they cou1d no doubt' 
appreciate his doubts about a general, co-ordinated defence strategy. 
As he went on to explain: 
My chief fear is that an attempt. however _11 meant, to project 
the City as a whole could all tee easily end up by PrOriding 
fresh amunition to its detractors. The mere fact of emphasis-
ing'the City's bigness ••• could turn out to be a ~: 
worse still it could furnish an excuse to those in Whitehall who 
are 't1'ying to foist a new bureaucratic strait-jacket OIl the 
City's multifarious and flexible roles (ibid.). 
Finally, as a respons. to criticisms of the "am!a lAmgth" relation~ 
ship between !nstituticaal shareholders and industry, an initiative on 
the part of the industrial adYisor of the Bank of England. Sir Henry 
Denaon, led to a working party composed of the Association of Investment 
Trust Ccalpanies. the British Insurance Association, Finance for Industry 
(FrI). the Life Assurance Assoclaticas, the National ASsociation of 
Pension Funds and the Unit Trust Association. In its report of October, 
1975, the working party proposed the creation of Equity Capital for 
Industry (ECl). This was to b. a joint ftnture funded by the major 
wtitutional !nwstors to _et the extemal financial needs of 
lBIlufacturiDa firM with a market capitalisatiCll in the rcae of illt to 
\ 
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.£20lIl (Wilscm Committee, Vol. ~, pp. 121-5). The notion behind the 
formation of ECI was the provision of equity financing for small-to-
medium sized companies which had long-term prospects but current 
financial problems either because they were fully geared or for technical 
reasons. In this sense its role was envisaged as strictly supplementary 
to existing markets and as complementary to FFI, which offered loan 
finance to similar claases of firms (iJ)id.). 
Although this project had the active support of the Bank of 
England, it provOked a storm of negative reaction from a number of life 
insurance caDpanies as well as other fmancial institutions including 
the accepting houses and the clearing banks (ibid •• Vol. 5. pp. 88 & 196 
and Minns, 1980, pp. 87-8). This diadssive response stemmed in part 
from the expectation of no immediate return on the funds invested as 
weU as fears of competition with existing institutions like FFI (!!!!. 
Banker, Feb. 1977, p. 80). In addition there was scepticism as regards 
the extent of the "eCluity gap" that Eel proported to fill as well as 
doubts ccocernina the illplicatiCllS of its original belief that, 
"institutional investors might iu particular cases play a more positive 
role in the af~a1ra of the company in which they invest, and they might 
con8ic1er Eel to be a eu1tabl_ 1nstrumentforo collecti". action (Wilson 
committee, Vol ... , p. 125)." 
In other wards it was precisely the innovative aspects of the Eel 
proposal as against normal financial practices that brought down the 
weight of City opinion against it. Yet, many institutions decided in 
the end of "play ball " with the ne" ftnture in order to forestall moves 
towards the political direction of investment (Minns, 1980, pp. 87-8). 
At any rate the e~u1ty bu1c. which was widely regarded along with the 
NftIDP8d FFI - the City t. ans.r to the NEB, had an inauspicious 
beabmina. Althoqb oriainally tU'p'ted for .£500. its initial capital 
iuue reached 0DlJ .£ .. lJI in May, 1976. This was despite the fact that 
ECI's terms of reference had been considerably whittled down, that it 
woUld adopt a passive role and rely on merchant banks and City accountants 
for referrals and assessments (The Banker, December 1976, p. 1465. and 
Minns. Ope cit.). By the time ECl opened for business in 1977 the most 
that could be said (as with the Bank's other brainchild. the ISC) was 
that this, if it did act as a bridge between institutional investors 
and industrial manag.-nt, was an extrelllely narrow and shaky one. The 
view that its activities would be marginal to the concerns of either 
side of "proprietorial gap" was vindicated over the next few years, 
a point I shall return to in the final section of this chapter. 
In general then the attitude of the City towards Labour's economic 
and industrial PrograJlllDll initially was one of fairly unallayed hostility. 
As regards the NEB the financial institutions were initially opposed 
to even the sort of institution favoured by large industry, although 
this view changed as the fears about the scope and power of the state 
holding COIIIPany diainished. Naturally enough any notiOll of planning 
agre.-nts "as a total anathema to the City. bUt its oppositiClll to even 
a progt'UIM of vo1untaristic. tripartite concertationwent considerably 
further than that of industry. The cmly concession to the CBI strategy 
for deflecting the propuae of the Labour Left was . the qre.-nt to 
form a fairly loose financial working party under the agis of the NEDC 
(Bankers Mapzine, Oct., 1975, p. 9 and Lloyd above). What the· City did not 
want was any form of ne" regulatiOll which would limit its status as 
an "offshore island" or even the formation of an EDC for finance u 
that would entail tra4e union NpNMntation from within the banlcing 
system. On questions of the overall economic approach what is notable 
is the focua OIl inflaticm aDd the POWina concen"tratiOD cm lK:IIley supply 
fipN. as the .01e explaatiOll for the fomer, effeetlwl.y datiDa froII 
the Barber bOOII aDd sw..quentbuat in early 197 .. (e •• _ 'lb. BaDJcer. 
Aaa. 197 ... p. 858. and 10\'. 197 ... p. 1288). Tbia rapid COIlWNicm to 
.aoetariD .. 1_ awu. of the BaIt of £D&land. Aa early _ April, 1912, 
the Governor had begun to stress "the fundamental importance of the 
inflation problem (BEQB, 1972, p. 231)." Yet, for the next few years 
there remained a considerable ambiguity at least in his public statements 
as to how best to achieve monetary stability. The old remedy of treating 
it as a problem of excess demand seemed no longer applicable, whilst 
the Bank's highly reluctant acceptance of floating exchange rates removed 
''the discipline of a fixed parity (ibid., pp. 226-9)." Control of the 
money supply began to emerge as an important aspect of the Bank's counter-
inflation pro~, but only in tandem with other measures, in particular 
sa.e form of inec.s policy, e.g. the speech to the Lord Mayor's dinner 
in Octcber, 1974 (!!9!, 1974, p .... 36). A couple of years would pass 
before the Goftmor too jumped aboard the monetarist bandwagon. 
These then were the main political forces and their divergent 
positicos on the issue of the role of the state in investment finance 
and industrial policy as Labour returned to power in 1974: first, the 
uniCIDS and the Labour Left as repreaented on the NEC advocating a large 
extensiCID of public oWDerahip, a dynamic and well-funded NEB and the 
provision of state aid to the private sector through direct grants linked 
to a system of compulsory planning agreements; second, industrial capital, 
organized .ost pUbll~ tbrouab the CBI, important sections of which 
favoured a much more limited version of a para-state development bank 
and a revival of the tripartite "planning" discussions first introduced 
in the 19601 but favourina a reduction in corporate taxation over any 
system of state pant. or loans; third, the City along with its fellow 
travellers in the Bank of Enlland and the Treasury which were overtly 
hostile to the first approach and at least very cautious as regards 
the second especially .. reprda the extension of tripartism to the 
financial .ector it.elf, and fi~lly the government itself which le_ed 
towarda the uulutrial1ata' viewpoint but at the same time had to win 
the UDiaa. Ofti' to .CM foR of wap restraint. On the broader questiCll8 
of economic policy the positions were crudely as follows: for the unions 
a priority for full employment with control of inflation left to the 
price code; for the CBI initially a balance of aims with a rapidly grow-
ing concern about profitability and inflation leading to demands for 
cuts in taxation and public spending as well as a hesitant commitment 
to monetary restraint; and for the City an emphasis on reducing 
inflation and the PSBR within a tight monetarist framework. It would 
not be long before the deterioration of the economy added another set 
of actors mainly on the side of finance t namely the IMF. At this point 
we shall examine the unfolding and the resolution of these conflicting 
forces as reflected in the development of the economic and industrial 
policies of the Labour government. 
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11 Labour and the Crisis of the British Economy: The Genesis and Limits 
of the "Industrial Strategy". 
Fiscal and Monetary Policies 
It is not my intention here to discuss fiscal and monetary policies 
at any great length. However, since a central feature of the present argument 
is that the industrial stratesy as it emerged wal constrained and ultimately 
gutted by political and economic force I impinging on these areas of policy-
formation, it il necessary to highlight a few salient features of the broader 
economic path of the government. In brief the first two years of the govern-
ment proved particularly important, al the mode of resolution of the industrial 
and financial crises largely eltablished the framework of Labour's policies 
for the relt of ita te~ of office. 
Labour's firlt year wal daainated on the one hand by the attempt to· work 
out a new concordat with the unions in order to secure a voluntary incomes 
policy and on the other by the need to restore industrial and financial confidence. 
At first, however, the fo~er took precedence, as the government had to fore-
stall the tide of industrial militancy bequeathed by its predecessor. The 
miners were quickly bought off with the help of a Pay Board report which 
reco.-ended their treatment a. a ".pecial ca.e" and the TUC'I verbal commitment 
that they would not use this settlement as a justification for higher wage claims. 
Within a week the minerl' strike was over and the country back on a full working 
week. The first budget of 26 March. 1974, similarly made .ubstantial conce •• ions 
to the unions at least in terms of its redistributive consequences. However, 
the overall macro-economic impact of the budget leaned in a rather different 
direction. For the taxation increase. totalled nearly fl,400m al'against a 
arowth in expenditure of lome f700m. Together with a f900m reduction in 
the sublidies to nationalized industri.e. Bealey was aiming at "a massive 
reduction in the public sector's borrowing requirement, a reduction of about 
:..1+0'7-
fl,500m compared with 1973-74" (Hansard, 26 March 1974, col. 294). In any 
case the next "mini-budget" of 22 July at least momentarily reversed the 
deflationary impact of the first, erasing the estimated demand effect of the 
March budget and adding f340m to the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR), 
mainly through lowering VAT to eight per cent, increasing housing subsidies 
and doubling the Regional Employment Premium paid to employers on a per capita 
basis for workers in depressed areas. Ostensibly these measures were justified 
as part of the anti-inflation campaign, but they hardly tackled the real problem 
at this point, the rapid rise in wage increases fuelled by the threshold payments 
ay.tem. 
On November 12th, 1974, Denis Bealey announced his third budget in less 
than a year. The speech confirmed that the government's strategy towards the 
deepening liquidity crisis of the corporate sector would center on concessions 
in the taxation of company profits and relaxation of the statutory price controls 
which were then the main plank of its counter-inflation policy. On the eve 
of the budget the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) ,had published one'of 
its gloomiest business surveys ever, forecasting "a fall in production over the 
coming months with depressed corporate profits and the liquidity situation 
plating ~ .. jor role in the deterioration" (Financial Times, 12 Nov •• 1974). 
Bealey responded to this plea with a financial pill worth in his own estimation 
.ome £l,600m, half through deferment of taxation on stock appreciation and half 
through easing the price code. This was considerably less than the £3,OOOm 
demanded by the CBI, but tbe latter none tbe less welcomed it as "tbe biggest 
financial conceuion to industry ever" (CBI, Annual. Report, 1975, p. 7). 
Of course, tbe fact tbat the Chancellor had to publicly state Labour's 
commitment to a mixed economy and tbe need for profits is in itself indicative 
of the extent of industrial disquiet. If these financial favours were not 
enoush to re.tore busin •• s confidence, tbe rest of the budget no doubt belped. 
For Bealey not only gave priority to maintaining (or at this point reviving) 
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a profitable private sector, he also gave other indications that Labour would 
not pursue further the interventionist road mapped out during the Party's term 
in opposition, rather the reverse. From that point even those aspects of 
statutory regulation inherited from the previous Conservative government, such 
as the price code, would be rolled back and eventually, when the time was ripe, 
abandoned. Instead of involving itself on a compulsory basis in the internal 
affairs of private firms, as advocated by the left through the so-called 
planning agreements system, the government would rely on more acceptable (for 
business) fiscal instrument., leaving decisions about pricing and investment 
in private handl. 
Healey reiterated thil trajectory as regards investment by announcing 
in the same breath that the Bank of England was issuing a qualitative guidance 
to banks and finance houses reinforcing the priority given to industrial 
borrowers. He limi1arly confirmed that;he Bank of England and the London and 
Scottilh clearing bankl were expanding the facilities of their recently 
redecorated investment bank, Finance for Industry (rFI), to make available up 
to £1,000m in "medium-term funds for productive investment at commercial rates 
by British indu.try" (Hansard, 12 Nov •• 1974. col. 267). This amo\11!lt was 
coincidently identical with the initial funding proposed for the state holding 
~~any, the National Enterprise Board (NEB), one of the key institutions on 
the left-wing programme for boosting investment and extending government control 
over the private economy. The move was also widely seen as an attempt, which 
proved .uccelsful, to ward off a propolal from Haro1d Lever, Chancellor of the 
Duchy of Lancalter, for a medium-term lending facility, the so-called "Lever 
Bank" (The Times, 10 Oct., 1974, pp.2l & 22; and The Banker, Dec., 1976, p.l465). 
Lever now withdrew his support for a new type of investment bank since in his 
view "the expanaion of Finance for Industry announced by my right hone Friend 
providel exactly the agency I was advocating long before the present Government 
took office" (lanIard, 14 Nov., 1974, col. 606). 
The Chancellor did seek to reassure the left that this action would not 
"pre-empt decisions the Government may take to establish new facilities for 
financial companies on different terms in the context of its proposals for the 
regeneration of British industry" (ibid.). However, the timing of this 
announcement (before the actual creation of the NEB) and its context in terms 
of the general financial concessions to business indicated at the very least 
that this bankers' bank would exist as an alternative to state involvemen~ or 
shareholding for financially pressed firms. It likewise signalled (albeit 
implicitly) that the financing and powers of the NEB would be rather les8 than 
some of its proponents were advocating. 
The package of measures described above constitutes a key instance of 
the present study. On the face of it this one budget may not seem particularly 
significant. After all the amounts involved were not especially large from the 
point of view of the British exchequer. although they were relatively as regards 
the history of corporate taxation. Moreover. this was merely one among many such 
statements over the course of the Labour government, three in that year alone as 
pointed out above. However, this event did assume a greater signficance in the 
course of the Labour governments of 1974-79. and thus in a crucial stage of what 
some 'ob.ervers now see as the uumaking of the post-war period of rapid economic 
Irowth, full employment and Keynesian economic policies (Shonfield, 1980 and 
Go Idthorpe, 1981). For the budlet had a symbolic importance greater than its 
.pecific financial effects. althoulh these were real enough as I shall discuss 
below, in that it marked a .hift away from state intervention as a solution for 
the worst cri.i. of British industry since the interwar depre.sion. Moreover. 
that shift took place at a moment when the government was allegedly under the 
collective thumb of the unions and the left. i.e. the adherents of'a programme 
of .. ssive intervention to which the government was supposed to be committed. 
While the specific measures enacted at this point should be seen more as an 
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attempt to preserve the status quo than a breach in the post-war regime, 
they were at least the first loose threads which proved in a short space 
of time to be the unraveling of the latter. 
The Chancellor's budget statements subsequent to November, 1974, repeated 
the .ame refrain. The statement of 15th April, 1975, again concentrated on 
reducing the balance of payments deficit and the PSBR. Healey singled out 
wage rate increases of 29% as the key constraint on economic policy through 
their effect on domestic consumption and thus imports as well as public spending. 
Ris response was to order more deflation through higher taxes and future 
reduction. in public expenditure with the a~ of reducing the PSBR by some 
El,700m in the next year. Although he claimed to "absolutely reject the use 
of mass unemployment a. an instrument of policy", the Chancellor had to admit 
that the ultimate effect of a restrictive buda*t in a time of world recession 
could only be a further rise to a. much &8 -one million or 4% of the labour force 
by the end of the year (Han.ard, 15 April, 1975, col. 320). Once again only 
company taxation was exempted from the squeeze, as Healey renewed the reliefs 
introduced in November and extended them to unincorporated businesses as well 
as others that had not qualified for the earlier benefits. Even this austere 
budlet could not, however, have 1IIUch illlDediateimpact on the inflationary 
spiral. By May the RPI had reached 25%, and wage rates were running at record 
. levels. In this context the government managed to cajole the TUC into accepting 
the six pound per week pay limit in July to last for one year. This broke the 
back of th~ inflationary cri.i., and price increases began to fall off from the 
peak in August of nearly 27%, albeit with painful slowness. 
Unemployment, however, proved more intractable than the Chancellor had 
anticipated <at lea.t publicly) reaching 1.2 million by the end of the year. 
De.pite thi. and a considerable improvement in the balance of payment. deficit 
the budget of April, 1976, made no attempt to reflate the econ~. In this the 
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Chancellor took the rather unusual step of tying most income tax concessions 
to future pay rise. a. part of the campaign to renew the voluntary pay pact 
at the lower level of three per cent per annum. As in the two previous budget 
statements financial concessions were focussed on investment and company profits. 
Although Healey rejected any lowering of the basic rates of corporate tax he 
now allowed taxable profits to be calculated after deducting allowances for 
capital depreciation. This measure in aid of companies with large amounts of 
fixed asset. was supplemented by an increase in industrial grants, together 
giving a small fillup to the company sector of some [lOOm over the next year 
(Bansard, 6 April, 1976, cols. 246-252). Tbe budget al.o granted special 
consideration for small bUlines.e., rai.ing the maXimum profit level for the 
preferential rate of corporation tax and broadening the exemptions from capital 
tranlfer tax (which had replaced the traditional estate duty in 1974). The 
latter effectively reduced by nearly half the tax payable by private businesses 
on the tran.fer of as.et. (Sunday Times, 11 April, 1976, p.61). Tbe PSBR 
commitment precluded Healey from giving much more away in absolute financial 
terms, but the tone of this Itatement as before indicated that his toughness 
toward I labour would be matched with kindness for capital. In the context of 
the _cumulative fiscal impact of. this and previous budget. _and the world 
recessionary climate, the Chancellor's stated aim of-increasing the rate of 
growth of GNP to over five per cent per year for the three years from 1977 
could only appear as hopele •• ly optimistic (Hansard, 6 April, 1976, col. 240). 
Tbe prospect. for bringing unemployment down to the post-war norm were equally 
dim. 
Up to this point Labour could at lea.t claim some success for its policies 
al regard. crisi. man&aement. It has Itabilized the economic situation, 
diffused industrial conflict from the pitch of 1974, pas.ed various pieces of 
siJDificant reform in employment protection, .ex discrimination and industrial 
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relations and at least maintained social provisions. However, for the rest 
of the year successive crises of confidence in both external and internal 
financial markets effectively derailed its medium-term programme of modest 
growth in public expenditure and the hope of economic recovery, as well as 
its attempt to hold down the rate of inflation through voluntary wage restraint. 
Sterling felt the pressure first as in March the exchange rate fell below $2.00 
for the first time ever. Even the restrictive budget in April did little to 
relieve the situation, and by early May a massive move of short-term capital 
out of sterling drove the exchange rate down to $1.80. As the pound dipped 
still further towards $1.70, the Chancellor attempted to back up the dwindling 
reserves of the Bank of England by negotiating a $5.3b stand-by credit with a 
group of ten countries and the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). This 
facility stabilized the pound for a short time but only through the continuous 
support operationl for the Bank of England in the foreign exchange markets and 
a conlequent further run-down of re.ervel. By July 22nd the strain had proved 
too much, and under pressure from the U.8. government and the BIS, the Chancellor 
aDDOUDCed more cutl in planned public expenditure of some fl,OOOm. Coupled 
with a fl,OOOm incre.le in employerl' National Insurance contributions these 
-- --.. iiure. aimed to reduce the projected "BR for 1977-78 from £10.Sb to E9b 
(Hansard, 22 July, 1976, cols. 2010-20). 
Yet, once again the relief proved short lived. From May through to 
September la1es of government securities slumped as the financial markets engaged 
in a "gilt strike" against Labour'. economic policy (The Economist, December 25, 
1976, pp.72-3). In practice the Conservatives had ceded a considerable amount 
of leverage to financial ~rkets with the introduction of Competition and Credit 
Control and floating exchange ratel in the early 1970s (despite the renewal of 
the "cor.et" at the end of 1974). In th •• e circumstances the IIIODetariat ideology 
which had by now infected the City became a self-fulfilling prophecy: the 
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markets viewed the rate of monetary expansion and the budget deficit as excessive 
and refused to buy long-term stock unless interest rates went up. This the 
Chancellor was loathe to do since it would amount to an admission that the 
July measures had failed to restore financial confidence, so he had little 
choice but fund the PSBR through short-term borrowing thus increasing M3 rapidly 
and leading to a situation of near panic (Keegan and Pennant-Rea, 1979, p.133 
and Tomlinson, 1981b). In a short space of time the markets forced 
the hand of the Chancellor. The Minimum Lending Rate was jacked up from its 
low point of 9% in March to 13% in September and a record 15% on October 7th. 
What the domestic markets had Itarted, the foreign exchange markets and 
the IMF were left to finish. Whilst the Chancellor had resisted pressure from 
the Treasury, the IMF and US Treasury for further cuts in public expenditure 
in the summer, sterling began to tumble downwards once again in September 
eKeegan & Pennant-Rea, 1979, pp.159-72 and Pay & Young, 1978). Even the dramatic 
. hikes in MLR could not stem the tide, and by the time of the Labour Conference 
in the last week of September the government was in complete dilarray. On 
Tuelday, September 28th when the pound had fallen 71 cents in two day. to $1.64, 
the Chancellor turned back in panic from the airport, where he was due to fly 
'off to the annual IMF meeting, to haRangue the Party' conference. On the 1_ 
day the Prime Minister made in effect the formal announcement of the abandonment 
of Keynesianism.. The next day the government announced the 
application to the IMF to draw on the lecond main credit tranche of $3.9b and 
a week later MLR was railed to a record 15%. Eve.n these steps did not stop the 
flow immediately, and sterling slid down to a low point of nearly $1.55 later 
in the month. 
When the IMF team arrived on November 1st, it added considerable support 
to the monetarilt minority within the Treasury which was advocating lubltantial 
cuts in public expenditure. Althouah the Prime Minister attempted to fight 
what he viewed as a conlpiracy between US and UK treaBury officials, Realey 
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was evidently won over to the hard-line approach (ibid.). In the meantime 
the Governor of the Bank of England announced in his speech to the Lord Mayor's 
banquet on 21 October his new-found belief in "a publicly-announced monetary 
.target" of 12% for the current and something less for the next financial year 
(BEQB, 1976, p.454. He likewise justified the recent measures (the rise in 
interest rates and the call for special deposits) as demonstrating the deter-
mination: 
to restrain the growth of bank lending to the private sector within 
the bounds set by the 12% target; and to secure adequate official 
sales of public sector debt to the general public, so as to neutral-
ise the creation of liquidity arising from the public sector deficit 
and thereby also moderate the rate of monetary expansion (ibid.). 
City opinion welcomed this change of heart. The November issue of The Banker 
drew an earlier parallel in its explanation of the crisis and the implied 
solution by way of 
saluting those unreformed bankerl in 1931 who thought that uncorrected 
budget deficits are the root of currency debasement; which:iswhy 
in 1976, as in 1931, banker. responded to Britain's uncorrected 
budget deficit in the only way open to .them: by selling pounds on 
the exchanges. Have the facts of life turned out not to be Keynesian 
after all? (The Banker, 1976, p.1203). 
On December 15th as part of the conditions for the loan the Chancellor 
announced another round of cuts in. pu~l.~c: .... ~~~?~~t~r.e.J'l~ns amoU?_~ing to f.lb 
for 1977~78 and El.Sb for 1978-79. The control of monetary growth likewise 
received a new emphasis with a limit on domestic credit expansion (DCE) set 
at f.9b for the year up to April, 1977. and £7.7b for 1977-78. As a result 
the pound, which had remained edgy throughout November despite the IMF loan, 
finally stabilized at around the $1.70 level. However, the price paid for 
financial peace was severe, as the mealures implied a contraction in real 
public spending over the next two years and dashed any hopes of sustained 
economic recovery. 
The next two year. amounted to little more than a holding operation. 
The government managed to keep public expenditure and the PSBR well within the 
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targets agreed with the IMF, mainly because the actual deficit for the crisis 
year 1976-77 turned out to be considerably lower than earlier projections. 
By the last year of the government public spending was some 4% in real terms 
below what it had been at the end of the first year (CEPR, April, 1981, p.27). 
The rather unexpected ease with which this was accomplished allowed the 
Chancellor to ease up somewhat on the fiscal squeeze. In the budget of March. 
1977, he announced immediate concessions of £l,290m in personal taxation and 
promised further reductions of £96Om upon the successful conclusion of the 
next round of the pay policy. However. by now the programme of voluntary 
restraint of wages was beginning to shred at the seams. The TUC was unable to 
agree to a further round of pay curbs apart from a general commitment to maintain 
a twelve month gap between settlements in anyone industry. Still the reduction 
in public expenditure projection. allowed Bealey to implement some of the 
promised tax cut. in July. At the same ti .. , given the absence of any firm 
alreement with the TUC the loverament moved towards the unilateral imposition 
of a 10% norm, although its means for enforcement were left exceedingly vague. 
Despite these measures the economy showed little signs of recovery in the 
first half of 1977, and Healey resorted to a further round of tax cuts as well 
as a small upward revi.ion of public expenditure plans in October. These were 
, 
calculated to cost something over £l,OOOm for the current financial year and 
£2.000m for the following, 8ti11 leaving the PSBR target well within the figure 
agreed with the IMF. 
By the end of the year the economy seemed to have turned the corner. 
Unemployment peaked in September at nearly 1.5m or 6% of the labour force, 
although it fell off only slightly thereafter. The balance of payments 
current account moved back into lurp1us in August for the first time since 
1972. and more .ignificantly the return of ahort-term capital pUlhed tbe total 
balance for official financina to a record .urplus in the third quarter of the 
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year of some £2.6b. With a steady pound and growing reserves MLR was allowed 
to drift downward slowly but persistently to a low point of 5% in October. 
As the dollar depreciated official reserves reached a record sum of nearly 
$2lb in January, 1978, allowing the Chancellor to announce an early repayment 
of $lb to the IMF. As a result of the low level of pay rises, a favourable 
change in the terms of trade and the slight appreciation of sterling, the 
RPI fell to single figures by the new year. 
Industrial production remained depressed, however, and in the April, 
1978. budget the Chancellor once again found cause for a mild fiscal stimulus 
of some E2,OOOm for the coming year. The reflationary steps of the past year 
finally began to take effect, and 1978 saw a modest consumer boom. This proved 
to be shore-lived, however, as economic recovery brought with it the same set 
of problema that had beset the government in the first place. The current 
balance slipped back into the red in the first quarter of 1978, and sterling 
came under some pressure in March and April as short-term capital funds once 
again proved extremely volatile, forcing a series of hikes in MLR from 6j% in 
January to 10% in June. A shaky dollar and rising interest rates in the U.8. 
forced the government to raise the rate again in November to l2j% also largely 
in response to short-term capital movement.. Retail prices likewise began to 
rise from mid-year as average earnings increased at an annual rate of 14% in 
the 1977-78 pay round. In the meantime the prospect for industrial capital was 
particularly bad, as the combination of a slightly appreciating exchange rate 
and rapidly rising labour costs meant a depreciation in U.K. competitiveness 
more or le.s to the po.ition before the devaluation of the pound in 1976 as well 
as a downturn in real pre-tax profit rates. 
It was the complete di.integration of the social contract and the revival 
of wage .ilitancy that featured particularly strongly in the la.t few month. of 
the goverament. The 12-month rule agreed with the TUC in 1977 at least managed 
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to delay wage increases, but from the spring of 1978 the latter began to 
accelerate rapidly. None the lels, the government attempted to turn back the 
tide and impose an even tighter norm of 5%. In the white paper of July, 
Winning the Battle against Inflation, it hinted that this was just the first 
Itep toward I the establishment of a longer-term framework. Despite decisive 
votes against any renewal of the pay policy at both the TUC and the Labour 
Party Conferences in the autumn, the government persisted in its unilateralist 
course, issuing confidential directives to local authorities and preparing 
lanctions against private firm. that breached the norm. Againat the advice 
of leading trade unionista and.aenior party politicians the Prime Minister, 
James Callaghan, decided to delay the election expected in the early autumn 
and tough out the revival of shop-floor militancy. This proved to be a fatal 
error, as the government waa soon engulfed by a series of disruptive and very 
public strikes, later given the epitaph of the "winter of discontent". Workers 
at Ford were the firlt to break through the norm, winning a 17% increase despite 
the threat of government aanctions against the company. There followed prolonged 
disputes in transport with the tanker drivers, lorry drivers and train drivers, 
in the civil service and with low paid manual workers in the public sector. 
Combined with severe winter weatheT in January the strikes led to widespread 
shortages in the shops as well aa potent and hardly popular symbols such as 
mounds of uncollected rubbiah in the atreets of London, hospitals turning away 
patients, etc. The prea. hardly helped al in particular the popular dailies 
engaged in what can only be called a campaign of near hysteria against the strikers. 
the Conservative oppo.ition wal hardly slow to seize this particular Itick 
to beat the government, and the effect on Labour's standing in the country 
was nothing .hort of disa.troul (Coatel, 1980, Ch.2). 
In February and March average earnings were running at 15% over the level 
of the year before, and in April the RPI returned to double figures. By the time 
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of the general election in May the balance of payments current account had 
deteriorated sharply, and unemployment was still stubbornly stuck at 1.3 million 
or 5.6% of the work force, more than double the rate at the start of Labour's 
office. Consequently, the government had little to show from its five years 
at the helm of economic management apart from a very modest growth in real 
disposable income. Moreover, the strike wave of 1979 starkly illustrated the 
breach between a government pursuing incomes policy whatever the consequences 
and the union rank and file attempting to recover lost real wages, marking an 
obvious parallel with the fate. of previous governments both Conservative and 
Labour and undercutting the latter'. claim of superior economic management 
through its .pecial and co-operative relationship with the unions. However, the 
most severe co8t was the virtua.'l abandonment of full-employment as the central 
aim of government policy, although another year or two would pass before the 
-ful-l implications of this were realized. 
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Industrial Policy and Capital Form8tion 
As noted above Labour's industrial programme had proved highly 
contentious even before the 1974 election. The appointment of Tony Benn 
as Secretary of State for Industry seemed to herald a radical break with 
the past tabour policy of fiscal inducement for investment and "voluntar-
istic planning." Le. planning only in the sense of tripartite consultations 
between the reDresentatives of the state, private industry and or~anized 
labour. In Dractice the industrial policy of the ~overnment fell back into 
this well-worn mould with more or less the same impact (or lack of it) on 
industrial re~eneration. As described in the previous section fiscal 
inducement in fact played as great if not: a greater role in Labour's 
policy towards private investment as in previous years. Government 
spokesmen repeated time and a~ain their comadtment to boost company profits 
and reassure industrial and financial confidence. I shall return to look at 
the consequences of this approach ~elow. but for now I will 
brieflY describe the fate of the two main planks of the so-called 
alternative industrial strategy, the NEB and the planning agreements system 
and attempt to draw out the logic of the approach actually pursued by the 
government. 
Given the pol'tti'cW1 differences within the Cabinet over the extent 
and nature of the state intervention required, it took some time to get the 
industrial programme on the statute books. However, the publication of the 
.. :' ....... ,····························1····· .... ·· .... ········ .. . 
government white paper; 'The'Re8enetttion'of'Btitiih'Industry, in July, 1974, 
left little doubt that the Party's proposals would be emptied of their more 
4 
radical content. The white paper confirmed that Labour would establish 
the NEB and that the latter would have powers to purchase share h$ldings in 
as well as make loans to private firms. There was no mention of compulsory 
purchase, however, and the financial objectives of the NEB were stated in 
the conventional terms of lecuring an "adequate return" on its investments. 
Much of the white paper was devot.d tQ the discussion of planning agreements, 
-420-
but here again the provisions of the document were much more in line with previous 
Labour policY' than with the 1973 Programme. Instead of statutory powers to 
compel the major companies to sign such agreements, the latter would be 
strictly voluntary. Only the promise of public aid would be used as an induce-
ment for companies to sign a~reements with the ~overnment. 
After further delays the IrtdustrY'Bi11 out1inin~ the role of the 
NEB and the planning agreements system was introduced into the House at the 
end of January. 1975. This Bill established the NEB with an initial fundin~ 
of f700m to be raised to £l,OOOm at a future date with the consent of the 
Treasury. The Bill made no reference to any compulsory planning agreements, 
but it did include a long section on disclosure of information. This would 
allow ministers to require any company to proVide information on a wide 
range of activities, including capital expenditure, disposal of assets, 
intended acquisitions, sales and exports, including estimates for future 
periods. These clauses posi.tively alarmed the CBI~ which had been previously 
assured by the apparently successful efforts of the Prime Minister to control 
the draughting of the Bill. Industrialists objected immediately to these 
provisions and maintained a campaign against them throughout the tortuous 
passage of the Bill through. the House of Commons. In the end they were 
successful. An attempt by SOlD! left-wing MPs to introduce a compulsory purchase 
clause in March was quite simply rebuffed by the government. When the final 
version passed into law the clauses offensive to industry had been effectively 
5 
watered down. 
In the meantime private capital dealt with the remaining thorn in 
its side, namely the position of Tony Benn at the Department of Industry. 
"From the late summer of 1974," in the words of the Prime Minister's Press 
Secretary, "the insistent whisper distille(1. from all (the Treasury's) 
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advice and alarm was that 'sometning' had to be done about Tony Benn, the 
Minister for Industry"(Raines, 1977, p. 31). The relationship between Benn 
and Wilson had in any case largely broken down during the increasingly 
public disputes over the white paper and the Industry Bill, but it was tbe 
issue of Britain's ~C membership that finally offered the Prime Minister the 
chance to clip the wings of his contentious Minister. The division within 
the Cabinet as well as the Party over the EEC essentially followed the left-
right split on other issues, and Benn featured as a prominent anti-Marketeer in 
the camoaign that led up to the referendum. In the end he was "not so much 
removed from the chess-board as castled" (ibid.) Within days of the two-thirds 
vote in favour of continued membership on June 6th, Wilson offe~ed him a stark 
choice: exchange jobs with Eric Varley at the Department of Energy or leave 
the Cabinet. After some deliberation and the attempt to rally some support 
Benn decided his ~osition was hopeless and chose the former course. In 
Varley the Prime Minilter had piCked wisely, for he was also anti-EEC and 
had good relations with the unions but was far more compliant and could be 
relied on to make the amendments to the Bill which Wilson needed to assuage 
the fears of the CBI. Benn's left-wing deputy, Eric Reffer, had in any case 
been sacked earlier in the year for his part in the EEC debate, so the 
radical rule of the industry roost was now effectively over. 
r~en the NEB finally went into operation in early 1976, it was 
hardly a vehicle for increasing political control over investment flows or 
the major private corporations. Any doubts remaining in the City should 
have been put to relt by the appointments of Lord Ryder, formerly of Reed 
International, and (later Sir) Leslie MUrphy, previously deputy chairman 
of Schroders (holding company for the merchant batik of the same name) to 
the two top posts. In an interview in February, 1976, MUrphy clarified his 
view that the NEB would exilt to'fil~ gapl in existing capital and loan 
markets and not attempt to supplant them. He likewise emphasised the 
constraintl on the NEB's operations: that it would attempt to secure a 
commercial return on its iuvestments, run its subsidiaries' including the 
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lame duck transfers along profitable lines, enjoy no special privileges over 
private sector firms, abide by the general rules of fair trading and the City 
Takeover Code and exercise considerably more managerial freedom than the 
nationalised industries (The'Banker, Feb. 1976, pp. 148-50). The extent of 
that freedom was best brought home by a meeting in May. 1977 between Murphy, 
Ryder, Sir Peter Carey (Permanent Secretary at the Department of Industry), 
Sir Kenneth kith (Chairman of Rolls Royce and a leading merchant banker) and 
Sir Arnold Weinstock (Managing Direct'or of GEC). The topic for discussion was 
the proposed merger of Rolls Royce with GEC in which the latter would 
virtually take over managerial responsibilities from the NEB (Kellner and 
Crowther-Hunt, 1980, pp. 318-23). Although the deal did not go through, the 
tensions that resulted between the managements of Rolls Royce and the NEB 
laid the groundwork for the eventual bust up in November, 1979, when under 
the new government Rolls Royce was transferred to the Department of Industry 
and the entire board of the NEB resigned in protest. More significantly 
these discussions, which had important implications for the government's 
industrial strategy, apparently went ahead without the full knowledge or 
approval of the Cabinet or even the Secretary of State for Industry, Eric 
Varley (ibid. & p. 189, and Sampson, in'The'Observer, 18 Nov. 1979). 
In any case most of the NEB's finances were effectively tied up in 
the two bankrupt firms transferred to its control, British Leyland and Rolls 
Royce. These alone accounted for nearly 90~ of NEB shareholdings and by 
early 1978 had absorbed some 94% of NEB loans (Parr, 1979, p. 55). At the 
end of 1978 total NEB investments in BL and Rolls Royce amounted to 
EI,157m, while the rest of the portfolio accounted for only El18m (NEB, 
Annual Report 1978, p. SS). Moreover, despite its brief about supporting 
employment and promoting industrial democracy NEB controlled firms showed 
little compunction over engaging in ~ather ruthless pruning of jobs in the 
quest for profitability. At BL in particular a hard-line management received 
full government backing as it cut the work-force by nearly 33,000 in the four 
years from December, 1975, and successfully took on and more or less crushed 
-423-
h d •• • • I 6 the powerful s op stewar organ1zat1on at Lts maLn pants. Nonetheless, 
within these rather narrow limits the NEB did play at least a limited 
initiating role in the area of new technology. It took a significant share 
in Britain's ailing computer firm, ICL, and played a major part in establish-
ing new firms in micro-electronic hardware and software, mainly through INSAC, 
INMOS, NEXOS and LOGICA. Its greatest success story during the period of the 
Labour government was undoubtedly the rescue operation mounted for Ferranti's. 
This technologically advanced but financially troubled firm turned round 
rather quickly under NEB control and eventually produced a healthy profit 
and considerable capital gain for the parent company (Parr, 1979, and 
wilson, 1979, pp. 149-51). In sum the NEB in practice bore a much stronger 
resemblance to the views discussed earlier of major industrialists of what 
was needed than to any of the proposals put forward by the unions or the 
Labour Left. Given the limited role, the leadership and the conventional 
approach to finance adopted by the Board, it is hardly surprising that the 
City ultimately accepted its operations as non-threatening, and that various 
financial institutions had engaged in joint operations with it by 1979 (ibid.). 
As mentioned above the planning agreements system'had already been 
emasculated both in Cabinet and in the passage of the Industry Bill through 
Parliament. Yet th-. government remained highly coumitted to some kind of 
voluntaristic programme. This crystallized in the issue of a government 
white paper, 'Art'Apptoaeh'to'Induittial'Sttategy, in November, 1975, following 
a meeting at Chequers of representatives of the government, the TUC and the 
CBI under the auspices of tbe National Economic Development Council (NEDC). 
This document still included the term "planning agreement discussions" but 
made it clear that these would be strictly voluntary and would in effect take 
place as part of the usual tripartite consultations in the indu,stry-level 
Economic Development COIIIIlitteel (EDCs). Although the white paper weilt on at 
some length to distinguish the industrial strategy from Labour's earlier fiasco, 
the 1965 National Plan, it was essentially a low key version of tbe previous 
, , 
exercise. In the game plan of this document, by the end of the next summer 
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the government would present its medium-term projections to the NEDC, 
broken down to indicate the implications for each of 30 or so key industrial 
sectors. These projections would then form the remit for individual EDCs 
or ad hoc committees to be established where no EDC existed (later termed 
Sector Working Parties) for tripartite discussions. The results of these 
discussions would be returned to the Council for the use of the government 
in devising both its industrial and macro-economic policies. While the 
white paper was fairly anodyne in its wording and content, it did include 
some specific criticisms of the inadequacies of the City's capital markets. 
At any rate the continued suspicions of the CBI and the growing wariness 
of the TUC prevented either side from actually signing the document as a 
formal agreement, although both did at least go through the motions of 
offering verbal support. The reluctance of the CBI was less defensible in 
this case since the industrial strategy largely followed its own proposals 
for the extension of the existing tripartite system (CBI, lleport, 1975-, p. 13). On 
the otber hand union fears that the exercise was little more than a minimal 
pay-off to secure compliance with a new phase of wage restraint (much as 
with the National Plan of 1965) proved well founded, as already in the spring 
of 1975 the joint efforts of the CBI and the government brought success in 
the form of the £6 pay limit (Glynn, 1978). 
The planning agreements system as originally proposed was thus left 
by the wayside. Given the voluntaristic framework imposed by the tabour 
leadership and the total hostility of industry to any disclosure of 
information let alone anything more comprehensive, this was inevitable. The 
government only signed one so-called planning agreement with a private 
company, and this only came about because the American parent of Chrysler 
informed the government that current losses were forcing it to close down 
its UK operations. It would seem that from the somewhat cynical viewpoint 
of the firm, the agreement was simply a means to extract rather large sums of 
public money in the short term, some £162.Sm in written off 10s8es and 
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guaranteed loans over three years. In July, 1978, having use~ up all but 
f7.5m of that initial financial commitment, Chrysler simply told the 
government that it was accepting a take-over bid from Peugeot-Citroen, a 
move to which the Secretary of State for Industry had little choice but 
agree. 
Yet, if the planning agreements system played virtually no role 
except as a rather sorry joke, the government nevertheless placed great 
emphasis on the industrial strategy. The Chancellor's bud~et statements 
and economic situation report. consistently mentioned the significance of 
progress in the strategy as the key to industrial regeneration. What 
was actually accomplished is difficult to determine. By the end of Labour's 
term of office EDCs or SWPs covered some 41 industrial groups, and the vast 
majority of these did report back to the NEDC on an annual basis. These 
reports typically set some sort of objective for the future, usually in 
terms of import penetration and home market share,'l)ut there was little 
detailed discussion of these' objectives and no attempt tp create new 
instruments to meet them on the part of the government. In fact since 
the actual thrust of Labour's fiscal and monetary policy cut in the opposite 
direction to growth of investment and output, it hardly seemed likely that 
any targets hO¥ewr modest in these areas would be achieved. ('..enera1ly the 
SWPs and EDCs acted much as trade associations, which is hardly surprising 
since management representatives tended~to come from the latter rather than 
specific individual companies. The discussions and recommendations of the 
SWPs consequently centred on concerns such as promoting better maker/user 
relations, export performance, product development, product development, 
production organization and efficiency. 
One area of major weakness in the industrial strategy was simply 
the lack of central co-ordination (Grant, 1980b). Despite the uriency of 
the 1975 white paper the first general report only appeared in January, 1978. 
Even at this late date the objectives were stated only in the vaguest of terms, 
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e.g. 3\'7.: annual growth over the "next few years", with no attempt to break 
down the implications for particular sectors (Memorandum by the Chancellor 
the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Industry, 1978, p. 7). In 
addition by this late date all of the SWPs together only covered some 407, 
of manufacturin~ output and only a portion of these suhmitted some sort 
of estimated objectives for output, manpower and imports. 
Even at the sectors' level co-ordination in the sense of 
communication between the different aspects of the industrial policy 
apparatus seems to have been non-existent. For example the Electronic 
Components SWP complained when the NEB created its microelectronics firm, 
INMOS, without any prior consultation, indicating a lower degree of 
co-operation than the SWP could expect even from private companies 
(Grant, 19ROb,p. R). At the same time it seems likely that the SWPs did 
have some influence on government activity through the Industrial Policy 
Group in the Treasury or the-Depar~iit of' -Industry. This was particularly 
the case in the drawing up of Select{ve7 -trift'stment Schemes . and other 
projects requiring state aid (ibid., pp. 7-12). Similarly communications 
from SWPs no doubt added weight to CBI recommendations and re-inforced 
industrial priorities across a range of industrial and economic policies 
from taxation, manpower training and higher education, the use of 
Industrial Development Certificates,. modifications of the facilities 
offered by the Export Credits Guarantee Department and the creation of a 
7 Market Entry Guarantee Scheme. However, the concern expressed by seven 
SWPs, especially the Machine ToolsEDC, towards the end of the government 
about the effects of the appreciation of the poUnd on their export prospects, 
received no positive response from the Chancellor, mainly because it cut 
right against his budgetary and counter-inflation policies.8 
The other fundamental weakness of the industrial strategy was 
the absence of any means of implementing recommendations through the 
tri-partite process (Grant, 19ROb). As argued above this was largely the 
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result of concessions to industrialists who feared any extension of public 
control over company decision-making. By 1979, three years into the 
industrial strategy, the annual analysis indicated that many firms seemed 
unaware or unconcerned about its existence. Consequently, the analysis 
dwelt on the need for a "communications programme" in order to "increase 
awareness of the Industrial Strategy and of the work of the SWPs, 
especially among middle management and shop floor workers". 9 The 
"coDlDUnications problem" was particularly marked amongst trade unionists 
both at the national executive and shop steward levels, for the experience 
had left the latter with a somewhat jaundiced view of the potential of 
voluntaristic industrial planning. A TUC~onference of union representatives 
on SWPs in October, 1977, indicated at that early date the frustrations 
and fears on the labour side of tri~artite planning. One after another 
the union representatives complained of the unwillingness of management 
to diVulge any information about future programnes of exports, maiming, 
output or investDnt, particuiarly' at company level. The tenor of 
discussions at the SWPs can be judged by the complaint of one member of 
the Chemicals EDC that "most of the cent~al threads of the TUC documents 
here on Government industrial strategy have not been accepted as the 
central theme for our discussion. at !DC level, nor at Sector Working 
Party level"(TUC, 1977, p. 21). Instead of planning the growth of 
employment in this advanced and relatively buoyant sector of British 
industry. "the employers consistently press for fewer jobs" (ibid.). Others 
noted that the exercise hardly appeared to have any impact on increasing 
investment or employment, rather the future promised only further reductions 
in both areas vital to the unions. In the words of one unionist who 
brought out the contradiction between the supposed role of the industrial 
strategy and the actual iDlllact of Labour' 8 economic progranme, "our work 
is being frustrated, and will continue to be frustrated, unless the TUC 
demand for an expansionist economic policy is, in kind, acted on by the 
Government" (ibid., p. 37). 
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The obvious conclusion for many of those present was best 
expressed by Jack Jones of the Transport and r~neral Workers' Union~ namely 
that~ "to introduce planning agreements is the number one consideration, 
and without nlanning agreements at company level~ frankly the ~ector 
Working Parties will become talking shops" (ibid. t p. 31). In this 
context even one right-wing unionist basically sympathetic to the industrial 
strategy could warn that owing to the lack of publicity about the trade 
union role: 
the Neddies (EDCs), and the Sector Working Parties, are being 
seen by the rank and file as instruments for knocking them into 
shape. We are seen as being policemen pursuing policies and 
trying to enforce policies, on the shop floor that they know 
nothing about and have not been briefed for (ibid., p. 25). 
The call for compulsory planning agreements and detailed disclosure of 
information at the company level were of course non-starters as far as 
the CBI and the government were concerned. The narrow limits of the 
industrial strategy would not be breached by Labour for the rest of its 
term. Consequently, while the TUC continued to give lip service to the 
programme in its public statements, there is little doubt that it was 
increasingly frustrated by the lack of significant progress towards 
anything like an expansionary programme or genuine tripartite planning. 
The union rank-and-file meanwhile returned to its traditional mode for 
defending its interests, namely industrial action, whatever the conse-
quences for the government. 
In sum the industrial strategy as implemented followed the para-
meters set down by the CBI at the start of the government, more or less 
the same as occurred with the NEB. Fiscal concessions formed the founda-
tion of Labour's approach to industrial regeneration, the effects and 
consequence. of which I shall return to below. However, 
on top of this the government continued and developed a programme of 
fairly massive state aid to those firms and sectors for Which even the 
virtual elimination of the tax burden would not guarantee survival. 
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This aid came largely in the form of grants and low-interest or interest-
free loans by way of Regional Development Grants, Investment Grants and 
the provisions in Sections 7 and 8 of the Industry Act 1972 and the 
building of government factories through the Local Employment Act 1972. 
Assistance from these sources totalled some £4851m over the life of the 
government, dwarfing the funds channelled through the NEB (see Table 10.1). 
Furthermore, it was not used to increase the leverage of the government 
in industrial planning as earlier envisaged. Rather, the administration 
of these funds in any detailed sense was left largely in the hands of the 
firms or sectors involved within the general guidelines set down by the 
10 
various statutes. In the provision of state aid it was industry's 
view of the proper form of accountability that prevailed, not that of 
the unions or the Labour Left. 
Finally it should be noted that the financial sector was largely 
left out of the industrial strategy, although two fairly minimal concessions 
1',' 
were made to the critics of the role of the City in the provision of 
investment funds. First, the government set up the Comudttee to Review 
the Functioning of Financial Institutions under Barold Wilson. The 
Comadttee met throughout the second half of Labour's term but did not 
complete its final report until after the electoral defeat in 1919., As 
such the Committee could. not be expected to have any significant impact 
on government policy, but there exists the strong suspicion that the main 
intention behind its creation was really to deflect trade union demands 
di ' f'· 1· • . 11 for greater state rectl0n over 1nancla lnstltut10ns. The same 
applies to the second institutional innovation, namely the establishment: 
of the Committee on Finance for Investment under the auspices of the NEDC. 
This was formed in January, 1976, under the Chairmanship of Lord Roll, 
also Chairman of the Merchant Bank, S. G. Warburg, with fairly wide terms 
of reference: 
To consider and keep under review problems conaected.with··the 
demand for funds for investment by manufacturing industry, the 
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mobilisation of the finance required, the channels through which 
it moves and the related roles of financial institutions; and 
to report on these matters as appropriate to the NEDC (Wilson 
Committee, Vol. 8, p. 74). 
As the City had long resisted the notion of an EDC for the financial sector, 
the mere creation of the Committee was something of a concession. Indeed, 
it appears to have had same impact on the industrial strategy as by 
May, 1978, some nine SWPs included a clearing banker on their staffs for 
the first time. tts work in its first two years covered such topics as 
financial aspects of the industrial strategy, bonding problems for export 
firms with large contracts, the implications of deferred tax liability for 
external finance and financial problems of small and medium-sized firms. 
Aa such the Committee at least made some headway towards bringing financial 
representatives face-to-face with industrial problems. However, one should 
not make too much of this since the other side of its work was deflating 
if not outright rejecting some pet schemes of the TUC, e.g. the notion of 
a contracyclical reserve fund in the Swedish mould to supplement existing 
capital allowances and the modification of credit facilities to encourage 
exports and discourage imports in" line with French practice (ibid., pp. 71-97). 
Similarly, in 1979 several SWPs in nigh technology areas were still concerned 
about the need for new sources of finance given that the "banks are not a 
suitable source for the kind of risk capital needed by small companies 
wishing to expand in these sectors", a matter which was simply referred 
11 C • f· ·d· 12 A • to the Ro ommlttee or its ConSl eratlon. year later Wlth a new 
government in power the Roll C01llllittee was still admitting "the need for 
the financial community to be made more aware of the work of the EDes and 
SWPs and their objectives (NEDC, Jan. 1980, p. 15). Here again the limits 
on vo1untaristic planning were determined by what business r~presentatives 
were willing to consider. In the case of finance this fell far short of 
any idea of greater state involvement or direction. 
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Perhaps the simplest assessment of the industrial strategy is 
that "it seems to have been more succ.essful in giving industry's needs 
a higher priority within government than in influencing private industry 
(Grant, 198Cb, p. 2)." As discussed above the top industrial priority 
was the reduction in corporation tax, and in financial terms it was 
the concessions on stock relief of November, 1974, that constituted 
the heart of the industrial programme. As pointed out in Chapter Eight 
these measures more or less compensated for the decline in pre-tax 
profitability, to the extent that by 1977 as the Treasury and the Depart-
ment of Industry admitted, "substantially the whole of the profits which 
a manufacturing company continues to re-invest on its business, whether 
by way of stock or plant, are effectively relieved from corporation 
tax (Wilson COllDllittee, Vol. 1, p. 21)." The result was a clear decline 
in the level of the tax in real terms by 1979 as compared with a decade 
earlier (see Table 10.2). The level even fell in current terms in both 
1975 and 1976, years of rapid inflation when total company income rose 
by some f6.6b. As a percentage of company income the fall was even 
more dramatic. Some idea of what could have happened had Labour ~ 
granted stock relief can be gauged from Table 10.3. As a percentage 
of profits net of stock appreciation corporation tax shot up to nearly 
29\ in 1974, dropping to 13.4\ by 1977. By the latter date according 
to one estimate most major corporations were paying little if any 
corporation tax (see Table 10.4). 
Labour's policies towards the corporate sector thus apparently 
managed to maintain the level of post-tax profitability of the early 
1970s despite the slide in pre-tax rates of return. In this course 
it largely continued the approach of previous governments whether 
Labour or Tory since the mid-1960s albeit on a considerably greater 
scale. However, even this did not win the sustained support of 
industrial capital. The CBI became increasingly alarmed about the 
deterioration in pre-tax rates of return, especially when they began 
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to turn down once again in the wage explosion of 1979. Industry's 
attitudes hardened over the course of the government, as the CBI 
repeatedly demanded further concessions in taxation (especially the 
National Insurance Surcharge) and further cutbacks in public expendi-
ture. The continued concern over wage costs and productivity levels 
probably explains the at least partial conversion to "monetarism" 
over these years (CBI, 1976 & 1978). 
At the same time the government's programme of fiscal concessions 
could hardly be counted a success in terms of its main aim, raising 
the level of investment. 
Gross domestic fixed capital formation (GDFCF) in constant 1975 
prices peaked in 1973 at slightly over £2lb and remained between £20.1 
and £20.8b for the rest of the decade. Net domestic fixed capital form-
ation (GDFCF net of capital consumption) likewise reached its apogee 
in 1973 at flO.9b but fell steadily thereafter to f7.4b by 1979. For 
manufacturing the story was even worse. In constant 1975 prices net 
investment had fallen to fO. eb in 1976 from its postwar high of f2.lb 
in 1970. Although it recovered somewhat to £1.2b by 1979, it still 
remained over 40% below the level nine years (see Table 10.5). To put 
the matter bl\Dltly under LaboO%' industry was not just falling short of 
the vast increase in investment called for by both the unions and the 
CBI, it was moving in the wrong direction. While this was in part due 
to the growth of capital consumption resulting from Britain's aging 
plant and equipment, the point is simply that the programme of tax credits 
and state aid could not even maintain existing levels of net investment 
let alone spark a major revival. 
Anoth_ aspect of the relative and at times absolute reduction 
in corporate taxation seems pertinent to the present discussion, that 
is the corresponding decline in state revenue from this source. Look-
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ing at Table 10.6 one can perceive a virtually continuous fall in taxes 
on company income (including distributions) as a share of total taxa-
tion over the past twenty-five years. The last Labour government was 
no exception to this rule; indeed, it departed from the relative stab-
ilization of the previous decade. As a proportion of taxes on incomes 
the results of Labour policies are equally clear, especially with re-
gard to the 45% drop in the two-year period from 1974 (see Table 10.7). 
This trend is particularly important since it implies that ceteris 
paribus government revenue had to be raised from other sources, and 
this is precisely what happened. In fact state expenditure leap M 
upwards particularly in the middle years of the decade, mainly as a 
result of the rise in transfer payments due in turn to changes in the 
demographic profile anG the effects of stagflation (Wright. 1977, 
p. 146). Given the commitment later carried through to reduce the 
budget deficit by some 2\ of our GDP over the three years from 1976, 
rising taxation especially on incomes in~vitably playe~ a large role 
in the economic programme of the government. This role was reinforced 
by the repeated warnings by the Chancellor to the unions that he would 
use fiscal measures to mop up wage increases in excess of the current 
norms. As a result the burden of adjustment fell on wage and salary 
earners through the rise in income tax, national insurance surcharge 
and taxes on consumer spending and considerably more so than would have 
been the case had corporate taxation been maintained at pre-existing 
levels. As a very rough estimate if Labour had retained company taxa-
tion as a proportion of fiscal revenue at the 1970-74 average, it would 
have raised an additional .£7.5b over the next five years. Of course 
this would have meant a permanent profits' squeeze on the private 
sector and no doubt a tidal wave of bankruptcy, but it gives some idea 
of the scale of concessions introduced in November, 1974 (Table lO.6). 
As an alternative estimate fl'om the Wilson Committee for the financial 
year 1978-79, first year allowances were due on capital expenditure 
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of nearly £ lOb , on industrial buildings amounting to £700m and on stock 
relief to the tune of $1.4b, a total reduction in the company tax 
burden of some £12.lb for one year alone (Wilson Committee, Appendices, 
pp. 541-2). Although the last Labour government was specifically 
responsible only for the industrial buildings and stock relief aspects 
of this form of assistance, an important point here is that many companies 
now do not make sufficient profits to utilize all of the allowances 
due to them and must carry them forward to count against future years' 
taxation. As the same report put it: "This phenomenon known as 'tax 
exhaustion t reduces the effectiveness of tax incentives for investment" 
(ibid., p. 541). 
The significance of the above argument seems most apposite to 
the crisis period of 1974-77; that is, the same years in whiCh the 
burden of company taxation dropped most sharply were those in which 
through the combination of incomes policy and fiscal claw back real 
take-home pay fell by some 5% (CEPR, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 14). I do not 
mean to claim here that the fall in revenue from concessions to 
business constituted the main constraint on Labour's economic programme, 
but it clearly had some significance in the continual and initially 
successful efforts of the Chancellor to hold down real wages. The 
ultimate importance of this relationship seems all the greater given 
the no'" abundant evidence linking the latter to shop floor militancy 
and hence inflation. 
Put most simply class conflict in modern Britain has found its 
sharpest expression in a struggle over the distribution of national 
income between wages and profits and the attempts to maintain real rates 
of· post-tax growth for both factors (Goldthorpe, 1981 & Panitch, 1976). 
The policy actually pursued by Labour in 1974-79, as with the previous 
Labour governments of the 1960s, in practice effected a shift in those 
relative shares and rates of growth away from "working people and their 
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families" and towards owners and managers of capital through the com-
bination of direct controls and fiscal measures. In this the government 
was initially fairly successful as wages fell and the share of national 
income going to profits rose from 10% in the third quarter of 1975 to 
13.1% in the first quarter of 1977 (Tarling and Wilkinson, 1977, p. 401). 
However, as noted above the private sector did not take up the surplus 
thus generated and channel it into increased investment, and economic 
deflation effectively frittered away the potential benefits in sagging 
output and growing unemployment. In the end the union rank-and-file 
rebelled against the attempt to make it bear the main burden of economic 
retrenchment. The voluntary incomes policy broke down in 1977-78 as 
the number of and working-days lost due to industrial disputes shot 
back up and wage settlements accelerated in the effort to regain 
previous levels of real take-home pay~ch as with previous attempts 
at incomes policy (ibid. t Henry and Omerod, 1978 & Henry, Sawyer and 
Smith. 1976). This process culminated in a series of disruptive and 
highly publicized strikes in the "winter of discontent" of 1979. The 
latter in turn severely damaged the credibility of Labour's claim of 
a special relationship with the unions as the key to its counter-inflation 
policy and economic programme in general. Consequently, it likewise 
played a major role in the electoral defeat for the government later 
that spring. 
In sum the industrial strategy as it eventually emerged amounted 
to little more than an exercise designed to induce union co-ope%'ation 
with incomes policy and as a justification for substantial tax con-
cessicms to private industry. In so far as Labour remained in the 
tripartite voluntarist mode of planning there were severe limits placed 
en any extension of state control. Even the new public agency t the 
NEB, carried on its activities largely outside any political reference 
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and was in any case dwarfed in financial terms by the more traditional 
modes of public aid, namely loans, grants and reductions in taxation. 
By the end of its term the government had very nearly exhausted these 
latter forms of public intervention at least as a means of influencing 
corporate decision-making. Tax credits were now so extensive that little 
new could be offered as an inducement to invest, other forms of public 
aid could not be significantly increased without causing a major 
political controversy. In any case the effectiveness of these forms 
of assistance had already been brought into question despite their 
extensiveness (Grant, 19SOb). More to the point company investment was 
mainly influenced by the rates of profitability and the overall state 
of economic activity. In so far as the government coul.d influence the 
latter it was narrowly constrained by the limits on monetary expansion 
and the need to reduce the PSBR, and its economic policies thus tmder-
mined the professed aims of the industrial strategy. Within these limits 
Labour could only affect profitability by entering the distributional 
conflict on the side of capital, but this course proved to be highly 
damaging and divisive in the end. The programme of voluntaristic 
corporatism had apparently come to the end of its rather tortured road. 
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III The City, Industry and the Wilson Committee 
The public debate on the relationship between the City and industry 
reached a peak in 1975-76. Various articles appeared in the financial 
press dealing with the range of issues discussed in Chapter Eight, in 
particular the role of equity as against loan finance, gearing levels, 
the short-term outlook of the markets, profitability, the arms-length 
relationship, various gaps in external finance, etc. Some of the comment-
ary was quite critical (e .g. Lester, in Management Today, Feb., 1975, 
Investors Chronicle, May 30 and June 13, 1975 and the Economist, October 9, 
1976). Other forums proved predictably more defensive, as was the case 
with the exchanges in the Banker (Feb., May, Sept. and Dec., 1976). 
Much of this debate simply rehearsed the arguments presented to the 
Wilson Committee and as such I will look at them in more detail below. 
However, the controversy acquired a sharp political edge with the 
publication of the NEC document, Barking and Finance, approved by the 
Labour party Annual Conference in September, 1976. This made a number 
of proposals which were bound to send tremors through the City, not to 
mention industry and commerce. In particular it called for the creation 
of an investment reserve fund out of ''blocked balances" of the major 
corporations along Swedish lines, integration of existing public sector 
financial institutions, nationalisation of the top seven insurance 
companies, the big four clearing banks and a merchant bank and reform 
of the Bank of England to make it mCJre "publicly accountable" and end 
its role as representative of the City (Labour Party - NEe, 1976, pp. 19-24). 
Needless to say the government did not act upon any of these proposals, 
and there is little doubt that the Wilson eommittee was primarily set 
up to diffuse this sort of pressure from the left of the Labour movement. 
Much of the initial reaction of the City to criticism of its relation-
ship with industry has been described abO'ge. At this point, however, I 
wish to describe briefly the recent history of a number of the initiatives 
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undertaken to deflate some of this criticism, especially as regards 
the arms-length relationship between the providers and users of finance. 
As noted above one highly trumpeted venture was the creation of Equity 
Capital for Industry (ECl) in 1976. Although born amidst controversy 
and scepticism a severely pared down version of ECl did survive the 
next few years. Its initial capital of some £4lm, if only a fraction 
of its original goal of £50Om, was at least subscribed by 365 financial 
institutions, including the major insurance companies, pension funds, 
uni t and investment trusts and Finance for Industry (FFl). Yet t Eel 
did not even manage to live up to this meagre promise. By the end of 
March 1979 it had invested no mOI'e than £9.4m in a grand total of eight 
companies, two of which collapsed (Wilson Camnittee, Appendices, pp. 476-7 
and Minns, 1980, pp. 87-8). This desult0I'Y performance was despite 
highly selective investment criteria which demanded an immediate return. 
One problem may have been its dependence on I'8ferrals from merchant 
banks which were not exactly sympathetic to the institution. In the 
end most of its profits were made not from investing in industry but 
from lending the bulk of its capital on the money markets (Minns, OPe 
ci t. ) • ECl proved to be less a bridge between institutional investors 
and industry than a pI'ecarious catwalk. 
Finance for Industry fared somewhat better, reflecting its longer 
history and greateI' acceptability to banking capital. FFI had been set 
up in 1973 out of a meI'geI' of Finance CorpoI'ation fO%' IndustI'Y (FCI) 
and the IndustI'ial and CommeI'cial Finance Corporation (ICFC). 'l1le 
latter two oI'ganisations dated back to 1945, in effect the City's 
somewhat belated acknowledgment of the "Macmillan gap" in the provision 
of medium-term extemal finance. In fact ITI operated as a bolding 
company as both of its main divisions I'8tained theiI' separate identities, 
ICFC catering foI' small and FCI fO%' laI'ge companies. In the next few 
years ITI established seveN.l other subsidiaries dealing with shipping 
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(Finance for Shipping (FFS», leasing, property and consultancy. As 
noted earlier FFI had been beefed up with the announcement in Healey's 
"business budget" of November, 1974, that the clearing banks and the 
Bank of England would make available £l,OOOm through this facility for 
medium-term lending to industry, a successful move to scupper the 
government's proposed "Lever bank". However, the performance of the 
group was constrained by the strictly commercial criteria governing 
its investment decisions. Given the recession and the liquidity problems 
of British industry demand for new borrowings fell away over the next 
few years. In financial year 1975-76 FCI could only place £116m of 
its new ftmds. while ICFC increased its investments by slightly more 
than £23m (FFI, 1975-76, p. 4). The next year proved somewhat worse, 
as FeI advanced only £66.2m, while IeFC's gross investments grew 
slightly to £27. 7m (ibid., 1976-77, p. 4). Over the next two years 
to March 1979 the performance of-FFI as a whole picked up along with 
the gradual economic recovery, but this was not equally true of each 
of its divisions. Although ICFC's new advances increased to £5Om in 
1977-78 and nearly £68m in 1978-79, FCI could only manage to place !4Om 
and .£63m in the same two years (FFI, 1977-78 and 1978-79). In fact 
much of the increase in the total investments of the group was 
accounted for by its other subsidiaries. New advances by FFS grew to 
!12m in 1977-78 and !32m in 1978-79, while the leasing division 
registered increases of £4Bm and .£46m over the same period (ibid.). 
Thus, while from its fOWlding in 1973 to the end of March 1979 FFI 
as a whole had invested a respectable if modest sum of £65Om in 
industry, an increasing proportion of this total came in the fo%'lll of 
leasing and industrial hire purchase (Wilson Committee, Appendices, 
pp. 475-7). More to the point, even with the most favourable reading 
of the results the amounts involved were negligible in the context of 
the overall pattern of relations between industry and finance. Far 
from breaking the mould of ol'thodoxy, FFI adopted the standard practices 
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of City institutions, and its performance followed the fluctuating level 
of economic activity. As such it could hardly count as an adequate reply 
to union demands for a counter-cyclical investment fund as a key element 
in the industrial strategy. Nor did it fulfil Harold Lever's original 
expectations thct it would "ultimately develop with a major impact on 
the future efficiency of British industry", that its operations would 
"involve the banks much more closely in the investment decisions of 
industry," or that it would "meet the challenge which has now been recog-
nised of providing a stable form of long-term and medium-term lending 
for industry, for exports and for capital investment (Hansard, 14 Nov., 
1974, cols. 607 & 609)." 
The final development highlighted as signalling a significant 
change in the relationship of finance and industry was the growth of 
medium-term lending by the clearing banks. As discussed in Chapter 
Eight the Committee of London Clearing Bankers claimed in its evidence 
to the Wilson Committee that this type of lending accounted for £5,927m 
or some 39% (excluding shipbuilding finance) of total domestic advances 
to the non-personal sector in November 1977 (CLCB, pp. 101 and 276). 
However, of this total '£2,937m or nearly half was eurocurrency lending, 
most of which is spent overseas on capital investment, working capital 
or acquisitions (ibid., and pp. 133-9). Since the issue at stake here 
is the use of medi\Dll-term bank lending to finance U.K. industrial 
investment, much of the latter ought to be exclhuded, althougJt it is 
impossible to put forward a precise figure given the available evidence. 
Whatever the exact amounts there is no doubt that medium-term lending 
by the banks has increased in recent years, but what this means is 
another matter. For one the growth of term-lending was conditioned by 
two factors: first the efforts on the part of the clearers to convert 
sane of their ''hard-core'' overdrafts into this form, thereby charging 
higher interest rates. Aa such the growth of contractual lending has 
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not represented a source of additional finance for industrial borrowers 
and has been matched by the decline of the overdraft facility. The second 
factor was the evaporation of the market in long-term fixed-interest 
loans with the arrival of high inflation. From the point of view of 
industrial customers it is clear that medium-term contractual loans are 
only a second-best alternative to long-term fixed-interest loans, and 
that a considerable unsatisfied demand exists for the latter (Wilson 
Committee, Report, pp. 222 & 225). If the growth of medium-term lending 
hardly seemed to harbinger a radical change in the relations between 
the clearing banks and industry, it did begin to pose a liquidity problem 
for the banks. Already in 1976 the latter were warning that in the 
event of a rapid rise in demand, "they could fair.1y quickly reach a 
limit on medium-term lending beyond wliich they could not prudently go 
on the basis of their present deposit mix (The Banker, December 1976, 
p. 1454 and.£!£!!., p. 18)." Two solutions were possible for this problem: 
(i) the more unlikely one of attracting longer-term deposits and (H) 
the more realistic one of introducing some sort of rediscounting facility 
by way of the Bank of England. Even before the Wilson Committee had 
convened the banks had begml discussions with the Bank over the second 
possibility (ibid." but this may have been in response to pressure from 
some sectors of industry. The notion of a rediscounting facility to 
buttress medium-term bank lending had first been mooted in the NEDO 
report, Finance for Investment (1975), discussed in Chapter Eight. Sir 
Charles Villiers supported a similar scheme at a Financial Times conference 
in March 1976 on "The City in National and International Finance" (The 
Times, '+ March 1976, p. 18)." More generally, the CBI, at least as 
represented by an interview with its economic director, Dermot Glyn, 
placed considerable faith in the enlargement of FFI and the creation 
of ECI as sources of long-tenn external finance (The Banker, Dec. 1976, 
pp. 1449-51). Similarly, while agreeing that there was "scme scope for 
closer contacts and bette%' understanding" between the two sectors, this 
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did not mean in his view "City people taking a direct part in industrial 
management," though there might be a case for "industrialists serving 
on City institution boards (ibid., p. 1451)." Thus, while treading 
carefully in order not to encourage the proposals of Labour's NEC or 
the TUC, one can see indications of a certain amount of behind-the-scenes 
pressure by some industrialists on the financial institutions to make 
some concessions to the latters' critics. To learn the fate of these 
various schemes we must turn to the evidence and report of the Wilson 
Committee. 
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The Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions 
was appointed in January 1977 under the chairmanship of Sir Harold Wilson 
and started to receive written evidence in the spring. The actual hear-
ings began in the autumn of the same year and continued through to the 
end of 1978. The evidence was published in two stages for which no hard 
distinction applied, although the first dealt more generally with the 
financing of industry and trade and the second tended to concentrate 
more specifically on the regulation and supervision of financial 
institutions. As the second issue is not my particular concern here 
I will draw mainly but not exclusively on the first stage evidence. 
Although .. he Wilson Comm! ttee published an interim ProgreSS Report at 
the end of 1977, its final Report did not appear until June 1980 well 
after Labour's electoral defeat. As such its work and subsequent 
conclusions cannot be said to have exercised any iDfluence on the 
Callaghan government, and the sub8equent Conservative government simply 
ignored it. My examinaticm of the evidence to and recommendations from 
the Committee will therefore focus on three themes: 1. the sueeessful 
effort to isolate and dampen the enthusiasm for certain pet schemes of 
the TUC and the Labour left, especially the extension of public owner-
ship into the financial sector and the creation of a new kind of invest-
ment bank; 2. the response of industry and the City to the criticisms 
of financial practices discussed previously; and 3. the fate of some 
les8 politically hot but 80me might think equally significant suggestions 
for reform, especially the institution of some sort of central rediscount-
ing facility to encourage meditml-term bank lending. 
TUC evidence to the Committee unlike the rest of the submissions 
took the industrial strategy as its point of departure. Its criticism 
of the industrial strategy highlighted three requirements: 1. a more 
active and positive approach en the part of the government; 2. closer 
UnJcage between the sect oral and company levels througb the introduction 
of planning agreements; and 3. bJ'inging the financial institutions into 
the "industrial consensus" (Wilson Conunittee, Vol. 2, pp. 82 and 104-7). 
From this perspective the TUC submission focussed on the decline of the 
manufacturing sector, which it admitted was due to a complex of factors 
including the level of demand, productivity, non-price factors and the 
quality as well as the quantity of investment (ibid., pp. 74-5). However, 
in the context of a more vigorous programme to revitalise British 
industry it foresaw the need to double manufacturing investment over 
the next ten years. Here it challenged both the efficiency of the 
markets in allocating investment and more broadly the criterion of 
profitability as the sole guide to investment, i.e. that the latter 
should also take into account long-term prospects, the prio~ity of 
home manufacturing, regional disparities, future employment, etc. 
(ibid., pp. 76-82). 
Following from this the unions wanted a greater degree of public 
direction of investment especially with regard to the use of North Sea 
oil revenues. In terms of specific recommendations the TUC wanted the 
implementation of planning agreements to monitor major investment 
decisions and an increase in the fimding of public sector agencies so 
that the NEB could dispose Llb per year and the Welsh and Scottish 
Development Agencies a further L~, a move which would require funnell-
ing roughly a quarter of total oil revenues through these institutions. 
As regards the private sector the TUC advocated a closer involvement 
of financial institutions with industry and suggested that the Wilson 
Committee investigate the possibility of rediscounting medium-term 
loans at the Bank of England as one means of achieving this. More 
specifically it proposed the creation of a new lending facility jointly 
financed by the public and private sectors and capable of investing 
Llb per annum. In effect 'the new institution would be a "massive 
extensicm of Equity Capital for Indusnylt, backed by the insurance 
companies and pensioo funds as well as public revenues drawn from oll 
revenues and a new national savings scheme and capable of offering loan 
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as well as equity finance (ibid.~ pp. 82-5). In addition the TUC 
supported a new institutional framework~ a tripartite standing committee 
to replace the NEDC Committee on Finance for Investment. The standing 
committee would play a more active role of direction in reference to 
an investment targets be responsible to the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
and the Secretary of State for Industry rather than the NEDC and perhaps 
include statutory powers of direction (ibid., pp. 85-6). In its second 
stage evidence the TUC repeated many of the same points, arguing in 
particular that it was not in favour of complete state direction of 
investment but rather a modification of market determination. In 
considering the Bank of England the TUC put forward proposals designed 
to ensure greater "public accountability." Opposing any moves towards 
developing a more independent role for the Bank the unions recommended 
instead that its Court of Directors be reconstituted on a "genuinely 
tripartite" basis, i.e. including at least one-third trade unionists, 
some of them drawn from the finan~~al sector (TUC, 1979, pp. 56-8). 
Its only other significant proposals included the endorsement of the 
Post Office Union's submission ca·lling for a merger of the National Giro 
and the National Savings Bank to create a public sector rival to the 
major clearing banks (ibid. ~ p. 58). In addition as reg8I'ds foreign 
investment it supported the case foi:' existing exchange controls but 
advocated greater scrutiny, especially of the activities of multinationals, 
through the creation of a new Foreign Investment Review Agency which 
would include union membership (ibid., pp. 67-9). In sum the TUC 
submissions, while moderate by compar:t.son to the NEC document a few 
years earlier~ called for a strategy· of investment linkage in which the 
public sector would play a more prominent and active role. Evidence 
from representatives of private business was uniform in its opposition 
to such an approach. 
CBI evidence was very much in this vein. Its main argument was 
that industrial investment had not been restricted by a shortage of 
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external finance but by "a lack of confidence that industry will be 
able to earn a sufficient return (Wilson Committee ~ Vol. 2 ~ p. 1)." 
It was not so much the quantity but the effectiveness of investment 
that was deficient, but in so far as the former had been limited, 
this was the result of the decline in profitability (ibid., pp. 6-11). 
To justify this argument the CBI drew from articles in the Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletin. However. it relied entirely on figures 
for the pre-tax rate of return. The rather more favourable trend picture 
of post-tax profits was rather too conveniently ignored. Moreover. this 
assumption was implicity challenged by the evidence of the Bank of 
England and the Treasury, which cited econometric research indicating 
a relationship between future expectations of profitability and the 
changes in the level of output over the previous few years (Vol. 5, p. 241 
and Vol. 1, p. 47). The latter in fact provided the best "explanation" 
for levels of investment. In the words of the Treasury, "The dominant 
influence on investment, therefore, is the general macro-economic climate -
and unless this is conducive to investment no measures specifically to 
encourage investment are likely to have much effect (Vol. 1, p. 47)." 
As such the CBI evidence downplayed issues of gearing and the type 
of external finance. While admitting that both industrial managers and 
institutional lenders had expectations about "prudent" gearing ratios, 
it argued that these were justified by recent troubles and that 
comparisons with other countries could be misleading (Vol. 2, pp. 14-22). 
Similarly, it recognised the usefulness of long-term fixed-interest loans 
but saw the solution to their disappearance not in the introduction of 
variable rate medium-term lending but rather in the removal of the 
source of uncertainty, namely the rate of inflation (ibid., pp. 23-5). 
As regards state finance the CBI saw no reason for any extension of 
public sector involvement and repeated its support for "non-discriminatory" 
tax allowances as against selective forms of aid (ibid., pp. 26-7). 
.. 
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In short the whole tenor of the evidence was a "vote of confidence" in 
the financial system. In so far as defects or gaps were recognised with 
regard to smaller companies tois was seen mainly as a problem of communi-
cation. ~e main difficulties for these companies were pictured as 
essentially due to high taxation and inflation (ibid., pp. 31-8). Although 
somewhat sympathetic to the notion of a Small Business Administration 
on the American model to provide information and guarantee loans, the 
CBI remained agnostic on this issue (ibid., p. 35). Thus, in respect 
of specific recommendations the CBI proposed the following: a 
reduction in "the motmting burden of capital taxation," an improvement 
in financial advice for smaller firms, a closer relationship between 
companies and their shareholders, the removal of uncertainty regarding 
the tax treatment of stock relief, the abolition of dividend and profit 
margin control, an extension of some ECGD schemes and a relaxation of 
exchange controls. The central point was that given a reduction in 
inflation and an impt'()vement in profitability, "internally generatl!d 
funds, suitably complemented by private-sector external funds, will then 
be adequate to finance the industrial recovery (ibid., p. ~).n 
In their oral evidence the CBI witnesses largely repeated the same 
refrain. Sir Arthur Knight (Courtaulds) pointed to labour productivity 
as the biggest single factor explaining the low efficiency of capital. 
He made it plain that what was at issue here was less workers demanding 
a bigger slice of the cake than "the way in which on the shop floor the 
practices which have been there for a long while have bad a greater 
impact in the last 15 years or so (ibid., p. 53)." While admitting that 
state agencies like the NEB had a role to play with regard to companies 
facing unfair competition and in holding government shares, (later Sir) 
John Methuen, Chainnan of the CBI, felt the latter shOUld be returned 
to private OIfDership in due course. He similarly argued that North Sea 
oil revenues should be used to bring down taxes, especially direct forms, 
rather than for selective investment through government intervention 
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(ibid., p. 65). The sole area where they were prepared to admit the 
existence of any gap in the financial system was in relation to small 
and new businesses. Here again, though, the thrust of the argument was 
that lower taxation was the answer. Only as a temporary stop-gap until 
lower taxes had worked through into higher personal savings was there 
a case for government guarantees or subsidies of loans (ibid., p. 67). 
Such was not the view of the Association of Independent Businesses. 
Representing in its own view the wide range of unquoted firms the AIB took a 
far more critical view of the role of financial institutions. Although 
it too highlighted changes in the rate of taxation as essential to 
improving the environment for small businesses, specific features of 
the financial system were seen as detrimental. In particular, the AIB 
attacked the banks for tb·eir "obsession with security" in the provision 
of loan finance as well as the "rigid rules" regarding the ration of 
long-term lending to short-term borrowing (ibid., p. 114). These 
practices were viewed as placing small businesses in Britain in a 
disadvantageous position compared to the Continent or the U.S. Recognis-
ing that these practices were unlikely to change without some assistance 
from the government, the AIB recommended in addition to various tax 
changes the instit1.dal of government guaranteed loans simil&r to the 
ECGD scheme and an "over the counter" market in the shares of unquoted 
companies (ibid., pp. 121-2). Thus, not only was the lIB more critical 
of the role of financial institutions than the CBI, but it saw the 
provision of government guaranteed loans as a permanent and valuable 
feature rather than a temporary palliative. 
Representations from the financial sector tended unsurprisingly 
to justi~ the existing system with few concessions to criticisms of 
the AIB and none whatsoever to the position of the TUC. The Committee 
of London Clearing Bankers set the tone for the peak associations that 
followed. The bulk of its evidence was concerned with describing and 
defending existing arrangements for the financing of investment. For 
example the "relatively low" level of lending to manufacturing industry 
was explained by the reluctance of the latter "to make use of the bank 
finance available to it (Vol. 5, p. 164)." The CLCB did recognise 
the existence of some gaps and defects, in particular term finance 
in the range of 10 to 20 years and risk capital for small businesses, 
although ICFC and the banks' own equity subsidiaries were seen as 
partially filling this role (ibid., p. 178). Of somewhat greater 
interest the clearing banks noted what they termed the "proprietorial 
gap" in the financial system by which they meant that '''the proprietorial 
functions traditionally disCharged by the individual entrepreneur and 
the private shareholder in the past have not been perfectly assumed 
by today's professional manager and institutional shareholder (ibid.)." 
In terms of specific recommendations'tbe CLCB advocated: 1. a policy 
of fiscal neutrality towards all types of savings (in reference to 
the position of the building aoc1«ties •. insurance cQlJPaDiea and the 
national savings movement); 2. a review of the institutional machinery 
for providing equity or long-'tem flm4s to smal~er fims (.with a view 
to the possibility of channelling fmu:1s from insurance companies and 
pension funds through such; institutions ~.~); 3 •.. ~~~ments . in 
facilities for long-term finance (including consideration of an 
official refinancing art'i!lDgement); and 4. improvements in the techniques 
of monetary policy (mainly the removal of the special deposit scheme 
and the use of "non-discriminatory instruments"), (ibid., pp. 179-81). 
In their oral evidence the representatives of the CLCB made it clear 
that as regards the third recommendation they envisaged only a facility 
extended on a short-term basis if a bank ran into liquidity prcblems 
as the result of expanding its term lending and not a more permanent 
arrangement (ibid., p. 195). However, later evidence from the Bank 
of England indicated that discussions on the issue had been dropped, 
and that the Bank was in any case rather scepti<:al about ita feasibility 
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(Vol. 5, p. 252). Similarly, the CLCB opposed the creation of a guarantee 
scheme for loans to small businesses on the lines of the American SBA 
(ibid., p. 208). 
Evidence from other financial institutions largely repeated the 
same themes with some slight variations. For example the Accepting 
Houses Committee was rather more sympathetic to the idea of an SBA-
type agency (ibid., p. 100). Finance for Industry on the other hand 
voiced its opposition to any such scheme which would encourage "weak, 
small businesses to increase gearing levels which are already danger-
ously high (Vol. 4. p. 89)." FFI similarly lauded the UK system of 
providing finance "in appropriate and orthodox forms" as superior to 
that of other countries which had higher gearing ratios, large 
quantities of "soft" money and consequent4'greater instability in periods 
of economic recession (ibid., pp. 84-5). The Insurance Canpany 
Associations naturally opposed any move on the part of 50vernment 
authorities to intervene in the market and "direct insurance companies 
and other financial institutions to invest a stated proportion of their 
funds in prescribed forms of investment (Vol. 3, p. 84)." Indeed, the 
lCAs extended this objection even to voluntary guidance in line with 
the industrial strategy insofar as this would limit their "traditional 
freedom of investment (Second Stage Evidence, Vol. 2, p. 42)." The . 
Stock Exchange similarly objected to the TUC proposals for a tripar-
tite standing committee with the power to direct !55Om annually of 
the funds of the major savings institutions (ibid., p. 228). The 
position of the CLCB on "fiscal neutrality" for similar types of 
savings was likewise supported by the Stock Exchange (Second Stage 
Evidence, Vol. 4, p. 38) and the Insurance Canpanies Associations 
(ibid., Vol. 2, p. 2~~ while the Building Societies Association was 
neutral on the issue (ibid., VOl. 3, p. 63). 
In effect critical comments on the relaticmship between industry 
-451-
and finance were few and far between. The Treasury reported that 
"from the point of view of the suppliers of finance it would appear 
that viable projects and credit worthy companies can, by shopping around 
for the right mix, obtain all the financial resources they are likely 
to need." However, it noted at the same time that "there are continued 
suggestions, for example from Sector Working Parties, that this is 
not so (Vol. 1, p. 58)." It likewise suggested that financial institutions 
might be better placed to meet industry's needs if relations were closer, 
if banks placed more emphasis on long-term expectations and if 
institutional investors intervened more often in company affairs. 
It similarly treated with same favour the argument that risk capital 
might not be readily available because existing institutions took too 
narrow and short-term a view of their commercial interests and because 
some cases might not qualify by normal commercial criteria but only 
by reference to long-term natiqnal interest (ibid.). Similarly, while 
the NEB generally supported the consensus view amongst the representatives 
of business that the mai~ constraint was profitability rather than 
the supply and forms of finance, its chairman did recognise that 
relations between institutional:' investors and management could be 
unsatisfactory when a company got into trouble. (Vol. 4, p. 37). 
When the final Report of the Wilson Committee appeared in June 
1980, it contained few surprises. A lengthy document which was in 
the main a description of changes in the financial system siDce Radcliffe, 
in its introductory statement it singled out three themes which ran 
through the Committee's considerations: 1. the impact of inflation; 
2. the enhanced role of financial institutions in the economy; and 
3. the need to iDpi'ew economi~ performance through greater and more 
effective real investment and the 1'01e of financial institutions in 
this pl'Ocess (Report, pp. 18-21). In the following I will briefly 
look at the arguments and reccmmendations of the Report regarding some 
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of the issues raised above, namely the fiscal treatment of savings, 
the relationship between finance and industry, the stimulation of new 
investment and the possible role of new institutions and the extension 
of public ownership. 
On the first point the Report recommended a greater uniformity 
in the taxation of similar types of savings (pp. 201-6). On the 
second issue, it recognised the significant differences in financial 
institutions and their relations with industry between Britain and 
other advanced capitalist countries, especially on the Continent 
and in Japan. It likewise took note of the "impressive degree of unanimity" 
on the desirability of institutional investors taking a more active 
interest in companies in which they held significant Shareholdings. 
At the same time it pointed out some of the disadvantages this could 
lead to, the possibility of greater financial cautiousness, costs in 
teI'lllS of managerial time and the risk of creating two classes of 
shareholders (pp. 248-51). In sum it felt that existing arrangements 
were more or less adequate and that any need for future collective 
action could be effectively dealt with through the existing mechanisms 
of Investment Protection Committees and the Institutional Shareholders 
Committee with the aid of the Bank of England (pp. 252-6). 
With regard to investment the Committee concluded that there 
was no evidence of any shortage at existing levels of demand and rates 
of interest. but it also noted that this was hardly surprising and 
that the general levels of supply and demand and the cost of capital 
might not be the most appropriate from a wider economic perspective. 
It likewise qualified these remarks by referring to the particular 
problems of small firms and high-risk investments (pp. 257-8). To 
deal with these latter specific issues the Committee recommended the 
establishment of an English Development Authority, a loan guarantee 
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system on an experimental basis and a new form of investment trust, 
small firm investment companies (pp. 216-21 & 268~ and Interim Report, 
p. 41). The prospects for improving the overall quantity and quality 
of investment were largely pictured in terms of changes in general 
economic conditions, mainly higher levels of profitability and prod-
uctivity. However, the Committee also saw the need to encourage long-
term debt financing and for this reason recommended the creation of 
rediscounting facility either through the Bank of England or some 
other agency like FFI (pp. 269-~). Similarly, no-one on the Committee 
objected to the principle of subsidisation of the cost of capital, 
although discussion of this issue was cautious because of uncertain 
benefits and possible expense. From this point the Committee divided 
on the issue of a new investment institution. Half the Committee felt 
that the recommendations already made together with such institutions 
as the NEB and the development agencies were largely sufficient or 
rather as much as could be done given that. the· -main problems lay 
elsewhere (pp. 268-70). A second group of foUl' members f:ldvocated a 
new lending facility in order to increase the demand for finance and 
lower the cost of capital but viewed the TUC proposal as unworkable. 
They wanted a new body (or bodies) to be gra.dua]:1y. built up~ have 
mixed public and private financing, act independently of government 
and avoid specific targets regarding the composition of its board and 
its investment objectives (pp. 271-3). The final group of five 
including the Chairman and the trade union members supported a modified 
version of the TUC proposal. In their view the size of additional 
investment required for industrial revitalisation required a new 
institution with fairly massive funding. Such a national investment 
banJc would be backed by public money from a North Sea oil £imd and 
private fiIiance from the institutional investors 80 that it would have 
the capacity to invest .£2b per annum. It would likewise have an 
uplicitly tripartite composition in its board of directors and operate 
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in close co-operation with the institutions associated with the 
industrial strategy (pp. 274-87). 
Finally on the question of public ownership the Committee reco-
mmended against the proposals of the Labour Party NEC for its extension 
to the main clearing banks and insurance companies (p. 362). On the 
other hand it remained fairly agnostic on the merger of the National 
Girobank and the National Savings Bank with a majority in favour of 
allowing them to continue as separate organisations (p. 370). In sum 
the Report and the work of the Committee in general was fairly 
effective in terms of its original implicit aim, namely defusing the 
left-wing pressure for dramatic action to exert political control 
over the financial sector. It likewise served as a forum for a l.mited 
front of private capital against such pressure and effectively blunted 
criticisms which portrayed the problem in terms of the supply of 
finance and failed to recognise the reality of the issues of profit-
ability and depressed output. At the same time its recommendations 
were for the most part fairly minimal and as such 'lmlikely to satisfy 
the TUC. Indeed, the latter continued to press for a national investment 
bank over the subsequent period as a major plank in its programme for 
industrial regeneration (TUC, EcOnomic Review, 1981, ch. 9). 
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Conclusion 
The trajectory of the Labour governments of 1974-79 is rather 
paradoxical. On returning to power it appeared that Labour might 
"break the mould" of postwar British politics in the direction of 
extending state control over the economy and deepening previous attempts 
to place tripartite concert at ion at the heart of the formulation of 
economic policy. By the end it had become clear that the government 
had precipitated a rather major breach in the programme of vOluntaristic 
corporatism that had emerged in the 19608 but in a rather different 
direction. Along the axis of representational inputs Labour maintained 
and widened the tripartite forum of the NEDC, but it is fairly evident 
that the latter had little or no impact on the poli.cies actually 
pursued by the government. The industrial strategy served little 
purpose other than as an inducement for the unions to cooperate with 
yet another period of wage restraint. For their part the unions got 
little in return once the initial ficirry of legislation associated 
with the Social Contract had passed. Indeed one can make a good case 
for claiming that at least as regards influence over the basic thrust 
of macroeconomic policy, the political power of the unions had reached 
a new lCM. 
As regards policy outputs the government superficially remained 
attached to the programme of ad hoc intervention and voluntaristic 
planning, but the core of the industrial strategy was in fact the 
virtual elimination of the corporate tax burden. More significantly 
in the long run, the whole framework and mode of procedure for the 
formation of economic policy was radically transformed. With the 
abandonment of full employment ecOnomic policy was now constructed 
primarily in reference to financial criteria, i.e. the PSBR and the 
money supply. The elevation of the principle of fiscal and monetary 
restraint dominated every aspect of the government t s programme. In 
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this respect the parallel with the inter-war period is all too evident, 
as once again the adherence to fixed rules of "financial prudence" 
precluded any effect! ve approach to the growth of tDlemployment. While 
Labour did not meet the demand of the new right for a balanced budget 
and an independently constituted central bank (e.g. Buchanan et al. 1978), 
it clearly travelled some distance down that path in the attempt to 
insulate economic policy from the "irresponsible" demands of subordinate 
groups and classes. However, in contrast to the inter-war period the 
adoption of such rules for decision-making was recognised as a politically 
determined event. While it was possible to justify the monetarist 
cotDlter-revolution in political-economic terms (putting the value of 
money first), there was no chance of returning to the belief that this 
was a "natural" feature of economic order. As such the political 
conditions for the pursuit of such a policy were likely to be mueh 
less stable, especially once the consequences for employment became 
clear. 
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TABLE 10.1 
State Assistance to Industry - Financial Years 1974/75 to 1978/79 
programme 
Regional Development Grants 
Investment Grants 
Regional Selective Assistance 
Assistance under Local Employment Act 
Selective Assistance under Section 8 
(Industry Act 1972) 
Special Assitance to Shipbuilding and 
Associated Industries 
Cumulative Total £ million 
1755.8 
228.5 
532.2 
223.1 
1012.1 
1098.9 
TOTAL £ 4850.6 million 
Source: Industry Act Z.9?2~ Annual Reports of the Secretaries of 
State fo~ Industry, Scotland and Wales, Z9?5-l979 
TABLE 10.2 
MainstreamCorporatian Tax (excluding tax on distributions) 
!m at constant 1975 prices 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
2742 3192 2653 2348 2224 2184 1349 1075 1509 1797 2112 
Source: C80, National Income and E:r:penditure, 1,980: Table 5. l 
-459-
TABLE 10.3 
Mainstream Corporation Tax as a % of Total Company Income 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 197B 1979 
14.9 17.3 14.2 11.8 B.B 9.2 6.8 4.8 6.6 7.8 7.B 
MCT as a % of Gross Trading Profits Net of Stock Appreciation 
25.5 31.5 24.7 20.9 18.6 28.9 17.6 17.6 13.4 14.8 17.7 
Source: ibid. 
TABLE 10.4 
Payments of mainstream cOrporation tax 1976-1979 
(fm. ) 
1976-7 1978-9 
Company Profits Tax paid Profits TaX paid 
Allied Breweries 6~ nil 77 nil 
Bass Charrington 69 17 106 21 
B.A.T. 374 2 433 nil 
Bowater 78 nil 90 nil 
British Leyland 71 nil 15 nil 
B.P. 1784 nil 2225 37 
Courtaulds 46 nil 54 nil 
Distillers 91 7 163 32 
Dun lop 74 nil 43 nil 
Esso 69 nil 43 nil 
Ford 122 nil 242 72 
G.E.C. 207 41 325 92 
Grand Metropolitan 57 nil 116 29 
G.K.N. 70 nil 87 nil 
I.C.I. 540 12 421 43 
Imperial Group 130 9 131 nil 
Harks & Spencer B4 29 IlB 40 
P. & O. 31 nil lB nil 
Reed International 37 nil 81 22 
Rio Tinto-Zinc 279 nil 284 nil 
iiffi' 117 5072 3BB 
Souroe: Kay and King, Z980, p. 1.94 
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TABLE 10.5 
Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation 
£ billion at 1975 prices 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
19.0 19.5 19.7 19.8 21.2 20.6 20.4 20.6 20.1 20.9 20.5 
Net Domestic Fixed Ca ita1 Formation 
(GDFCF less capital consumption £ billion at 1975 prices 
10.3 10.3 10.2 9.9 10.9 10.0 9.3 9.1 8.0 8.2 7.5 
Net Domestic Fixed ca~ital Formation - Manufacturing 
£ billion at 1975 prices 
1.9 2.1 1.7 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.1 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.2 
SoW'oe: CSO~ National Income and E:cpenditW'e, 1.980; Tables W. '/ and H.8 
TABLE 10.6 
C Tax Pa ents as a \ of Government Recei ts from Taxation 
Annual Average excluding ACT 
1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 
15.2 10.0 7.7 6.9 3.9 
as a \ of Government Recei ts from Taxation 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
7.6 8.5 7.4 6.8 6.2 5.7 3.5 2.7 3.8 4.5 5.0 
Estimate of additional Company Tax TOTAL 
payments at 1970-74 average of 6.9\ 1.3 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.3 7.5 .£b 
Source: CSO~ Economi.o TNnds,t AnnuaZ Supl!,zement, ZB8Z; pps. ZSZ and l66 
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TABLE 10.7 
Company Tax Pa>~ents as a % of Central Government Receipts from 
Income Tax (excluding ACT) 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
20.0 22.0 18.7 18.1 16.3 13.7 8.1 6.5 9.4 11.3 13.4 
Source: CSO~ Naticna1. Income and Ewpenditure, 1.980; Tab1.es 5.1. and 7.2 
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FOOTNO'lES TO -CHAPIER '!EN 
1. For a more complete account of the traditional and recent weak-
ness of the Labour left and the convoluted relationship between 
the Parliamentary Party, Conference, the Constituency Parties 
and the unions consult Minkin (1978), Hatfield (1978), Coates 
(1980) and Panitch (1979). 
2. See Chapter Nine. 
3. For a critique of the experience of incomes policy in the 1964-70 
Labour governments and an early statement of the "social contract" 
position, see the pamphlet by Wilson's close economic adviser, 
Thomas (now Lord) Balogh (1970). 
4. The Prime Minister personally took over the chairmanship of the 
Cabinet sub-committee on industrial affairs to thwart the 
influence of Benn and his friends over the drafting of the 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Whi te Paper. As he himself described the event: 
It was not until late July that the Department of 
Industry's draft White Paper emerged. As I had 
feared, it proved to be a sloppy and half-baked 
document, polemical, indeed menacing in tone, redo-
lent more of an NEC home policy committee than a 
Command Paper. One basic weakness was that it 
appeared to place mo~~ emphasis on the somewhat 
amorphous proposals for planning agreements than on 
the NEB. A special committee of senior ministers 
was set up under my chairmanship to mastermind the 
re-drafting, which ~ickly decided that the document 
should be re-written ••• The section on planning 
agreements was cut down to size. (Wilson, 1979, p. 33). 
See the interesting discussion in Hatfield (1978), ch. 11. 
See Coventry, Liverpool, Newcastle and North Tyneside Trades Councils 
(1980) for a somewhat lurid but nonetheless interesting account 
of the experience of the NEB from the point of view of trade union 
activists. 
See Industrial Strategy: Memorandum by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Industry; NEOO: January, 
1979, for a complete list of the commitments of the government 
on the basis of the industrial strategy. 
See Industrial Strate&y: Analysis of Sector Working Party Reports; 
NEOO: February, 1979. 
~., esp. ch. 6. 
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10. See Industry Act, 1972 as well as the annual reports mentioned 
in Table 10.1. 
11. See below, Section Ill. 
12. See Footnote 8. 
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CONCWSION 
Why is there so Little Corporatism in Britain? 
It is hardly an l.D'lderstatement to say that British society had 
reached a terrible impasse by the middle 1970s, a predicament for which 
there are no clear lines of resolution far the predictable future. A 
centrel theme of this dissertation has been the oscillation between 
forms of liberalism and corporatism/interventionism in 20th century 
British political economy. This degenerative spiral should not be 
confused with current 'middle way' allegations of the pernicious effects 
of 'adversary politics'. This is by no means a new idea, although in 
previous works it has been mainly' applied to the ideology of the 
Conservati ve Party (Harris, 1972), or in matters of industrial relations 
(Crouch, 1977 and Moran, 1977). My contention here has been that such 
a characterization can also be applied to relations between government 
and business (especially industry) and more generally to the formation 
and implementation of industrial and economic policy. In this sense 
the election of the Conservative government in 1979 can be seen as 
another twist to this vicious cycle, although the particular virulence 
with which this government has pursued its pro-market programme marks 
a qualitative br~ak with post-war policies. 
I have already noted the extent to which the Labour governments 
of 197~-79 made substantial concessions in the direction of a pl'OlNJlllD8 
of "finaneial control" and "fiscal responsibility", opening the door 
which Marga%'8t Thatcher wa1lced through. What in effect the latter did 
was to marry the same political and economic forces which structured 
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Labour's policies with an appeal to the tDaditional right of her own 
party, the small business lobby, and a populist anti-welfare, anti-
state and pro-law-and-order rhetoric. This new ideological and 
programmatic pie, a more ideologically-based monetarism, secured at 
least -emporarily both the politics of power and the politics of 
support (Gamble, 1974) in the sense of the adherence of the dominant 
economic forces (principally the City but also with less consistency 
the CBI) as well as an electoral base. Since the election, however, 
the political and economic conditions for any medium-term continuity 
of this approach have become less and less favourable. In part this 
is due to a host of new familiar reasons, the inability of the 
government to actually coatrol the maley supply in the context of 
modern financial conditions, or even to choose an index which makes 
some unambiguous reference to the former. In this regard the problems 
with the chosen target of the government (Ma) and its close relation-
ship with the pattern of public borrowing have in fact led to the re-
emergence of the PSBR as the cen'tral constraint, so the continuities 
with the previous Labour government an! stronger than would at first 
seem the case.1 Similarly, one could refer to the incapacity of this 
programme to come to realistic terms with the problems of the "mcnopoly 
power" of both the uniona and the corporate sector and its reliance 
on notials of "changed expectetions" which are at variance with a 
sociological appreciation of eCalomic behaviour and attitudes (Goldthorpe, 
1978 and 1981). Finally, adherence in terms of both the politics of 
pOW'er and support has slipped badly. as first the CBI and then even 
the City lost faith in the monetarist prescription. While it is hardly 
appropriate to melee predic'tions, the future tnCBt likely bedes political 
instability, as the electorate comes to terms with the cClOsequences 
of monetarism in the form of mass unemployment and urban disintegration. 
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Apart from these brief comments it is not my intention to analyse 
here the genesis or fate of Conservative policies. Rather I will return 
to some earlier themes and consider the implications of the argument 
and evidence unfolded above as regards the representation and influence 
of the major socio-economic interests. 
In the Introduction I noted the parallel lines of argument 
advanced by Hilferding and Shonfield in widely differing circumstances 
and junctures predicting in effect a stabilisation of a modern political 
economy on the basis of organized capitalism and quasi-corporatism. 
More recently, various authors have pointed to the decline of Keynesian 
politics, let alone the development of the latter towards a more 
corporatist/interventionist programme, in most advanced capitalist 
societies over the last decade (e.g., Goldthorpe. 1981, Shonfield, 1981, 
and Skidelsky, 1979). While it is possible to designate the general 
conditions in political-economic terms for both the demise of the 
Keynesian consensus and the ins tabi li ty of the corporatist :a1 ternati ve 
(ibid. and Sabel, 1981), my concern here is with the particular weakness 
and instability of the latter project as regards Britain and the specific 
features that might account for this. In the first place I have pointed 
to the structural and institutional aspects of both organized labour 
and industrial capital that have militated against the development of 
a more coocerted programme of intervention. Yet, efforts in the latter 
direction have emerged at a number of junctures. mainly but not exclusively 
tmder the aegis of a LabOll%' government. 'This rather weak impulse towards 
a "producers' alliance" has been blocked in broad terms by Labour's: 
adherence to a form of consensus politics or "democre.tic planning" that 
has operated within the bounds of What was acceptable to business interests 
and to a lesser extent organized labour. I will return to the particular 
features that precluded an "industrial consensus" on the part of the 
unions and industry in a moment. 'The second theme has been that this 
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rather weak impulse has been deflected by the political and economic 
pull of financial capital. Thus, patterns of financial dominance in 
the political system are crucial to an understanding of the limits to 
and constraints upon the corporatist programme. In the following 
sections I will focus on the relative positions of finance and industry 
after taking a brief look at that of the unions. In this my aim is 
to highlight an argument based on the political, economic, structural 
and institutional features depicted in previous chapters for the historic 
weakness and instability of corporatist/interventionist programmes in 
modern Britain. 
The 1lliens and the TUC 
The political and organisational strengths and weaknesses of 
British labour have been stated often enough in the past but it is 
appropriate to repeat the Min points here. In institutional terms 
the modem uniens began as an uneasy compromise between class and 
occupatienal interests (HObsbawm, 1969 and H. A. Turner, 1962), a 
feature which has remained .para1IlOtmt· to th~ present day. Thus, union 
structure in the modem period has been characterised by its If occupational 
striation" (Ulman, 1969) and weak and narrowly focused administration 
at the natienal level on the one hand and by the development of powerful 
but locally oriented shop-steward and workplace organisations at plant 
level. Similarly, the unions' industrial muscle in the post-war period 
of full employment has been based in the first instance on the Jsecond-
tier' of industrial relations and built round a twin strategy of job 
control at the point of p%'Oduction (Zeitlin, 1990) and wage militancy 
(Panitch, 1976). At the 8ame time it is most· easily mobilised around 
these issues and ~d .ost pOWe~fU1 in a defensive or what could at 
most be described as an incrementally aggressive poatlrre. 
Parallel coosideratioos apply to the issue of the influence of 
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the unions and the working class more generally in the political realm. 
Briefly stated the modes of influence include pre-eminently the following: 
the relationship with the Labour Party, direct access to government 
and the administration, industrial action and last but by no means least 
electoral controls. The relationship between the unions and the Party 
has obviously grown in significance in recent years, mainly, though 
not exclusively, through the influence of the left at Cooference. 
However, this vehicle of influence has proved much more effective at 
the programmatic level, the drawing up of Party platforms and manifestos, 
than in the actual formulation or implementation of policies. As regards 
'the latter it is modes of direct access that are most important, and 
here the TUC has hardly proved very effectiVe. 'I'be TUC can, be- crudely 
depicted as something less than the sum of its parts. The political 
voice is heard most clearly, and it is able to mobilise support most 
convincingly, when dealing with industrial relations issues narrowly 
defined or defending the eXisting practices of its members. Even in 
these areas its advice and strong protests have been ignored by 
Conservative governments both with regard to the 1972 Industrial 
Relations Act and the CUITent -employment legislation. When one moves 
outside this area to wider issues of economic and industrial policy, 
its positive influence even at its supposed height during the period 
of the Social Contract can only be described as minimal. It is only 
in a defensive sense around a narrowly circumscribed set of issues 
'that cme can speak meaningfully of trade union'power in terms of 
direct access to government. 
Looking at industrial and economic policy more directly specific 
insti tuticmal factors .hould~ -be added to the above considerations. 
Although for example TUC, annual economic reviews have increased in 
sophistication over the years since their initiation in 1968, the 
ineapaci ty of the peak organiaaticm, the lack of support staff and 
resources (which holds equally true for individual unions) have certainly 
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hampered the development of coherent and realisable alternative pOlicies. 
Similarly, the diverse occupational basis of most unions has restricted 
their effective representation on an industry basis as in the case of 
the Industrial Strategy (Metcalfe and McQuillan, 1979). At the same 
time these very weaknesses have prevented collusion at national level on 
an tmfavourable basis for all but the very short term. This rather 
negative aspect of tmion power can be seen in a paradoxically positive 
light in that it has in the past ruled out certain avenues of crisis 
resolution that would have implied deterioration of working class incomes 
and conditions of employment. 
Similar considerations apply to the use of industrial action. 
Again this particular weapon has had a largely defensive character, 
although that has not prevented a sort of incremental encroachment on 
managerial authority in conditions of prolonged full employment. In 
terms of the present discussion it can be viewed as largely responsive, 
especially to trends in real take-home incomes, and again as a 
decentralised, but for considerable periods effective, means of preventing 
scme kinds of "solutions" to tbe Bl'itish predicament. Having said that 
it is equally obvious that the r.turn of mass unemployment heavily 
qualifies both the latter IIDd the previous point. The inability of 
the unions to offer effective opposition to the ending of full-empl~nt 
is a telling indictment of previous practices and implicit or explicit 
strategies. Whatever happens in party political terms in the near future, 
it is quite clear that the leverage of industrial action will not regain 
its previous force for s~ time to come. Likewise the recourse to 
industrial action has entailed. si,gn.ificant costs in the past as symbo-
lised al ale level by the wmt.Z' of ·aiscontent. Equally important is 
the diffusion of a set of a'ttitudesaJDalgat , in particular, the union 
left which have not exactly encouraged it progressive movement in 
devising or implementing new sets of policies: that is, one can observe 
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an opposi tional tendency amongst left-wing union leaders which in effect 
mirrors rank-and-file sectionalist ecanomism, as in the current attach-
ment to "free collective bargaining". As a final point these costs 
have been equally clear in electoral terms, which have proved increas-
ingly \.Dlfavourable in recent years. It has yet to be seen whether a 
government can survive ten per cent unemployment, but it seems equally 
obvious that a new kind of package is needed if the unions and the Labcur 
movement generally will ever regain a secure base in the politics of 
support. 
Industrial Capital andtbe CBI 
The weakness of the CBI as a political representative association 
has been noted often enough in the past. This is the main substantive 
conclusion of the chief work an this organisation (Grant and Marsh, 1977) 
88 well as that an its predece8sOr~ the FBI (Blank~ 1973). My own con-
clusions are broadly similar -:t.~. th.!!~E:V~ authors,although with two 
important qualificatians: 1. in scme respects the lack of influence 
of the CBI has been exaggerated and 2. its institutional and organisa-
--
ticoal weakness should not be confused with the positional weakness 
of capital as a whole. In part _ I argued most explicitly in Chapter 
Eight, these representatianal featQres of industrial capital can be 
seen 88 predicated upan certain structural and relational Characteristics 
of British business, characteristics which have endured despite the 
important changes of the pcat-war ~rlod. Pre-eminently I have in mind 
here the federal structure of the industrial. company, which has preserved 
a decentralised and often family-baaed pattern of authority as the locus 
far all but the MiD finlU1ciat.~~i~ -and has in turn implied that 
the head office functions ~lY as • financial control. centre. 
Seccndly. the pattem of ecanomic relations between industrial companies 
and financial insd.tutiona haw been doadnated by the practices and 
priorities of the latter. This economic relationShip has re-inforced 
I 
\ 
') 
I 
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a short-term orientation towards profits, earnings, marketing etc., and 
likewise retarded, if not exactly prevented, the emergence of a longer-
term planning orientation, which would be more conducive to a different 
kind of industrial politics. 
In addition to these structural and relational features one should 
point to the organisational weakness of the CBr itself. Even more than 
the TUC the CBI represents the lowest common denominator of the interests 
of its members. In the same vein its ability to take an initiating or 
regulatory role has been severely limited, although this has been less 
'trUe in the last ten years or so, as indicated by the obvious exceptions 
of the voluntary price freeze under Heath and the concessions on taxa-
tion and price controls under Wilson and Cal.lagban. Like the TUC it has 
proved most effective in a defensive CJlpacity, lobbying on the 
common ground of improved profitability, lower taxes, interest rates 
and public expenditure, more ''responsible'' wage claims, etc. Yet, this 
has not prevented some quite eKtraordinary and hypocritical vacillations 
over quite a range of issues from industrial relations to monetary policy. 
In part this has been a feature of its aggregative function, its attempt 
to reconcUe the divergent interests and ideological positions of small 
versus large 'businesses, national as against multi-national capital etc. 
In other areas, it should be seen as, part of an effort to present a 
"united front" of capital even when the latter includes non-indus1:rial 
interest. Thus, the inconsistent stance on monetary policy and the 
un~llingness ~ pursue criticisms of financial institutions in recent 
years is a result &n some respects of the subordinate poSition of 
industry discussed above and in others of the fear of opening the door 
for more radical proposala &om the l.tt. In a more speculative vein 
one might relate the political inconsistency of industry to two 
potentially contrary "logics" inherent in its structural location. One, 
the "economic", pulls it in the direction of profit maximisation, cost 
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reduction, monetary stability and hence towaros a confrontational relation 
with organized labour. The other, "technical" impulse pushes it towards 
planning, market control, and co-operative arrangements with the unions 
inaGalbraithian search for monopolistic security. The relative importance 
of fixed capital costs and union power might indicate why industry appears 
to experience the opposing face of these two logics far more than finance. 
Having said this it should be noted that the CBI has had some notable 
successes in recent years, that it is not the only voice of industry, 
let alone capital as a whole, and that indirect forms of influence are 
as if not more important than the direct lobbying efforts of a peak 
association. To illustrate these points briefly I will. have to look 
more closely at the various modes of access and influence available to 
the industry in terms of the politics of power. 
The relationship between i~<ius:t~'y and the main political parties 
has been fairly thOI'Ougbly examined elsewhere (Grant and Marsh, 1977, 
pp. US-UB, and Grant, 1980a: aitri981Y:Brfefly~ . some of the main points 
of these discussions concern the uneasy relations with the Conservative 
Party owing to the position of small rosiness amongst the membership, 
the over-representation of City interests amongst MPs, the concentration 
of non-constituency financing in a few large companies and the fear on 
the part of the Tories of being too closely identified with big business. 
At the same time it is quite clear that industry and capital in general 
enjoy closer links with the Conservative than with the Labour Party and 
that contacts with the latter areJllOl'e likely to be ad hoc and informal. 
Yet, Labour governments have pl"Oved more receptive than their Conserva-
tive counterparts 1:0 the iriawsof industry generally and the CBI in 
particular, especially in the recent past. 
Turning 1:0 modes of direct access it is equally evident that 
industry has a privileged position vis-l-vis labour and other subordi-
nate groupB and classes. This is true whether one looks at representa-
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tion on advisory bodies and multi-or-tripartite agencies or the more 
important bi part i te and informal links with sponsoring departments, in 
this case primarily the Departments of Industry and Trade, as well as 
the Treasury (ibid. and Metcalfe and McQuillan, 1979). As an illustra-
tion of the significance of the informal, bipartite links it is useful 
to examine the description of the formation of industrial policy under 
the last Labour govf!X'nment given by A. M. Bailey, the Under-Secretary 
in charge of the Industrial Policy Group of the Treasury. This unit 
worked closely with the Department of Industry feeding the latter's 
views on industrial interests especially as regards particular industry 
groups, into Treasury discussions where they would be co-ordinated 
with financial implications as brought in by the Department of Industry, 
the Bank of England and other departments (Wilson Committee, Vol. 1, 
p. 84). Tbe rest of the exchange between Hr Bailey and Clive Jenkins 
of ASTMS deserves to be reproduced verbatim: 
Hr JeDkins - How do you get the companies' views? 
Hr Bailey - I talked about the indirect way of getting them -
through the Department of Industry divisions who are cons tantly 
in touch with companies. We go on visits when we can find the. 
time. We make contact informally in lots of ways. The Permanent 
Secretary of the Treasury has about monthly (sic.) meetings with 
indus t:l' ialist8 • 
Hr Jenkins - How is that organised? 
Hr BaUey - Tbat is again pretty informal. Eight or ten 
industrialists are invited to discuss with senior Treasury 
officials a particular theme, a broad theme, like exports or 
financial problems or whatever seans appropriate and topical. 
Also they have about a half-hour exchange of views on macro-
economic pt'OSpects. partiCularly as they affect the company 
sector. This is a fdrly loosely structured but from the 
Treasury point of view very useful opportunity to exchange 
views di1'ectly with businessmen. Again, the whole industrial 
strategy work is an important way of getting views systematically 
from particular sectors of industry, and of course from the 
trade union side as well as the management side. 
Hr Jenkins - How ma~ trade union officials go into the 
Treasury fOr these discussions? 
Hr BaUey - As of now I have to say none. 
Hr Jenlcins - I suspected that, I must say. 
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Hr Bailey - It would be nice if we could arrange something 
similar. 
Hr Jenkins - So there are no agendas for these meetings: it 
is just friends talking to friends, is it? 
HI' Bailey - Except, as I say, in a loosely structured way, 
having a theme for discussion, We do have the TUC in pretty 
regularly to the Industrial Strategy Staff Group discussions 
on the progress and organisation of the industrial strategy 
work (ibid., pp. 84-5). 
Among other things the above conversation illustrates that, while 
the CBI is the normal c01llllL1nications route for the general concerns of 
industry, informal, if not quite haphazard links with individual 
iDCluatrialista are another important mode of access. A similar point 
is brought out in considering one case study specifically mentioned by 
Grant and Marsh, namely the passage and implementation of the 1972 Industry 
Act. ntese authors note that the CBI was suspicious and surprised when 
the Bill was published in May, 1972. Subsequently, it ol>PO.sed unsuccess-
fully Clause 8, which allowed the government to extend aid to and take 
equity holdings in -private fIrms outside the development areas, managing 
to insert only minor amendments and perhaps having some influence over 
the restricted way in which the government made use of this particular 
piece of legislation (Grant and MaI'Sh, 1977, pp. 156-168). In the view 
of Grant and Marsh the paasage of the bill and the inclusion of a clause 
allowing state equity holdings !~ the fac~ of industrial opposition is 
best explained by reference to the political and economic context of 
the time, the collapee of Rolls Royee and UCS, the track record of 
government lending to these and other industries, the conCeI'n about 
unanployment and the expense of investment in new technologies. In these 
c1rcumstances the expressed wishes of the CBI were simply oVeI'I'idden; as 
they put it, "Tbe decisioDS were political ones." (ibid., p. 168),; 
'ftlis account is a pel'feC'tly oorrect and largely satisfactory 
explanation for the 1IIOtives behind the passage of the Bill. However, 
it is not too churlish to point out that, as it stands, it i.s ;in one 
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respect incompl.ete. As discussed at some length in Chapter Eight fairly 
extended hearings before the Trede and Intiustry Sub-Committee preceded 
the Industry Act in which testimony from some of the most influential 
industrialists of the day indicated considerable support for this sort 
of ad hoc intervention, including the infusion of public money in the 
fom of equity. Indeed, even the CBI evidence was considerably less 
hostile than might be supposed from the above account, and some of its 
representati ves expressed regret over the demise of the IRe, which had 
also been officially attacked by the organisation in earlier years. 
Moreover, the same hearings were the original testing ground for proposals, 
which emanated from the same group of industrialists, for the sort of 
institutidn which later took fom in the NEB. In the latter case the 
CBI also officially shifted round from initial hostility to acceptance 
of a modified and less interventionist model. A parallel path was 
followed by the Conservatives as they moved from opposition into 
goveMlIDent, as well as by Labour in the opposite diI'ection when the 
ini tial proposals from the left were toned down to assuage business 
fears. 
The point of this particular example is not that such channels 
of cOlllDUDication are behind each and every goveI'tlDent decision, nor that 
the latter are simply and solely responsive to the interests of industry 
or capital in general. Indeed, I have argued throughout this work that 
there is no necessary link between the needs of capital and government 
economic policies and that the latter are in the last analysis the result 
of political processes. However, this position should not be confused 
wi th the somewhat quallfied pluralism of Grant .and Marsh, especially 
when these authors c;:onclude t~t their evidence "seems to confirm the 
autOD01II1 of poll tic. and to indicate that govElE'll1Dent acts largely 
independently of business interests (p. 214)." To clarify the differ-
Gees I will conclude this section with a discussion of the characteristics 
of industry associations that distinguish them from trade unions and 
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then consider indirect but no less effective modes of access and influence. 
The initial point here is that the organisations of capital and 
labour are not equivalent in terms of either their influence or status. 
There exists a fundamental assymmetry in the relative positions of 
capital and labour in capitalist societies, anchored in juridical and 
''real'' relations at the point of production, which also finds expression 
in the explicit arena of power, namely the political system. While it is 
true that the social and political power of both capital and labour rests 
ultimately on their ability to apply the sanctions of economic obstruction, 
for labour this capacity depeDds crucially upon collective organisation. 
For business on the other hand the primary unit of organisation is the 
firm or company. As Offe has argued most persuasively, 
If a firm decides not to invest and/or not to employ workers, 
its decision is made autonomously on the level of the individual 
accumulating unit and iD· accordance--.-With calculations.- of indi v-
idual profitab~t:y. If workers decided to strike, they need 
some mechanism of agreptionand _ coordination; individual 
attempts '110 .. exercise· tI:lw' !!uegati ve"·- market. poweI'.--would be, 
in all but the most exceptional cases, negligible in effect 
and therefore counterproduCtive from the viewpoint of the 
individual actor (Offe, 1981, p. 147). 
Industrial tNde aDd peak associations are thus not essential for 
the exercise of the economic power of capital. in the same way that unions 
are for labour. In fact;as argued .arlierthey have been formed. histori-
cally in the British context for rather particul.ar reasons, typically 
to co-ordinate labour policy in response to unionisation or to act as 
a "conspiracy to defTaud the public" in the sense of restraining the 
free play of market forces. In the l.atter case association is only one 
avenue for achieving the desired result, namely reducing environmental 
uncertainty, the other and more faVoured route being combination. 
Trade associations do ;not aenerate power that does not already exist 
but rather function pr~ily to provide services to their members and 
articulate the common interests of the latter in the political realm 
(ibid., and Offe and Wiesenthal, 1981). In fact in the B~itish case 
( 
\ 
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the development of a political role has been dependent upon either the 
particular circumstances of state intervention in times of war or the 
deliberate encouragement of governments, as with the creation of the 
CBI under Labour in 1965. 
Thus, it is quite misleading to move from the recognition of the 
insti tutional weakness and laclc of political influence of the CBI (with 
which I am in broad if less than total agreement) to the assertion that 
government policies are "largely independent" of business interests. 
In the first place, as has been stated often enough in the past, 
governments of whatever party simply caunot ignore decisions about 
investment, manning, pay, prices., etc., which are made primarily at 
the level of the individual company, nor the effects of specific 
industrial and economic policies on those decisions. In an immediate 
sense the state exists in a relat-ion-of dependence on the private sector 
for its revenue. More generally governments are oo\.Uld to be evaluated, 
whether justly or not, on the performaDCe of a largely private economy 
as the latter affects the 1i velihood of the entire society. This 
. 
condition gives business a rather particular if somewhat diffuse sort 
of leverage, which is reflected in the very way that policy areas are 
perceived and presented. 1bus, the various policy problems that have 
exercised postwar governments. strikes, productivity, competi ti veness , 
efficiency, growth, etc., have been constructed within a fairly unmis-
takably managerial framework. This, howev8l", is not to say that up 
to recently some constraints within this ~work have not favoured 
subordinate interests, most notably the commi tInent to full employment. 
Yet, it is laraely the case that if govC'lJIIe1lts have not been terribly 
successful in pzomoting Bri tiah -- c.pi taUsm. it is not for want of trying. 
AB a final point one shoulctaDte. that th8l"e is a more specific 
sense in which the ultimate econoadc sanctions of industrial capital 
have operated as an important point of leverage on government policy. 
In "normal times" capital accumulation, while typically a central point 
of reference of and principle for explaining government economic policy, 
does not exercise an immediate and pressing influence on the latter. 
This at least is my interpretation of the kernel of truth in the state-
ment of Grant and Harsh that: 
The unions can withdraw the labour of their members, the 
City can induce a wave of selling in sterling, but the CBI 
can only criticise the government's policies or perhaps 
tell its members not to cooperate in their implementation 
(1977, p. 198). 
However, if as in 1974-75 a political and economic conjuncture leads 
to severe problems of liquidity, the collapse of investment and profi ta-
bility and the threat of widespread bankruptcy, the political influence 
of industry and the CBI is rather greatly enhanced. In an adIni ttedly 
fairly singular crisis of that sort, any government short of a revolu-
tionary regime (and even the ..latter) is virtually bound to make immedi-
ate and significant concessi~_t~ .. ~ci':l~try in order to revive business 
confidence and prevent economic breakdown, although perhaps one need 
not capitulate so canpletely as did Labour under those circumstances. 
This latter point applies with.greater force to situations of financial 
confidence, blt the particular position of the City deserves a separate 
and closely considered treatment. 
The City and the Bank of England 
Much of the argument in previous chapters has attempted to 
substantiate the proposition that financial capital occupies a uniquely 
important pesi tion in Britain. Tbis position has been rooted in the 
eooDOlDic relationship with indU8tl'ial and coumercial capital described 
earlier as one of financial dominance in the sense that it is structured 
by the PRctices and priorities of the -financial sector. This relation-
ship is likewise reflected in the politics of power at the political 
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level, which is not to say that there have not been implicit and explicit 
challenges from the side of industry. However, such moves have not 
carried a great deal of conviction and have at the least lacked finishing. 
Industrial capital and its political agencies have been far more ready 
to accept the political-economic framework set in place by financial 
interests and to chafe at some of the more pernicious effects than to 
mount anything like a frontal attack which might well expose their own 
defence to political onslaughts from a rather different direction. This 
reluctance is also tied up with the fact that the dominant, multi-
national elements of British industry have rather more in common with 
financial interests than what separates them, especially in comparison 
to labour. However, here I wish to stipulate more explicity the specific 
modes of access and influence that buttress financial dominance in the 
political sphere, following the direct and indirect distinction applied 
above to industry and labour. 
In terms of access to political parties it is quite obvious as 
noted earlier that the City has a rather close relationship with the 
Conservatives in terms of the number of MPs and Cabinet Ministers with 
financial backgro\Ulds. More important for the present discusSion 
financial interests have generally accorded with the neo-liberal wing 
of the Tory Party, as the latter's progranmatic stance has 'typically 
been articulated with the City's priorities: defending the value of 
money and the procedural norms of fiscal and financial probity. What 
is more remarkable, however, is the capacity of the financial sector 
to assert these priorities in the case of governments less obviously 
sympathetic in terms of their ideologies or professed programmes. In 
these instances other modes of access and. influence have been more 
important. 
In direct terms the relationship between the Ci'ty and the Bank 
of England and through it the Treasury is perhaps best described as 
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one of super-privileged access. The membership of the Court of 
Directors of the Bank is probably the best single index of the inner 
circle of the City establishment, although it should be said that the 
Court is not involved in the Bank's detailed policy formation. The 
Bank in turn is in constant contact with the Treasury and has a voice 
on all important economic policy decisions, especially as regards 
their financial effects. As pointed out by the then Permanent 
Secretary to the Treasury over a decade ago, Sir Douglas Allen, 
"Somebody from the Bank of England is on nearly every economic c01!lTlittee. 
Therefore, there is a view of the Bank of England expressed there 
(Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, 1970, p. 5)." While 
the Treasury is of course the higher authority, its relationship with 
the Bank, as described by the same civil servant, is less one of 
"control" than "cooperation" in the operation and working out of policy 
(ibid., p. 5). Moreover, as remarked by Lord Balogh to the same 
collll1i ttee, it is a rather one-sided cooperation in that, "There is not 
the same outward-going situation of Treasury people (let alone cabinet 
Ministers) intimately participating in the workings of the Bank; 
nor is it easy for outsiders ••• to know how the Bank opinion is, so 
to speak, shaped (!bid., p. 193)." 
At the same time there are few reasons to quarrel with the views 
expressed to the same Committee by the then Governor, Sir Leslie O'Brien: 
••• having been in the City all these years, I think it is 
fair to claim that the Bank has an understanding of the 
legitimate interests and needs of City institutions. The 
knowledge that they have this understanding gives City 
institutions in general confidence in the Bank so that they 
know they can go to the Bank with their complaints and 
troubles and get a fair and understanding hearing. However, 
that does not mean ••• that the Bank stand ready to push 
vis-a-vis GoVeI'nment in Whitehall City interests without 
regard to whether the Bank think it is sensible or not ••• 
I am not, then, the representative of the City, but I do 
represent City interests where I think it is right and proper 
to do so (ibid., p. 273). 
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One should note that witnesses from the clearing banks and accepting 
houses professed satisfaction with this representational role and that, 
as expressed in a memorandum from the Finance Houses Association: 
There are clearly advantages in having the Bank act as 
spokesman for the City and for individual financial inter-
ests since it carries the authority of ind~pendence and of 
a unique breadth of knowledge and experience of the whole 
financial sector (ibid., p.x1v). 
Yet, this is only half of the picture, as the Bank must also act 
as the arm of the Government, the agency for implementing monetary 
policy,and likewise exercises a supervisory role as regards financial 
markets and institutions. In this sense the Bank is more correctly 
seen as a mediating institution, rather than a simple representative 
of financial interests. It occupies a dual role to cite Lord O'Brien 
once again, as the" 'bankers' best friend' and arm of authority (ibid., 
p.295)." Indeed, the BanK is probably the one British institution that 
quite closely fits the corporatist mould, although one .might say 
paradoxically that its corporatist relationship with the City has pre-
cluded the extension of a simUar system to other sectors. However, 
although its supervisory function has not been a topic .of consideration 
in this dissertation, its typical manifestation has been informal rather 
than statutory, characterised by "sponsored self-regulation" rather 
than legal statute. The ambivalence of this position has resulted in 
some strains in the relations between the Bank and the City in recent 
years, most notably when the system of sponsored self-regulation came 
under severe stress during the secondary banking crisis. As discussed 
in the previous chapter this crisis along with the resulting criticism 
and specific problems related to entry into the EEC saw the generation 
of new agencies and the revival of older associations for the direct 
representation of specific financial interests. Yet, it should not 
be forgotten that many if not quite all of these were sponsored and/or 
initiated by the Bank of England. If a number of pressures have led 
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to the increase in the statutory powers of the Bank in recent years 
and consequently drawn out the conflicts inherent in the representation/ 
self-regulation relationship, those strains have been contained up to 
the present within an informal framework that has been only slightly 
modified. On this point one should note the perhaps too highly favourable 
assessment of the relationship given more recently by the Accepting 
Houses Committee and the Committee of London Clearing Bankers 
(Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, 1976, esp. pp. 51 and 69). 
At the same time. if the trends towards a more statutory form of 
supervision are continued much further, then this could well engender 
a corresponding pattern of direct interest representation (Koran, 1981, 
and Sargent, 1981). 
Looking at the role of the Bank as the agent of the government 
on matters of monetary policy, several features stand out. First, 
parallel to the informal system of regulation is the rel;iance on ''moral 
"., -'- .. -- . . 
suasion" as an instrument of qualitative control. The Bank has never 
issued a directive under the powers of the nationalisation Act of 1946 
but has relied instead on the obedience of financial institutions to 
its qualitative requests. Secondly, while the Governor makes a 
distinction between his secondary role as "discriminating advocate" 
of City interests and his primary duty of putting forward "what is in 
the Bank's view in the national interest and not as the champion of 
sectional opinion (SCNI, 1970, pp. 274 and 295)", it is equally true 
that the Bank has maintained a fairly consistent set of priorities at 
the heart of this perception of the national interest. To cite Lord 
Balogh once again, 
• •• the lopsidedness of the opinions of the Bank. so far 
as one can make out from published material, is such that 
if they prevailed the industrial interests of this country, 
which after all are the all-important interests of the 
country as against the financial and banking interests ••• 
would - at any rate as the dice have fallen - turn out to 
be neglected (ibid., p. 193). 
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Finally, the Bank's operations in financial markets have not only been 
structured by a financier's weltanshauung; they have been largely responsive 
to the activities and practices of those markets and institutions. 
Indeed, in recent years it has been deliberate policy to augment the 
influence of market forces as is evidenced in the adoption of Competition 
and Credit Control, the floating exchange rate, the shift from Bank 
rate to MLR and finally the pursuit of monetary targets. These develop-
ments in monetary policy can be seen partly as an adaptation to changes 
in financial institutions and practices and the international movement 
of financial capital and partly as yet another search for the Holy Grail 
of the City, an instrument for the self-regulation of markets outside 
political control. If none of these experiments have proved very 
successful, their combined effect as indicated in previous chapters 
has been to increase the leverage that financial markets and institu-
tions exercise a&Binst government policy. 
This brings me to the final and most important mode of influence, 
which is precisely the activities and practices of financial markets 
and institutions. The latter have been a determining force not merely 
in the conduct of monetary policy noted above, but in the broader areas 
of fiscal and budgetary policy and the overall economic programmes 
that different governments have adopted. In this sense it is less 
accurate to speak of a political business cycle in Britain than a 
financial political cycle. Although the market in government debt has 
been a significant force at particular junctures, the foreign exchange 
markets have proved the most important in this respect. Indeed, the 
major deflationary packages of the post-war period have corresponded 
virtually on a one-to-one basis with successive sterling crises. The 
latter in turn have been occasioned by mpid movements of short-tenn 
capital out of sterling rather than the usually cited position in the 
current balance of payments. The one significant exception that rather 
proves this rule is the restrictive measures enacted by the present 
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government upon its election in 1979. Now it is partly misleading to 
view these short-term capital flows in terms of the City as a political 
actor. In the first place London is the chief but not the only foreign 
exchange market where sterling is traded. Secondly, it is not only 
financial institutions but all large multinational corporations and 
even wealthy individualS who deal as economic agents on the exchanges. 
For these reasons it makes more sense to speak of the leverage accorded 
to financial practices and processes rather than to personify the latter 
as political actors. Similarly, such agents are not primarily motivated 
in their dealings by political considerations. Not to put too fine 
a point on it, they are in it for the money. Yet, at the same time, 
there is typically an assessment of a government's performance, programme 
and prosp~~ts inherent in the decision to buy and sell a particular 
asset, whether government bonds or pounds. This is indicated by the 
usual explanation for an exchange crisis, a collapse in "financial con-
fidence" • There i8 also typically a yiew as to what must be done to 
"put the economy right." 'Ibis assessment t whether such policies are 
financially ,"sound" or "pI'Udent" need not be communicated through organised 
groups in the direct sense implied by the pluralist (or corporatist) 
perspective. 'Ibe mere activity of the markets necessitates a response, 
al though it is often backed up by more overt communications to ensure 
that the government has got the point. 'Ibe immediacy of a sterling 
crisis greatly enhances the influence of the Bank of England. Although 
governments can and sometimes have ignored the advice of the Governor 
in these circumstances, to do so can have serious negative repercussions 
on financial confidence, especially if the Bank's disapproval is made 
public. This advice is taJcen very seriously t as governments ignore 
it at their perU, which is perhaps what Sir Harold Wilson meant when 
he referred to the impact of the Governor's scowl (Wilson Committee, 
Vol. 4, p. 137). 
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To conclude this chapter briefly, I have maintained throughout 
this work that it is primarily these twin features of super-privileged 
access through the Bank of England and informal influence by way of 
financial markets that have constituted the main instruments of 
financial leverage and offer the principle explanation for the 
political dominance of financial capital in Britain and have consequently 
acted as a major constraint on the corporatist alternative. These forms 
of political dominance are evidently bound up with but not reducible 
to the particular pattern of capitalist development in Britain which 
has resulted in a related dominant position of the financial sector 
in the economy as a whole. If the modes of indirect influence via 
financial processes and practices do not fit in very well with an 
analytic framework built round the concept of political actors, this 
indicates the deficiencies of the latter rather more than the 
insignificance of the former. 
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FOOTNOTES TO OONCllJSION 
lSee various memoranda and evidence to and Reports of the Treasury 
and Civil Service Committee (February, April and July 1980). 
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